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Preface 
 
 
The importance of this innovative volume lies in the way it links traditional 
studies of resistance to the more recent literature on conflict and violence in 
Africa. In this way it fills an analytical void by allowing a reinterpretation of the 
old resistance literature and by developing a new tradition of conflict studies. In 
this way, Rethinking Resistance reinforces the field of conflict studies and lifts 
this interesting and relevant area of research to a higher analytical plane.  
A further richness of this collection is its diversity. Firstly, this diversity is 
geographical: the articles cover areas of Sub-Saharan Africa from the Sahel to 
South Africa and from the Fuuta Jallon mountains in Guinea to Somalia, not 
forgetting of course Madagascar. Diversity in time is also to be found: various 
pre-colonial revolts are treated as extensively as revolts that took place around 
the time of colonization, as are the anti-colonial insurgencies towards the end of 
this period of domination and the civil wars following independence. And 
finally there is the diversity of subjects: most of the chapters are devoted to 
historical accounts of the phenomenon of resistance and their significance, 
although at the end of the volume there are equally discussions concerning the 
memory of revolt and its use towards ends which often only preserve an indirect 
link with historical reality. 
A further interesting aspect of this book is that it focuses more, if not almost 
exclusively, on revolts, wars and periods of violence about which little or 
nothing is known than on the well-documented phenomena of resistance. This 
represents an important contribution to theoretical and comparative research. 
Let me cite two examples to illustrate this point. The first concerns the analysis 
of the Sawaba insurrection in Niger by Klaas van Walraven. This is the first 
time that such an account has been presented in the historiography of 
contemporary Africa, which is important as it will allow a subsequent 
comparison between the Sawaba revolt and that of the Frolinat in Chad. These 
two insurrections occurred virtually contemporaneously and in neighbouring 
Sahelian countries. However, the Sawaba revolt was destined to failure while 
the Frolinat-supported uprising evolved into a full-blown civil war that was only 
ended by the coming to power of a party of former guerrillas. How can two such 
similar events but with such different outcomes be explained? What were the 
factors that contributed to these contrasting results? From Van Walraven’s 
research it might be possible to offer some first interpretations and answers to 
these questions. A second example is Ineke van Kessel’s chapter on the Black 
Dutchmen in the Netherlands East Indies. As the author herself indicates, this 
example of a mutiny by Africans engaged in a colonial army is atypical but 
deserves to be compared with similar incidents that occurred in the King’s 
African Rifles and to Senegalese infantrymen. 
 
 ix
 x
 
 
 
 
Rethinking Resistance covers a wide range of issues and constitutes an 
important step towards a better understanding of the phenomenon of revolt and 
violence in Africa, as argued by the authors in the introductory chapter. 
 
Robert Buijtenhuijs 
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Rethinking resistance in African history:  
An introduction 
 
Klaas van Walraven and Jon Abbink 
 
 
Some conceptual and definitional issues 
 
Throughout Africa's history, distant as well as recent, Africans have resisted 
forces of domination. The theme of Africans rejecting or fighting the rule of 
others, African or non-African, and their struggle against forms of domination, 
injustice or exploitation has been a closely studied subject ever since the 
inception of modern African studies in the early 1960s. The interest in this 
central theme emerged in the heyday of anti-colonial struggle that was itself 
generally articulated through modern nationalist discourse. Spurred on by what 
appeared as the unstoppable tidal wave of decolonization after the Second 
World War, which reinforced the already widespread feeling that colonialism 
was a grossly unjust dispensation, many scholars felt the need to investigate 
whether and to what extent Africans had, all along, resisted the forces of 
colonial or white settler rule. 
Thus, in 1958 the study by Shepperson and Price appeared, appropriately 
entitled Independent African, about John Chilembwe and the rebellion in 
Nyasaland (Malawi) during the First World War.1 This set the stage for 
representations of African reactions to colonialism as falling between resistance 
and collaboration – notions that were redolent of Europe during the Second 
World War.2 It also preceded the theme, pioneered by Terence Ranger, of the 
modern nationalist struggles of the 1950s and 1960s somehow being connected 
with earlier forms of violent resistance to the imposition or maintenance of 
colonial rule. Besides collaboration, European settlement and occupation were 
                                                 
1 G. Shepperson & T. Price, Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, 
Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915 (Edinburgh, 1958). 
2 S. Ellis,  ‘A New Look at Resistance; With Special Reference to Madagascar’; paper 
for the conference Revolt and Resistance in African History, African Studies Centre, 
Leiden, 11-12 October 2001. 
 
2 Van Walraven & Abbink 
seen as having triggered, first, early forms of violent struggle (so-called 
‘primary’ resistance) and, now, modern nationalist battles for independence 
(‘secondary’ resistance).3 The concept of resistance thus became the historical 
dimension of African nationalism.4 
Inevitably, in later years, questions started to be raised about this 
representation of Africa's twentieth-century history. By the late 1960s historians 
had accepted that the construction of this history around the two antipoles 
‘resistance’ – ‘collaboration’ grossly simplified its actual complexities. 
Resistance and collaboration were now seen as rational, alternative strategies to5  
Africans trying to defend their interests in the face of the imposition of 
colonialism and capitalism6 – comparable in some ways, perhaps, to analyses of 
European reactions to Nazi occupation in terms of varying degrees of 
accommodation rather than through the moral prism of collaboration and 
resistance. More fundamentally, and much later, it was opined by Glassman that 
the historical resistance literature was marred by a teleology that constructed all 
African protest as leading inexorably to modern nationalism and 
decolonization.7 
Nevertheless, the early resistance literature as such could be said to have 
been a source of inspiration to some of the liberation struggles taking place in 
the 1960s or 1970s, and in that respect to have established a connection between 
early and later forms of resistance. This was certainly the case, at the level of 
elites, in the struggle for Zimbabwe, the early history of which had known a 
revolt against white occupation (1896-1897).8 Another example of this is 
provided by the work of Bley and Drechsler,9 which considerably influenced, at 
the level of nationalist propaganda, the struggle for independence in Namibia 
(see Chapter 11 in this volume). 
                                                 
3 T.O. Ranger, ‘Connexions between “Primary Resistance Movements” and Modern 
Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa’, Journal of African History, 9 (1968), 
437-53 and 631-41. 
4 L. Vail & L. White, ‘Forms of Resistance: Song and Perceptions of Power in Colonial 
Mozambique’, in D. Crummey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa 
(London & Portsmouth, NH, 1986), 193. 
5 J. Suret-Canale, ‘“Résistance” et “Collaboration” en Afrique Noire Coloniale’, Etudes 
Africaines Offertes à Henri Brunschwig (Paris, 1982), 319-31. 
6 See on this Vail & White, ‘Forms of Resistance’, 194 and 221. 
7 J. Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the 
Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH & London, 1995), 12. 
8 T.O. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-1897 (London, 1967). 
9 H. Bley, South West Africa under German Rule, 1894-1914 (London, 1971) and H. 
Drechsler, ‘Let us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against German 
Imperialism (1884-1915) (London, 1980). 
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Yet it is doubtful whether this connection represented more than, in the 
words of Ranger himself, the ‘continuity of resistance emotion’.10 Thus, in the 
midst of the ‘second chimurenga’ (‘fighting in which everyone joins’)11 or 
struggle for independence, Ranger emphasized that this struggle in no sense 
represented a ‘return to the values of the society engaged in the 1896 risings’ 
and, more debatably, that the current struggle could not be informed by 
continuing Shona or Ndebele cultural forms.12 He also criticized the other key, 
and politically committed, figure of the early resistance literature, Allen 
Isaacman, for replacing his own continuist thesis with a sort of ‘instant 
continuity’ that established a direct link between, in Isaacman's case, Frelimo’s 
struggle against the Portuguese in the 1960s and peasant militancy in 
Mozambique in the 1910s.13 Clearly, this sort of argument, which (implicitly) 
attributed proto-nationalist sentiments to early instances of resistance to colonial 
rule, carried the risk of anachronism.14 Ranger therefore wondered whether the 
debate about continuity or discontinuity of manifestations of resistance should 
not be transcended by a periodization of African history involving a series of 
qualitative transformations.15 
In defence of the initial resistance literature, it should be pointed out that it 
was in part a response to Eurocentric studies that preceded it and characterized 
resistance to colonial conquest as reactionary struggles against the facts.16 The 
critics of these Eurocentric views saw resistance to be a forward-looking 
defence of African tradition against alien occupation, in the process assuming 
that the African societies involved were united in this common purpose.17 This 
assumption also underlay many analyses of Africa's later struggles for 
independence, which were invariably labelled nationalist and sometimes even as 
Marxist, transformations, thereby attributing a unity of ideas and organization to 
                                                 
10 T.O. Ranger, ‘Resistance in Africa: From Nationalist Revolt to Agrarian Protest’, in 
G.Y. Okihiro (ed.), In Resistance: Studies in African, Caribbean, and Afro-American 
History (Amherst, 1986), 49; emphasis added. 
11 Standard Shona Dictionary, rev. ed. (Harare & Bulawayo, 1987). 
12 T. Ranger, ‘The People in African Resistance: A Review’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 4 (1977), 1, 130. 
13 A.F. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique (London, 1976). See also 
A. Isaacman et al., ‘“Cotton is the Mother of Poverty”: Peasant Resistance to Forced 
Cotton Production in Mozambique, 1938-1961’, International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, 13 (1980), 614. 
14 Ellis, ‘A New Look at Resistance’, 3-4. 
15 Ranger, ‘The People in African Resistance’, 145-46. 
16 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 9-10, on R. Robinson & J. Gallagher, ‘The Partition of 
Africa’, in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), The New Cambridge Modern History, vol. 11 
(Cambridge, 1962). 
17 See for a critique, Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 10. 
4 Van Walraven & Abbink 
them that in retrospect they seldom had. According to Norma Kriger, these 
labels at best betrayed some of the aspirations of the leading elites involved,18 
although the chapter by Klaas van Walraven in this book on Sawaba's revolt in 
Niger shows that the relation between revolutionary ideology and elite 
aspirations may have been more complex. 
A fundamental point of criticism of the early resistance literature was that 
the focus on resistance to white people or colonialism implied concentrating 
more on mere reactions of Africans than their true agency in historical 
development.19 Moreover, historians of modern African nationalism stressed the 
role played by elites, just as writers on imperial history had done.20 Hence, 
Allen and Barbara Isaacman in 1977 critiqued resistance studies as having been 
‘extremely elitist, a bias contemporary African historians share[d] with their 
Eurocentric predecessors’.21 During the 1970s, therefore, scholars began to add 
a nuance to this elitist perspective by focusing increasingly on the issue of class 
structure, arguing that it was the specific configuration of class interests that 
determined whether Africans resisted or collaborated with colonial or white 
settler rule.22 Marxist paradigms inspired a shift away from the search for the 
roots of nationalism to a search for the roots of underdevelopment, especially 
because by then so many African countries were stricken by growing economic 
malaise and political instability.23 It was argued that the earlier focus on 
resistance and nationalism obscured the extent to which Africans had been 
unable to strike at what were held to be the real structures of oppression, i.e. not 
colonial administrations but metropolitan capital (on which more below). 
Studies on so-called ‘modes of production’ began the redefinition of proto-
nationalist resisters in Africa's colonial history into peasants fighting 
international capitalism.24 
One of the consequences, however, was that the concept of resistance began 
to widen steadily. Isaacman et al., for example, portrayed the withholding of 
labour for cotton production by Mozambican peasants as an act of resistance.25 
                                                 
18 N.J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge, 1992), 11. 
19 Ranger, ‘Resistance in Africa’, 34. 
20 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 11. 
21 A. Isaacman & B. Isaacman, ‘Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central 
Africa, c. 1850-1920’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 10 (1977), 1, 
39. 
22 Ibid. 41. 
23 Vail & White, ‘Forms of Resistance’, 194. 
24 Ranger, ‘Resistance in Africa’, 34-36 and Ranger, ‘The People in African 
Resistance’, 142. 
25 Isaacman et al., ‘“Cotton is the Mother of Poverty”’, passim, and Isaacman & 
Isaacman, ‘Resistance and Collaboration’, 47 ff. 
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Crummey argued, more generally, that resistance could also be mute, with 
stealth being one of its principal characteristics.26 Scott later took up the theme 
in a series of pioneering and highly influential sociological studies drawing 
attention to the social basis of ‘everyday resistance’ of the downtrodden and the 
powerless.27 In a later study Achille Mbembe showed that even the world of 
dreams could be interpreted as relevant to resistance – in this case against the 
French in Cameroon during the 1950s.28 By then others had already objected 
that the widening of the resistance phenomenon overextended the concept29 to 
the point of including ‘everything from footdragging and dissimulation to social 
banditry, arson, poaching, theft, avoidance of conscription, desertion, migration, 
and riot’ – in short, ‘any activity that helps to frustrate the operations of 
capitalism’; this frankly constituted an act of violence done to language, with 
‘resistance’ and ‘collaboration’ blurring analysis of, instead of enhancing 
insight into, human behaviour.30 While it is true that, say, tax evaders and 
smugglers resisted colonial governments in some sense, interpreting their 
activities as an attack on the underlying political order greatly expanded the 
notion of political action – in line with Marxist reasoning.31 Often, this kind of 
approach also engendered evidential problems, which were ‘resolved’, to some 
extent, by reading political intent into actual conduct (see also below). 
A positive aspect of the extension of the resistance concept was precisely 
that it took analysis beyond the political dimensions of struggle on which 
relevant studies had concentrated before. Moreover, early resistance studies 
focused too narrowly on revolts during the colonial era, thereby overlooking 
acts of resistance against the rulers of pre-colonial polities and seeing revolt in 
the post-independence era as a mere colonial hangover. The combined effect 
                                                 
26 D. Crummey, ‘Introduction: The Great Beast’, in Crummey, Banditry, Rebellion and 
Social Protest, 10. 
27 J.C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven 
& London, 1985) and idem, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts 
(New Haven & London, 1990). The reality of silent sabotage and cheating (by peasant 
serfs) is delightfully presented in the great nineteenth-century novels on feudal Russia 
by, for example, Turgenev and Gogol. Remarkably similar in tone is the epoch-making 
novel on pre-revolutionary Ethiopia by Haddis Alemayehu, Love until the Grave (Addis 
Ababa, 1973). 
28 A. Mbembe, ‘Domaines de la Nuit et Autorité Onirique dans les Maquis du Sud-
Cameroun (1955-1958)’, Journal of African History, 31 (1991), 89-121. 
29 P. Geschiere, ‘Le Politique “Par le Bas”. : Les Vicissitudes d’une Approche’, in P. 
Konings, W. van Binsbergen & G. Hesseling (eds), Trajectoires de Libération en 
Afrique Contemporaine: Hommage à Robert Buijtenhuijs (Paris & Leiden, 2000), 97. 
30 Vail & White, ‘Forms of Resistance’, 195. 
31 Ellis, ‘A New Look at Resistance’, 3. 
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was to exaggerate the importance of the colonial period.32 One concept that it 
was hoped during the 1970s and 1980s could help in ‘de-politicizing’ resistance 
studies and focusing more on the initiatives of the dominated was that of ‘social 
banditry’ as popularized by Eric Hobsbawm in European historiography. 
Inspired by the legend of Robin Hood, the concept of the social bandit arises in 
the dialectic of social demand and interdependence, leading the bandit to 
protect, redistribute, avenge and sometimes even lead wholesale rebellions 
against the political order.33 Such revolt is mostly seen as defensive, inspired by 
a specific vision of the social universe as held by the lower orders of society, for 
example peasants,34 that attempted to protect this vision – called the ‘moral 
economy of subsistence’ – against the hegemonic ideology of the ruling 
classes.35  
Studies that applied the social banditry concept to African cases of resistance 
remained, perhaps, relatively few. Isaacman et al. presented robberies from 
cotton warehouses by discontented Mozambican peasants as ‘a legitimate 
expression of peasant protest’ that was ‘clearly different from the predatory 
actions of criminals who preyed indiscriminately on all sections of society’,36 in 
other words, fulfilling those key conditions distinguishing the social bandit from 
the common criminal, i.e. the desire to destroy oppressive institutions perceived 
to threaten the traditional order and the intention to redistribute the loot of 
operations to ‘the people’. To Isaacman, the social bandit could help us 
understand early rural resistance to colonialism and capitalism, arguing that this 
form of banditry was an important form of resistance in early twentieth-century 
Africa with rural alienation and a perception of colonial governments as 
illegitimate interlopers and the availability of sufficient geographical space as 
critical factors in the growth of this social and political activity.37 
Hence, studies appeared that focused on social banditry besides the 
resistance concept as such. An early example is the study by Edmond Keller 
that constructed the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya in the 1950s as a form of social 
banditry,38 and the volume edited by Crummey.39 This volume provided, among 
                                                 
32 Crummey, ‘Introduction’. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See E. Wolf’s influential book Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), 106-9, and his 
Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969). 
35 Glassman, Feasts and Riot, 13. 
36 Isaacman et al., ‘“Cotton is the Mother of Poverty”’, 604. 
37 A. Isaacman, ‘Social Banditry in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Mozambique, 1894-
1907: An Expression of Early Peasant Protest’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 1 
(1977), 29-30. 
38 E.J. Keller, ‘A Twentieth Century Model: The Mau Mau Transformation from Social 
Banditry to Social Rebellion’, Kenya Historical Review, 3 (1973), 2, 189-205. 
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others, analyses of the shifta tradition in Ethiopia – a remarkable example of 
social banditry but always with a political overtone. The (Amharic) word refers 
to people who had a political reason to remove themselves from the authority or 
law of power holders and ‘went into the woods’ where they engaged in political 
resistance as well as banditry to sustain themselves. Interestingly, the chapter by 
Aregawi Berhe in our volume shows how the shifta tradition helped to inform 
and structure a more modern form of resistance to colonial rule, that of the 
‘Patriot’ movement fighting the Fascist Italian conquest and occupation from 
1935 to 1941. However, other studies questioned the applicability of the social 
banditry concept to African history. Maughan Brown40 disputed the 
appropriateness of the concept to Mau Mau in Kenya, as did Colin Darch for 
Renamo in Mozambique,41 whilst even Isaacman himself showed that the 
‘social’ bandits he studied did prey on some of the peasants or migrants in 
Mozambique – in contravention of Hobsbawm's model suggesting that they 
refrain from predatory behaviour against the people of ‘their own’ territory. By 
arguing that these early Mozambican bandits never attacked their natal 
communities or rural people that explicitly supported them, Isaacman could 
uphold their ‘social’ status. Nevertheless, one could argue that the fact that these 
bandits lacked Hobsbawm's class consciousness and did not perceive 
themselves as the defender of all peasants – differentiating as they did between 
rural people on the grounds of social proximity and political support42 – 
engenders evidential difficulties and reduces the practical applicability of the 
social banditry concept, in this as well as most other cases. 
More fundamentally, Austin observed in the volume edited by Crummey that 
the distinction between social bandits and common criminals requires one 
common political system that claims hegemony over both rich and poor. 
Conceptually, social banditry in Western history constituted a challenge to 
existing forms of control over territory and property but not of the validity of 
these concepts as such. This, however, is the root problem in the applicability of 
social banditry in African historical contexts. First, the relatively open frontiers 
of pre-colonial polities encouraged deviants not to challenge the common 
central authority but, rather, segment and constitute their own political system 
with their own underlying values. Second, before and since the imposition of 
colonial rule, the forces of the modern state and market began, to varying 
degrees, to pervade African societies, thus allowing for the coexistence of 
                                                                                                                       
39 See note 4 above. Based on conference papers of earlier in the decade. 
40 D.A. Maughan Brown, ‘Social Banditry: Hobsbawm’s Model and “Mau Mau”’, 
African Studies, 39 (1980), 1, 77-97. 
41 C. Darch, ‘Are There Warlords in Provincial Mozambique?: Questions of the Social 
Base of MNR Banditry’, Review of African Political Economy (1989), 45/46, 34-49. 
42 Isaacman, ‘Social Banditry’, 25. 
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competitive socio-political values. The interpenetration of two formerly distinct 
societies (in our case the European colonial and the African ones) therefore 
produced ‘primary’ forms of resistance with no repertoire of common values 
shared between the opposing sides. The Robin Hood narrative is therefore 
largely lacking in African mythology, with the vocabulary of deviance more 
often developed in the language of magic and witchcraft.43 
The same fundamental objection could therefore, at least in certain cases of 
African resistance, be levelled against the use of the concept of protest. This 
notion differs from the concept of resistance in that protest entails a higher 
degree of vocalization. While resistance may be mute or take place through 
stealth, protest assumes a more explicit form of articulation of grievances, 
marked among others by such (modern) cultural forms as strikes, campaigns of 
defiance, riots and disorder.44 According to Crummey, however, as in the case 
of social banditry, such protest presumes some common social and political 
order that links the protesters to those they appeal to for redress.45 
In this volume, therefore, we continue to use the concept of resistance, 
employing it in a broad sense to signify intentions and concrete actions taken to 
oppose others and refuse to accept their ideas, actions or positions for a variety 
of reasons, the most common being the perception of the position, claims or 
actions taken by others as unjust, illegitimate or intolerable attempts at 
domination. The concrete acts of resistance involved may or may not be acts of 
physical violence and extend also to other spheres of human behaviour. 
Resistance, however, must be defined not so much by various forms of concrete 
acts, as by the intent of those performing these acts, aimed usually at the 
defence of pre-existing and cherished socio-political arrangements, upholding 
other civilizational ideals, or just defending existing power structures, elite or 
otherwise. This also helps to distinguish (violent) resistance from the concept of 
violence as such, which is employed in a more instrumental or technical way 
here, though not without attributing meaning to it (see below). Finally, as shown 
in the literature, large-scale manifestations of collective resistance have been 
described with the aid of different notions, such as revolution, revolt, 
insurrection, insurgence or insurgency, and rebellion. In this volume, the 
concept of revolution is eschewed,46 since it usually signifies very radical, 
                                                 
43 R.A. Austin, ‘Social Bandits and Other Heroic Criminals: Western Models of 
Resistance and Their Relevance for Africa’, in Crummey, Banditry, Rebellion and 
Social Protest, 89-94. 
44 See, for example, R.I. Rotberg & A.A. Mazrui (eds), Protest and Power in Black 
Africa (New York, 1970). 
45 Crummey, ‘Introduction’. 
46 The adjective ‘revolutionary’ will be used, however, when referring to the rhetorical 
or ideological dimensions of revolutionary transformations. 
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fundamental transformations of societies and political systems quite exceptional 
in African history. The other terms will be used more or less synonymously, 
although the term ‘resistance’ perhaps carries more of the connotation of intent 
referred to above. 
 
 
Resistance to what? 
 
Even if one agrees that resistance has been a marked feature of human 
behaviour in African history, this begs the question already alluded to in the 
previous section of what or whom the target of such resistance was. In trying to 
answer this question, one leaves the area of even minimal consensus. Did 
Africans resist the imposition of colonial rule or specific configurations of 
capitalist economic relations associated with colonialism?47 Were political 
forms of resistance directed at the imposition of colonial rule or, as implied in 
the chapter by Stephen Ellis in this volume, were they as much directed at 
African elites profiting from the onset of capitalist relations of production? 
Were manifestations of resistance during decolonization aimed at ending 
colonial suzerainty or also the product of intra-elite rivalry, as argued in the 
chapter on the Sawaba revolt (Niger) in this book? 
What is clear is that communities have resisted various forms of rule or 
domination throughout African history – a phenomenon, as emphasized by 
Crummey, not just limited to colonial rule but extending far back into pre-
colonial times and covering most of the post-colonial and contemporary period. 
The chapter by Mirjam de Bruijn & Han van Dijk in this volume graphically 
underlines the manifestation of resistance as a near-permanent characteristic of 
political life in pre-colonial West Africa, or at least of certain areas or polities in 
that region. Closely bound up with specific political economies and fragile 
ecological contexts, the lack of political stability and absence of monopolies of 
violence represented, perhaps, the fundamental hallmarks of the history of this 
region, as well as of many others. Analytically, resistance would then be a 
derivative notion, depending (though not in any mechanistic sense) on other 
concepts and features such as political instability, competitive value systems, 
economic exploitation and social (im)mobility. This would, in effect, render the 
resistance concept less useful for an analysis of African historical development. 
Perhaps then an alternative term like ‘contestation’ should be used. 
It could be argued that the, at times, limited value of the resistance concept 
could be implied from several more recent resistance studies that appeared 
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during the 1990s. Two important features of these studies, some of them 
marked by great detail and subtle analysis, are, first, the emphasis laid on the 
nature and degree of internal differentiation in communities involved in 
rebellions and, second, the role of coercion in the mobilization of people for the 
rebellious cause. The combined effect of these two nuances was to show how 
complex and multifaceted cases of resistance could be in their structure, 
development and, especially, their meanings and objectives. Thus, in the 
introduction to his brilliant study of the 1888 rebellion on the Swahili coast, 
Jonathon Glassman argued that, in general, peasant consciousness and 
resistance during the colonial period tended to grow out of an awareness of 
conflicts integral to the agrarian communities in which peasants lived. 
‘Tradition’, in this context, was the cultural language or idiom in which 
peasants expressed conflicting views of their world and innovated new ones.48 
This also constituted an important nuance of James Scott's view of the ‘moral 
economy of the peasant’ as something universal and unchanging.49 In order to 
describe the awareness of his own Swahili rebels, Glassman used the term 
‘contradictory rebellious consciousness’, to which we will return below in the 
section on rebellious imagination. 
Norma Kriger, working on the war of independence in Zimbabwe, similarly 
argued that the peasant concept as such has an external bias that implicitly 
assumes that differences internal to the peasantry pale into insignificance when 
compared to members of other classes or occupation and status groups. Hence, 
it vitiates against examining gender, lineage, and generational and other 
differences that are of considerable importance in explaining the evolution of 
rebellion and relevant peasant responses.50 
Moreover, Kriger showed that coercion played some role in the mobilization 
of peasants for the second chimurenga (1972-1980), thus adding a vital nuance 
to our view of the struggle for Zimbabwe. Her field data suggested that guerrilla 
coercion may have been important in winning popular compliance, a point also 
notable in the thirty-year Eritrean struggle for independence. If true, this could 
not only profoundly affect our view of historical cases of resistance and 
rebellion but also bring the older resistance studies more in line with analyses of 
more recent wars and violent conflicts, in which coercion has tended to assume 
an important place. Other questions, which we will consider below, are whether 
the ideological motivation so prevalent in, especially, anti-colonial resistance 
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cases should not, therefore, be interpreted in a different light and whether the 
ideological dimension is not an understudied aspect as far as more recent revolts 
and conflicts are concerned.  
With regard to Zimbabwe, Kriger showed that coercion may adversely affect 
popular support due to the fact that cultural nationalist appeals cannot 
compensate for the material sacrifices of the peasantry. The lack of peasant 
support that Kriger noted in the districts she studied may not have been an 
obstacle to guerrilla success, yet peasant attitudes undoubtedly affected the 
outcome. Caught between the guerrillas and the Rhodesian state, peasants 
pursued their own agendas, seeing the guerrillas as potential allies or susceptible 
to manipulation for their own objectives. Peasant resentment of the white 
minority government did not mitigate negative views about coercion by the 
guerrillas. Hence, the coercive nature of mobilization also had repercussions for 
post-war relations between peasants and the new government party, ZANU-
PF.51 This was confirmed by the important study by Alexander, McGregor & 
Ranger,52 who provided an important testimony on the internal divisions during 
the war of independence and the pain inflicted by state violence thereafter. 
Another volume, edited by Bhebe & Ranger,53 nuanced in this respect the role 
played by spirit mediums in peasant mobilization, well known since the study 
by David Lan.54 
Clapham55 similarly concluded that a context of insurgency may or may not 
be marked by a relation of common interests between insurgents and the 
surrounding population. His edited volume marked, perhaps, the transformation 
of the ‘freedom fighter’ into the more straightforward ‘guerrilla’. Concentrating 
solely on cases of resistance against the governments of post-colonial states, 
this book could not be seen to have the political commitment to the resisters 
themselves, as exemplified by the Isaacmans and maybe the early Ranger. 
Rather, it drove home the point that resistance is a phenomenon not limited to 
pre-colonial and colonial Africa. If rebellions against post-colonial states used 
to be explained away as a hangover of colonial rule, through the heavy if vague 
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ideological concept of neo-colonialism,56 now it was argued that, very 
generally, violent revolt derives from blocked political aspirations and in some 
cases ‘reactive desperation’.57 
Hence, in his typology of guerrilla insurgencies, Clapham listed ‘separatist 
insurgencies’, ‘reform insurgencies’ and ‘warlord insurgencies’, besides the 
now familiar ‘liberation insurgencies’. He argued that revolts against 
independent African states initially grew out of failures in the decolonization 
settlement, subjecting peoples to governing groups widely considered as alien 
and illegitimate. Eritrea and southern Sudan were given as examples. 
Alternatively, revolts were, or are, triggered by unrepresentative, autocratic 
regimes, a category that actually merges with cases considered as failures in 
decolonization. Listing Chad and the Senegalese Casamance as examples,58 we 
could tentatively add two cases presented in this volume, namely that of 
Renamo's war in Mozambique, which was in part driven by regional discontent, 
and that of Sawaba's revolt in Niger, where the degree of regime illegitimacy 
was, however, overestimated. More straightforward desperation, according to 
Clapham, drove rebellions in Uganda under Amin and Obote, in Somalia under 
Siyad Barre (discussed by Jon Abbink in this volume), in Liberia and in Sierra 
Leone. 
Generally, these types of insurgencies were long denied any legitimacy, by 
the OAU and internationally, but their growing acceptance as expressions of 
popular alienation in the post-Cold War era with its ideals of ‘good governance’ 
and multipartyism was reflected in this new scholarly attention. (The warlord 
type of insurgency is discussed below). Clapham observed, in this regard, that 
insurgencies occur in all types of rural African settings and economies. While 
the structure of society does not, therefore, seem to have much bearing on the 
incidence of rebellion, it has nevertheless some influence on the type of 
insurgency, with differences between these types more due to their receptivity 
in society than to their own ideology or organizational models. Hence, Clapham 
likened the technique of guerrilla struggle to pre-colonial modes of warfare and 
considered it the normal way of doing battle in societies without powerful 
states. He observed, in this respect, that a disposition to resort to insurgency 
may be linked to the structures and values of a society: where state structures 
are weak and the use of violence in pursuit of certain objectives was a normal 
feature of pre-colonial society, the incidence of violent resistance merely 
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represents the continuation of such practice in the post-colonial era.59 This 
underlines what was mentioned above about political instability (in the sense of 
imbalance or lack of permanence of the main features of a polity and its power 
configurations or continued violent opposition to these structures) as the salient 
feature of pre-colonial life in the nineteenth-century West African Fulbe 
polities. These pre-colonial socio-cultural characteristics also inform much of 
the context of twentieth-century Somali history, as shown in the chapter by Jon 
Abbink in this volume, and of the Patriots' resistance to the Fascist occupation 
of Ethiopia analysed by Aregawi Berhe (Chapter 4). 
It would, however, be going too far to conclude that resistance as a concept 
has lost its analytical value due to the fact that so much of the political life in 
Africa's past and present is characterized by instability and physical violence. 
As shown in recent literature, many revolts in the past decade were affected if 
not driven by a sociological factor that has gained increasing importance, i.e. 
generational tension. Hence, at least some of these insurgencies were marked by 
more or less explicated political or ideological intentions, thus distinguishing 
them as cases of resistance as defined above, from the phenomenon of violence 
as such. With most Sub-Saharan countries marked by high birth rates and young 
populations but deteriorating economies, youths have been finding it ever 
harder to gain access to educational facilities, employment and social 
advancement and political representation. Competition for jobs, schooling and 
privilege, especially in the urban domains, has thus begun to mark, to a greater 
or lesser extent, relations between different generations and has, concomitantly, 
become a factor in post-colonial political systems and in several violent revolts 
emerging as a result of blocked mobility or political communication within 
those systems. Interestingly, this factor appears to have been present for much 
of the post-colonial period, if not always with the same urgency. Thus, it played 
some role in Sawaba's revolt in Niger during the 1960s, as analysed by Van 
Walraven in this volume. Kriger, too, showed that in the war for Zimbabwe 
during the 1980s youths were empowered by the chimurenga and sought to 
challenge the authority of the elders. Moreover, aspirations to gain a modern 
education have, perhaps, appeared as the outstanding driving force in the 
political mobilization of youth. As shown in this volume's chapters on Niger 
and Mozambique, promises of foreign scholarships sometimes constituted an 
effective means of recruitment of potential rebels, as the dream of overseas 
studies drove or lured youngsters to participate in revolts against their 
governments. 
An important recent study of resistance in which the anger of youth was 
attributed a crucial role is Paul Richards's analysis of the RUF rebellion in 
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Sierra Leone.60 Arguing that the decline in patrimonial distribution during the 
1980s tested the loyalty of the younger generation while the capacity of the state 
to control its formal territory diminished sharply, Richards stressed that this 
conflict was manifestly not an ethnic one. Rather, it was driven by a younger 
generation, in particular by young school drop-outs and, more generally, victims 
of educational collapse. Other studies have similarly underlined the importance 
of youths, and especially of school drop-outs, in recent resistance movements. 
For instance, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, 
Joseph Kony, was a school drop-out himself,61 while marginalized youths 
decided in droves, and without consulting their parents, to join the Mai-Mai 
militias fighting in the east of Congo-Kinshasa.62 
Participants in the fierce fighting that wrecked Congo-Brazzaville in 1993-
94 and again in 1997 were mostly young men (aged 15 to 35), in the first wave 
of violence from the capital itself and in the second wave from several other 
towns in the country, most of those involved being school drop-outs. Since 
educational advancement in Congo had always been affected by political 
considerations, the economic decline and rising graduate unemployment of the 
1980s and 1990s threw idle youngsters, who had at least some experience of 
political mobilization, onto Congo's streets. Even if the social frustrations of 
these youths did not directly cause the civil war (which was very much the 
immediate result of rivalry between more comfortably positioned and older 
politicians), their thwarted expectations of social and economic advancement 
proved a rich recruiting ground for those wishing to create a personal army. 
This, of course, does not constitute the central objective to be attributed to the 
Congolese conflict, at least not at the level of the leaders who began the revolt 
against President Lissouba. Yet the social frustrations of Congolese youths 
deeply affected the course and nature of the insurrection. In a study of this 
violent period, Bazenguissa showed how the militiamen went on a looting spree 
to recompense themselves and their families, targeting any urban property, 
including that of people of their own ethnic group, as well as that of the very 
politicians who had hired them in the first place. With fine houses regarded as 
the receptacle of the power exercised by a politician, the looting became a 
genuine trial for a political class of elders that was collectively held responsible 
for the misfortune of the young. However, while the pillaging indicated some 
political awareness on the part of the militiamen in the sense that it symbolized 
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an emergent social distance between them and the political leaders, this 
ideological aspect should not be overrated as it was to some extent a mere 
justification to satisfy some immediate material desire.63 
It is therefore hard, or has become harder when compared to past cases, to 
attribute more or less explicit ideological objectives to some of Africa's more 
recent strife. Hence, concepts like resistance and guerrillas, let alone freedom 
fighters have increasingly given way to notions such as ‘new wars’, ‘warlords’ 
and, quite simply, ‘conflicts’ (see also Jon Abbink’s chapter in this volume). 
Whatever political objectives are ascribed to recent conflicts, these cannot be 
explained by reference to African nationalism – the ideological dimension of 
the original resistance studies. The armed clashes between the rival wings of 
Zimbabwe's guerrillas during the early 1980s had already raised uneasy 
questions about the nature of ethnicity and factional conflict in the nationalist 
movement of a country that had been at the centre of debate in the resistance 
literature.64 Later and much more violent (or at least more atrocious) conflicts 
such as those in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique clearly showed that not 
all acts of resistance to official authority constitute forces of progress or 
emancipation. Consequently, as discussed further in the section below on 
violence, recent scholarship has produced more anthropologically oriented 
studies that tend to view wars as very complex social phenomena, rather than as 
struggles in straightforward support of modern political ideologies.65 
The rise of the African warlord has had important implications for our 
imagination of, and the attribution of meaning to, recent violent revolt. Warlord 
insurgency can be described as aiming to weaken or overthrow the official state 
leadership, with the formal control of the state a desirable objective though not 
necessarily essential. Rebels such as Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor could 
simply take over substantial parts of the formal state territory and introduce 
quasi-governmental structures to run them without actually overthrowing the 
internationally recognized government.66 However, an analysis of the behaviour 
of warlords does not in itself constitute the meaning – in terms of objectives and 
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intentions – of their concrete military activities, which as such represent a 
rebellion against the formal state authority. The study by William Reno of 
warlord politics and African states67 did not really define warlords and their 
objectives but, rather, described their actual behaviour. Against a background of 
collapsing state patronage politics, Reno ascribed the warlords' actions to the 
pursuit of power and wealth, for purely private interests completely dissociated 
from the state project. 
Several points of interest come into play here. First, is there any similarity 
between this warlord action and the role of ‘big men’ in pre-colonial political 
cultures? Second, how are evidential problems resolved in reconstructing the 
intentions behind the actions of these modern rebels? Instead of simply reading 
political intent in actual conduct, one should carefully research the motives of 
the specific warlords in question –as far as conditions and data allow – since 
even in this category of political actors there are differences between individual 
cases. For example, recent literature suggests that there were certainly 
differences between the motives of the RUF leadership in Sierra Leone and, say, 
those driving Charles Taylor's revolt against the Liberian government of Samuel 
Doe.68 
Furthermore, if the rebellious intention of warlords is reduced to the pursuit 
of wealth and power for wholly personal benefit, how close does this come to 
the much criticized view of Paul Collier that wars are mainly motivated by the 
desire for economic gain69 or even to the ‘new barbarism’ thesis exemplified by 
Robert Kaplan,70 arguing that resource competition, environmental stress and 
culture clashes provoke violent anarchic revolts, i.e. ‘apolitical events 
indistinguishable from banditry and crime’?71 Finally, are we not too easily 
overlooking the possibility of ideological motivation – even if broadly defined – 
on the part of these modern rebels72 and could this not also be in line with the 
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decline of explicit ideologies in the post-Cold War era and with, as some have 
argued, the ‘decidedly cynical context’ of current Africanist scholarship?73 
Here it should be noted that violence can also be constructed as a political 
act aimed at gaining power and ending one's social exclusion.74 Atrocities and 
even wholesale material destruction have, in this respect, an underlying, and 
what can sometimes be called political, intention. The RUF revolt in Sierra 
Leone is an example, as are the LRA's actions in Uganda. Thus, while Doom & 
Vlassenroot75 assessed Kony's programme as ‘from the start rather indistinct, a 
mixture of political entrepreneurship, personal frustration and warlordism’ and 
concluded that he is no longer trying to win the conflict but is content with 
employing violence as a tool and end in itself, they also noted his anti-
establishment message, which was to be realized through destruction and could 
be considered to some extent as being political in intent. This issue is pursued 
further in the following sections. 
 
 
On violence 
 
Even if not all of the more recent rebellions lacked political content, it is clear 
that they differed considerably – at least as far as style and military execution 
were concerned – from the project underlying, for example, Frelimo's war 
against the Portuguese or that of the Patriotic Front against the Rhodesian state. 
In particular, the nature of the violence involved has undergone changes since 
the onset of colonial rule, anti-colonial revolts and decolonization. 
Violence can be defined as the contested use of damaging physical force 
against other human beings with possibly fatal consequences.76 While it should 
be distinguished from the concept of resistance explained above, it should be 
realized that violence usually involves an intention on the part of those 
employing it, i.e. the deliberate humiliation of other human beings, often with 
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the objective of achieving or maintaining domination over them. In this 
analytical, and not normative, sense violence is much more meaningful than is 
frequently assumed, while it is also often rule-bound (though not always) and 
sometimes constituent of new social relations.77 Indeed, violence is a form of 
'social' behaviour,78 in the sense of sociologist Marcel Mauss’s ‘total social fact’ 
– set in a universe of cultural meaning and ‘communication’, however 
normatively negative that may be. 
This is also true for ‘terrorism’, a term that may have some relevance to 
certain cases of resistance described in this volume. Terrorism is defined as the 
method, or the theory behind the method, whereby an organized group seeks to 
achieve its aim mainly through the systematic use of intimidating violence,79 
usually against arbitrarily chosen individuals. Thus defined, it distinguishes 
itself from the concept of resistance through the predominance of sheer violence 
over any other instruments with which one could theoretically attempt to reach 
one's goal, such as through persuasion, propaganda, and non-coercive 
mobilization generally. Terrorism excludes violent clashes with the opponent, 
since it involves the use of violence against a target that is largely constructed as 
victim. According to Hardman, terrorism even excludes mere intimidation as 
the terrorist is defined by the actual use of violence, although this is an 
unhistorical definition. In contrast, Crenshaw entertained, as we do, a broader 
definition including also the threat of violence.80 
There is a widespread view, however, that terrorism has a political purpose, 
which means that it must be seen as a form of rational behaviour in the 
instrumental sense. Terrorism represents purposive behaviour, involving a 
conscious strategy, to communicate a political message rather than directly 
defeat the terrorist's opponent. Terrorists generally seek to arouse not only the 
government deemed to be their enemy but also, and especially, the wider public 
– the message being that the government's authority does not go unchallenged. 
This publicity factor is a key aspect of a terrorist strategy and implies that the 
target of terrorist action lies in the realm of symbolism. Its users expect a 
reward out of proportion to the resources employed and, sometimes, the risks 
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taken. Its use can also be seen in the context of inequality of power relations, 
which forces the militarily weaker party to be deceptive.81 
There are several dimensions to revolts such as those staged by Renamo in 
Mozambique, the RUF in Sierra Leone or the LRA in Uganda that would 
qualify as ‘terrorist’ as it is defined here. Many of the more disturbing aspects 
of these recent forms of resistance are discussed in Gerhard Seibert's analysis of 
Renamo in this volume. In the early twentieth-century Somali revolt of the 
Sayyid Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan (see Chapter 13), one could also speak of 
terrorist tactics against those Somalis opposed to him. However, before some 
more general remarks are made on this kind of violence, it can be noted from 
the above discussion that the concept of terrorism is emotionally very powerful, 
lending itself to subjective interpretations that are usually driven by political or 
moral purposes.82 It is obviously a term with strong pejorative connotations. In 
the hegemonic ideologies of ruling elites, the violence practised by those 
dubbed as ‘terrorists’ is denied any legitimacy – to which purpose the term 
‘terrorism’, in its dictionary meaning, is also applied. While terrorism practised 
by formal governments usually appears or is presented as law enforcement, that 
of non-governmental, unrecognized groups is condemned as law breaking.83 
Consequently, this volume avoids the term ‘terrorism’ and employs the notion 
of violence instead, although the ideas behind the terrorism concept may inform 
our understanding of this violence. 
The horrors in Mozambique described by Seibert call for an explanation that, 
unfortunately, denies them unique status. Thus, an interesting comparison is 
provided by the war in Sierra Leone, in which atrocities were committed that 
Richards argued to be deliberate and intentional. First, this war had a clear 
political context and its belligerents had rational political aims. Rebel violence 
was not an instinctive response to population pressure, as suggested by Kaplan, 
but the result of a mobilization of youths fighting out of social frustration on 
behalf of a small group of angry excluded people.84 While the RUF's head, 
Foday Sankoh, exercised largely exhortatory leadership, the rebel war effort 
was, in fact, directed by a war council. Radio communication played a vital 
role, inspired perhaps by Sankoh's personal background as a radio signals 
technician and thereby striking an interesting parallel with one of his heroes – 
fellow radio technician Pol Pot. In addition, and in marked contrast to the 
centrally organized structure of Renamo discussed by Seibert, the confidence 
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reposed in RUF commanders, both boys and girls, delegated the execution of 
daily battle to the lower cadres, thus providing the movement with strategic 
flexibility. The war, therefore, was not fought by ‘madmen or mindless 
savages’, but deliberately planned and executed corresponding to a consciously 
elaborated strategy.85 
Secondly (and in line with the concept of terrorism), Richards observed that 
the violence was supposed to unsettle its victims. New recruits, for example, 
were terrorized in the process of capture, but later treated generously, with the 
whole process approaching and perverting the initiation ritual of the forest 
cultures of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Thirdly, the perpetration of atrocities had, 
according to Richards, specific objectives, at least initially. Rebels began 
amputating the limbs of nearby villagers to thwart the harvesting of crops and 
thus the restoration of food production and a return of normal village life to 
which hungry fresh recruits could escape. Feet were cut off recruits wishing to 
flee, while planned elections that threatened to sidetrack the rebels were 
checked by severing the hands of potential voters. The increasing menace of 
militias hostile to the RUF was met with another spate of mutilations. In this 
way, acts of violence became the logical way of achieving intended strategic 
outcomes, even if as a last-ditch expression of sectarian rationalism. Revenge 
for lynchings of suspected rebels, as well as attempts to fight the magical 
powers attributed to hostile militias and chiefs, would have provided additional 
reasons for rebel atrocities.86 
Doom & Vlassenroot also pointed to the deliberate and rational use of 
atrocious violence or, instead, to its beneficial effects for the LRA's cause in 
Uganda. The violence perpetrated by the LRA strengthened the power of the 
field commanders far beyond their logistic and military capabilities. The 
unpredictability of the LRA's violence was, in this respect, a key weapon. With 
a minimum of weaponry and well-trained troops, it was able to traumatize the 
entire population of northern Uganda. The random nature of its violence 
reinforced the rebels' self-confidence and the experience of impunity bolstered 
in-group cohesion.87 
There are several similarities, as well as differences, between the violence 
perpetrated in these revolts and in Renamo's war as described by Seibert 
(Chapter10, this volume). First, in most cases the recruitment of rebels was 
violent, with the threat of punishment by the government after escape 
discouraging their desertion. In the Sierra Leonean, as well as Liberian88 
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conflicts, this also involved a manipulation of initiation ritual that was not 
present or as explicit in Mozambique or Uganda. Yet, in general, one can 
observe a process of degeneration in the perpetration of violence in the context 
of African tradition – a process also described by Abbink for the Suri people in 
southern Ethiopia, although admittedly on a much smaller scale.89 Seibert also 
points to 'cultic' aspects of the excessive violence committed by Renamo 
fighters that were often of an obscure nature or directed at violating sexual 
taboos. Here, he cites research undertaken by Wilson,90 who argued, like 
Richards and Doom & Vlassenroot, that violence perpetrated by rebel forces 
was purposive. Renamo's atrocities were intended to instil a paralysing fear in 
the wider population for purposes of control with a minimum of means, which 
more or less strikes a parallel with the LRA's actions in northern Uganda. The 
actual number of incidents in Mozambique was not very great or at least out of 
proportion to its impact on the population. The ritual aspects involved were 
deliberately made incomprehensible so as to have a maximum effect in terms of 
fear. By making the violence appear to lack rationality and in the process 
creating a vision of inhumanity that set Renamo outside the realm of social 
beings, the rebels instilled a belief that the violence could not be managed – 
thereby escaping from the bounds of social control and, hence, preventing the 
people from resisting.91 
Thus, the violence perpetrated in these revolts is, in the strategic-
instrumental sense, not irrational but deliberate and reasoned if atrocious. Its 
random nature serves to make it unpredictable,92 which in turn makes it 
unmanageable and therefore increases people's fear and their propensity to 
submit, especially if the form of violence is incomprehensible and, hence, 
alienating.93 In addition to moral issues, this raises fundamental questions as to 
whether such violence can, therefore, be truly understood. While such questions 
cannot be answered here, they have not only bothered numerous scholars but 
also writers, poets and novelists, such as authors who focused on the 
consequences of the Shoah in European history.94  
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It seems, therefore, difficult to explain the sheer extent and intensity of the 
violence involved in these revolts. In some respects, it may have been triggered 
by the (initial) cause or nature of some as a kind of last-ditch and embittered 
attempt to save local societies from social collapse and political hegemonies 
deemed illegitimate (the RUF in Sierra Leone and, less convincingly, the LRA 
in Uganda). In other respects, however, it is the external dimensions to these 
conflicts that appear to have fuelled the conflicts, even if these did not 
determine the form of violence involved (Renamo in Mozambique, although 
external/regional dimensions clearly played a role in Sierra Leone and northern 
Uganda too). 
To some extent the degree of this violence was informed by the desire to 
destroy rather than construct or reform. Richards related this desire to the 
intellectual anger of excluded educated elites whose bitterness led them to 
‘save’ their society through a war of devastation. Whether informed by the 
uncompromising mentalité of university intellectualism as exemplified by 
Peru's Sendero Luminoso (with which Richards compared the RUF) or spurred 
on by the despair and embitterment of more rural leaderships and rank and files, 
a penchant for destruction affects most resistance movements whose (original) 
aim is radical transformation. Indeed, while rural movements may wish to 
obliterate society because they feel that they cannot defeat ruling hegemonies or 
fit into the political system and are encouraged in this by a self-esteem inflated 
by their own violent powerfulness,95 even the more sophisticated programme of 
Maoist thought foresees a role for chaos and ruin as the necessary precursor of 
revolutionary change.96 A destructive tendency is, moreover, not simply the 
preserve of rural rebel movements alone. In a fascinating article, Mkandawire 
argued that it is urban malaise that lies at the root of the activities of and 
antipathy exhibited by post-colonial rebel movements towards rural 
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populations.97 Their extreme violence towards rural folk would stem from their 
fundamentally opposed aims and agendas. 
On a more controversial note, Wilson argued that organized violence 
appeared to be seen in northern Mozambique as a normal and likely, if 
somewhat undesirable, tool of economic and political activity, based on cultural 
conceptions of spiritual and magical male power elaborated under Renamo.98 
While this would to some extent put the horrors narrated by Seibert in context, 
it seems in contrast to, or at least to differ from, the experiences of the 
chimurenga in Zimbabwe and its underlying Shona and Ndebele cultural 
notions stipulating the need for endorsement of violence by the ancestors and 
the necessity of cleansing after committing the violent act.99 Perhaps the level, if 
not the nature, of the violence in Renamo's revolt can also be partly explained 
by the tendency of violence to escalate once it is employed. As Seibert shows, at 
least in the initial stages of the war, Renamo enjoyed some local support or 
sympathy before the situation got out of control, just as the movements 
preceding the LRA in Uganda could reckon on support from the Acholi people 
before this culminated in a permanent state of terror.100 In addition, the role 
played by external powers (on which more below) had an escalatory effect on 
the levels of violence involved. As mentioned earlier, Jon Abbink has analysed 
this process of escalation for the Suri people in southern Ethiopia, where 
traditional violence has had a propensity to escalate under the influence of the 
state modernization project, ecological pressures but also the importation of 
modern small arms like the AK 47.101 Such weapons allow these people a 
fateful quantum leap in killing techniques, thus making the use of physical force 
contested in a way that ‘traditional’ violence with spears, knives or slow three-
bullet rifles was not. 
One of the most disturbing aspects of violence in war and resistance is the 
sexual dimension. Women are constructed as objects and objectives of war and 
violence, something clearly shown in the more shocking details of Seibert's 
narrative of Renamo. Wilson argued, in this respect, that the ideological 
superstructure reserving agency for men and constructing women as a threat to 
that agency was reinforced by the use of sexual violence. The violent capacities 
of Renamo as an institution were conceived of partly as being based on male 
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power and, consequently, intimately threatened by the existence of female 
sexuality.102 Alternatively, raping women was an act of asserting superiority 
over men, as in the case of the Rhodesian security forces and their auxiliaries 
who violated African women in part to humiliate the guerrillas of the Patriotic 
Front.103 
Nevertheless, rape and the subjection of women to the status of slave wives 
by Renamo were not really ritualized but instead considered as a ‘bonus’ for 
men participating in the revolt.104 Again, the fighters of the chimurenga were at 
times also involved in exercising what they saw as their rights over women,105 
just as happened later on a wider scale in Sierra Leone, Liberia and during the 
genocide in Rwanda. As Bhebe & Ranger observed in the struggle for 
Zimbabwe,106 women had to contend with the confused sexual morality of war, 
even if one cannot simply reduce their role to one of objects of exploitation. 
This, of course, is not an African phenomenon but a universal one, as shown in 
the fate of thousands of Muslim women during the civil war in Bosnia and in 
the experiences of the countless German women overpowered by the invading 
Russian armies in 1944-45.107 Perhaps this aspect, more than anything else, 
serves as a vital correction to the heroism so often attributed to resistance, 
revolution and even violence as such.  
One last aspect of violence in African revolts to be noted here is the role of 
forces external to the societies concerned – be they colonial or white settler 
governments, the influence of racist ideologies, the totalitarian dispositions of 
certain European powers or, in the post-colonial era, the involvement of 
regional actors. In many cases these external forces influenced the nature and 
form of violence or helped to drive it to much higher levels. The chapter by 
Robert Ross in this volume shows how the vicissitudes of war and resistance on 
the South African frontier were affected, among others, by racist attitudes that 
bolstered white self-righteousness to the point that it was regarded as legitimate 
not just to subject but also to exterminate the African other. These inclinations 
were even more prevalent in the totalitarian dispositions of German and Italian 
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colonial rule, as shown in Gewald's chapter in this volume on the Herero 
genocide and its aftermath in Namibia and Berhe's analysis of the brutal Italian 
repression of Patriot resistance in Ethiopia. These attitudes were part of a much 
wider European cultural complex, in which one set of mentalities claimed, if 
necessary, the right to kill with regard to those considered of inferior racial or 
cultural status.108 Indeed, some would argue that Europe's Shoah had specific 
antecedents if not roots in previous colonial experiences.109 
That these dispositions cannot be regarded as something of the past is, 
moreover, shown by Ranger in his discussion of the ‘guilt-free semantics of the 
Rhodesian war’, which shielded white Rhodesians from raising uncomfortable 
questions about their own humanity.110 Such guilt-free semantics are, in fact, 
closely bound up with the waging of war itself and can be observed in any 
conflict to this day. Hence, Ken Flower, the chief of Rhodesian intelligence 
responsible for the creation of Renamo, admitted with shocking laconism that 
the force he had helped to field had just developed into a monster out of 
control.111 
While Seibert is right to stress that the war in Mozambique had specific 
internal roots, we should not forget, as Wilson observed, that although the 
nature of Renamo's violence was informed by local cultural logics, its 
effectiveness and intensity were to a considerable extent bound up with the 
intervention of regional white powers.112 The same thing could be said about 
some of Africa's more recent revolts. The civil war in Liberia, for example, had 
profound regional dimensions that served to complicate and prolong the 
hostilities.113 The war in neighbouring Sierra Leone experienced the 
considerable involvement of Charles Taylor and his NPFL rebel movement in 
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Liberia as well as of Sierra Leonean exiles based there and wishing to fight their 
way back home. Moreover, Richards emphasized that the earliest atrocities 
committed during Sierra Leone's civil war, rather than being the work of Sierra 
Leoneans, had actually been the work of foreign mercenaries.114 Similarly, 
Doom & Vlassenroot115 observed that after 1994 the LRA in Uganda began to 
receive ‘full-scale support from Sudan’. In other words, while it cannot be 
completely reduced to extraneous factors it seems difficult to conceive of the 
horrendous violence marking many of Africa's more recent revolts as being 
completely isolated from external involvement. 
 
 
Imagining 
 
Resistance and, perhaps to a lesser extent, violence are conceptually dependent 
on more or less specified intentions. Motivation is, consequently, one of their 
key components. In order to understand the phenomenon of resistance and 
violence in African history, one must therefore focus also on what those who 
organized, led or participated in revolts thought they were doing or intended to 
achieve. While from the perspective of the older resistance literature this was 
considered to belong primarily to the realm of ideology, in later publications the 
attribution of meaning to resistance was researched from other conceptual 
angles as well, such as discourse, religion and predominantly cultural features 
(rituals, values). 
The concept of ideology became somewhat disqualified, partly because of 
the obvious inadequacies of the explanation that resistance movements were 
straightforward nationalist uprisings. These inadequacies stemmed, however, to 
some extent from classical definitions of ideology as referring to relatively 
comprehensive political programmes or complex and explicated systems of 
thought claiming universal validity and marked to varying degrees by 
systematization and coherence.116 Yet, viewed more or less along the lines of 
the concept of discourse, ideology could be seen as encompassing any views, 
ideas or thoughts purporting to provide meaning to cultural reality, political 
systems or social existence, at whatever level of abstraction and complexity.117 
Marked by descriptive and prescriptive elements, ideology, as discourse, 
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represents the construction of meaning as a social process through spoken and 
written dialogue, leading to systems of meaning through which reality is 
imagined.118 Such a process of imagination is a social phenomenon and as such 
affected by its interaction with the social context, though not determined by it in 
a mechanistic sense.119 
An important and subtle approach to the role of ideology in African 
resistance, with some bearing on certain chapters in our volume, is Glassman's 
earlier-cited analysis of the Swahili revolt of 1888.120 As mentioned above, 
Glassman used the term ‘contradictory rebellious consciousness’ to explain the 
tendency of rebels to express their grievances in language marked by or 
reminiscent of the hegemonic ideologies of ruling groups. Inspired by Gramsci, 
he did not dismiss this as a form of ‘false consciousness’ in the Marxist sense 
(i.e. consciousness appropriate to the material interests of another group), but 
argued, first, that the perceptual languages in which class positions are 
articulated tend to differ since beliefs are not created by or within one specific 
group but are forged in the crucible of social interaction, arising from the rough-
and-tumble of everyday struggle. Perceptions of group interests do not precede 
such struggle but grow out of it. 
Second, and again following Gramsci, Glassman stressed that hegemonic 
ideologies influence popular consciousness not through the imposition of 
particular ideas but by the way that these ideologies shape the questions to be 
asked and the issues to be debated. The language of political culture is not an 
instrument for the defence of underlying interests but a form of discourse within 
which certain issues are defined and debated. Hence, popular consciousness is 
not appropriate to the material interests of either subordinate or dominant 
groups (nor is hegemonic ideology). Affected by hegemonic ideologies, popular 
consciousness is rarely revolutionary in the fullest sense, yet still contains much 
that is expressive of perceptions of struggle against those dominating society. 
Such consciousness is made up of different fragments of thought originating in 
different times and places, including conflicting daily experiences and 
hegemonic ideas. The result is a bizarre combination of ideological components 
crafted in the course of struggle in which individuals find justification for their 
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different agendas. As an ever-changing patchwork of thought, political 
awareness arises, in traditional or pre-modern settings such as pre- or early 
colonial Africa, not only over conflicting views of the ideal society but also 
over definitions of custom and tradition. In this context, defence of the local 
community is not an objective goal of struggle but the form of discourse in 
which the struggle occurs. This discourse, while being shared at many levels of 
society, is not a uniform mode of thought but an ideological or discursive 
language.121 
The resultant forms of contradictory rebellious consciousness can be 
observed during different periods of Africa's history. Robert Ross's chapter in 
this volume shows, for example, how Khoi and English settlers along South 
Africa's Kat River came into violent conflict with each other and, against the 
background of hardening race relations, held conflicting views on the nature of 
early colonial society. Measures taken by white settlers not only threatened the 
material aspects of Khoi life but also dashed hopes of reconstructing Khoi lives 
in the context of loyalty to the British crown. Hardening British ethnic and 
racial consciousness determined who the opponents of the British were, and 
Khoi settlers ‘rebelled because they were declared to be rebels’: ‘even then 
many of those who were considered to be disloyal to the Cape Colony struggled 
as hard as they could to preserve their loyalty’. In the process, the concept of 
resistance blurred with that of loyalty – i.e. allegiance to an older and now 
contested view of society. Similarly, Ineke van Kessel (Chapter 6 this volume) 
concludes that the African soldiers recruited for service in the colonial army in 
the Netherlands East Indies were caught in a colonial paradox since they were 
encouraged by the Dutch to look down on the Asian indigenes and maintain a 
status of Europeans while at the same time they were denied the equal treatment 
that this status implied, due to racial bigotry and meanness. In revisiting the 
menalamba rising, Stephen Ellis (Chapter 3 this volume) shows that this revolt 
was not only a movement of resistance to colonial rule but also a campaign 
against an unpopular Malagasy government that had discredited itself through 
forced labour and enslavement practices, and association with Christianity. The 
resisters aimed to restore the indigenous monarchy in what they saw as its 
proper form, purified from alien (religious) influences and the rapacious 
practices of the indigenous elite. 
Perhaps the best example in our volume of revolt being motivated by the 
desire to resist foreign intruders or usurpers is the chapter by Aregawi Berhe 
(Chapter 4), although even in the case of the Patriots' resistance contradictory 
indigenous perceptions of what local African society should look like played a 
role in the background and aftermath of the resistance. Thus, the shifta tradition, 
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which Berhe argues inspired the Patriots to fight the Italians, involved a 
tradition of rebellion against indigenous authorities that were regarded as having 
failed to deliver justice or respect local customs. While the essence of resistance 
to the Italians was to safeguard Ethiopia's independence, religious values and 
cultural identity, it also led Ethiopians to re-examine the nature and meaning of 
their own state in the context of the modern world. As Berhe concludes, some 
of the social and other political aims of Patriot resistance, such as ideas on 
social justice, equality and openness of the political system, later met with 
repression and violence from the Ethiopian authorities. 
The Patriots' revolt shows, however, that in ideological terms, not all 
rebellions in African history can be classified fully as contradictory rebellious 
discourses. The chapter by Mirjam de Bruijn & Han van Dijk in our volume is 
perhaps the best example of sharp clashes between antagonistic ideologies. 
Upcoming Fulbe minorities sought to legitimise their political and economic 
ambitions against existing hegemonies by propagating a stricter, ‘uncorrupted’ 
Islam that ostensibly promoted a new egalitarianism but gave justification to the 
violent subjugation of other peoples (especially non-Muslim groups), the 
plunder of their wealth and the exploitation of their labour. In the process, the 
oppressed became oppressors themselves and prompted the counter-resistance 
of communities that adhered to other religious beliefs, objected to Islam as the 
dominant ideology or tried to escape from the pressure of Islamic reform and 
(imposed) economic marginality. Even though individual Muslims also became 
the victims of Fulbe expansion and the discourse involved in these revolts was, 
consequently, marked by contradictions and ambiguities, the ideological 
counter-positions were, at least seemingly, put in sharp and uncompromising 
relief. 
This was also true, though with different ideological reference points, for the 
Tuareg revolt against French colonial rule in Niger (1916-1920), analysed by 
Kimba Idrissa (Chapter 8). Idrissa, in revisiting the famous rebellion led by 
Yakin Kawousan, argues that the ideology of Islam, as represented by the 
Sanûssiya order, functioned mainly as a mobilizing vehicle that rejected any 
blind fanaticism of fighters who wanted to engage in a holy war against the 
infidel. Rather, the alliance with the Sanûssiya was of a tactical nature. Idrissa 
takes issue with Fuglestad's comparison of the revolt with classical forms of 
Tuareg pillaging,122 arguing instead that in Kawousan's case raiding had a 
political purpose, namely the weakening of the colonial enemy. He explains the 
revolt as an anti-colonial uprising against the loss of an aristocratic Tuareg 
hegemony over other cultural communities. This hegemony was based on a 
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political economy involving nomadism, animal husbandry, raiding and slavery 
and grounded in beliefs of cultural superiority and independence of mind, both 
of which were obliterated or jeopardized by famine and the destruction by the 
French of Tuareg economic power through enforced sedentarization and 
subjection to colonial control. Here, too, few if any intermediate ideological 
positions would have seemed possible between the principal adversaries 
involved. 
Ironically, with the chapter by Idrissa the arguments of the resistance 
literature turn full circle as he reintroduces the explanation of rebellions as 
manifestations of anti-colonial, if not fully (proto-)nationalist, uprisings. The 
chapter by Klaas van Walraven about a much later period in Nigerien history, 
the Sawaba revolt during the 1960s, shows, however, that it is impossible to 
generalize about the role of nationalist ideology. Rather than as the exclusive 
result of Marxist-inspired nationalist militancy, the revolt of the Sawabists was 
fuelled by personal aspirations for higher education, access to jobs and social 
advancement coupled with some ideological conviction and pragmatic 
opportunism. Hence, we can concur with the argument by Alexander, 
McGregor & Ranger,123 made in another historical-geographical context, that 
popular motivation for supporting various forms of armed insurgencies proves 
resistant to generalization. 
Moreover, the difficulties scholars have encountered in generalizing 
ideological motivation have increased considerably with regard to the more 
recent cases of armed rebellion to which, as noted above, it is much harder to 
attribute explicit ideological objectives. Richards's study of the RUF revolt in 
Sierra Leone is exceptional here since he argued that, beyond the horrors of 
death and mutilation, the rebel leadership held a clear vision of a reformed and 
accountable state as their ideological objective. This objective was to some 
extent inspired or affected by the populism of Gadaffi's Green Book ideology, 
Pan-Africanist militancy and the writings of an American futurologist, yet could 
not be communicated properly due to poverty, incompetence and sectarian 
isolation. Internally, the rebel movement was driven, like an ‘enclave’ culture, 
by meritocratic and egalitarian ideas about social accountability, which differed 
strongly from the surrounding local society that it had rejected.124 Interestingly, 
Van Acker & Vlassenroot also read an enclave mentality in the aspirations of 
the Mai-Mai militias who mobilized certain traditions and new conditions of 
mobility in a new interpretation of customary defence, based on the social 
significance of the land but with rejection of the local traditional authorities. 
Yet, while displacing power into the hands of these young combatants, militia 
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alliances remain(ed) weak and mobilized and divided in a continual process of 
transformations, on ethnic as well as financial grounds, precluding a common 
ideological objective such as the building of a new state.125 
Consequently, the usefulness of the concept of ideology for an understanding 
of people's imagination of revolt and resistance remains limited. Other scholars, 
notably anthropologists, have therefore resorted to other conceptual angles. 
David Lan's study of spirit mediums had already drawn a lot of attention to the 
role of religious practices in the mobilization of Zimbabwe's peasants for the 
chimurenga.126 It showed how tradition afforded the war a revolutionary 
element – a paradoxical situation that had important implications for the 
struggle and its aftermath, since ‘any attempt to establish political legitimacy 
[would] only succeed if it obtains the endorsement of the ancestors. For the 
ultimate test of legitimacy of any political system is its ability to provide 
fertility, to ensure that the crops grow, that the people prosper and are 
content.’127 That this is or was true not only for Zimbabwe but also other 
African countries is shown in the chapter on Sawaba's revolt in Niger, where 
the ability to muster ‘luck’ and provide good rains and growth represented key 
elements in the regime's survival. African conceptions of political legitimacy 
thus provide their own peculiar dimension to wars of resistance. Bhebe & 
Ranger,128 for example, argued that the rain shrines of Zimbabwe provided a 
view of history that gave a pattern to be followed in the struggle against white 
rule as a whole. These religious dimensions gave Zimbabweans a specific 
relation to the land and held that blood could be spilled to claim it, provided that 
fighters and the land would be ritually cleansed afterwards.129 
However, religion did or does not always play such a constructive role. 
While the Holy Spirit movement of Alice Lakwena represented the political 
manifestation of an Acholi society driven into a corner by Museveni's rise to 
power in Uganda,130 her succession by Joseph Kony proved much less 
beneficial. Kony, like a biblical prophet inspired by his own (quasi-) religious 
rituals and belief-system, wanted to punish the Acholi people for their ‘sins’ in 
the wake of the LRA's failing popularity.131 Similarly, Stephen Ellis's study of 
the civil war in Liberia drew attention to the destructive effects of manipulated 
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religious repertoires.132 In our volume, Seibert's study of Renamo's war in 
Mozambique demonstrates that ritual magic can be helpful in mustering some 
degree of popular support for or acquiescence in an insurgency, however bloody 
its execution. He shows, moreover, that one of the few effective antidotes to 
Renamo's expansion was the involvement of an armed peasant movement, the 
Naparamas, reputedly equipped with rival supernatural powers. 
These various religious dimensions show that, to some extent, acts of 
resistance take place in the realm of the mind. The study by Mbembe, 
mentioned above, argued in this respect that part of the life and activities of 
Ruben Um Nyobè, the source of inspiration of the UPC rebellion in colonial 
Cameroon, revolved around dreams he experienced in the maquis. These 
dreams constituted the rebel's comment on and opposition to colonial violence. 
This, of course, also has some links to the religious dimension discussed above, 
since to the Beti people in Cameroon the world of the night and sleep are 
proximate to death and the invisible world generally. While colonialism 
therefore not only penetrated the physical world of Africans but also touched 
the very foundations of their imagination and pursued them in their sleep, the 
invisible world in turn allowed them to manipulate the ‘economy of the day’ 
and the strategic points controlled by the French administration. This rendered 
dreams relevant to anti-colonial resistance as efforts to control daily, or rather, 
daytime life, to direct the struggle and to heal the community.133 
This naturally extends the concept of resistance considerably. One chapter in 
our volume which contributes to the widening of the resistance notion is the 
study by Jan-Georg Deutsch on the supposed absence of slave resistance under 
German colonial rule in East Africa. Deutsch argues convincingly that slave 
resistance to subjugation mainly took the form of flight. This also puts labour 
migration during early colonial rule in Tanganyika in a different perspective, 
since those who, like the Isaacmans, initially made so much of peasant 
resistance to capitalist encroachment appear to have overlooked the social 
origins of those marginal groups who, at least in East Africa, embraced colonial 
subordination and made early colonial capitalism work. Deutsch also criticizes 
the danger of romanticizing resistance by reading legitimate current concerns 
about the marginality of certain social strata back into African history or, 
alternatively, by making the existence of slave resistance dependent on the 
presence of a genuine Spartacus. 
It is exactly this romantic dimension to resistance that is discussed, from a 
very different ideological angle, in the chapter about Sawaba. Inspired by 
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Colburn,134 Van Walraven argues that the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist dogmas 
that helped Sawaba's leader, Djibo Bakary, to legitimise his invasion of Niger in 
1964 actually amounted to a form of romantic narrative that blurred his sense of 
reality. Colburn argues in this respect that Marxism represents, or represented, 
not so much an explicit and comprehensive ideology stipulating coherent plans 
for reformed government as a millenarian mentalité geared towards effecting a 
radical break with the past. With little precise guidance as to the concrete 
challenges of government, Marxism and its discursive off-shoots functioned as 
a dreamy mind-set inspiring its revolutionaries to behave more or less as 
mystics propagating the possibilities of a simple, Herculean transformation of 
the world they lived in. One could add to this that the associated revolutionary 
perceptions of the nature of chaos, anarchy and violence were necessarily rosy 
in character, attributing good, necessary, even constructive effects to their 
occurrence. Added to the alienating effects of exile that many revolutionary 
agitators experience(d) at some stage in their career, this could contribute 
towards a state of thorough misunderstanding of political reality. Van Walraven 
argues this to be true, as a preliminary assessment, for the leader of Sawaba, 
while concluding that war and revolutionary violence are not romantic at all. 
Furthermore, this romantic dimension does not only create concrete effects 
for the nature, patterns and outcomes of rebellions (Marxist-inspired and other), 
but also has effects at the level of research. Thus, in discussing the concept of 
social banditry, Austin remarked on the romantic element of the masculine 
violence involved, arguing that this can only be redressed by looking at the role 
of women. More generally, he opined that the social bandit represents the heroic 
version of self-help, defying government from a geographically and socially 
isolated position, with his moral purity becoming reinforced by the inevitably 
tragic fate met out to him at the hands of the authorities.135 Not just social 
bandits but even the more technical concept of guerrilla in due course acquired 
such romantic connotations.136 Even when researchers began to detect 
collaborators and pragmatic opportunists making their mark on African history, 
the romantic narrative was upheld and, according to Ranger,137 given a new 
boost with the Isaacmans pleading the case of the masses and their popular 
struggle against colonial capitalism. Inevitably, such romanticism found its way 
even more easily in literary presentations of the African condition. For example, 
novelists living in the relative calm and security of Rhodesia's cities entertained 
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a flawed notion of the chimurenga that during the 1970s began to engulf the 
countryside.138 
While some of the authors already discussed in this chapter make passing 
mention of the romantic narrative, there appears to be need for more systematic 
scholarly attention to this aspect. The attribution of romantic dimensions to 
resistance, revolt, revolution, and even war and violence generally, is, in fact, an 
understudied theme. Lan, in discussing the more peaceful role of spirit mediums 
in mobilizing Zimbabwe's peasantry for the war effort, noted coolly that rural 
folk were ‘organised, mobilised and educated sometimes by gentle means, 
sometimes not’.139 More generally, perhaps Western people in particular are in 
need of a demythologized view of the nature of war and violence. Existing 
attitudes to these dramatic phenomena appear to have become more and more 
romanticized or at least detached from their ugly realities, perhaps in part 
because of the effects of long-standing conditions of peace in the Western world 
itself, but also as a result of the alienating effect of increasingly complex 
weapons technology, which has a tendency to blur perceptions of the act of 
killing140 while not necessarily impairing the attribution of heroism to those who 
perform the deadly act. Media discourse on the role of high tech in the Gulf War 
or in the Western war against the terrorist phenomenon has in this respect been 
illustrative. 
 
 
Memory and heritage 
 
A final issue to be considered in the historical and social study of resistance is 
that of ‘memory’. There is an ideological sedimentation of the impact, or the 
tranformative effects, of revolt and resistance, especially when they have been 
violent and dramatic, on the people involved. This can be recognized in the 
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social, psychological and political domain. In contemporary communities and 
polities in Africa – even, or perhaps especially, in the non-literate ones – the 
stylized and selectively framed social memories of revolt and resistance 
continue to be felt at different levels, either as ideology or as justification for 
new forms of resistance. As Ranger has suggested,141 a heritage of ‘excessive 
violence’ has implications for the legitimacy of subsequent regimes that issue 
from it, as well as for the governability of citizens under it. Cultural factors 
come into play here, as practices of violence – often representing a break with 
the past in terms of their scope and intensity – have a qualitative effect on ideas 
of political order and social cohesion. For instance, the violence of the Dervish 
movement in Somalia in the early twentieth century, while initiating a massive 
rebellion against foreigners, alienated most Somalis who did not adhere to the 
violent and uncompromising message of the movement and created new 
antagonisms between clan groups that were carried well into the post-
independence era (see Chapter 13 this volume). In this sense it is not surprising 
that the movement’s leader, Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan, who was seen by 
observers as the chief initiator of ‘Somali nationalism’, is not well remembered 
by Somalis today. 
A critical factor determining how the memory of resistance by earlier 
generations against colonial rule or other oppressive dominance is 
institutionalized is how the proponents of resistance dealt with the people or 
‘the masses’ on whose behalf the struggle was usually waged. Here a cultural 
analysis alongside a politico-historical one is necessary: movements and acts of 
resistance tend to have resonance when they refer or tune in to the cultural 
values and symbolism that animate people. As Donham suggested in a brilliant 
study of resistance responses of the southern Ethiopian Maale people against the 
violent policies of the Ethiopian revolution, people’s cultural commitments are 
crucial.142 Here the diversity across Africa is great and challenges scholarly 
explanation. It is without doubt that the construction of memories of resistance 
is an ongoing process with political relevance in contemporary African history. 
As the chapters in this volume on Namibia by Melber and Gewald make 
abundantly clear, the ideological manipulation of history – either the German 
colonial mass murder of Herero or the invocation of the ‘heroism’ of the 
liberation struggle of the 1970s and 1980s – is used in the construction of 
legitimacy and power of new regimes in no need of a critical discourse on the 
past. This ‘politics of memory’ itself is a social fact that should receive close 
scrutiny from academic scholars. The different representations of the past 
                                                 
141 Ranger, ‘Afterword’, 705. 
142 D.L. Donham, Marxist Modern. An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian 
Revolution (Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford, 1999). 
36 Van Walraven & Abbink 
advanced by different actors and observers are partly shaped by their 
contemporary concerns but this does not imply that they are all plausible. As 
Cole has suggested, representations of memory narratives exist within culturally 
defined patterns of meaning that are structured by narrative conventions as well 
as by the social context of their telling.143  
There can also be outright disagreement on the ‘facts’ and often this centres 
on who has gained power and who lost. Some events glorified by incumbent 
governments as defining moments in the emergence of the (post-colonial) 
nation are thus rejected by others as disastrous episodes. One revealing example 
is the invocation by the Eritrean government at independence in 1991 of the 
violent bandit and raider Hamid Idris Awate as the national hero who initiated 
the Eritrean armed liberation struggle. Among the Kunama and some of the 
Nara people of western Eritrea, who were the main victims of his murderous 
exploits, he is seen as a notorious butcher of their people.144 In a nation 
emerging from a period of struggle or dominated by a certain ethnic, religious 
or regional group, these issues of memory of whom and for whom are crucial in 
shaping the internal political dynamics of a country.145 
In the case of Zimbabwe, for example, the ex-ZIPRA fighters saw 
themselves, after the 1980 independence, as victims of a war in which tribalism 
at the national level had replaced nationalism and in which they perpetuated 
ZIPRA's struggle.146 But the scope for venting alternative views is often 
seriously limited. As Alexander, McGregor & Ranger147 show, the enactment of 
the ‘official memory’ of the liberation war sought to silence alternative 
memories, such as the recognition of ZAPU heroes who only received scant 
recognition. It will be a matter of the extent to which the political system is 
allowed to be democratic and pluralist as to whether such memories of the 
liberation struggle can (continue to) be monopolized in the face of the 
alternative views being presented. When the state discourse on the memory of 
violence and struggles of the past suppresses alternative views, it not only tends 
to exclude certain others and falsify history but may also engender in itself new 
resistance to its present-day authoritarian policies in other domains. In this 
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process, a post-colonial regime’s ‘amnesia’ may be seen, in turn, to generate 
nostalgia on the part of those constituencies that feel slighted or excluded. 
There is, in addition, a vast range of cultural and socio-psychological effects 
associated with a violent past that are encoded in the social memory. This is not 
limited to the colonial situation but also to preceding experiences of violence, 
oppression or humiliation. Some conquered peoples have episodes in their 
rituals whereby the conquerors – Islamic slave raiders or expanding 
neighbouring despots – are depicted as malevolent spirits or as dogs (as among 
the Malian Dogon). In many areas of East Africa, spirit medium cults multiplied 
after the traditional chiefs were killed or removed by the new authorities. Some 
examples are southern Sudan after the predatory conquest of Mohammed ‘Ali, 
and southern Ethiopia after the conquests of Emperor Menilik II in the late 
nineteenth century. The vacuum left after the decline of divine kings and 
traditional chiefs was filled by an upsurge of crisis cults based on spirit 
possession, as if to reconstitute a nostalgic past.  
A more active recourse to spirit mediums (and ancestors) in actual 
movements of resistance was seen in the well-known example of the Zimbabwe 
liberation war, as described, among others, by David Lan. A cultural resource 
in the specific setting of rural Zimbabwe became an essential asset to a political 
resistance movement and its success. What is interesting is the legitimacy and 
power it gave to the spirit mediums, perhaps ultimately even over and above the 
political authority of the guerrilla movement. This explains why, after 
independence, the new holders of power were criticized for neglecting shrines, 
for failing to thank the ancestors by offering an apology for the violence, and 
thus for not leading the way in cleansing the nation.148 President Mugabe's 
interventions (for example in installing certain shrine keepers) were considered 
wholly illegitimate. Such considerations played a role in the 2002 Zimbabwean 
elections when some people even talked of widespread protests as 
foreshadowing the third chimurenga.  
Resistance studies will enter a new phase when the dominant concern with 
the heritage of colonial rule and the revolts this evoked recede into the past and 
when the already forty-year-long era of independence can be considered by 
itself. In some countries, this time-span has been long enough to have produced 
its own memories of violence and terror. The most gruelling example may well 
be the Sudanese civil war that has, in effect, been continuing since 1956 and 
seems insurmountable except by the secession of the South, which is very 
different both historically and culturally from the North. In some thought-
provoking and sensitive work on the Nuer and Dinka peoples, Hutchinson and 
Jok Madut Jok have demonstrated the deep and often unforeseen socio-cultural 
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impact of protracted conflict on local societies.149 The Nuer example illustrates 
that violence can be too massive and dramatic to allow people to ‘remember the 
victims’ in a culturally proper way. Indeed, they are, as Hutchinson suggests, 
consigned to a social and spiritual oblivion in order to release a more 
destructive use of violence against enemy government troops.150 This will 
reshape the social memory of resistance and probably even impair its 
effectiveness. 
We can thus conclude, with D. Crummey,151 that for modern African history 
the themes of resistance, rebellion and protest are far from exhausted. 
Empirically, new modalities of political inequality, injustice and protest have 
emerged in post-colonial states, and new social dynamics of rural-urban 
relations152 or generational conflict are evident. Theoretically, the old notion of 
the ‘masses vs elites’ has given way to a complex of new contradictions,153 rural 
differentiations and old impermanent articulations. The upshot of this is that the 
significance of resistance as a theme is not reduced, but increased: a newer 
historiography combined with sociological and anthropological insights is 
laying the foundations for understanding resistance in post-colonial states as a 
wider socio-cultural, not only political, phenomenon. In addition, in 
reconsidering resistance in colonial times, there is the need, as argued by 
Stephen Ellis in this volume, to analyse issues such as African intra-elite 
struggles and not just those against colonialism. Those fighting colonial 
governments at other stages accommodated or collaborated.154 Moreover, the 
relation of elites vs non-elites in terms of their differential incorporation in (late) 
colonial states requires a new look, considering for instance that in the 1945-60 
period the relations of cooperation and non-cooperation of Africans and colonial 
regimes became increasingly complex.155 These considerations indeed form the 
background to the present collection of studies. 
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The chapters 
 
The chapters in this volume are based on papers presented at a seminar for 
invited scholars held in October 2001 at the African Studies Centre, Leiden. 
They show a geographical and thematic diversity purposely chosen to reflect the 
empirical range of resistance in Africa. The book’s separate sections reflect our 
interest in the recurring key issues in a comparative study of resistance in 
Africa, but in view of the extensive references to the various chapters in this 
introduction, it is not necessary to describe each one individually here.  
In Part I the historical and in some cases pre-colonial dynamics of resistance 
are discussed. De Bruijn & Van Dijk treat the contestation of Islamic Fulbe 
expansion in West Africa, Ellis reconsiders the complexities of conquest and 
resistance in Madagascar, indicating the internal divisions in Malagasy society 
itself vis-à-vis colonial encroachment, while Aregawi discusses the Ethiopian 
Patriots’ resistance to the Fascist Italian conquest and occupation in the 1930s. 
The chapters in the second part focus more on the internal dynamics and 
contradictions of moments and movements of resistance within colonial 
settings: the rebellion or mutiny of African soldiers in the Dutch colonial army 
in the Netherlands East Indies by Van Kessel, the various responses of 
collaboration or resistance in a settlement in South Africa’s Eastern Cape by 
Ross, and the search for the response of slave groups in German colonial East 
Africa by Deutsch. 
The focus of Part III is on the actual symbolism and use of violence in an 
ideological and practical sense: Van Walraven’s study of the remarkably but 
largely unknown Sawaba revolt in Niger in the 1960s, Kimba Idrissa on the 
early twentieth-century Tuareg revolt against French colonial rule, and Seibert 
on the Mozambican civil war of the 1970s and 1980s. All three cases illustrate 
the essential role of indigenous interpretations and reverberations of power, 
revolt and unsettling violence. 
The final section, Part IV, reconsiders some well-known resistance 
movements and moves back to ‘memories’ of resistance. Gewald and Melber 
discuss Namibia: the former considers the colonial period and its dreadful 
heritage of Herero genocide, while the latter looks at the state-cultivated 
memory of the country’s violent liberation struggle and its highly contested 
representation today. And lastly, Abbink reinterprets the Somali Dervish revolt 
of the early twentieth century, assessing its transformative impact on Somali 
culture and identity and on the political dynamics of Somalia’s currently 
stateless polity. 
In some respects, these studies come full circle to the theme of our title, 
rethinking resistance: both for academic observers and for (the descendants of) 
the people involved. Here the notion of heritage or legacy is important, not only 
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in shaping conceptions of colonial-era resistance movements but also for an 
understanding of the emerging political antagonisms of today. 
We trust that this volume of selected case studies will contribute to 
reinvigorating the study of resistance, revolt and contestation in African history, 
both past and present. The subject is fascinating in its focus on the agency of 
African people shaping their own tormented history and also essential for an 
understanding of the problems and grievances of today in an unequal world of 
struggle and crisis. We do not necessarily want to substitute it for Marx’s old 
idea of class struggle but, in many respects, movements of resistance are the 
motive force of African history. 
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Resistance to Fulbe hegemony in nineteenth-
century West Africa 
 
Mirjam de Bruijn & Han van Dijk 
 
 
African history of the Sahel and Sudan zone appears to have 
been marked by political instability. Resistance to Fulbe 
empires was more common than the main literature 
suggests. The Fulbe are pastoralists and the empires of 
nomadic pastoralists are inherently unstable. The Fulbe 
emirates are often described as having been born out of the 
revolts of religiously inspired nomadic pastoralists against 
oppressive sedentary regimes. However, the resistance 
movements against Fulbe hegemony itself can partly be 
explained as revolts of the originally nomadic population 
who felt their cause was not well defended by the elite of 
these emirates. Opposition to the ideology of Islam inspired 
revolts of non-Islamic groups. These resistance movements 
were also fed by the oppressive nature of the new emirates, 
whose most prominent characteristic was slavery. 
Resistance is expressed in contemporary ritual and oral 
traditions, challenging the official historiography of these 
emirates. Political instability was the norm illustrated by 
three case studies discussed in the chapter.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Fulbe is a collective term for a number of people who are culturally, 
linguistically and politically related and who inhabit a vast area in West Africa 
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and also live in Sudan and even Eritrea. They are known in the literature under a 
variety of names: Fulani, Peul, Haalpulaar and Fellata. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, they gradually migrated into the forest zones of the coastal 
states of West Africa such as Ghana, Benin, and Côte d’Ivoire. Their main 
occupation is the herding of cattle, although nowadays this is often combined 
with cereal cultivation. Throughout the Sahel, they are regarded as expert cattle 
herdsmen. 
The migration of the Fulbe over West Africa probably began during the Mali 
Empire in the fourteenth century, when the empire’s rulers promoted their dis-
persal to prevent them from becoming a threat to political stability. For a long 
time, they remained a minority in most areas. Small groups were already 
familiar with Islam which had entered West Africa via the trade routes across 
the Sahara and from 1700 onwards, they began to become politically dominant 
in many areas. Moreover, the political situation was highly unstable in the 
western Sahel because an invasion by the Moroccans had led to an anarchical 
situation. In addition, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries periods of 
severe drought plagued the region, negatively affecting the political situation.1  
The jihads staged by the Fulbe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
throughout the Sahel and Sudan of West Africa can thus be interpreted as a 
reaction to this political instability. The Fulbe established centres of political 
power, some of which developed into emirates.2 The main nuclei of Fulbe 
power were the polities in the Senegal River Valley, the Fuuta Jallon mountains 
in Guinea, the Inland Delta of the Niger in Mali (Maasina), the north of Nigeria 
and the Adamawa Plateau in Cameroon. In between these big centres there were 
numerous small polities dominated by the Fulbe in the central Gourma of 
present-day Mali, the north and west of Burkina Faso (Jelgoji, Boboola, Dori, 
Liptako), northern Benin (Bornou), the Sene-Gambia, northern Senegal 
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(Bundu),3 and the southern and western parts of present-day Niger (Dallol 
Bosso, Birni N’konni). 
Historians and social scientists have taken the organization and functioning 
of these political formations as their point of departure. The workings of pre-
colonial Fulbe emirates are analysed as if they were a higher order of social 
organization than traditional acephalous segmentary lineage-based societies and 
rule of them tends to be regarded as a management problem. Others analyse this 
form of political and military organization as an organizational device 
permitting ‘predatory accumulation’.4 The jihad is described as a tool for 
establishing power or as a means in itself for spreading Islam.5 
However, by privileging the viewpoint from the political centre over that of 
the groups who were subjugated, and by favouring stability to political and 
military turmoil, these perspectives are one-sided. As is argued below, there are 
a number of structural features that render political entities like those created by 
the Fulbe in the Sahel inherently unstable. Revolt and resistance were a 
structural part of the histories of these emirates and politics was an arena of 
conflict and confrontation with people who were subjugated. Political instability 
was part of normal daily life and determined people’s actions. ‘[R]esistance and 
the creativities that shape resistance have been in place as long as the cycles of 
political and military terror’. People have developed ‘traditions of resistance’ in 
situations of political oppression.6 This resistance and their expression can take 
various forms – from organized armed rebellion, to fleeing to remote areas, and 
the expression in ‘hidden transcripts’7 like ritual, healing practices and 
‘unofficial’ oral traditions.8 
It is difficult to appreciate the importance of revolt and resistance in the 
political developments of this period. There is not much information available 
on the plight of ordinary people and the ways in which they tried to resist 
political oppression, slavery and raiding by the empires. What little is known is 
mostly derived from sources from the political centre, such as court chronicles, 
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correspondence between rulers, and accounts of European and Arab travellers, 
none of whom were in a position to reflect on the perspectives and experiences 
of the common people. In the case of the Fulbe, the literature is very much 
jihad- and Islam-oriented.9 
Three examples are taken in this chapter to illustrate revolt and resistance 
against Fulbe hegemony: the Timbo Emirate in the Fuuta Jallon, the Diina 
Emirate in the Inland Delta of the Niger in Central Mali, and the Futanke 
Empire which followed the Diina and the Bamana Kingdoms of Kaarta and 
Segou in the second half of the nineteenth century. The case studies, set against 
the background of inherent instability in ‘pastoral/nomadic’ Fulbe polities, 
reveal experiences of rebellion and their accompanying violence. We elaborate 
first on this background, then explain the common features of Fulbe polities and 
finally examine various rebellions in these polities. 
 
 
The structural instability of pastoral/nomadic hegemony 
 
A number of structural features could have contributed to the fundamental 
instability of Fulbe states in the nineteenth century. Any state is, in principle, 
liable to collapse under the impact of revolt and resistance but those established 
by pastoralists are inherently more likely to disintegrate than others.10 This 
instability emanates from the political ecology of pastoralism that prescribes a 
mobile mode of exploitation of resources and a flexible political organization. 
According to evidence from other semi-arid regions of the world where 
pastoralism is the dominant mode of production, pastoral economies cannot 
exist in isolation because of high risks in the production environment. To gain 
access to cereals, pastures and water, nomadic pastoralists need to engage in 
relations with sedentary peoples through trade, conquest or subjugation, and 
especially so in periods of crisis.11 
Trade relations tend to be unfavourable for pastoralists since they want to 
exchange animal products for basic staple food. In times of ecological crisis, 
frequently experienced by most nomadic pastoralists who inhabit harsh and 
extremely volatile ecological environments, the rate of exchange of animal 
products against cereals drops enormously,12 and this can lead to a rapid 
depletion of their assets. Under ‘normal’ conditions, however, the caloric terms 
                                                 
9 G. Nicolas, ‘Le Modèle’, 584. 
10 A.M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World (Cambridge, 1984). 
11 Ibid. 
12 J. Swift, ‘The Economics of Production and Exchange in West African Pastoral 
Societies’, in M.A. Adamu & D. Kirk-Greene (eds), Pastoralists of the West African 
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of trade (the number of calories in cereals one can get in exchange for a calorie 
from animal products) are quite favourable for pastoralists.13 To mitigate the 
high risks associated with equal exchange of animals for cereal products, one 
solution is to subjugate a cultivating population so as to have a source of labour 
for food production. An example of this is the oasis system in the Sahara 
worked by Tuareg slaves14 which required little political organization. However, 
in most cases an elaborate political and economic organization was needed to 
ensure hegemony.  
The creation of a state-like structure by pastoralists tends to marginalize the 
pastoral way of life and can lead to the disengagement of the pastoral elites 
from the nomadic population. Historically relations between nomadic 
pastoralists and the state have always been difficult. A nomadic pastoral 
lifestyle does not fit the needs of sedentary political entities very well since they 
require the mobility of populations to be curtailed for political and military 
purposes. The levying of taxes on cattle, for example, undermines the viability 
of pastoralism. Pastoralists were often moved to the margins of political power 
even within the empires of their own creation, being encapsulated in a strict 
hierarchical order. In a number of cases, this inequality led to the collapse of 
polities under the pressure of internal rebellions of the nomadic pastoralists.15 
The Fulbe, who were the major players in these jihads, were indeed mobile 
pastoralists and found themselves marginalized in the nineteenth century Fulbe 
states.16  
This structural inequality may also have served to divide risk positions. 
Substantial effort has to be invested to reduce the risks of the ecological 
environment in which nomadic pastoralists live. Trade and political hierarchies 
can divert risk to lower-status groups17 and this in turn increases the potential 
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for revolt against the system. One would expect the oppressed and often-
enslaved groups who had the highest risk position and related lack of wealth to 
become part of uprisings and resistance against the dominant groups. 
Pastoral/nomadic polities are often situated in harsh ecological areas, making 
it hard for these polities to produce enough to feed their populations and to keep 
the hierarchy in tact. In the past, the semi-arid climate and the soil quality did 
not permit a significant increase in production and the creation of a surplus to 
maintain the state apparatus. Trade contributed very little to the revenues of the 
state.18 Therefore, the revenues of the state were based on taxes and control over 
the labour of subjugated people. There was a permanent demand for slaves 
caught during raids and wars. In itself, this may have been a source of political 
instability and the jihad may have been an ideological masquerade for this 
situation of inequality and warfare, by providing a raison d’être for slavery 
(they were pagans)19 and a ‘vraie morale de la guerre’ (the promotion of Islam 
and the fight against infidels). In such circumstances, struggles between rivals 
can be expected.20 
Thus, it may be argued that pastoral polities were inherently unstable and 
that revolts and rebellions were part of political life. In this chapter we further 
investigate whether there was indeed opposition to Fulbe hegemony in 
nineteenth-century West Africa, and if so, how these revolts were organized, 
which groups revolted and what their objectives and motivations to do so were.  
 
 
The Fulbe emirates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
 
Although each of the Fulbe emirates discussed in this chapter arose under 
specific conditions, they shared a common socio-economic and ideological 
motivation. The origin of most of these states was in fact a revolt against vested 
political and economic powers that opposed the economic and political  
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Développement, 16, 3-4 (1984), 553-81. 
  
 Resistance to Fulbe hegemony in nineteenth-century West Africa 49 
 
 
Map 2.1  West Africa: Nineteenth-century Fulbe emirates 
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ambitions of an upcoming minority. For example, the Emirate of Timbo in the 
Fuuta Jallon developed from a revolt by Islamic Fulbe against their oppression 
by pagan Pulli (non-Islamic Fulbe) and Jallonke (the original inhabitants of the 
Fuuta Jallon). This emirate was, in fact, a federal state of nine provinces. Later, 
due to strife between two branches of the royal lineage, a system for the rotation 
of office between these branches was set up. This led to an almost permanent 
state of civil war since none of the parties was inclined to respect the system, 
which considerably weakened the power of the political centre.21  
The origins of the Maasina Emirate in the Inner Delta of the Niger are also 
found in rebellion, this time against the Bamana Kingdom of Segon, a political 
power that controlled the region from outside. For some time, groups of Fulbe 
had been dominant in parts of the delta, hereby creating a complex hierarchy 
dating back through several waves of conquest.22 However, due to internal 
warfare they were never able to organize a countervailing force against the 
Bamana Kingdom. In 1818, an Islamic cleric named Aamadu Hammadi Buubu 
united the Fulbe under the banner of Islam and fought a victorious battle against 
the Bamana and their allies. He subsequently established his rule in the Inland 
Delta and the adjacent dry lands east and west of the delta. This state appears to 
have had tight control over its core area, as is testified by the fact that its 
political and economic organization is still visible today in the organization of 
agricultural production in the Inland Delta. Nevertheless, the hegemony of the 
emirate was constantly threatened. During the reign of Aamadu Aamadu, the 
grandson of Sheeku Aamadu, internal contradictions weakened the emirate to 
such an extent that it became easy prey for the forces of the Futanke, which 
subsequently overthrew the Maasina Emirate.23 
The character of the Futanke Emirate was somewhat different, although its 
founding was related to the conquest of the Maasina Emirate and the Bamana 
Kingdoms of Segou and Kaarta in the aftermath of a movement for reform. 
Threatened by French colonial forces while at the same time being supplied 
with firearms by them, the Futanke staged a jihad to fight paganism and the 
competing Islamic brotherhood of the Tijannya. Its founder, El Hadj Umar, an 
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Islamic reformer originating from the Fuuta Tooro on the banks of the Senegal 
River, died fighting against rebels shortly after his forces defeated the Maasina 
Emirate. After El Hadj Umar’s death, the emirate was divided in three and ruled 
by his sons. These three units – with Nioro, Segou and Bandiagara as their 
capitals – suffered political instability and were added to the French colonial 
empire within three decades.24 
These three emirates were structured in similar ways and were based on the 
same religious and political ideologies. They developed political hierarchies and 
economic organization that may be typified as being slave-based. The strict 
hierarchy was based on the structural inequality of different social groups. This 
did not, of course, mean that there were no internal differences or that social 
mobility did not occur.  
The most important distinction was between noblemen (free people) and the 
non-free. The noblemen consisted of the ruling class of political overlords and 
Islamic clerics. The pastoral population, who helped them come to power, 
formed a group of vassals to the political elite. They were considered noblemen 
though in reality their political influence was minimal. The conquered 
populations were reduced to servitude or slavery and more slaves were captured 
in order to provide enough labour for the functioning of the economy. In 
addition, there were groups of bards, courtiers and artisans who occupied an 
ambiguous political and social position. The political elite and Islamic clergy 
exploited the rest of the population. The various population groups under their 
command were dependent on this elite for military protection and religious 
services. The vassals were important for warfare, the slaves for all the work. 
This form of oppression and the related excessive differences in wealth may 
have been an important reason for resistance, although the most oppressed were 
the last to revolt because they simply had neither the means nor the organization 
to do so.  
The historiography of these emirates concentrates on the political elite, the 
way in which they came to power, their administration and the role of religion 
in life and administrative affairs, and the economics of trade and taxation that 
formed the economic basis of these polities.25 The basic picture emerging from 
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this body of literature is that after an initial period of conquest (jihad) and 
skirmishes to establish control over the rebellious groups in the periphery, some 
kind of political unity was established. The pastoralists forming the backbone of 
the conquering groups produced a political elite that settled in town and 
governed the realm. The debate on these ‘aristocracies’ centres on the issue of 
whether the ruling groups were new formations or a return to pre-existing ruling 
lineages.26  
For a number of reasons, this picture is not satisfactory. The whole debate on 
Fulbe statehood and aristocracy, while interesting in itself, does not address 
questions about the issue of political stability or the position of non-free people 
in these polities. Yet there are both empirical and theoretical arguments for 
broadening the debate to include these questions. In the first place, a number of 
Fulbe emirates were severely shaken by rebellions, and even succumbed due to 
a combination of outside pressures and internal weakness. The prime example 
of this evolution is the Maasina Emirate, which gave way to the Futanke 
Emirate. The collapse of the social and economic order in the periphery of the 
Maasina Emirate at the time its political centre disintegrated also shows its 
internal weakness.27 
Secondly, while establishing their hegemony, the Fulbe defined a strict 
social hierarchy and had to impose limitations on all kinds of economic and 
trading activities. The freedom for pastoralists to move around was curtailed in 
order to ensure the smooth functioning of other production activities such as 
cereal cultivation and, in the case of Maasina, of fishing activities. Economic 
activities had to be controlled to ensure a constant flow of taxes and 
commodities to the state apparatus and the standing army, especially for the 
cavalry.28  
Under Futanke rule, some of the millet harvest in Kaarta was destined for the 
army. In Maasina a considerable force was needed to ensure the protection of 
the livestock herds when they were pastured on the dry lands outside the Inland 
Delta of the Niger.29 These measures met with resistance from those groups in 
society who had to participate in new designs for their social and economic 
lives that were not of their own making. For example, coalitions between 
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pastoralists, free cultivators and slaves were formed to fight invading nomads 
when the central power no longer functioned.30 
Thirdly, despite the fact that very little is known about the experiences of the 
people involved, it appears there was considerable resistance to the forced 
acceptance of Islam by these emirates. For example, many nomadic Fulbe, 
predominantly Wodaabe fled northern Nigeria when their liberty was curtailed 
and they were forced to convert to Islam following the jihads instigated by 
Usman Dan Fodio from Sokoto.31 Conversion to Islam meant not only changing 
one’s religion but also submitting to rules dealing with all aspects of social, 
political and cultural life. Certainly, when the new rulers enthusiastically 
introduced their agenda for social and economic change in the early years of 
these emirates, they met with resistance and revolt. However, it is difficult to 
dissociate resistance against Islam from politics, since Islam was at the same 
time the prime ideological motivation to subjugate or enslave these pagan 
populations. People preferred to stick to their pagan beliefs partly because they 
did not want to be dominated and turned into slaves. 
 
 
The Emirate of Timbo in the Fuuta Jallon, Guinea 
 
This emirate was the first of the Fulbe emirates in West Africa, originating in a 
jihad fought in the first half of the eighteenth century. Malinke and Fulbe 
Islamic believers went to war against the animistic Fulbe (Pulli), the Jalonke 
and other pagan populations. After the victory of the partisans of Islam, an 
Islamic theocracy was imposed on the subjugated populations in the region. The 
first ruler took the title of Almaami32 and resided in Timbo. People who had 
resisted the jihad were deprived of their rights to land except for a small piece 
for their own subsistence, and were reduced to servitude. The nomad Pulli lost 
all freedom of movement and the Jalonke lost their noble status and became 
slaves (maccube).33 
In the adjacent provinces of the Fuuta Jallon. The Malinke almaamis, not the 
Fulbe, were in power. These almaamis were far more tolerant than their Fulbe 
counterparts who dominated most of the other provinces of the empire. For the 
Malinke, Islam was mainly a vehicle for their commercial aspirations and the 
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repression of their opponents was not a major concern. However, the Fulbe 
almaamis gradually penetrated this region and submitted it to more stringent 
control. They followed a policy of divide and rule by carefully subdividing the 
various provinces under their rule and adding a hierarchy of chiefs who lived 
lavishly at the expense of their subjects. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, discontent among the common 
people increased. Division of the leadership of the Fuuta Jallon between two 
different branches of the Fulbe royal family – each with their followers – was 
perpetrated at provincial and village level, increasing the pressure of the 
political class on their subjects. Political oppression mounted, resulting in a loss 
of freedom for many of the movement’s followers. The almaamis became 
exploitative and imposed high taxes, and they lived for their own pleasure 
instead of living according to Islamic rules. This state of affairs led to a popular 
resistance movement called Hubbu (‘those who refuse’). The movement 
developed only gradually up to the middle of the nineteenth century but it 
persisted for almost forty years. However, it never succeeded in reaching its 
objectives and ultimately, resistance turned into banditry.  
The leader of the Hubbu movement, Alfa Mamadu Dyuhe, was an outsider 
and did not belong to the political elite of the Fuuta Jallon. He was the son of an 
Islamic scholar who travelled from the Seeno east of Maasina (probably with 
his followers and taaliibe)34 to the Fuuta Jallon and established himself in 
Timbo. Alfa was a pious Muslim and well respected for his intelligence. He 
became a fervent opponent of the almaami because of its exploitative regime, 
which he considered to be in conflict with Islamic ideology. 
Finally, Alfa Mamadu Dyuhe had to seek refuge in the mountains of the 
neighbouring province dominated by Malinke and refugees of the almaami 
regime where he had many followers among the oppressed and marginalized. 
The majority of the movement were nomadic pastoralists, Pulli and Fulbe, such 
as slaves who had fled their masters. The movement was engaged in full-scale 
conflict with the almaami and even conquered the capital of the empire, Timbo, 
just before the death of its leader. In the end, almaami from other branches of 
the royal family chased them from the capital. Nevertheless, this defeat did not 
mean their disappearance and the movement continued to exist for forty years. 
Ultimately, Samoori, king of a neighbouring Bamana kingdom, stamped out the 
unrest because it continually made trade routes insecure.35 
 
                                                 
34 Taaliibe is a word borrowed from Arabic meaning pupils. 
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A number of aspects of this rebellion deserve more detailed attention. In the 
first place, resistance originated from within the empire and was born out of 
widespread discontent with the behaviour of the Fulbe political leadership. High 
taxes seem to have provided the main economic motive to stage the rebellion, 
and this excessive taxation as well as the oppressive political structure were 
seen as a result of the corruption of the state. 
Secondly, though composed of people who were marginalized from a social, 
religious and ideological point of view, the movement aimed at a more pure and 
uncorrupted form of Islam. Its dominant objective was not a return to paganism 
but instead to conquer and purify the state and promote egalitarianism 
(however, it seems that some were more equal than others). A reduction of the 
tax burden and the abolition of fines were the prime measures taken in the areas 
controlled by the Hubbu. Slaves were part of the movement but there was never 
any move to do away with slavery or to change the status hierarchy. Those who 
profited most from the rebellion were the bush Fulbe who were able to escape 
the exaction of the political elite. 
Motivations for the rebellion were thus economic and ideological. A third 
motivation may have been frustration linked to the inferior social position of 
Hubbu leaders. Rivière cites Marguerite Verdat to illustrate this point by 
imagining the reasons of one of the leaders for continuing the Hubbu rebellion: 
‘il est incontestable que Tierno Aliou a souffert de la médiocrité de son origine, 
- matériellement... mais surtout peut-être dans son orgueil. Nul doute qu’un 
complexe d’infériorité n’ait pesé longtemps sur lui et ne l’ait poussé à chercher 
passionnément à rompre le barrage que sa naissance mettait à son 
ambition...’.36  
This rebellion was negatively regarded by neighbouring Malinke kingdoms 
and the British and the French on the coast. They feared the impact of this 
movement on trade relations in the region, as did Samoori Touré who, as we 
have seen, ultimately quashed it. These negative perceptions could be why so 
little attention has been devoted to the rebellion. It was a movement directed 
against the logic of oppression by a central state. Taxation formed the basis of 
the French colonial empire so it is logical that colonial writers and historians of 
the Fuuta Jallon virtually neglected the movement.37 Only in a post-colonial 
context under the dictatorship of Sekou Touré, who also wanted to do away 
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with the traditional leadership of the Fulbe almaamis in the Fuuta Jallon, did 
studies by Guinean scholars of this movement begin to appear.38 
 
 
Maasina or Diina, the Inner Delta of the Niger 
 
The Maasina Emirate, also called Diina (‘religion’ in Arabic), was established 
by the Fulbe jihad led by Sheeku Aamadu. In 1818, his forces won a decisive 
victory over the troops of the Bamana Kingdom of Segou. This jihad was 
inspired by events in northern Nigeria where an important scholar of the time, 
Usman Dan Fodio, established an Islamic empire with Sokoto as its capital. 
Sheeku Aamadu was but one of the several potential leaders in Maasina, the 
Inland Delta of the Niger, where the division of power was infinite and divided 
between several Fulbe, led by animist ardo’en39 and Sonrai lineages.40 The 
different ardo’en fought continuously against the Bamana and their king, Da 
Monson, who ruled south of the delta in Segou. This chaotic period in which 
banditry, raids and violence dominated daily life produced important oral 
traditions and heroes41 and is today known by the Fulbe as the jahilaaku, the 
time before the Diina or the introduction of Islamic rule. The jihad of Sheeku 
Aamadu was launched at an ideal moment to resist definitively Bambara power 
and to implement law and order through the rule of Islam in the Inner Delta. 
One of the characteristics of Sheeku Aamadu’s rule was his drive to order 
life according to a strict regime of rules and laws organizing the structure of the 
rural areas. He introduced semi-sedentary pastoralism (though this may have 
been underway anyway) and forced the nomadic pastoral groups to settle not 
only in the Inland Delta of the Niger but also in the adjacent areas both east and 
west of the delta. A system of transhumance was put in place, and other 
productive economic activities such as cereal cultivation and fishing were 
structured in relation to each other.42 In current historiography, this scheme for 
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natural resource management has been labelled ‘Diina’ and has become 
synonymous with Fulbe hegemony in the delta and everything attached to it. 
The period of the Maasina Empire was in some ways a break from the past but 
the previous anarchistic situation was probably related to the political ecology 
of the region in which pastoral production played (and still plays) an important 
role. 
It thus seems plausible that the Maasina Empire was also unstable because, 
especially in peripheral areas, attempts to control natural resource management 
and herd movements ran counter to the basic strategy of herdsmen to respond 
flexibly to highly variable pasture conditions.43 This analysis goes against the 
dominant view of the Diina as having a natural resource management system 
aimed at the promotion of the interests of pastoral nomads who formed the 
backbone of the empire. Though we have found no explicit descriptions of 
nomadic resistance to Maasina,44 it can be argued that the Diina did not promote 
their interests.45 Another element of this form of state-building was the 
campaign begun by Sheeku Aamadu to bring Islam to all villages and cattle 
camps, with villagers being enslaved if they did not submit. During the 
                                                 
43 It is therefore paradoxical that in the literature related to ‘development’ the structural 
and functional aspects of this system are central (see Vincent, ‘Pasteurs, Paysans’; 
Gallais, Le Delta Intérieur; Gallais, Hommes du Sahel; M. Forget, ‘Populations et 
Genres de Vie dans le Kounary (Cercle de Mopti, Soudan)’, in Galloy et al. Nomades et 
Paysans, 159-234; R.M. Moorehead, Structural Chaos: Community and State 
Management of Common Property in Mali (Brighton, 1991); M.D. Turner, Life on the 
Margin. Fulbe Herding Practices and the Relationship Between Economy and Ecology 
in the Inland Niger Delta in Mali (Berkeley, 1992); T. Vedeld, Village Politics. 
Heterogeneity, Leadership, and Collective Action among Fulani of Mali (Ås, 1997). 
The Diina is now being described as a balanced indigenous pre-colonial system of 
natural resource management corrupted by colonialism and the modern Malian state. 
The inherent contradictions and weaknesses when attempting to control land use in a 
situation where climate variability and risks associated with agricultural production are 
so high are completely neglected in this description (see Van Dijk, ‘Ecological 
Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’). Its contemporary dynamics, 
under the impact of political change, colonialism and the penetrating market economy, 
are invariably valued as negative. This is often justified because current tendencies 
seem to reinforce the positions of those who are already powerful and wealthy (see for 
example, Gallais, Hommes du Sahel). However, this may be a continuation of the 
situation as it was in the past. 
44 Writing on the Guimballa (the northern part of the Inland Delta), Vincent remarks 
‘Les combats des chefs Peuls contre Cheikou Ahamadou sont la source de toutes les 
légendes que les griots racontent encore’. Unfortunately, these oral traditions have not 
been published. Vincent, ‘Pasteurs, Paysans’, 53. 
45 De Bruijn & Van Dijk, ‘State Formation’; Van Dijk, ‘Ecological Insecurity’. 
  
58 De Bruijn & Van Dijk 
nineteenth century the number of slaves increased enormously in the Inner 
Delta and they formed the backbone of the empire’s economy.  
Such a rigid reordering of the economic and social structure of the area did 
not of course go without resistance. In the literature, the Maasina Emirate is 
presented as being successful in establishing its hegemony in the area. Never-
theless, on further inquiry it appears there was fierce resistance to the empire 
from the beginning to the end. For example, the ‘official’ history of the empire 
compiled by Ba and Daget reads as a succession of campaigns against opposing 
forces to the central power both from inside and outside the core of the 
emirate.46 
The success of these opposition groups was related to the support they 
gained from outside forces, as a movement in the northern part of the delta 
shows. Around 1820, Al-Hussein Koita fiercely resisted the power of Sheeku. 
Brown describes him as follows: 
 
A Pulo of the Diawando caste (who) apparently gathered… [a] following in the 
Fittuga…although his intentions and relationship to Shaykh Ahmad’s movement are 
not clear. The movement, however, was clearly seen by Shaykh Ahmad as a form of 
threat, for he sent an expeditionary force, led by his cousin, ‘the son of his paternal 
uncle’, Al–hajj Sa’id, against Husayn whose movement was destroyed in 1822-3.47 
 
The Koita clan in Fulbe society was responsible for trade and, as Stewart 
remarks, trade was hampered by the rigid political and economic order Sheeku 
Aamadu introduced into the area.48 This could have been the reason why the 
Kunta, the ruling groups of Arabs in the Azaouad (Timbuktu), supported Al-
Hussein Koita and tried to mediate for him. Koita asked a member of the Kunta 
clan for advice and was told: 
 
We are always remembering you and constantly we are asking God to give you 
victory and backing. We are going to write to al-Shaikh Ahmad Lebbu, 
recommending him to pay attention to you and to entrust you with the 
administration of the area (in which you reside [Fittuga]) 49  
 
The Kunta did not want Sheeku Aamadu too close to their own sphere of 
influence and at the same time they wanted to retain access to the Inland Delta 
                                                 
46 Ba & Daget, L’Empire. 
47 Brown cited in Stewart, ‘Frontier Disputes’, 505. 
48 Johnson, ‘The Economic Foundations of an Islamic Theocracy’, 490, mentions that 
there were virtually no exports from the Maasina Emirate and that consequently 
restrictions were imposed on imports and taxes were levied on transit trade. 
49 Stewart, ‘Frontier Disputes’, 505. 
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of the Niger in order to keep their trade routes open. By supporting opponents, 
they tried to maintain some measure of control over the area and its economy. 
As Stewart explained it: ‘…the object of such a policy would be to undermine 
Shaikh Ahmad’s zealous programme of reform which seems to have offended 
‘Abdullahi’s (Kunta) real compassion for the unlettered folk who were being 
persecuted and which also clearly threatened Kunta commercial interests on the 
Niger Bend’.50  
Somewhat later, in 1825, the Kunta supported another revolt close to the 
political centre Hamdallaahi. This revolt ‘was led by Galajio (jalajo b. bodejo) 
[Guelaajo] who had joined Shaikh Ahmad’s [Sheeku Aamadu] movement 
shortly after his jihad began, embraced Islam and joined his previously 
conquered Bambara lands in Kunari with those of Sheeku Aamadu. He asked 
his former master from Timbuktu for support against Sheeku Aamadu. They 
were defeated finally and fled to the east where they were received by Gwandu 
and settled in what became the Kunari Emirate (1840)’.51 In the official 
historiography Guelaajo is depicted as a malcontent ruler who opposed the 
regulations of Sheeku Aamadu. His greatest misfortune was that his realm was 
halved in size. 
 
The periphery of the Diina 
One of the weak points of the organization of the Maasina Emirate was its 
dependence on different ecological zones that, because of their vastness, were 
barely controllable. The Inner Delta of the Niger could not sustain the herds 
during the wet season and floods made the area unsuitable for pasturing 
animals. These animals were then led to the dryland zones east and west of the 
delta, zones not automatically part of the emirate and that cannot be considered 
as having been incorporated in the Maasina Emirate. 
Nevertheless, there is a tacit assumption in the literature that the sphere of 
influence of the Diina extended over these areas. For instance, the Hayre Seeno 
area to the east was already a Fulbe-dominated area before Sheeku Aamadu 
attained power. Some of these Fulbe chiefs willingly submitted to their new 
leader, whereas others did not. An example of the latter is Ba Bulkaasum52 who 
refused to accept the leadership of Sheeku Aamadu. According to the oral 
traditions gathered in the region, the main argument used for his refusal is that 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 506. 
51 Ibid. 507-8. 
52 De Bruijn & Van Dijk, ‘Power and Ecology’; C. Angenent, A. Breedveld, M. de 
Bruijn & H. van Dijk, Hayre, Vertelling van een Nomadisch Koninkrijk (Rijswijk, 
1998). 
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The Fulbe chief of Booni, Hamady Yero Dicko, on horseback  
Source: Le plateau central nigérien by Lt Louis Desplagnes (Paris, 1907) 
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he did not want to submit to another Islamic leader, since he was one himself 
with a longer tradition. He subsequently left the area. 
Towards the end of the heyday of the Diina, when the regime was becoming 
increasingly oppressive and exploitative, popular movements started to appear. 
The story about Maamudu Nduuldi, a pastoral leader in the middle of the Niger 
Bend in Booni, is clearly resonant of growing discontent. Maamudu Nduuldi is 
known as a hero with magical powers who fought and defeated the intruding 
Tuareg from the Niger Bend several times.53 His movement developed in protest 
at the difficult economic conditions. Not only nomadic pastoralists but also 
runaway slaves of the Fulbe and Tuareg joined his forces, and impoverished 
sedentary cultivators united under his banner. According to local traditions, he 
brought prosperity by distributing the booty his army collected during its raids. 
Eventually he developed into a kind of independent warlord living on the 
fringes of the Diina but opposing it at the same time. He nearly went to war to 
fight the Hayre, the polity to which he belonged. The people here kept to 
magical practices and did not build a mosque or settle in camps. In short, they 
did not adhere to the rules imposed by the Diina. 
 
‘The weapons of the weak’ 
Alongside these violent and open forms of resistance to the Diina, it seems 
plausible that people also had other channels for opposing the state. These are 
not recorded in the literature but analysing contemporary rituals of the region 
combined with their stories about the past reveals some evidence. This is a field 
of study needing more in-depth analysis than is possible here. For example, 
there are important methodological questions attached to the problem of 
whether one can infer the logic and meaning of specific cultural forms in the 
past from their present-day existence and functioning.54 Nevertheless, one could 
argue that these forms are part of a cultural and historical repertoire which 
people draw on for specific purposes. Thus not all that one observes today has 
been ‘invented’, rather, people use memories of the past to solve current 
problems. 
A curious example of this can be found among the Dogon of the Bandiagara 
Escarpment. The Dogon are a group of pagan sedentary cultivators in the 
drylands east of the Inland Delta. Frequently the victims of slave raids, they 
always opposed the Maasina Emirate and the small Fulbe chiefdoms 
                                                 
53 Curiously, these feats have been claimed for the Maasina Emirate as well. In Ba & 
Daget’s book L’Empire, he is described as a warlord serving the empire. However, in 
Booni, the capital of the chiefdom he ultimately founded, any connection with the Diina 
of Seeku Aamadu is denied. Given the chronology, we are inclined to go with the Booni 
version of the story. 
54 See also De Bruijn & Van Dijk, ‘Power and Ecology’. 
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surrounding them. Since they were not able to resist these rulers and contest 
their power militarily, they retreated to the inaccessible rocky areas of the 
Bandiagara Escarpment and Bandiagara Plateau.  
The resentment this provoked among the Dogon is still recognizable in 
various Dogon cultural expressions. During the funerals of old men and 
especially the Hogon (the spiritual leader of a Dogon community), a great deal 
of aggression is expressed against the Fulbe. In one ritual, a dog – representing 
a Pullo – is killed in a particularly violent manner. Other examples of 
resentment are visible in the Dogon mask dances where the Fulbe, both men and 
women, are ridiculed: the mask representing a female Pullo only collects cow 
dung and has no interest in the world except for the back end of a cow; the mask 
representing a male Pullo expresses laziness and stupidity.55 
Possession cults are found everywhere in the region, especially to the 
north.56 During the reign of Sheeku Aamadu, a ruthless campaign was started 
against pagan expressions that were unacceptable to Islam and that could not be 
tolerated as competing religious cults. It seems that Sheeku Aamadu accepted 
only certain forms of possession, for example healing rites, but no others. 
Today, possession cults are accepted healing practices.57 Whether the cultural 
expressions manifested in these possession cults were a sign of resistance, of 
opposition to the dominant ideology of Islam or whether they were accepted and 
integrated in Islam is not clear because both forms of religious expression had 
co-existed before the Maasina Emirate.  
 
These cults must have been brought together in resistance to the force of an Islam 
that sought to take root in the smallest villages. Before this time – much before the 
nineteenth century – Islam had been the religion of princes and had been contained 
in the larger urban areas.58 
 
A story about the confrontation of Sheeku Aamadu with one of the most 
important cult priests of the time suggests that the possession cults were tacitly 
accepted.59 However, this cannot be taken for granted: ‘…the Fula domination 
                                                 
55 M. de Bruijn, W. van Beek & H. van Dijk, ‘Antagonisme et Solidarité: Les Relations 
entre Peuls et Dogons du Mali Central’, in De Bruijn & Van Dijk, Peuls et Mandingues, 
243-66. 
56 Gibbal, Genii. 
57 Ibid. 25. 
58 Ibid. 27. 
59 Similar stories exist concerning the confrontation between Islamic scholars and the 
French colonial regime and between Islamic scholars and other kind of djinns (see for 
example, A.M. Yattara & B. Salvaing, Almami. Une Jeunesse sur les Rives du Fleuve 
Niger (Brinon-sur-Sauldre, 2000). 
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of the last century, a memory still strong in the follower’s minds, had probably 
not been as pacific and conciliatory towards Waada Samba (the priest) and his 
followers as legend would lead one to believe’.60 
Many of these cults’ priests are riimaybe or former slaves of the Fulbe. 
Today the possession cults are indeed presented as a counterculture, which 
distinguishes riimaybe from the Fulbe nobles. This presentation of the cults also 
serves as a ‘reinvention’ of history in which the power of the Fulbe chiefs is 
contested and in which riimaybe heroes are presented as being neglected in 
mainstream history. This contestation of old power relations and the redefinition 
of a riimaybe identity independent of their masters is a field of study that 
deserves more attention. 
 
 
The Futanke Empire 
 
Many regard the Futanke or Toucouleur conquest of the western Sudan and 
Central Mali as a ‘reform movement’. In fact, the jihad led by El Hadj Umar 
Tall was meant to establish the hegemony of a new Tijaniyya brotherhood over 
the dominant Qadiriyya (in Fuuta Jallon, Maasina, Sokoto, the Kunta, etc.). In 
the first instance, it can be interpreted as a resistance movement itself: ‘[T]o the 
ruling groups Umar was a dangerous revolutionary whose activities should be 
curtailed’.61 
By the time he started his campaign, El Hadj Umar was residing in the Fuuta 
Jallon, which he did not subjugate. One of the reasons why this campaign 
developed into a real conquest was the presence of the French, who provided 
the Futanke with weapons through trade with the aim of using them to conquer 
the interior of the western Sahel. The first of El Hajj Umar’s successes were in 
Segou, Kaarta and Maasina. However, internal rivalries between the different 
Futanke leaders led to a continuous struggle for control over the state apparatus 
and the exploitative regime built up in these areas led to further resistance 
against oppression. In Maasina, anti-Futanke resistance came within months of 
the establishment of Futanke rule. El Hajj Umar died in 1864 while fleeing to 
the Bandiagara Plateau (east of the Inner Delta of the Niger) following a serious 
rebellion staged by a coalition of forces of the Maasina Emirate and the Kunta 
federation from Timbuktu.62 After his death, the emirate was divided in three 
                                                 
60 Gibbal, Genii, 34. 
61 B.O. Oloruntimehin, ‘Resistance Movements in the Tukulor Empire’, Cahiers 
d’Études Africaines, 8, 29 (1968), 123-43. 
62 Ironically the Kunta and the Maasina Emirate were opposed during the heyday of the 
Maasina Emirate. 
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parts: Segou, Kaarta and Maasina. In Segou his son, Aamadu, was the ruler, in 
Maasina it was Tijani.63 
The coalition between the rulers of Maasina and the Kunta was finally 
suppressed by El Hajj Umar’s successor, Tijani. In Segou the Diarra family, 
whose government was in exile, led the resistance while in Kaarta, the Futanke 
drove the opposition underground. More resistance came from the Massassi 
dynasty that operated from areas that were not conquered. These various 
resistance groups did not coordinate their actions but operated independently. 
This was partly due to the differences in organization of the various kingdoms 
that were overthrown, and their hostility towards each other, which resulted in 
internal fighting among the rebels. As already mentioned, the Maasina Emirate 
had always been an opponent of Segou’s, and had been fighting against the 
Kunta federation. These revolts could persist and withstand the pressure of the 
Futanke because the French, whose interest in the interior of Africa was 
growing in the second half of the nineteenth century, were providing them with 
arms.64 The French policy was one of weakening the big empire they wanted to 
submit. 
There are various explanations for the reasons for resistance. In the first 
place, it was resistance against outside conquerors but it may also have been 
inspired by the hostility between the various Islamic brotherhoods represented 
by the Futanke (Tijaniyya) and their opponents (Qadiriyya), and finally the 
clashes may have had their origins in ethnic opposition. Evidence of this is 
difficult to find since Islamic rhetoric supersedes any other possible point of 
friction in the available documents that were controlled by the Islamic clergy. 
Based on the few popular sources such as songs, poems and prose of the 
common people (soldiers and the like), it may be concluded that some 
differences did exist on the basis of ethnicity.65 
Pushed ahead by the slow penetration of the French into the interior of West 
Africa and faced with all these pockets of resistance, the Futanke Empire 
remained in a constant state of war and emergency from its beginning until its 
gradual collapse. The string of emirates gradually gave in to French colonial 
forces and in 1893 after the conquest of Kaarta and Segou, the last remnants of 
the Futanke state, Bandiagara, were turned into a French protectorate. In local 
storytelling and oral traditions in Central Mali, the period from 1862 to 1893 is 
remembered as particularly dangerous and violent. Because of the absence of 
control over the peripheral areas, raiding groups of Tuareg and local rulers had a 
                                                 
63 Robinson, The Holy War.  
64 Oloruntemehin, ‘Resistance Movements’, 133. 
65 J.H. Hanson, ‘Islam, Ethnicity and Fulbe-Mande Relations in the Era of Umar Tal’s 
Jihad’, in De Bruijn & Van Dijk, Peuls et Mandingues, 85-97. 
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free hand in raiding and oppression as long as people in their own regions paid 
their taxes, the soldiers and slaves required by the Futanke rulers. The Futanke 
forged coalitions with the pagan Dogon on the Bandiagara Plateau and Fulbe 
from the east to withstand the pressure of the Maasina Fulbe. 
The Futanke were also actively involved in raiding and plundering activities. 
The Inland Delta of the Niger, where the Kunta-Maasina opponents were 
particularly strong, was a continuous battleground and plagued by slave raids. 
The spatial organization elaborated under the rule of Maasina was profoundly 
disturbed and the establishment of the capital of the Futanke in Bandiagara on 
the cliffs allowed them to control areas to the east and to compete for control 
over the Inland Delta.66 This earned their rule qualifications like ‘une guerre de 
pillage et massacre’.67  
Internal resistance from the Futanke themselves against their own rulers also 
existed, though hardly any research has been done on this topic. There is, for 
example, a document written by a maabo, a Fulbe weaver, who fought as a 
soldier in the El Hadj Umar war.68 It was not published during the time of the 
Futanke Empire but it seems that the document was written at the court of 
Aamadu, but was not appreciated. It expresses grievances and critiques the war 
and its associated cruelties. We do not know whether this discontent was shared 
by a wider group of common people, and soldiers that did not want to continue 
the war. It is not known whether these soldiers presented serious resistance to 
Futanke rule or whether their opposition was only expressed in words and 
writing. 
Internal unrest in the Futanke state of Kaarta has also been interpreted as a 
generational conflict. The older generation – the people who were soldiers 
during the conquest of Kaarta – became a wealthy landed elite who managed 
important trade routes and large agricultural enterprises. They opposed the war 
and its cruelties because it hampered their commercial ambitions. The younger 
generation consisted of Futanke soldiers who were newly recruited in the Fuuta 
Tooro and still wanted to fight to defend and expand the empire’s territory and 
have their share in the booty before settling down as a landed elite. This 
generation formed a potential nucleus of resistance against the Futanke Empire 
from within, though for thoroughly mundane reasons.69 
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Discussion 
 
Four elements warrant further discussion. In the first place, sources on revolt 
and resistance from a local or a popular perspective are limited,70 although 
numerous documents describing political unrest and leaders of revolts do 
appear. However, documents we collected in Central Mali only reflect the 
viewpoint of the political elite in power and it is therefore difficult to prove that 
revolts were related to the disparities created by these empires. This relationship 
can, nevertheless, be inferred from the fact that leaders of revolts and resistance 
movements were repeatedly able to mobilize a following of discontented 
people. This is clearly second best to eyewitness accounts. The other way to 
trace the existence of a counterforce is to look at the hidden transcripts in the 
form of ritual, storytelling and other cultural expressions. As we have indicated, 
there are methodological difficulties attached to this approach. 
The second issue is that it is equally difficult to unravel the real sources of 
discontent. Often in official historiography, the propagation of Islam is the 
prime motivation for undertaking a jihad or to revolt against corrupt regimes. 
However, in other situations in West Africa, people also went to war for more 
mundane purposes unrelated to this ideology. In short, religion was not the only 
reason for revolt. Economic motives must have been equally important and the 
collection of booty was a widespread phenomenon in the Sahel and Sudan 
zone.71 As Hanson mentions, the collection of booty was an important reason for 
new recruits to push for action in Futanke Kaarta. The people following 
Maamudu Nduuldi in the Niger Bend were impoverished and fought in his army 
because it brought in the livestock they lacked. 
Thirdly, there is a definitional problem determining distinctions between a 
revolt or a rebellion and a raid or expedition to collect booty. Differences 
between an organized state and an emirate are also not clear-cut. All three 
empires discussed in this chapter originated in a revolt against established 
powers. Taking a long-term view of their history, political stability was the 
exception rather than the rule. In all three cases discussed in this chapter, the 
oppressed who became rebels ultimately became oppressors themselves. To 
remain in power they had to organize the accumulation of resources to maintain 
some form of administration and to feed a standing army.72 This meant that they 
had to suppress their former allies and followers as the very basis of their 
                                                 
70 The sources used by Kane et al., ‘Une Vision Iconoclaste’ and Hanson, ‘Islam, 
Identity’ are exceptions rather than the norm. 
71 Cf. Reyna, ‘Predatory Accumulation’. 
72 For the moment, we skip the issue of ecological instability, which is an important 
additional factor contributing to political instability. 
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power. As an alternative, they had to seek control over labour by raiding slaves 
or attempt to gain control over peripheral areas. In all cases there were costs 
attached to such a strategy because repercussions could always be expected. 
None of the empires found a lasting solution to this dilemma and political 
instability remained a more usual condition in the nineteenth century than 
political stability. This would indeed require a different approach to historical 
research. 
Lastly, something should be said about the role of Islam. Why was Islam 
such a powerful vehicle behind these jihads and later revolts against the polities 
emanating from these jihads? As it is today, Islam provided not only an 
ideological framework but also a set of ideas on how to rule. This ideological 
component was appealing to those who were excluded from participation in the 
corrupt political centre. The political component of Islam provided the idea of a 
‘purified’ state, a clear vision of the role of charismatic leadership, and rules by 
which life could be governed. Ironically these movements aiming at purification 
and emancipation often turned into their opposite. These observations from the 
past are relevant even today for an understanding of all kinds of events not only 
in Africa but also in Central and South-East Asia and recently even in Europe 
and North America. 
From this modest investigation into resistance and rebellion in three areas of 
Fulbe hegemony, it is clear that the Fulbe and their associates were not able to 
establish stable states or empires. In the cases examined in this chapter, not only 
did the inherent instability of a pastoral state play a role but also the social 
hierarchy and its related ‘class’ oppositions. The relations of exploitation 
embedded in these hierarchies and the related feelings of inferiority seem to 
have been an important motive for fighting one’s way up the hierarchy. 
Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between a revolt against an oppressive 
political hierarchy and the more common wish of people in the nineteenth-
century Sahel to exploit another group. It is telling that in none of the revolts 
studied was the basic principle of social inequality questioned. Within the 
Hubbu movement slaves continued to play a subordinate role. The slaves of the 
Fulbe and the Tuareg who supported Maamudu Nduuldi in the Niger Bend are 
still of inferior status in Mali today. 
Often an important drive for these revolts seems to have been an attempt to 
escape from the pressure of Islamic reform. However, in many cases this was 
the ideological justification behind more mundane motivations like the escape 
from economic marginality and the removal of structural limitations imposed 
upon one’s freedom to undertake what one wanted and to raid others who were 
less powerful. 
It is equally difficult to make a clear connection between ethnicity and 
revolts though this may have been important in some instances. The complexity 
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of the various layers of ethnic identities, which arose over the centuries and 
which is largely unknown, is only beginning to unfold through new research. In 
a number of instances the opposition between strangers (conquerors) and the 
original population may have been an important dividing line. In summary, the 
daily reality for the ordinary people living under Fulbe rule in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries must have been one of conflict and political instability, 
in which they sometimes participated actively and of which they were at other 
times the victims. How this influenced their daily lives will forever be hidden as 
there is a silence about their fate in the oral traditions and written sources of 
these times. 
 
 3 
 
 
 
Colonial conquest in central Madagascar: 
Who resisted what? 
 
Stephen Ellis 
 
 
A rising against French colonial rule in central Madagascar 
(1895-1898) appeared in the 1970s as a good example of 
resistance to colonialism, sparked by France’s occupation of 
Madagascar. Like many similar episodes in other parts of 
Africa, it was a history that appeared, in the light of later 
African nationalist movements, to be a precursor to the more 
sophisticated anti-colonial movements that eventually led to 
independence, in Madagascar and elsewhere. In the light of 
the later history of nationalism, however, it is instructive to 
revisit the rising of the menalamba in Madagascar and to 
reconsider the episode.  
 
 
On 22 November 1895, less than two months after French colonial troops had 
taken the Merina royal capital at Antananarivo in their conquest of Madagascar, 
there was a violent uprising in a district immediately to the west of 
Madagascar’s premier city. The violence was directed at local officials of the 
royal government and at prominent Christian converts, but what most shocked 
Europeans was the murder of other Europeans: the local missionary family, 
British Quakers who had lived in Madagascar for more than twenty years. 
William Johnson, his wife Lucy and their baby daughter were hacked to death 
by a mob of perhaps a thousand people. French troops retaliated by laying waste 
the area surrounding the scene of the Johnsons’ murder, burning houses and 
killing people more or less randomly in the belief that severe punishment would 
prevent any repetition.1 Nevertheless, throughout the following weeks there 
were reports from many parts of central Madagascar of local disputes of various 
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sorts getting out of control, fights breaking out at markets, unpopular village 
officials being attacked and church buildings being damaged. In many places 
there were reports of exceptionally serious raids by cattle rustlers, sometimes in 
bands hundreds strong, and some including Malagasy army deserters with 
breech-loading rifles. There were fantastic rumours of impending doom and 
disaster. 
The French were officially committed to propping up the royal 
administration of Queen Ranavalona III, previously regarded by European states 
as the ruler of Madagascar although the state that she reigned over had never in 
fact controlled more than half the island. Her government was also, to a degree 
the French had underestimated, in an advanced state of collapse. The 
establishment of a protectorate was the result of lobbying by the French Foreign 
Ministry, which had recently achieved some success with a similar policy in 
Tunisia and which in principle wished to avoid any more expensive form of rule 
in Madagascar. This policy was contested by others in the administration in 
Paris, however, including some in the war ministry, members of the French 
expeditionary force in Madagascar and the small number of French private 
citizens who were already living on the island, most of them dirt-poor Creoles 
from the island of Réunion.  
In March 1896 there was a wave of attacks on administrative posts of the 
Merina royal government in several parts of the central highland region. The 
attacks were obviously coordinated, to the point that French officials in 
Madagascar sensed at once that this was of a different order from ordinary 
cattle-stealing or even from the attack on the Johnson family four months 
previously. Rumours spread that the rising was secretly being organized by 
Queen Ranavalona, the figurehead of the protectorate government, or by some 
of her courtiers. There were even rumours that British missionaries were in 
league with the insurgents in spite of the murder of some of their own. Although 
these rumours were essentially false, the fact that they were so widely believed 
says much about the nature of the insurrection as well as about divisions among 
the French. This was, after all, the period of the Dreyfus affair, when French 
men and women were bitterly split on a great range of issues, especially those 
concerning the role of the army.2  
The insurgents, who later became known as menalamba (red shawls), were 
to keep some semblance of organization until 1898 and posed a serious  
                                                 
2 S. Ellis, ‘The Political Elite of Tananarive and the Revolt of the Menalamba: The 
Creation of a Colonial Myth in Madagascar, 1895-1898’, Journal of African History 
XXI, ii (1980), 219-34. Among the documents that Dreyfus was accused of having 
given to the German government were those relating to the French invasion of 
Madagascar! 
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embarrassment to French rule. In August 1896, a senior French official on the 
island reckoned that 300,000 people were living in areas under menalamba 
control.3 In retrospect, however, it is clear that there was never the remotest 
chance of the menalamba forcing the French to abandon their aim of exercising 
formal control over Madagascar. On the contrary, the seriousness of the 
uprising caused the government in Paris to develop a more rigorous policy, 
declaring Madagascar to be a French colony and sending a military governor 
with wide-reaching powers, General Gallieni, to sort out the problem.  
While as many as 100,000 Malagasy may have died from violence and 
hunger during the uprising, the number of deaths of French soldiers and 
civilians, more from disease than enemy action, was in the hundreds. The 
enormous difference in casualty figures is evidence of the superiority of French 
arms but perhaps also indicates something about the menalamba. It may, for 
example, suggest that the insurgents did not conceive of themselves as a single-
minded anti-colonial resistance movement. Before exploring this idea further, 
however, it is useful to describe briefly the literature produced by Africanist 
historians on collaboration and resistance between Africans and colonial 
occupiers. 
 
 
Collaboration and resistance 
 
Particular historical objects or phenomena – in this case, the menalamba rising 
– are liable to differing interpretations as times change and new generations ask 
questions about the past that seem most important or interesting in the light of 
current circumstances. Madagascar remained a French colony from the time of 
the menalamba until 1960, and for 12 years afterwards its first post-
independence government continued with many of the policies inherited from 
colonial times. For almost 80 years, there seemed little reason for anyone 
involved in public life to remember the menalamba other than as a reactionary 
opposition to colonial rule by the least educated part of the population of central 
Madagascar. Moreover, many Malagasy historians were Christians, who were 
often nostalgic about the independence of pre-colonial Madagascar but could 
not easily sympathize with those like the menalamba who had burned churches 
and killed pastors.  
It was only after the uprising of 1972, when Madagascar acquired a radical 
nationalist and socialist government, that the memory of the menalamba was 
rehabilitated. The government officially commemorated the tragic anti-French 
insurrection of l947, which resembled the menalamba movement in many ways, 
                                                 
3 P. Bourde, quoted in Ellis, Rising of the Red Shawls, 97. 
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claiming it as a precursor of its own nationalist struggle.4 The first modern book 
on the menalamba was published in 1976 by a Malagasy radio journalist who 
had devoted a series of programmes to the subject, representing the menalamba 
as nationalists who had fought to preserve the island from foreign rule, and 
including a whole series of revolts between 1895 and 1905 within this 
category.5 It comes as no surprise that the menalamba should have been 
identified as nationalists or proto-nationalists at a time when Madagascar was 
governed by a radical regime that based its legitimacy on its rejection of neo-
colonialism. In the years immediately after independence there were many 
African governments and their supporters that identified themselves in public 
with earlier anti-colonial movements. An obvious place to start looking for a 
radical anti-colonial pedigree was in the records of those people who had fought 
against European intruders in the period of conquest or of early colonial rule. 
This was the golden age of African nationalism: the period from 1945 until, 
perhaps, the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980. It was a period when it was 
growingly apparent to people all over the world that colonialism had become an 
anachronism, a politically unjust dispensation whose time had passed. 
Investigating the extent to which Africans had resisted colonialism was thus 
both interesting and politically useful.  
It was in roughly these circumstances that collaboration and resistance to 
colonial rule were constituted as a field of formal historical inquiry by historians 
of Africa intent on recovering the historical records of a continent that 
Europeans had often dismissed as being without history.6 A pioneering work in 
the new history of African nationalism was Terence Ranger’s book on 
resistance to colonial rule in Rhodesia, published in 1967 when Ranger was 
working at the University of Dar es Salaam’s history department, a nursery of 
talented scholars, in a city that was one of the main diplomatic hubs of the 
southern African liberation struggle.7  
From the beginning, one of the key themes of research on this subject was 
the connection between resistance to the imposition of colonial rule (dubbed 
‘primary resistance’ by Terence Ranger) and modern nationalist movements 
(‘secondary resistance’).8 One inclination of nationalist historians was to 
explore the connections between these two generations of resistance movements 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 158-62. 
5 J. Rasoanasy, Menalamba sy Tanindrazana (Antananarivo, 1976). 
6 A notion usefully explored by E. Wolf, Europe and the People Without History 
(Berkeley & London, 1982). 
7 T. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-1897 (London, 1967). 
8 T. Ranger, ‘Connexions between “Primary Resistance Movements” and Modern Mass 
Nationalism in East and Central Africa’, Journal of African History, 9 (1968), 437-53, 
631-41. 
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with a view to determining the extent to which later nationalist movements 
might have been the descendants of earlier resisters, or at least with the aim of 
exploring the ways in which nationalists drew inspiration from earlier examples 
of opponents of colonial rule. Although some prominent commentators pointed 
out that the notions of ‘collaboration’ and ‘resistance’, redolent of Europe in the 
Second World War, were too stark and lacking in nuance to do justice to the 
complexity of most African histories,9 studies based on this approach formed a 
prominent school of writing in African history.   
When I began in 1976 to investigate the history of the menalamba for my 
PhD thesis, it seemed obvious that the movement should in the first instance be 
considered as a case of resistance to colonial rule. I assumed that further and 
more penetrating questions would proceed from this starting-point. It was taken 
for granted by most Africanist historians at that time that people whose 
countries were being invaded by foreign troops intent on taking formal control 
would be naturally inclined to resist this process, so there was little point in 
asking why they were fighting. Ranger’s work suggested that the key questions 
were instead related to the ways in which resisters organized themselves, 
whether and in what senses they could be regarded as nationalists, what the 
results of their struggle were, and what effects it had on later nationalist 
movements. I soon found, however, that the question of who precisely the 
menalamba were and what motivated them was of crucial importance as they 
seemed more intent on fighting certain other Malagasy than they did on fighting 
the French or Europeans more generally. Equally, there were large numbers of 
Malagasy who showed no interest in the menalamba, who were from the centre 
and centre-north of this massive island, more than two-and-a-half times the size 
of Britain.  
I found myself being drawn not so much forward in time, as Ranger’s model 
would imply, in order to look at the effects of the menalamba on later 
nationalism, but rather felt myself pulled backwards, to an examination of what 
sort of society the menalamba came from. The so-called Kingdom of 
Madagascar was something of a juridical fiction. In the eighteenth century, a 
powerful state had emerged in the central region known as Imerina that had 
subsequently expanded rapidly through military conquest. Successive rulers of 
Imerina after 1817 had called themselves kings and queens of Madagascar, 
although in fact they had never succeeded in conquering the whole island. It was 
apparent that the expansion of the Merina state had produced all sorts of tensions 
                                                 
9 For example J. Suret-Canale, ‘“Résistance” et “Collaboration” en Afrique Noire 
Coloniale’, in Etudes Africaines Offertes à Henri Brunschwig (Paris, 1982), 319-31. It 
is notable that Suret-Canale was a veteran communist who had resisted German 
occupation in France during the Second World War. 
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and enmities tending towards social disintegration. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, central Madagascar had witnessed a series of movements of resistance 
to the royal government in Antananarivo including in the form of physical flight, 
occasional armed risings, and endemic banditry. The effective overthrow of this 
government by French forces in 1895 removed the last remaining constraints to 
a large-scale, violent, settling of scores.  
Seen from this perspective, the menalamba movement was not only, or 
perhaps not even primarily, resistance to French colonization but arose from a 
mass of unresolved conflicts whose roots lay in the pre-colonial history of 
Madagascar. Another historian, Gwyn Campbell, has emphasized this aspect to 
the point of doubting whether the menalamba were nationalists at all,10 but this 
is to ignore the politics of the menalamba. There is clear evidence from their 
own letters that the menalamba were nationalists in the sense that many of them 
had a conscious notion of Madagascar as a political unity that should be 
governed by a single monarch, whom they often called Mpanjakan’ 
iMadagasikara. This imagined community under one political rule qualifies as 
nationalism. Madagascar was rather different from many societies of mainland 
Africa in that the Merina Kingdom – alias the Kingdom of Madagascar – 
acquired, before colonial times, many of the hallmarks of what contemporary 
Europeans regarded as a state. It had a monarch situated in a capital city who 
had an overwhelming armed force at his (or, after 1828, her) disposal and a high 
degree of control over a substantial territory, one with an industrious and 
generally fixed population. The second king of the ruling dynasty, Radama I 
(1809-28) was an autocrat who welcomed contacts with the British diplomats 
and missionaries who sought influence in Madagascar at the end of Britain’s 
global war against France. King Radama had heard of Napoleon Bonaparte and 
developed an explicit ambition to be a conqueror like his hero, seeing the whole 
of Madagascar as his natural domain. He was formally recognized by Britain as 
the King of Madagascar in a treaty signed in 1817. Later, France, the United 
States and other Western countries all recognized the government in 
Antananarivo as the legitimate ruler of Madagascar, bringing it within the 
juridical field of the leading powers. Radama and his successors adopted a 
number of European institutions and technologies to strengthen their power, 
including literacy in the Latin alphabet, the institution of a state bureaucracy, 
and a standing army. They even made an attempt at establishing their own arms 
                                                 
10 This is emphasized in a series of articles by G. Campbell: ‘Missionaries, Fanompoana 
and the Menalamba Revolt in Late Nineteenth Century Madagascar’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 15, 1 (1988), 54-73; ‘The Menalamba Revolt and Brigandry 
in Imperial Madagascar, 1820-1897’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 24, 2 (1991), 259-91; ‘The History of Nineteenth Century Madagascar: Le 
“Royaume” or “l’Empire”?’, Omaly sy Anio, 33-6 (1991-2), 331-79.  
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and munitions factories. In 1868-9 the Queen and the Prime Minister converted 
to Protestant Christianity and made it into the state religion, and shortly 
afterwards established a system of compulsory primary education.  
Contemplating this chronicle 20 years ago, not only did it seem reasonable to 
describe the policy of successive Merina sovereigns and their leading ministers 
as a form of nationalism but also it was clear that elements of a nationalist 
ideology had taken root among at least some of their subjects. Even taking 
account of the decline in African nationalism as a coherent political force since 
the 1980s, which has suggested that its roots are perhaps more complex than 
once seemed to be the case, it still seems to me to be justified to describe the 
programme of the nineteenth-century Merina government in this way. The main 
objection that has been made to this is that the government in Antananarivo 
never succeeded in establishing control over more than two-thirds of 
Madagascar, and that it extended its rule by the military conquest of other parts 
of the island that owed allegiance to independent dynasties and other ethnic 
groups outside the Merina heartland. It was, it has been argued, not a national 
government at all, but only claimed to be such. According to this argument, the 
Merina state had conquered a number of independent peoples, thus being an 
empire rather than a national state.11 But the fact that the kingdom in 
Antananarivo inflicted terrible suffering in its campaign to conquer all of 
Madagascar, that it was never fully successful in this aim, and that the 
government increasingly came under the control of a clique of families from the 
central highlands does not detract from the identification of this government as 
nationalist in orientation. Part of the significance of the menalamba movement 
was that it demonstrated how deeply the nationalist idea had penetrated the 
society of the central highlands, the most densely populated area of 
Madagascar. It is not necessary for historians to consider nationalism as a noble 
or liberating force. Moreover, the various political formations throughout the 
island that were conquered by the Merina state did not represent ethnic groups 
in the sense that was to become general later, under colonial rule. The same 
language is spoken in the form of mutually intelligible dialects all over 
Madagascar, and every part of the island was influenced over the centuries by 
other parts of the island. The different named clusters of population at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century consisted of people of diverse origin who 
had adopted collective names in recognition of their political allegiance.12 Many 
of the menalamba who claimed they were fighting to restore a properly  
                                                 
11 Campbell, ‘Nineteenth Century Madagascar’. 
12 Cf. P. Larson, ‘Desperately Seeking the Merina (Central Madagascar): Reading 
Ethnonyms and their Semantic Fields in African Identity Histories’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 22, 4 (1996), 541-60. 
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The menalamba leader Rabezavana, Madagascar, 1897 
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functioning sovereignty to Madagascar were not ethnic Merina in the sense of 
being descended from families that had lived for generations in the central 
highlands around Antananarivo. This is the case, for example, with one of the 
two most important menalamba leaders, Rabezavana. 
 
 
What were the menalamba resisting? 
 
In short, the key question that has been asked of the menalamba is what 
precisely they were resisting. It is clear that this was not only a movement of 
resistance to colonial rule. It was also a campaign against an unpopular 
government that had habitually used extreme brutality, particularly in the 
recruitment of forced labourers, and which in its earlier years had organized 
massive military expeditions that enslaved people on a large scale and 
coincidentally caused numerous deaths from disease and hunger among its own 
conscripts. After 1869 this same regime was associated with an official 
Protestant church that came to be widely resented. The abuses of this state, 
regarded in the emerging system of international law as independent and 
sovereign, provoked the anger of the menalamba, to be sure, just as they had 
provoked outbreaks of dissent, often in the form of flight or banditry, in earlier 
years. But the menalamba were more than bandits, recalcitrants or people 
goaded beyond endurance by material demands. They had a clear political 
ideology which they expounded in the messages they wrote to each other, in 
their public proclamations and in the actions they took. They aimed to restore 
the monarchy, if not in Antananarivo then in another holy place of their 
tradition, in what they regarded as its proper form. This was a movement of 
purification. The insurgents over a very large swathe of central and northern 
Madagascar were not resisting the principle of the Kingdom of Madagascar, as 
it was officially known and as the menalamba themselves sometimes called it, 
but the way in which it had been administered. Indeed, in September 1896 a 
large gathering of menalamba from different parts of central Madagascar chose 
one of their number to be the new king of Madagascar, to replace Queen 
Ranavalona whom they now regarded as illegitimate due to her relations with 
the French.13 This may be contrasted with anti-colonial risings in other parts of 
Madagascar, notably in the south and southeast in 1904-5, which had no 
organizational and little ideological affinity to the menalamba movement. These 
were risings by people who did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the kings 
and queens of Imerina and had no ambition to construct a single state in 
Madagascar. They were motivated most obviously by a refusal to submit to 
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French rule and by protests against forced labour and colonial exactions and 
against the abolition of slavery.  
 
 
The penetration of capitalism 
 
That the self-styled Kingdom of Madagascar, ruled by Malagasy until its 
demise in 1895-6, was regarded by Europeans as a sovereign entity was to a 
considerable extent due to the growing influence of Britain in the Indian Ocean. 
Foreign influence in the formation of states in Madagascar was not in itself new. 
Successive political constructions on the island, going back many centuries, had 
been formed from the interaction between existing rulers and foreigners 
bringing in powerful political technologies, often of a ritual type.14 The 
European traders who frequented the coasts of Madagascar after the sixteenth 
century, buying slaves in exchange for guns, silver coins and manufactured 
goods, can be placed in a history of foreigners whose goods and skills were 
used as materials for political construction. However, King Radama’s treaty 
with Britain in 1817 and the arrival of British missionaries in Antananarivo 
three years later was difficult. It signalled the alliance of a powerful Malagasy 
king who was developing an ambition to conquer the whole island with a 
European state (which had its own political project) able to exert unprecedented 
power in the western Indian Ocean. The British governor in Mauritius in 1817 
had his own reasons for encouraging Radama to become king of Madagascar, to 
be an ally against the French and to guarantee an end to slave exports from the 
whole island. Unlike earlier generations of European slave-dealers and pirates, 
the British wanted not just to trade but also to build a new state, for which they 
offered technical, military and financial help.  
Eighty years after the creation of an Anglo-Merina alliance, the menalamba 
were resisting a form of governance that, while administered by Malagasy, also 
represented a growing European influence. For many of the Queen of 
Madagascar’s subjects the most obvious manifestation of this was the Christian 
church, considered by many to be an essentially foreign form of worship. After 
the 1860s, members of the Merina elite, for whom the church was a key 
structure of political administration, were increasingly likely to dress in 
European clothes, live in European-style houses and have a taste for imported 
consumer goods. The material aspects of the church, including its use for the 
recruitment of forced labourers and army conscripts and for raising a variety of 
taxes, were, before 1895, indistinguishable from its spiritual and ritual aspects. 
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The attempt to construct a Christian state of Madagascar after 1869, that was to 
cause such suffering before its collapse, was itself both a product and gauge of 
the growth of European influence that had a far-reaching effect even before the 
colonial period. The menalamba were fighting a Malagasy elite that they 
considered to have used brutal and unjust methods to enrich themselves and to 
have made common cause with European aggressors. Again, this is apparent in 
their own letters and proclamations.  
If the menalamba sprang from a population that had been abused and 
economically exploited before the imposition of colonial rule, their greatest 
enemies were the members of the Christian elite who had inflicted this on them. 
Royal ministers and officials, encouraged by missionaries to consider European 
styles of consumption and living as virtuous, used their position to increase their 
own wealth and power. This observation could easily lead to a Marxist-tinged 
analysis of the pre-colonial elite of Madagascar as a comprador class, whose 
economic interest in collaborating with foreign capital determined their political 
stance.15 Such a point of view came to be quite widely applied to the analysis of 
resistance in Africa, raising the question of whether people who fought against 
colonial rule were resisting the imposition of foreign domination as such, or 
whether the key determinant was perhaps not in fact the incursion of capitalism. 
In the case of Madagascar, capitalism could be said to have had a clear effect 
before colonial times on the growth of markets and of a property-owning elite 
that traded with the West and made use of international credit.16 Studies of 
resistance to capitalism in this vein often took, in the hands of Marxist scholars 
such as Eric Hobsbawm,17 a greatly expanded notion of political action, based 
on the proposition that infractions of the legal or moral order are tantamount to 
an attack on the political order thought to underpin them. Hence, some studies 
of African reactions to Western encroachment took an extremely broad 
definition of what constituted ‘resistance’, sometimes considered to include not 
only organized military activity against colonial forces but also tax evasion, the 
avoidance of forced labour, flight, so-called ‘social banditry’ and other 
manifestations of a refusal to accept the official colonial order. In this way 
Africanists came to identify, through documents located in dusty colonial 
archives, a whole stream of draft and tax dodgers, vagrants and others who were 
now considered as potential proto-nationalists.18  
                                                 
15 A fully-fledged Marxist analysis is P. Boiteau, Madagascar: Contribution à l’Histoire 
de la Nation Malgache (Paris, 1958). 
16 Cf. T. Ranger, ‘The People in African Resistance: A Review’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 4 (1977), 125-46. 
17 E. Hobsbawm, Bandits (Harmondsworth, 1985). 
18 For example A.F. Isaacman in collaboration with B. Isaacman, The Tradition of 
Resistance in Mozambique: Anti-colonial Activity in the Zambezi Valley, 1850-1921 
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An analysis based rigidly on an identification of people’s economic interests, 
however, does an injustice to historical facts, and particularly the strong 
political or cultural factor in people’s behaviour. (Indeed, what is culture except 
an attribution of meaning to action?) It behoves an analyst to look at the cultural 
forms of behaviour, or in this instance of expressions of opposition to 
government. It was demonstrated on many occasions in the nineteenth century 
that the most effective form of opposition to the government in Antananarivo 
coalesced around an alternative monarch. In more distant parts of Madagascar 
this might be a king having an established legitimacy at least in one locality, 
such as the Sakalava kings on the west coast of the island, but within the area 
which had come under the control of the Merina kings the only politically 
articulate rebellions were those based on an alternative king, such as the 
agitation surrounding the crown prince in the late 1850s, or the revolt in western 
Imerina in 1863-4 where insurgents claimed to be following a king who had 
miraculously resurrected or escaped assassination.19  
The menalamba revolt initially convinced French colonial officials that the 
idea of a Malagasy nation was the construct of a Merina ethnic group (or 
perhaps just of its more privileged strata) that was inveterately anglophile, and 
that the natural allies of France were therefore to be found in other parts of the 
island. This led General Gallieni, the military strong man who defeated the 
rising and attempted to create a model colony in Madagascar, to enunciate what 
he called a politique des races, intended to promote the sentiment of solid 
ethnic allegiances to France in other parts of the island. His idea was to govern 
Madagascar as a series of ethnically homogeneous administrative units, all of 
which he hoped would be better disposed to France than the Merina were. This 
strategy, however, soon encountered the realization that those people deemed to 
be ethnic Merina were the most numerous group on the island, constituting 
perhaps a third of the total population. In addition, their traditions of literacy 
and submission to bureaucratic government and the logic of markets and cash 
payments made the Merina in some ways more useful colonial subjects and 
auxiliaries than were the inhabitants of other parts of the island. This, in time, 
led to the curious situation where families of the Merina bourgeoisie, who were 
generally well placed to derive advantage from colonization, were sending their 
children into the liberal professions and, later, into the upper reaches of the 
administration, but still retained the reputation of being fundamentally anti-
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colonial. Prominent leaders of the nationalist movement which emerged in the 
mid-1940s were Merina aristocrats, including even relatives of the last queen.20 
The prospect of an independence that would restore to power some of the old 
slave-owning families of the Merina elite created a powerful counter-movement 
in some other parts of the island but most noticeably among the descendants of 
slaves in Imerina.21  
Even by the 1940s it was clear that Malagasy nationalism was complex 
enough to include several different strains, only some of which could be 
considered as belonging to the same tradition as the menalamba. At its heart 
was not only an aspiration to independence but also a social struggle between 
Malagasy. The history of the menalamba and the policies used by the colonial 
government to defeat the movement meant that the memory of the independent 
kingdom of Madagascar became an inspiration to nationalists able to point to a 
pre-colonial history of national government. Simultaneously however, this 
history was divisive, since it reminded some social groups of the exactions they 
had suffered under a government dominated by a ruling group of families from 
the central highlands. After 65 years of colonial rule, the island’s populations 
became closer than before to ethnic groups in the modern sense, with a clear 
sense of regional identity and a reinvented history to fit. 
 
 
What is left of the resistance debate? 
 
I have argued elsewhere that a great deal of writing about wars in Africa from 
the beginning of the colonial period until the late twentieth century was 
influenced by the coincidence of Africa’s political independence with the 
establishment of African history as an accepted academic sub-discipline, a 
process which began in Europe in the 1940s, and arguably slightly earlier in the 
United States by way of African-American studies.22 The literature on early 
resistance to colonial rule is a good illustration of how this synchronism 
encouraged a particular view of the past based on a sharp dichotomy between 
what historians have considered colonial and foreign and what they have 
identified as authentically African. An important aspect of historical research is 
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to situate people as far as possible in their own time by trying in the first 
instance to understand what motivates them in their own terms. The danger in 
identifying any group of resisters of colonial rule as proto-nationalists is its 
inherent risk of suggesting that they were motivated by ideas that they did not in 
fact have. Hence, one of the main flaws in the method of identifying primary 
and secondary resisters of colonialism, and attempting to incorporate them into 
a single nationalist narrative, is the risk of anachronism which it carries.  
By the same token, it is probably because of the rapidly changing fortunes of 
African nationalism in recent years that there have been so few studies of 
collaboration and resistance since the 1980s. African nationalism no longer 
appears to be as clearly heroic or progressive as it once did. If the debate on 
collaboration and resistance to colonialism ended rather abruptly, before any 
consensus had been reached or key questions had been really clarified, it is 
perhaps because of a number of contemporary developments which have served 
to complicate our view of the past. I would suggest that the most important of 
these is the onset of a new generation of wars. For example, it was in 1982 that 
armed clashes between rival Zimbabwean nationalist movements began in 
earnest, and within a short time Zimbabwean government forces were 
systematically killing thousands of Matabele people on suspicion of supporting 
the political opposition.23 Although the details of these events were not widely 
known at the time, it was plain that they raised a whole series of questions 
regarding the nature of ethnicity and factional conflict within the nationalist 
movements in Zimbabwe, the country which Ranger in particular had placed at 
the centre of debates on collaboration and resistance. This implied a need for a 
reformulation of discussions about which components of African societies were 
most opposed to colonial rule, and on what grounds, and what the consequence 
of their opposition was. In recent years the number of internecine conflicts in 
Africa has increased. War in Africa has come to seem such a disturbing 
phenomenon not only because of the number of victims it leaves behind, but 
precisely because it can no longer be so easily fitted into an explanatory 
framework.  
The relationship to nationalism of many current wars in Africa is unclear. 
Armed conflicts such as those taking place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Congo and elsewhere today are widely perceived in the West as representing a 
new generation of wars thought to have been caused either by the end of the 
Cold War or by the impact of globalization, or a combination of the two. In an 
alarming number of analyses, these wars are considered a sign of reversion to an 
age-old barbarism said to be characteristic of Africa. This point of view is so 
                                                 
23 K.P. Yap, ‘Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland 
Conflict, 1980-1987’, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam (2000). 
84 Ellis 
prejudiced as to require no further comment.24 In the most eloquent treatments, 
Africa’s new generation of wars is bracketed together with those in the Balkans, 
central Asia and elsewhere as part of a wave of so-called ‘new wars’. This has 
the considerable merit of considering Africa as an integral part of the world 
rather than as an enclave.25 
Such an analysis supposes that a historic rupture occurred in or about the late 
1980s or early 1990s which resulted in a new wave of wars, and that these 
recent wars are of a radically new type. This view, though, does not really stand 
up to scrutiny, at least in the case of Africa.26 It is true that dictators were kept 
in power in Liberia and Somalia with US assistance until 1990 and 1991 
respectively, and that these regimes collapsed more or less with the ending of 
the Cold War when the US government decided that it was no longer in its own 
interest to continue these relationships. In much the same way, the Mengistu 
regime in Ethiopia also finally collapsed in 1991 after the withdrawal of Soviet 
support. In all of these cases, however, military violence had already been both 
large-scale and systematic for years, taking the form, for example, of major 
conventional campaigns in Ethiopia, of substantial ethnic purges in Liberia in 
1985, and of the aerial bombardment of a major Somali city, Hargeisa, in 1988. 
In other words, many of Africa’s most serious wars actually began well before 
the end of the Cold War, even if these conflicts took on new forms in the 1990s.  
Thus, despite arguments to the contrary, Africa’s current armed conflicts go 
back further than the last decade and the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as shown 
in the introduction to this volume, wars of the current generation are often 
directly linked to (or they are even continuations of) struggles that occurred 
around the time of independence.27 This should cause us to ask some new 
questions about the violence which occurred during colonial times and which 
once seemed to be most convincingly explained as resistance to colonialism. 
The nature of the colonial relationship, which has been the subject of much 
recent research in the field of representations and identities, now appears more 
complex than it did three or four decades ago. The colonial bond did not consist 
                                                 
24 See criticism of the ‘New Barbarism’ thesis by P. Richards, Fighting for the Rain 
Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford & Portsmouth NH, 1996), 
xiii-xxix. 
25 Notably M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era 
(Oxford, 1999). 
26 The subject of an unpublished analysis by R. Marchal & C. Messiant, ‘Une Lecture 
Symptomale de Quelques Théorisations Récentes des Guerres Civiles’, presented at a 
meeting in July 2001 of the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London/Centre 
d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, joint study-group on African wars. 
27 Noted in the introduction to C. Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford, 1998), 1-
18. 
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entirely of colonial exploiters and suffering natives. Likewise, the aftermath of 
colonial rule in Africa was not simply a contest of continued dependency versus 
self-determination. There are grounds, therefore, to reconsider the whole history 
of violence during colonial rule and even up to very recent times within a single 
perspective, taking account not only of the colonial element in such conflicts 
but also of the social struggles within African societies. 
One aspect of earlier research on collaboration and resistance which has 
been vindicated time after time, however, is the extent to which modern African 
nationalists have invoked memories of those earlier African leaders who were 
known to have fought against white colonizers. In Zimbabwe, as Ranger 
demonstrated, the same word – chimurenga – was widely used to designate both 
struggles. In nationalist historiography, figures such as Samory Touré in central 
West Africa, Rainilaiarivony in Madagascar or Sultan Rabîh in Chad have been 
represented as patriots or proto-nationalists whose military feats could be 
explained primarily by their wish to avoid being incorporated into European-
ruled states.28  
These and many other historical fighters against colonialism do indeed live 
on in popular memory but many of them appear to have left a highly ambiguous 
legacy. Rainilaiarivony, the last prime minister of the pre-colonial kingdom of 
Madagascar, is remembered today in Madagascar but not often as a proto-
nationalist hero. Samory Touré, to take a clearer example, was certainly 
regarded by French colonizers as a major opponent, and he undoubtedly built up 
a powerful military force which dominated areas of modern Guinea, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. 
French colonization of the Sahel proceeded only after his final defeat. Samory’s 
conquests, however, were accompanied by brutal slave-raiding by his 
redoubtable cavalry and the forced conversion to Islam of peoples living on the 
historic frontier of Malinke penetration of the rain-forest.29 Ahmed Sékou 
Touré, the president who ruled Guinea with such ferocity from 1958 to 1984, 
claimed to be a direct descendant of Samory. There are probably as many West 
Africans today who have heard stories about Samory as a Malinke slave-raider 
from the north as those who know him as a fierce resister of colonialism. 
At a time when politics in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia are marked by a serious 
split between Malinke and others, the particular associations attached to 
Samory’s name are of obvious relevance. Nationalists could perhaps argue that 
state-building, whether in Africa or elsewhere, is generally a bloody business 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Les Africains (Paris, 1977), an eight-volume set edited by C.-A. 
Julien with contributions from leading historians, and published by Jeune Afrique. 
29 Y. Person, Samory, 3 vols (Dakar, 1968, 1975). My own observations concerning 
memories of Samory are based on interviews in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. 
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since it proceeds via an acquisition of a monopoly of violence, and that this no 
more disqualifies a Samory as a nationalist hero than it disqualifies a Bonaparte 
or a Bismarck. This is true enough, but it is through their historic legacies that 
such famous nationalists are judged. The question is not how much force these 
people used but what their legacy is. This suggests a need to analyse the nature 
of memory in societies in which historical traditions are still largely orally 
transmitted. The findings of such an analysis would then tell us much about any 
particular African nationalism. 
Perhaps we are better placed now than a generation ago to realize how 
seldom colonial rule took the form of a sudden attack by colonizers on societies 
previously innocent of commercial contacts with westerners. African societies 
had, in the past, been affected by joint interests or joint ventures in the form of 
the slave trade, for example. If the debate on resistance to colonial rule and its 
legacies is to be continued, perhaps what is most needed are new studies of 
various parts of Africa that dispassionately analyse what we now know of the 
nature of modern nationalism.  
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Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied 
Ethiopia: The Patriots’ Movement (1936-1941) 
and the redefinition of post-war Ethiopia 
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During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, a significant 
indigenous resistance movement, the Patriots Movement, 
emerged. The nature and impact of this resistance is 
reconsidered by highlighting aspects of its role in 
‘redefining Ethiopia’, its internal policy and its position in 
the global community after the start of the Second World 
War. The resistance movement was based on the ideals of 
restoring national independence and preserving cultural 
identity. There is also discussion of the reasons for the 
abrupt end to the resistance – mainly due to an external 
intervening factor (the British army) and the defeat of Italy – 
which prevented the challenge posed by the resistance 
movement and its incipient ideas of political reform being 
taken up seriously by the post-war imperial regime.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1935, Ethiopia, until that time a traditional polity with a predominantly 
feudal political system, was invaded by the industrialized nation of Italy under 
the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini. In defiance of the ensuing occupation, 
Ethiopians became involved in a multi-dimensional ‘patriotic resistance’ to 
drive the invaders out of their country, fighting against many odds, including 
indifference from the League of Nations and the West. It lasted for five years, 
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while the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, was engaged in a largely fruitless 
diplomatic struggle from exile. 
This chapter explains the resistance that was launched to counter the Italian 
occupation in Ethiopia, reconsiders the nature and impact of the resistance, and 
highlights aspects that ‘redefined Ethiopia’, its internal policy and its position in 
the global community following the beginning of the Second World War. The 
chapter has three sections. The first part is a condensed narrative of the 
occupation itself and the resistance it triggered. In the second part I look into the 
historical, religious and traditional values that drew numerous people together 
in resistance and discuss the actual resistance as it unfolded. Finally, I consider 
how the resistance came to an abrupt end because of external intervention, 
without which it would probably have continued for as long as the invaders 
could have clung on to the ancient nation. The challenge the movement posed to 
the post-war Ethiopian imperial state is also discussed. 
 
 
The Italian occupation of Ethiopia 
 
The Italians under Benito Mussolini were determined to have Ethiopia as their 
colony and make it pay for the humiliating defeat it had inflicted upon them at 
the Battle of Adwa in 1896, when a modern Italian army under four generals 
was crushed in one morning. Some years before, on 25 January 1887 at Dogali, 
12 kilometres from the port of Massawa on the way to Asmara, an Ethiopian 
force under the command of Ras1 Alula Ingida, the governor of the region then 
known as Mereb-Mellash, had destroyed another invading Italian army. As the 
historian Alberto Sbacchi remarked, that was ‘the first major setback received 
by any European power at the hands of an African army’.2 The 1896 Italian 
defeat at Adwa, however, sent a shock wave to Rome that lingered right up until 
the invasion of 1935. Italy had, during this time, been contemplating a 
comeback to maintain its colonial interests amid competition from France and 
Britain in the scramble for East Africa. 
‘As early as 1925, Mussolini gave orders for military preparation with a 
view of waging war against Ethiopia, but not until 1934 did plans for the 
conquest of Ethiopia receive his full attention. The preparation involved huge 
sums of money, and quantities of trucks, tanks, artillery, airplanes, and 
                                                 
1 Traditional Ethiopian titles denote military as well as civilian administration rankings. 
A ras is a chief of a region, under the emperor, and the head of a regional army. 
2 A. Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience 
(London, 1985), 4. 
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stockpiling of poison gas, to ensure Italy’s military superiority.’3 In fact, ‘De 
Bono’s two visits to Eritrea in 1932 were more of military reconnaissance than 
a simple tour of inspection by the Minister for the Colonies’.4 The Wälwäl 
incident of 5 December 1934, when Italian and Ethiopian forces clashed inside 
Ethiopian territory over the line of the frontier was not the actual cause of the 
Italian invasion. Mussolini’s fervour for a major onslaught on Ethiopia to build 
a greater empire became obvious ‘when he proclaimed that he was ready to 
declare war on Great Britain and France rather than give up the conquest of 
Ethiopia’.5 Content with their victory at Adwa, the Ethiopians now had to face 
one of the most serious offensives in their history.  
The springboard for the invasion was the land along the Red Sea coast that 
the Italians colonized 45 years before the 1936 invasion and which they had 
named Eritrea on 1 January 1890. Within two years, the final preparation for the 
conquest of Ethiopia was completed under the trusteeship of Marshal Emilio De 
Bono, the Commissioner of Colonies, who was sent to lead the invasion as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, with nine divisions of 250,000 
white combatants and 150,000 Africans from Libya, Italian Somaliland and 
Eritrea, collectively called askaris. Supported by 300 aircraft under his direct 
command, he had to advance from Asmara southwards into the hinterland of 
Ethiopia. On the southern front, one division with 100 aircraft, under Marshal 
Rodolfo Graziani, was deployed to head northwards. The plan was to converge 
on Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, within the shortest possible time, 
so that pressure from the League of Nations, of which Ethiopia had been a 
member since 1923, for a negotiated settlement could be avoided.  
The Ethiopian army, on the other hand, was estimated to have fewer than 
300,000 men, mobilized by regional rases or princes whose horizontal 
relationship with each other was undefined and in many cases competitive, but 
who usually stood united when foreign enemies threatened to invade. Emperor 
Haile Selassie, Commander-in-Chief of the national army, experienced a lack of 
modern means of communication that thwarted his establishing a centralized 
command to coordinate the war of defence in the mountainous regions. 
Tactically, this was an outstanding advantage for the invaders who were to 
coordinate and concentrate their forces as the situation demanded. There was 
also the problem of armaments. ‘The Ethiopian army was equipped with 200 
pieces of light artillery, 1000 machine guns and rifles with 150 rounds per 
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person.’6 Logistics were self-supplied except for small ammunition and hand 
grenades that were provided only sporadically. With the few exceptions of those 
who had travelled abroad, Ethiopians had not even seen armoured vehicles, 
tanks or bomber aircraft before. What brought them together to confront the 
mighty enemy was a strong self-image of national pride and patriotism, a love 
of freedom vis-à-vis foreigners, and specific ideals of human dignity they had 
nurtured through a long history of nationhood. The determination to remain 
independent and defend their specific cultural and religious values was 
manifested in their prayers, folk music and war songs, carried through the war 
and the resistance that followed. 
Early in October 1935 the Italians made a rapid advance towards Adwa, 
which was 30 kilometres from the colonial frontier that divided Eritrea and 
Tigray, the northern region of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian forces at Adwa were not 
only outnumbered but also could not withstand the long-range shelling of the 
howitzers, the deadly machine guns on the tanks and the bombs raining down 
from the air. The weapons they possessed were no match for modern Italian 
armaments. Before any serious engagement, they were ordered to withdraw in 
order to save their forces for a well-planned defensive manoeuvre deep in the 
country. On 6 October 1935, Adwa fell into Italian hands. Its seizure gave the 
invaders some psychological relief from the humiliating defeat they had 
suffered at Dogali and Adwa in 1887 and 1896 respectively, yet for those at the 
front, the war was just beginning and De Bono decided to advance with caution. 
A month later, on 8 November 1935, Mekele, the capital of the province of 
Tigray, came under the control of the Italians. Mussolini, who was infuriated by 
the slow pace of the campaign, replaced De Bono with Marshal Pietro Badoglio, 
who was Chief of Staff of the Italian army. Following instructions from Rome, 
Badoglio resorted to harsh military tactics to score a quick victory, including the 
dropping from the air of mustard-gas bombs over Ethiopian troops and civilian 
areas, even though mustard gas had been banned in 1925 by the Geneva Gas 
Protocol, to which Ethiopia and Italy were signatories. Thousands perished. 
Despite fire and air superiority and the use of mustard gas, the Ethiopian 
rebels and resistance fighters, who came to be known as ‘Patriots’ (locally 
known as Arbegnoch), began to regroup in their respective districts under their 
local leaders to confront the enemy. A series of major battles was waged over a 
period of three months: 15 December 1935 at Shiré and Enda-Baguna; 20-24 
January 1936 at Worsege-Tembien; 27-29 February at Workamba and Abiadi-
Tembien; 1-3 March at Selekhlekha; and in the second week of March at Emba 
Aradom and all the way to Alage. The battles were intense and the 
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determination of the Ethiopians was tested against all odds. In his 
autobiography the Emperor later wrote: ‘Although the Italians were superior to 
us in modern arms, our soldiers had the advantage in terms of courage. While 
our soldiers, who had won the battles in the Tambien and Shiré regions, were 
fighting with obsolete rifles like the Fusil Gras, they yet managed to capture 
more than 300 machine-guns and many cannons and tanks.’7 (Marshal 
Badoglio, on the other hand, estimated the number of Italian casualties in the 
Shire region alone as follows: ‘Our losses, including dead and wounded, were: 
63 officers, 894 Italians, 12 Eritreans. The losses of the enemy as ascertained on 
the field were about 4,000; to these must be added those inflicted by aircraft 
during the pursuit, the total of which was estimated at over 3,000.’8) This 
battlefront in the district of Shiré was just one of the several fronts in Tigray and 
was lead by Ras Imru, Governor of Gojjam Province, who later retreated to 
Gore in southwest Ethiopia. Virtually the whole of Tigray became a 
battleground for six consecutive months. 
Finally, on 31 March 1936 at Maichew and Lake Ashangé, the Emperor’s 
main force put up tenacious resistance but at the end of the day the Ethiopians 
were forced to retreat further south towards Dessie, the provincial capital of 
Wollo. Dessie fell into the hands of the Italians on 4 April 1936 after three days 
of long and bloody fighting. Unable to regroup and launch a counter-offensive, 
the Emperor and his remaining forces headed for Addis Ababa. The Battle of 
Maichew where the Emperor had assembled his best forces, eventually turned 
out to be the end of the conventional confrontation and the beginning of the 
Patriots’ resistance movement, which in fact seemed to have already started 
behind enemy lines.  
On the southern and southeastern fronts, however, the fighting remained 
intense with the forces of Ras Desta, Dejazmach9 Nesibu and Dejazmach 
Mekonnen, the governors of Sidamo, Harar and Illubabor regions respectively, 
deterring the northward movement of Marshal Graziani, who had vowed to 
deliver Ethiopia to Mussolini ‘with the Ethiopians or without them’.10 
Graziani’s wild statement was a reflection of Italy’s intended policy of 
resettling its overcrowded farmers on the fertile lands of Ethiopia. Not content 
with showering the Ethiopians with mustard gas, Graziani also resorted to the 
massacre of non-combatant villagers, for example, during battles in the Ogaden 
in 1936. At this time, about 900 Eritrean askaris, appalled by such Italian war 
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tactics, deserted to the Ethiopian side, thus testing the loyalty of the other 
colonial soldiers. Previously, in mid-December 1935, 400 Eritreans had already 
joined Ras Imru’s forces on the Shiré front.11 These desertions revealed the 
sympathy that many Eritreans felt for the Ethiopian and anti-colonial cause. 
While Graziani was contained on the southeastern front, Emperor Haile 
Selassie was unable to check Badoglio who was advancing from the north. The 
Emperor retreated from Dessie and entered Addis Ababa on the morning of 30 
April 1936, only to leave again two days later on his way into exile. On 5 May 
1936 Addis Ababa fell into the hands of the invaders without any resistance but 
amid chaos and looting triggered by the Emperor’s departure. 
The day the Emperor arrived in his capital, he hastily convened an assembly 
of his ministers and nobles. Two important agreements were immediately 
reached: (a) the Emperor had to go abroad to present Ethiopia’s case to the 
League of Nations; and (b) the seat of government had to move to Gore, 
southwest of Addis Ababa, and Bitweded12 Wolde-Tsadik Goshu should act as 
regent. While the first decision called for a diplomatic and political struggle, the 
second in effect meant the launch of a resistance movement against the Italian 
conquest, and was aimed at regaining independence. Many of the younger 
Patriots, aware of the ensuing authority gap caused by the Emperor’s absence, 
did not approve of his departure into exile. ‘Even the young Crown Prince had 
been suggesting to his own followers – to Dejazmach Fikremariam and 
Dejazmach Gurassu – that he should abandon his father and go with them as 
shifta to the hills’.13 But as the decision of the Emperor could not be contested, 
the resistance or shiftinnet (‘banditry’) had to commence without him. 
 
 
Resistance 
 
Historical background to Ethiopian nationhood 
Although strictly speaking beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief sketch of 
important moments in Ethiopia’s history is provided here in order to better 
grasp the essence of the resistance, as it was nurtured by strong notions of 
nationhood and cultural identity among large sectors of the population. 
The recorded history of Ethiopia as a state dates from the third century when 
it was known as the Kingdom of Aksum. Around 340 AD the Aksumite kings 
adopted Orthodox Christianity, which quickly became the religion of the 
                                                 
11 Nega Tegegn, Ye’Ethiopiawiyan Ye’Rejim Zemenat Tiglena Zemenawi Serawit 
Ameseraret 1855-1974 (Toronto, 2001), 73. 
12 A bitweded is a ‘beloved’, a trustee of the emperor. 
13 Mockler, Haile Selassie’s War, 135. 
  
 Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia 93 
inhabitants and provided the symbolism and substance of the royal ideology. 
They also developed literary works, commerce through the ports of Adulis and 
Zeila, and the minting of coins. The empire gradually expanded over the 
Ethiopian highlands.  
The expansion of Islam after the seventh century led to a loss of international 
trade routes and revenue for Aksum and a decline in its regional power. In the 
tenth century, a revolt by Queen Yodit of the Agew people further to the south 
led to the demise of the Aksum state. The kingship was reconstituted by the 
Christian Zagwe dynasty located in the Agew country (in the tenth to thirteenth 
centuries). In the thirteenth century, the Ethiopian state, now located further to 
the south, was revived on the basis of a restyled Aksumite royal ideology. Not 
long afterwards however, the expansion of Islam from the north (from the 
Ottoman Empire) and the assault of Imam Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi in 
1527-1543 dealt another devastating blow to the Ethiopian Christian empire, its 
population, resources, religious culture and architecture. After Ahmed’s defeat 
in 1543 it recovered only slowly. Then the Oromo migrations from the south 
brought another challenge by forcing a periodic shift of the political centre and 
a transformation of central Ethiopia’s civilization. The gradual loss of 
dynamism of the centralized state in turn gave rise to the emergence of local 
kings and princes who were often entangled in violent rivalry for supremacy 
(1760-1855).  
In 1855 the powerful Emperor Tewodros II (who reigned from 1855-1868) 
introduced the vision of a unified and modern Ethiopia. He managed to set up 
some semblance of a central state and collected royal revenues from the Amhara 
and Tigray regions. While challenging the encroachment of the Egyptians in the 
coastal area, Tewodros at the same time came into conflict with the British 
when he took hostage and locked up a number of European missionaries. The 
British sent an expeditionary force in 1868 and besieged his mountain fortress 
of Maqdala, where Tewodros, encircled by the British and with his offers of 
negotiation refused, chose to take his own life on 10 April 1868 rather than 
surrender to the invader. After a brief interlude he was succeeded by Emperor 
Yohannes (who reigned from 1872-1889) who had to fight against the 
Egyptians and later the Italians in the north. In the late 1880s he fought the 
invading Sudanese Mahdists in western Ethiopia, where he finally died at the 
Battle of Metemma in 1889. His successor, Emperor Menilik (who reigned from 
1889-1913), was a strong, modernizing leader who defeated the Italians at 
Adwa in 1896. To challenge the unbridled ambition of the foreign invaders, he 
was fully engaged in competition with France, Italy and Great Britain to expand 
territorial influence in the Horn of Africa, incorporating a large number of 
previously autonomous regions into the empire. The last of the emperors, Haile 
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Selassie (who reigned from 1930-1974) also had to fight invasion. He saw 
defeat (in 1936) and success (in 1941) while fighting Italian invaders.  
These last four emperors maintained a similar vision of creating a unified 
modern Ethiopia, and attempted to impose new ideas of loyalty and national 
identity on a dispersed and diverse population. The effects of this long history 
of struggle against a series of invaders created a sense of identity and pride 
associated with ancient historical referents based on political glory and religion, 
not only among the elite but also among the common people.  
 
The resistance begins 
By the time the Italian army had Addis Ababa under its control and Mussolini 
had declared Ethiopia part of the Italian Empire on 9 May 1936, only a section 
of the northern part of the country was firmly under their control. Sbacchi14 
observed that: ‘Five months after the defeat of Emperor Haile Selassie, 
Badoglio and Graziani controlled only one third of the country’. After the Battle 
of Maichew, resistance commenced more or less immediately. Many groups 
from the defeated army went into the bush and started resistance actions. 
Throughout the occupation period these Patriots remained active and made life 
difficult for the Italians, especially in rural northern, eastern and central 
Ethiopia. The country was thus never effectively occupied or colonized. For our 
purposes in this chapter it is also important to realize that during the struggle, 
which began as a ‘defense of the motherland’, new conceptions of politics and 
governance for Ethiopia emerged with and during the ongoing struggle. 
Although Mussolini exerted repeated pressure on his marshals on the 
frontlines to demonstrate a swift and profound victory over Ethiopia so that his 
rivals (Britain and France) would recognize Italy’s might, the progress made by 
his modern army remained slow as a result of the resistance it encountered. In 
the years that followed, the Italians were challenged in many a gorge, hill, 
mountain and village by units of Ethiopian Patriots. 
For many Ethiopians, the occupation of their land and the subsequent flight 
of their Emperor into exile meant the loss of their dignity and identity as a 
nation. It also meant the threat to or destruction of their traditional values and 
institutions, and more importantly the disruption of their history of which they 
were proud. The common motto at the time became ‘Tenes! atenesam woy, 
Hager sewrer zim telaleh woy’ (‘Rise up! Oh rise up, you cannot sit there when 
the country is invaded’). In connection with this motto, Haddis Alemayehu, in 
his book of personal recollections entitled Tezeta, gives a list of poems, poetic 
                                                 
14 Sbacchi, Ethiopia Under Mussolini, 34. 
  
 Revisiting resistance in Italian-occupied Ethiopia 95 
calls and war songs, like Bälew attilim woy! Tekur anbesa aydellehim woy (Get 
him, aren’t you a black lion?).15 
During the 1935-1936 war, behind the lines declared ‘liberated’ by the 
Italians, hundreds of Patriots emerged in their respective localities to wage a 
war of resistance in defiance of the occupation. While conventional battles were 
raging in central and southeastern Ethiopia, Tigray, the first province to be 
occupied in northern Ethiopia, became the first battleground for the Patriots. 
They operated in small groups, not far from their respective localities. 
Dejazmach Gebrehiwet Mesheha, Dejazmach Abbai Kahsay, Dejazmach Tesfay 
Medebai, Fitawrari16 Tessema Tesfay, Dejazmach Gizaw, Dejazmach Taffere, 
Agafari17 Birru, Kassa Sibhat, Kegnazmach18 Aberra Adale and on the women’s 
side Woizero19 Kebedech Seyoum and Woizero Desta Gebre-Mikael were some 
of the prominent resistance leaders operating independently from Adwa in the 
north of Tigray to Maichew in the south of the province. They were engaged in 
activities such as the ambushing of enemy troops to acquire arms and other war 
materials, snowballing huge rocks off mountains and cliffs when enemy 
convoys passed, disrupting the enemy’s communication systems by kidnapping 
their messengers and later cutting telephone lines, setting fire to anything under 
enemy control such as offices and fuel or ammunition depots by firing from 
long range, and harassing and killing enemy collaborators. 
As the activities of the Patriots in Tigray escalated, the Italians began 
deploying more detachments, depleting their main force pushing southwards. 
The Patriots, now referred to as shifta by the Italians, were liable to be hunted 
down. The word shifta can be translated as ‘bandit’ or ‘outlaw’, but in the 
traditional Ethiopian context the concept of shifta was much broader than what 
the Italians wanted it to mean. To be a shifta meant to rebel against someone in 
authority or against an institution that had failed to render justice. To become a 
shifta was also generally accepted as a means of bringing grievances to the 
attention of the people in order to gain sympathy when higher authorities had 
failed to deliver justice or rights customarily due. Usually a shifta emerged from 
the noble classes and had some form of wider, critical vision on the social order 
that enabled him/her to express, in words or in action, real or perceived 
injustices and responses to the situation. The commitment to deliver justice that 
was initially denied is embedded in the concept of shifta, although a shifta may 
him/herself not necessarily be free from wrongdoing. Thus shiftinnet (being a 
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shifta) in its diverse forms had an important social function and was one form of 
‘conflict resolution’.20 
In Ethiopia, visionary and assertive individuals who started as shifta had 
risen to the level of kingship, thus legitimizing the concept of shifta itself. Two 
late nineteenth-century shiftas, Kassa Hailu of Gondar and Kahsai Mircha of 
Tigray, had passed through this political evolution to become Emperors 
Tewodros and Yohannes in succession. Thus ‘the shiftas formed the military 
elite and became the core of the resistance, using their military skills against the 
Italians’.21 A shifta, however, whose acts surpassed the socially acceptable 
norms would be called t’era-shifta and would be regarded as a highwayman or a 
malefactor and be denied the affection of the people. The Italians 
understandably preferred to label the Patriots t’era-shiftas of the criminal type. 
Nevertheless, to be described as a shifta, especially in the event of Italian 
occupation, was an honour for an Ethiopian and this was how resistance started 
and spread. A commonly sung lyrical poem in the region at that time went:  
 
Adi tefiu, adi’do yewaal’ye, 
Beti Hatsur akiblini meneshiraye, 
Ne’merebey iye ne’merebey! 
 
In a lost country, you cannot stay a day, 
Through the fence, throw me the gun, 
I should go to Merebe, oh my Merebe!22 
 
There were many such popular songs, which were in effect traditional calls 
for resistance before the official call came. Officially, though, on 9 December 
1935, the Ethiopian Minister of War, Ras Mulugeta Yigezu, issued an order to 
all the chiefs of northern Ethiopia to carry on with ‘patriotic resistance against 
the Italians for taking away the independence of Ethiopia’.23 
While a guerrilla war, which had basically been the tactics of the shifta, was 
underway in the north in 1936 where the enemy had assumed full control, 
conventional battles were still raging in the centre, particularly around Addis 
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Ababa and to the south. After the defeat of the Emperor’s troops at Maichew 
and the fall of Addis Ababa to the Italians on 5 May 1936, the rases, 
dejazmaches and all other notables withdrew to their respective areas but were 
within close range of Addis Ababa. They were based in familiar and strategic 
villages to recover from the exhaustion of eight months of war, and to 
reorganize their forces for the next phase of the patriotic fight. These villages 
were logistically well situated, in that the leaders were able to follow events in 
the capital that might cause them to launch attacks. Ras Abebe Aregay was in 
Ankober, Dejazmach Balcha Safo in Gurage land, Dejazmach Zewdu Asfaw in 
Mullo, Blatta24 Takele Wolde-Hawariat in Limmu, the Ras Kassa brothers 
(Aberra, Asfaw-Wosen and Wond-Wosen) in Selale, and Haile Mariam Mamo 
was engaged in hit-and-run tactics around the city. With more than 10,000 
troops, Aberra, the son of Ras Kassa (who had accompanied the Emperor into 
exile) had been entrusted by the Emperor to coordinate the resistance in that 
region, which he was doing his best to accomplish. On 21 June 1936, for 
instance, he held a meeting of some Patriotic leaders, including the Patriarch of 
Wollo, Abune25 Petros, at Debre Libanos, the renowned monastery dating from 
1312 and located some 70 kilometres north of Addis Ababa. They made a plan 
to storm enemy-occupied areas in the capital but a lack of effective means of 
transportation and radio communication prevented a coordinated assault from 
taking place. Sporadic attacks by the different groups continued, however, to 
dominate the battle scene around Addis Ababa.  
Goré, in southeastern Ethiopia, the seat of the displaced government run by 
the elder regent, Bitweded Wolde-Tsadik Goshu, was far from within easy reach 
and never became effective in providing nationwide leadership to the resistance 
movement. The rases and governors had to do without the Emperor who was 
considered both the legitimate leader and an able commander. Indeed for many, 
the unexpected departure of the authoritative Emperor into exile had created a 
gap nobody seemed able to fill. The few rases, like Imru in Wollega and Desta 
in Sidamo, who had made the long retreat from the defeat in the north to the 
south near Goré, could neither realize effective mobility nor acquire the 
resources to keep their troops intact. But from a distance of hundreds of 
kilometres, their holding out and acts of defiance helped to inspire others to 
resist. Thus, they were capable of continuously ‘distracting the Italians’ mind 
and attention’.26  
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Early on, as information about the coordinated attack on Addis Ababa 
reached the Italians, they encircled the city with barbed wire and 38 cement 
forts. People and traffic could come into the city only through ten gates.27 This 
was indicative of the need for precautions against resistance activity. In general, 
as conventional warfare had proved ineffective in the face of the modern Italian 
conventional army, the need to resist the enemy in another form emerged. 
 
The spread of resistance 
The prospect of conventional war gradually faded but the spirit of resistance 
persisted. A different attitude of defiance and ways of attacking began to 
surface from many quarters. Virtually the entire membership of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Women’s Volunteer Service Association 
(EWVSA) and the Black Lion Organization, as well as many other small groups 
of individuals, appeared in the forefront of the resistance. Their activities ranged 
from direct assaults on top Italian leaders to providing all-round underground 
support to the Patriots in the villages and mountains. 
The Orthodox Church, which was historically an integral part of the 
Ethiopian state, began to play a pivotal role in broadening the dimensions of the 
resistance. The Church took it as an everyday obligation, inside and outside the 
church, to renounce the incursion of Italian invaders in a free country with a 
sovereign state. Passages from the Bible were frequently cited to invoke 
national sentiment and loyalty. The verse ‘Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands 
unto God’28 was recited in daily prayers. It was interpreted to mean that 
Ethiopia deserved all the rights of a free nation as recognized by the Almighty, 
and the Christian world should stand by its side. Guided by such a deep-rooted 
belief, Abune Petros, the Bishop of Wollo, marched through the streets of Addis 
Ababa denouncing the Italian occupation and calling on the people to keep 
fighting for independence. Many people came out of their houses to support 
him. However he was soon apprehended and on 30 July 1936 executed by firing 
squad in a public square, where his statue now stands.  
The killing of a bishop was unheard of in Ethiopia and shocked the nation, 
arousing the indignation of the people, especially the clergy. Defiance of Italian 
rule was mounting in different forms but such reactions did not stop the Italians 
who proceeded to execute monks, priests and deacons in many monasteries and 
churches, expecting submission. ‘On 21 May 1937, General P. Maletti had 
executed in the monastery of Debre Libanos alone 297 monks’.29 Five days 
later, more priests and deacons were massacred in the nearby church of Debre  
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Kebedech Seyoum, a female Patriot, c. 1935  
Source: Nega Tegegn, Ye’Ethiopiawiyan 
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Birhan, other executions and repression followed elsewhere. Yet the numerous 
monasteries and churches of Ethiopia continued to be centres of resistance and 
propaganda and to offer sanctuary to the Patriots. 
The participation of women in the resistance was crucial. It is difficult to 
estimate their real military contribution but their supplementary support 
activities, spying and sabotage actions in some instances were decisive. 
Historically, women had been active participants in previous wars defending the 
country. Not long before, Empress Taytu and her husband Emperor Menilik had 
marched to the battlefront in Adwa in 1896 and played an important role in 
bringing about the defeat of the Italians. Chris Prouty reports that Taytu had 
organized thousands of women, including Zewditu, her step daughter and later 
empress (1916-1928), and Azalech, her cousin, and strengthened the defence 
lines by supplying water and taking care of the wounded.30 She was also a 
military tactician whose participation had helped to bring about the defeat of the 
Italians at the Battle of Mekele a month before the Battle of Adwa.31 Ethiopian 
women had, thus, a reputation to uphold in defending the national cause.32 
Woizero Shawaragad Gadle had turned the EWVSA, which was under the 
patronage of Princess Tenagne-Work, daughter of the Emperor, into a 
clandestine movement of resistance. The women in this association were 
involved in scores of activities, ranging from supplying bandages, clothes and 
ammunition bought or stolen from Italian troops to the Patriots in the field, to 
giving shelter and forging pass papers for the active Patriots to travel inside 
enemy-controlled territory. Some of the women gathered military intelligence 
and a few even planned military operations. It was Shawaragad Gadle ‘who laid 
the groundwork for the storming of the Italian garrison at Addis Alem’.33 It was 
during this time that the term Yewist Arbegna (clandestine Patriot) was coined.  
In the countryside not only did women prepare quanta (dried meat), qollo 
(roasted cereals), besso (instant cereal powder) and various foodstuffs that may 
be compared to ‘dry rations’ in modern military jargon but also sharpened 
swords and shuttled between the zones of operation and their houses. According 
to G. Tafere’s dramatized description, they also ‘sent down from various slopes 
avalanches of stones, not heeding the shower of bombs that were coming down 
from the air, and women like Woizero Fantaye actually fought on the 
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battlefields’.34 In her documentary study, Salome Gebre-Egziabher35 provides a 
list of 64 women patriots in the resistance movement and also gave the names 
of prominent Patriots from every region, including hundreds from Eritrea. 
It was customary for married couples and young boys to join the resistance 
army and often find themselves far away from their homes for years. ‘When 
Dejazmach Habtemariam was too sick to lead the battles in Ogaden in April 
1936, his wife, equally a Patriot, took over commanding his troops’.36 ‘Woizero 
Wagaye and her husband Lij37 Bitew, the secretary of Ras Imru, have been 
together all the way from the northern front of Shire to the southern front in 
Wollega and many other married couples too were participating continuously in 
the patriotic resistance.’38 John Spencer adds to the list of prominent women 
freedom fighters, ‘Kebedech Seyoum, Qelemework Tilahun, Sliva Reyed 
Gadle, Laqetch Demissew, Qonjit Abinet, Likelesh Beyene and Abebech 
Cherkos’.39 Gessesew Ayele joined the resistance force at the age of 14 and 
fought on the southern front. 
In Addis Ababa, a group called the Black Lion Organization was formed, 
composed of young intellectuals from various schools and colleges including 
the recently established Holetta Military College. Some of its prominent leaders 
included Dr Alemwork Beyene, a veterinary surgeon, Yilma Deressa, a 
graduate of the London School of Economics, Belay Haile-Ab and Kifle 
Nesibu, both Holetta graduates, and Fekade-Selassie Hiruy and the Workeneh 
brothers, three of them British-educated. Their aim was much broader than any 
other group in the resistance, their organization had a constitution and they were 
poised to undertake urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Their constitution 
reflected their political motivation and commitment, and their programme also 
referred to the period that would follow a successful resistance.  
According to Taddasa, ‘among the most striking features of the constitution 
[of the Black Lion Organization] were: the affirmation of the supremacy of 
political over military command, the provision for the human treatment of 
prisoners and the non-molestation of the peasantry, the prohibition of exile, and 
the injunction of suicide rather than capture by the enemy’.40  
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Detachments of this group engaged the enemy in and outside the city in 
various forms. One of their most spectacular actions was the burning of three 
planes in the night of 26 June 1936 in Bonaya, Neqemte, when twelve out of the 
thirteen Italian officials present were also killed, including the Italian Deputy 
Viceroy to Ethiopia, Air Marshall Magliocco. The only survivor was Father M. 
Borello whose role was to guide and give a blessing to the short-lived Italian 
expedition in the southwest, undertaken to exploit Oromo discontent towards 
the Amhara-dominated Ethiopian state and pave the way for expansion through 
Dejazmach Habte-Mariam of Neqemte, who had shown signs of collaboration 
some days earlier. This indicates that by no means all Ethiopians in all regions 
unequivocally supported the Patriots’ resistance. Many were even ignorant of 
such a movement in central Ethiopia. While negotiations in Neqemte were 
underway, ‘the daring assault on the Italian high ranking officials was 
performed by four members of the Black Lion Organisation, namely Colonel 
Belay Haile-Ab, Major Matias Gemeda, Captain Yosef Nesibu and Captain 
Benyam Nesibu, who returned safely to their unit’.41 This operation infuriated 
Graziani and led him to order a blanket bombardment of Neqemte and its 
environs. History books refer to it as the Neqemte Massacre, a massacre in 
which hundreds of people of all ages were killed and wounded. Thus, what 
initially seemed to be a successful expedition for the Italians in an area thought 
to be sympathetic to Italian rule ended in disaster.  
However, the impact of the bombardment and the negative attitude of the 
people in the region forced most of the Patriots to abandon the area in search of 
a more favourable one, while the older Patriots began retiring to remote places. 
Ras Desta Damtew, the son-in-law of Emperor Haile Selassie and Commander 
of the Southern Patriots, withdrew to Arbagoma but was encircled by three 
columns of Italian infantry under General Navarrini. After days of fighting, Ras 
Desta escaped to Eya, Butajira where he was captured and executed by firing 
squad shortly afterwards. The Italians estimated Ethiopian losses in these battles 
at 4,000 of whom 1,600 were executed by firing squad.42 The Italians thought 
that the defeat and later the execution of Ras Desta would kill the fervour of the 
resistance but this proved to be wrong, as more people were moving to support 
the Patriots. 
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Acts of collaboration 
 
The Italians found a few collaborators among the Ethiopian nobility, not so 
much due to mere opportunism but largely because of their ambitions and 
claims to power, for which the Italians might be a stepping stone. Although 
superior force was the ultimate means upon which the Italians relied to execute 
their invasion and sustain their occupation of Ethiopia, they had been looking 
for collaborators ever since they began preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia. 
Their long stay in nearby Eritrea had helped them to study, contact and recruit 
collaborators in Ethiopia. They had focused on three elements of contradiction 
that might be manipulated within Ethiopian society: rivalry among the different 
contending (regional) leaders; traditional Christian-Muslim tensions; and the 
resentment of the southern Ethiopian people towards the central government for 
its unfair appropriation of their lands since the late nineteenth century. Initially, 
these contradictions seemed to facilitate the occupation, but with the spread of 
the resistance and the Italians treating collaborators as unreliable servants, they 
did not prove sufficient. 
Two well-known initial collaborators were Dejazmach Haile-Selassie Gugsa 
of Tigray and Ras Hailu Tekle-Haimanot of Gojjam, both rivals of Emperor 
Haile Selassie. Dejazmach Haile-Selassie, whose father was the grandson of 
Emperor Yohannes (who reigned from 1872-1889), foresaw regaining the 
throne of his great-grandfather with the support of the Italians. Thus he put his 
followers at the service of the Italians. Ras Hailu, son of Negus (King) Tekle 
Haimanot of Gojjam, who had been opposed to Emperor Haile Selassie’s rise to 
power in the 1920s, had also anticipated governing Gojjam without any 
imperial intervention if he collaborated with the Italians. Both received arms 
and money from the Italians for their services but not the power and prestige 
they had dreamt of. Some other low-ranking nobles also collaborated with the 
Italians, induced by similar expectations. However, once in power, ‘Mussolini 
ordered “No power to the rases”. Italy, he said, would not rule Ethiopia on a 
metayer basis by sharing power with the Ethiopian nobles.’43 Mussolini seemed 
to have rightly grasped the deeper feelings of the Ethiopian collaborators who 
had their own separate aspirations that would not fit in the Fascists’ policy. 
With the promise of reviving Muslim states like that of Harar and reinstating 
Oromo kingdoms like those of Abba Jifar and Abba Jobir Abdullah – kingdoms 
incorporated previously by Ethiopia – the Italians gained substantial 
collaboration from Muslims in the lowlands and Oromos in the south and 
eastern highlands. Abba Jobir, who was once imprisoned in Addis Ababa by the 
Ethiopian government for opposing the deployment of Amhara soldiers to 
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collect taxes in his region, formed an army of Oromo Muslims and joined the 
Italians to fight the Patriots. Later when he found out that the Italians would not 
let him acquire the autonomous power he aspired to, he began conniving with 
the British councillor who had an office in Gore.  
In all these major cases of collaboration, there was a feeling of victimization 
by the Emperor’s drive to centralize authority and reign over regional power 
holders that also claimed authority. However, although these acts of 
collaboration facilitated the objectives of the invaders to a limited extent, they 
were essentially acts through which the collaborators hoped to secure what they 
had lost under the reign of the Emperor. ‘Certainly they acted to protect their 
own interests, but these actions were not necessarily opportunistic. Instead, they 
reflected a long tradition of rivalry and tension between centre and periphery, 
particularly at times when the centre was perceived as weak or vulnerable.’44 
 
Intensified resistance and an attempt on Graziani’s life 
On 19 February 1937, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani together with his dignitaries 
and guests of honour were celebrating the birth of the Prince of Naples, in front 
of the Viceroy’s palace in Addis Ababa. Two young Ethiopians from Eritrea, 
Abraham Deboch, who worked for the Italian Political Office in Addis Ababa, 
and Moges Asgedom, a clerk in the municipal office, approached the podium 
and threw seven hand grenades, killing three Italian officers and wounding 52 
others. General Liotta, Commander of the Italian Air Force, lost his right eye 
and leg while Graziani, the main target of the attack, was wounded by some 300 
splinters. 
Moges and Abraham escaped to join the Patriots in Wolkait, while Tadelech 
Estifanos, Abraham’s wife, left a day earlier for the monastery of Debre 
Libanos. Meanwhile the city of Addis Ababa turned into an orgy of terror. 
Graziani ordered random retaliatory measures be carried out and Italian soldiers 
went out killing virtually anyone in sight, burning houses and churches, like St. 
George’s, and clubbing children to death. Not even the sick lying in hospital 
were spared. The terrible scenes prompted Mussolini into action, as he ‘forbade 
these draconian measures for fear of negative world public opinion’.45 The 
attack launched by Moges and Abraham ‘at the heart of the invaders’ gave the 
Patriots’ morale a boost and retaliatory measures taken by the invaders only 
further widened the existing gap between the Ethiopian people and the Italian 
occupiers. 
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After February 1937, a new mode of Patriot resistance started to grow in 
scope and popularity throughout the country. Yohannes Saomerjibashian, a 
young Ethiopian of Armenian descent, started an underground paper known as 
the Pillar of Ethiopian Light. Blatta Kidane-Mariam formed a clandestine 
movement of Ethiopian youth and worked closely with the women’s 
organization in resistance activities. Printed by Yohannes and distributed 
systematically by youth organized by Kidane-Mariam, leaflets calling for an 
uprising against the Fascists started appearing in the city’s public squares. The 
railway line linking Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti was frequently 
attacked. By October 1936, the Patriots had already ambushed an armoured 
train, escorted by a squadron of warplanes, that was secretly carrying A. 
Lessona, the Italian Minister of Colonies and C. Gigli, the Minister of Public 
Works. Such train ambushes now increased in frequency. The British author 
Evelyn Waugh, who also travelled from Djibouti to Addis Ababa via Harar by 
train during that year and managed to interview Graziani, later observed that 
‘there was a machine-gun section posted at the front of the train; another at the 
rear. From Awash to Addis the line was heavily guarded.’46 The resistance in 
central Ethiopia thus became widespread in numerous forms and proved 
tenacious. Patriot Haile-Mariam Mamo was well known for his hit-and-run 
tactics around Addis Ababa. In Gojjam, the professed shifta Belay Zelleke and 
his rival Hailu Belaw, although at times also raiding each other’s territory, 
inflicted heavy damage on stationary and mobile Italian troops. In Begemder, 
Yohannes Iyasu and Asfaw Bogale were fighting the well-equipped enemy on 
many fronts. A successful attack in Bellesa forced Governor O. Mezzetti to 
retreat to Gondar, the capital of the Begemder region, where he found further 
unrest.   
While resistance proliferated nationwide, the different groups of Patriots 
were, however, operating on their own, some in traditional ways (raiding, hit-
and-run attacks) and others employing modern tactics. There was no unified, 
central command structure. In most provinces, including Tigray, Gondar, 
Gojjam, Showa, Wollo, Arusi and Wollega, similar acts of resistance could be 
observed. Eritreans too were joining the resistance in large numbers. As early as 
January 1936, about 400 Eritreans abandoned the invaders on the Shire front 
alone, where the Italians had the upper hand, and joined the retreating Ras Imru. 
Some 600 Eritreans came to join Ras Desta at Adola on 20 February 1936 
(Seifu Abawaolla, cited in Salome).47 Patriots from Eritrea like Kegnazmach 
Andom Tesfatsion, Kegnazmach Assefa Bahitu, Kegnazmach Seleba Wolde-
Selassie and many others (see the list in Salome) joined the resistance 
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movement on all the major fronts and hundreds were killed fighting the 
Italians.48 This historical fact also refutes the idea entertained by some Eritrean 
writers that Eritreans were not involved in the Ethiopian resistance movement. 
On the economic front many Ethiopians seemed to boycott the Italian lire as 
currency. Especially in the countryside, people continued to use Maria Theresa 
thalers, the original Austrian silver dollar, for transactions although the Italians 
had declared the lire to be the unit of currency upon their arrival. However, the 
Italians had to pay Ethiopian labourers at the platinum mines at Yubdo in 
thalers because they would not accept lire. Furthermore, when the authorities 
forced the labourers to accept paper money (the lire), there was mass desertion. 
Several local markets almost ceased to exist as commerce went elsewhere.49 
Such crippling resistance inflated the already rising costs of Italian occupation 
and severely devalued the lire. A Maria Theresa thaler could be obtained from 
the Royal Mint in London for 6.50 lire in 1937 and sold for 13.50 lire in 
Ethiopia.50  
The spirit of the resistance echoed through some cities in Italy as well.51 
Ethiopians who were taken there either as prisoners or interpreters were 
expected to be moulded in Italian ideology and ways of thinking. Among the 
400 notables and their families who were deported to Italy through Massawa in 
the summer of 1937 was the young Zerai Derres, working as an aid. ‘Zerai 
Derres, an Eritrean interpreter of the exiled Rases, on 13 June 1938, in front of 
the monument of the fallen heroes of Dogali in Rome, pronounced words in 
favor of Haile Selassie. In an attempt to stop him, several persons were 
wounded.’52 Abdisa Agga (later a colonel), a suspected accomplice of Abraham 
Deboch and Moges Asgedom in their attempt to kill Graziani, was taken to 
Libya as a prisoner. When the German army was defeated in Libya, Abdisa 
Agga, together with other British, Greek, Yugoslav and Albanian prisoners, was 
transferred to a prison in Italy from which he later managed to escape. He then 
engaged in guerrilla activities in the northern mountains of Italy where he met 
Marshal Tito, the Yugoslav resistance leader. As Nega remarked, ‘Abdisa 
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fought the Fascists in their own land until he returned to Ethiopia after the 
liberation’.53 
In late 1937 Mussolini realized that resistance was increasing in Ethiopia 
despite Graziani’s appalling repression. He replaced Graziani at the end of 1937 
with Viceroy U. Amadeo, the Duke of Aosta, who he thought would take a 
more ‘pacifying approach’ as governor and would contain the fermenting 
Ethiopian rebellion. In an effort to try a different tactic, the new viceroy began 
to engage in dialogue with the rases and other rebel leaders, hoping to negotiate 
their surrender. He offered money, titles and posts in his administration and also 
employed the tactic of divide-and-rule among the independently acting rases 
and a few other leaders. In fact, some leaders like Dejazmach Gebrehiwet 
Michael, Dejazmach Amde Ali, Dejazmach Ayalew Birru, Dejazmach 
Habtemichael, the author Afework Gebreyesus, Mengesha Wube, and some 
low-ranking chiefs responded positively, which again shows that the 
Ethiopians’ response to Italian occupation and the opportunities of the new 
situation was neither uniform nor universal. But a majority remained defiant. 
This held for the Patriots, the Church, women’s organizations, most intellectuals 
and the youth, many of whom subsequently joined the resistance movement. 
Some of the Patriots made use of the negotiation scheme, appearing to 
collaborate with the occupiers but only to buy time until a more favourable 
moment to strike back. For instance, the famous Patriot Abebe Aregay 
negotiated his possible surrender with the Italians but historians generally 
interpret this episode as a mere diversion to obtain breathing space for his 
exhausted troops.54 Guerrilla bands, led by renowned fighters like Zewde 
Asfaw, Abebe Aregay and Mesfin Seleshi, continued to make the well-
entrenched Italians in Addis Ababa feel permanently uneasy. In addition, the 
provinces remained insecure for the invaders. Patriots Gerasu Duki on the 
Jimma road, Fitawrari Taffera on the Neqemte road, Gebre-Hiwet Meshesha in 
the Lemelimo Gorge, Tesfay Medebai in the Merebe Gorge and Belay Zelleke 
in the Nile Gorge, commanding from 500 to 3,000 armed Patriots, made rural 
Ethiopia continuingly hazardous for Italian movement. Only in the south and 
southwest was the situation more or less stable, and road-building programmes 
and administrative services could be set up. 
As the granting of titles, bribes and negotiations failed to bring the resistance 
under control, the commander-in-chief of the Italian forces at the time, General 
Ugo Cavallero convinced the Duke of Aosta ‘that the “Graziani method” would 
bring the desired result’.55 This meant a full-scale military campaign and 
                                                 
53 Nega Tegegn Ye’Ethiopiawiyan, 96-97. 
54 Konjit Abinet in McClellan, ‘Observations on the Ethiopian Nation’, 62. 
55 Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness, 190. 
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exercise of sheer terror, as well as better defence works. Cavallero built road 
connections between strategic spots linked with chains of forts – still a visible 
Italian legacy in Ethiopia today. From 1938 to mid-1939 Cavallero’s army was 
engaged in executing the ‘Graziani method’ in what seemed to be an endless 
war of terror and attrition.   
 
 
The end of resistance and post-war Ethiopia 
 
In 1940 Mussolini embarked on what was later to prove the most disastrous 
venture of his career. He signed a pact with Nazi Germany and entered the 
European War on 10 June. Britain and France, both accustomed to diplomatic 
rivalry with Italy in the colonial partition of East Africa, were now set to 
become the arch-enemies of Italy, as they were of her Axis partner Germany. 
This new alliance of world forces came as a salutary gift for Ethiopia. Emperor 
Haile Selassie, whose repeated cry for help in the five preceding years had been 
disregarded by the world powers and by the League of Nations, found support 
from this twist of events. Many types of assistance to the Ethiopian cause and to 
the Patriots began to flow in, not only from England where the Emperor was 
living in exile but also from the other Allied powers. Haile Selassie’s return to 
Ethiopia was synchronized with the British offensive56 that was planned to drive 
the Italians out of the region. 
The British organized the Emperor’s journey via Khartoum, Sudan, from 
where he would start mobilizing Patriots in exile and at the border, and advance 
into Ethiopia. When he arrived in Khartoum on 3 July 1940, he received 
messages of support from the prominent Patriot leaders in the field. Yet, he was 
not sure how the people he left with the Fascist Italians back in 1936 would 
receive him. Possible rebellions in Gojjam, the Ogaden and Eritrea and more 
seriously, the republican ideals of Takele Wolde-Hawariat and the dynamic 
intellectuals in the resistance were some of the threats that the Emperor needed 
to address. The Patriots’ resistance had created its own political momentum, 
with claims and implications for the post-war period in Ethiopia, with or 
without the Emperor. The role of the resistance in posing this kind of political 
challenge to a liberated Ethiopia is perhaps worthy of a separate study but it can 
be said that the ideals of just rebellion, social justice and people’s rights that  
 
                                                 
56 The British troops in fact were largely made up of African troops (including 
Sudanese, South African and other contingents). Cf. T.H. Parsons, The African Rank 
and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 
1902-1964 (Portsmouth NH, 1999). 
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Patriots at Debra Markos market after the Italian surrender 
Source: R. Pankhurst, ‘The Ethiopian Patriots and the Collapse of Italian Rule in 
East Africa, 1940-41’, Ethiopia Observer, 12, 2 (1969), 114 
 
110 Aregawi   
emerged from the resistance were a development which Ethiopia, and 
specifically the new government, had to deal with. 
From June 1940, an intensive propaganda campaign on behalf of the 
Emperor attempted to improve the conditions for his return (led by the British 
journalist George Steer). On 30 January 1941, the day Haile Selassie crossed the 
border from Sudan on his way to Ethiopia accompanied by General Orde 
Wingate and several Patriots, he declared that there would be no retaliation 
against the Italians. This declaration was considered the official cessation of the 
resistance, although nobody was sure how the Italians were going to respond. 
Soon the Duke of Aosta and his army retired to the strategic pass of Amba 
Alagie in Tigray, leaving Addis Ababa to the Patriots, who were in the nearby 
mountains and inside the city, and to the British general, Alan Cunningham, 
who was pushing his way up from Kenya north to Addis Ababa. On 6 April 
1941, Addis Ababa was liberated and a month later, on 5 May 1941, Emperor 
Haile Selassie entered the city. His rule was restored and he remained on the 
throne for the next 33 years. 
Although detachments of the British army, combined with the forces of the 
Patriots, ended the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, this period left an impressive 
memory of indigenous Ethiopian resistance. At the time, it was realized how 
much the occupation had shaken traditional institutions and the myth of the 
divine Emperor (as was still written in the 1930 Ethiopian Constitution). Many 
also related their patriotic struggle to the war in Europe where the common 
enemies of the Axis had to be rooted out. What people vividly remember to this 
day is the horrific behaviour of the invaders on the one hand and the endurance 
and heroic struggle of the Patriots on the other. 
In the wake of their defeat and withdrawal from Ethiopia, the Italians were 
expecting the Ethiopians, who had suffered brutal oppression at their hands for 
five consecutive years, to take revenge. Resistance, after all, is a reaction to and 
a product of real or perceived injustice, and the Italian injustices and exercise of 
violence were seen as beyond acceptable limits. Such actions had no precedent 
in Ethiopia: the mustard-gas bombings, the mass executions, the arbitrary 
massacre of civilians, the wiping out of an educated class. Yet, with the 
Emperor’s declaration not to hurt or inflict damage on the Italians in retreat, for 
which he later received a letter of gratitude from President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt of the United States, the Ethiopians did not resort to the violent style 
of vengeance they had witnessed by the Italians since October 1935 (the Adua 
Syndrome). In these five years of occupation, the Ethiopians resisted 
aggression, injustice and violation of their rights as a sovereign nation. Once it 
was over, two factors mitigated their response and their anger to avenge. Firstly 
there was their traditional prudence based on a religious culture of tolerance and 
dignity, and in this respect there ís a difference in religious culture between 
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Ethiopians and Europeans. And secondly, the international political situation 
(i.e. pressure from the British and Americans) and the dependence of Ethiopia 
on foreign diplomatic and material assistance may have played a role in 
softening the Ethiopian response at a higher level. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The Italian invasion (1935) and occupation (1936-1941) of Ethiopia were 
conducted by a modern and strong European army that could not be matched by 
Ethiopia at the time. Conventional military theories and diplomatic manoeuvres 
were employed in extreme forms against an Ethiopian army that did not have 
even a working central command structure, let alone modern weaponry systems 
or diplomatic backing. The Italian invaders unleashed an unprecedented 
campaign of violent submission both from the ground as well as from the air, to 
which the Ethiopians had no defences and which caused huge loss of life. At the 
beginning of the occupation, the collapse of the Ethiopian army before 
Mussolini’s war machine followed by the flight of the Emperor into exile led 
many to believe that the fate of a long-independent nation was doomed. Any 
possible emergence of patriotic resistance also looked far-fetched. ‘Mussolini’s 
dream, one shared by the Italian people and constantly reiterated in the press, 
that millions of Italians would be able to find land and work in Ethiopia’57 then 
seemed to gain ground.  
But the Ethiopians were poised to fight back. The Italians controlled the 
major towns, yet they could in no way gain control over the vast Ethiopian 
countryside where resistance was gathering momentum. Despite Italian violence 
intended to force them into submission, the majority of Ethiopians drew upon 
their sense of freedom and pride, and were mentally prepared to resist the vastly 
superior forces that threatened their sovereign rights as an independent nation, 
and their historical identity, religion and culture. 
Ethiopians decided to resist even without the Emperor, who some said 
should have been there as a symbol of unity. Thus the formal Italian war of 
occupation was confronted with an informal, open-ended and community-based 
resistance. The traditional form of resistance, shiftinnet, had found a new terrain 
to spread to and a new enemy to counter, this time enjoying a much broader 
popular support. Unlike the old shiftinnet inspired by a rebellious noble or a few 
politically ambitious individuals, anti-Italian resistance drew upon all sectors of 
Ethiopian society: the peasantry, the nobility, the clergy, intellectuals, women 
and the youth alike. ‘From this point resistance was no longer an aristocratic 
                                                 
57 Schaefer, ‘Serendipitous Resistance’, 103. 
 
112 Aregawi   
affair’ but in fact ‘serendipitous’, as Schaefer58 rightly observed – gifted with 
the ability to find novel ways of revolt and action. For the Italians, however, 
resistance was an act of violence by irrational outlaws or t’era-shiftas who 
deserved to be hunted down, flogged, publicly hanged or executed by firing 
squad in order to create a state of fear and submission. Despite the repression 
and atrocities against the resistance fighters, the Italians never achieved the 
desired result. 
While the resistance expanded in scope and tenacity, the Italian human and 
material costs were growing, and driving the Italians to a state of increased fury. 
Not only was the whole objective of their occupation thwarted but also ‘never in 
their quinquennium of rule did the fascists feel secure in Ethiopia, and their 
anxiety came to border on neurosis’.59 To the relief of Ethiopians, Italy entered 
the Second World War on the side of Germany, and the Allied forces began to 
pour in support to bolster the resistance movement in Ethiopia. After the Italians 
were defeated, resistance, which had become nationwide, came to an abrupt 
end.  
The five years of Italian occupation shook feudalist Ethiopia and the impact 
the occupation created in traditional Ethiopia was significant. As McClellan put 
it: ‘It was an event that swept away old myths and created opportunity for 
Ethiopians to re-examine the nature and meaning of their state. For Ethiopia, the 
war highlighted a need to move fully into the modern world’.60 The fact that 
Ethiopia had failed to repulse the predatory Italian invasion in itself proved to 
many that the country had a long way to go, among other things, in building a 
modern system of self-defence. But, given the whole purpose of the invasion 
and occupation, there was another aspect to what the ‘modern world’ 
constituted in the context of the Ethiopian conception as a free and sovereign 
nation that had to face unprovoked aggression. While the need to move into the 
modern world was deemed essential, there also emerged a rethinking of why 
and how the occupation was conducted and how resistance had been organized. 
In the first place, there was no doubt that it was basically Italy’s authoritarian, 
nationalistic and greedy colonial ambition that led to the invasion and 
occupation of Ethiopia. For most Ethiopians, the invasion and occupation were 
executed in the most barbaric and violent manner. The perception was that if 
this was the guise of the ‘modern world’, few Ethiopians would be attracted by 
it. Second, the essence of the resistance was to safeguard the independence, 
religious values and cultural identity of Ethiopia, all taking inspiration from the 
                                                 
58 Schaefer, ‘Serendipitous Resistance’, 89. 
59 H.G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley, 1994), 148. 
60 McClellan, ‘Observations on the Ethiopian Nation’, 57. 
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domain of the past as heritage. In view of the violent ‘present’ defined by the 
Italians, the Ethiopians naturally oriented themselves to the past, i.e. all that 
defined their historical and cultural identity. In both cases, the raison d’être of 
the motivation for change was negative. Italy’s modernity can hardly be seen to 
have positively transformed Ethiopia’s traditional society. The only thing 
remaining and still referred to by Ethiopians is the ‘heritage’ of Italian road-
building. 
After 1941 Ethiopia moved towards modernity at its own pace within the 
contours of the old imperial order. The Patriots’ contribution to the freedom and 
independence of the country was highly valued, and many of their leaders were 
rewarded with public positions. However, the social and political aims of the 
resistance – ideals relating to social justice, equality and more openness in the 
political system – were not really followed up. Patriot leaders were also 
expected to be loyal to the Emperor again, and those who dissented or actively 
conspired against him were removed, and in some cases (like Belay Zelleke) 
executed. While the Emperor promulgated a new revised constitution in 1955, 
installed a parliament, allowed limited non-party elections, embarked on far-
reaching judicial reforms and developed the education system, the old property 
relations and the lack of democratic rights, such as a free press, free elections 
and political parties, remained unaddressed. In this respect, the Patriots’ 
programme was not realized. 
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Ambiguities of resistance and collaboration on 
the Eastern Cape Frontier: The Kat River 
Settlement 1829-1856 
 
Robert Ross 
 
 
This chapter attempts to unravel the complexities of 
resistance to, and collaboration with, the British colonizers 
of the Eastern Cape, South Africa, by the inhabitants of the 
Upper Kat River Valley. Since the Khoikhoi landholders of 
the valley had received their land as a result of British 
action against the Xhosa, and had generally accepted the 
precepts of mission Christianity, it could on the one hand be 
expected that they would fight on the side of the British 
against the Xhosa. On the other hand, they were subjected to 
racist attacks by the British settlers whose farms they 
defended, and by British officials. In addition, the ethnic 
distinction, on which the British acted, between Xhosa and 
Khoikhoi was more tenuous than they generally assumed. As 
a result, in the successive wars on the Eastern Frontier, the 
stance taken by the Khoikhoi was often uncertain, and 
finally led to a minority joining the Xhosa, and thus going 
into rebellion against the British. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The conflict between the Xhosa and the Cape Colony, along what is 
conventionally described as the Eastern Frontier of the Cape but which could 
equally be seen as the Western Frontier of Xhosaland, involved the longest 
series of wars in the history of Africa's colonial conquest. For almost a century, 
from 1779 to 1880, the region was wracked by successive outbursts of violence 
118 Ross 
in what has been called Africa's ‘Hundred Years’ War’.1 The violence varied in 
intensity and there were long periods of relative, even absolute, peace between 
those times conventionally considered to be war. Nevertheless, the threat of 
war, the experience of war and the recovery from war dominated the minds and 
lives of most of the frontier's inhabitants throughout the era, and certainly until 
after the end of Mlanjeni's War in 1853. This conflict clearly demonstrated that 
when the British Empire was forced to apply its full military might, it could not 
be contested by Africans. The conquest decisively led to the Cattle Killing 
Movement of 1857, the major breaking of Xhosa power.2 
 In the course of this contest, loyalties were never clear. It was never the case 
that there was an indubitable association between social position – ethnic or 
otherwise – and the political stance taken. Perhaps the only exceptions were 
some of the British who, imbued with a racial consciousness foreign (in the 
literal sense) to the shifting alliances of the Frontier,3 complicated matters for 
themselves and even more so for the rest of the Frontier’s inhabitants by 
attributing ideas and loyalties to others that they did not possess. For the rest, all 
those involved shifted their stance from time to time as the exigencies of 
personal advantage developed. In this chapter I discuss one specific case, that of 
the Kat River Settlement where, if the oxymoron is allowed, the murk and the 
confusion were even clearer than elsewhere. I give a preliminary account of the 
dilemmas faced by its inhabitants during three major wars which, in the first 
quarter of a century of the Settlement's history, affected the lives of the 
approximately 5,000 people living in the 800 square kilometres of the Upper 
Kat River Valley, and in effect doomed the experiment of the Settlement to 
failure.4 In order to do so, it is necessary to give a short description of how the 
Settlement came into existence, and what its place on the Frontier was 
considered to be. 
 
                                                 
1 C.C. Saunders, ‘The Hundred Years’ War: Some Reflections on African Resistance on 
the Cape-Xhosa Frontier’, in D. Chanaiwa, Profiles of Self-Determination (Northridge 
CA, 1976). 
2 J.B. Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing 
Movement of 1856-7 (Johannesburg, 1989). 
3 On the frontier in general, see the classic article by M. Legassick, ‘The Frontier 
Tradition in South African Historiography’, in S. Marks & A. Atmore (eds), Economy 
and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa (London, 1980); on the British, R. Ross, 
Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750–1870: A Tragedy of Manners 
(Cambridge, 1999), esp. chapter III. 
4 This chapter is as yet a preliminary discussion because not all the archival materials in 
the Cape Archives and in the Public Record Office in London have been fully 
investigated. 
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The Settlement 
 
The upper reaches of the Kat River Valley receive rain with too little regularity 
to allow agriculture without irrigation, and thus lie just to the west of the 
ecological border of Xhosaland proper. Nevertheless, they were long part of the 
regular pastures used by the western Xhosa on a transhumant basis, and from 
about 1800 onwards began to be settled more permanently by the followers of 
Ngqika, the head of the Rharhabe. Ngqika himself had his ‘Great Place’ in the 
Kat River Valley, and Maqoma, his most prominent son and the most 
impressive Xhosa of his generation, came to live there. After the war of 1819, 
the area was part of the region declared neutral territory and effectively extorted 
(if somewhat willingly) from Ngqika as the price of colonial support in his 
struggle for supremacy over the Western Xhosa, and particularly his uncle 
Ndlambe. 
 Of course there was little chance that any form of neutrality would prevail as 
both the Cape Colony and the Xhosa attempted to claim the region. It was, in 
fact, marked for settlement by Scots highlanders but this measure was 
rescinded, as much because of personal feuds within the Cape government as 
for any reason of policy. Thereafter, in 1822, Maqoma came to settle in the 
valley, initially with the tacit support of the Cape government. There were, 
however, others in the government who could not countenance a Xhosa 
presence in the valley, notably Andries Stockenström (who owned a large farm 
just to the east of the Kat River), at the time Commissioner-General of the 
Eastern Districts, and a man whose official career at the Cape would be long 
and fiery. Stockenström proceeded to pick a quarrel with Maqoma, which was 
not difficult in the unsettled state of the frontier. In 1829, Maqoma was expelled 
from the valley, ostensibly for conducting a war-cum-cattle raid against some of 
the Thembu to the north.5 
 This expulsion was opportune and allowed the lands to be given to Khoikhoi 
in the immediate aftermath of Ordinance 50 of 1828, which had abolished all 
legal discrimination in the Colony suffered by free people of colour. Within 
four years, 2,000 people of Khoi descent had moved into the valley, and over 
the next decades this number would grow rapidly. They came from a variety of 
places. Many had been to some extent under the influence of the London 
Missionary Society (LMS), and many of these, though not all, had been resident 
                                                 
5 J.B. Peires, ‘The British and the Cape. 1814-1834’, in R. Elphick & H. Giliomee (eds), 
The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840, 2nd edition (Cape Town, 1989), 484; 
A. Stockenström, The Autobiography of Sir Andries Stockenström Bart, C.W. Hutton 
(ed.), 2 vols (Cape Town, 1887), I, 300-324; J.C. Visagie, ‘Die Katriviernedersetting, 
1829-1839’, PhD thesis, UNISA (1978), 34-36. 
  
 Ambiguities of resistance and collaboration on the Eastern Cape Frontier 121 
at missionary stations in the Eastern Cape, notably Bethelsdorp and Theopolis. 
Others came from the farms of the Eastern Cape, where they had either been 
effectively bonded labourers, or had a more independent status and more 
wealth, particularly if they were in some way linked to the farm owners by ties 
of kinship. Others again were living in Xhosaland but as they could claim to be 
Gona they were admitted to the Settlement.6 Many spoke isiXhosa as well as 
Khoi – a dying language by this time but still occasionally used in the 
settlement – and Dutch, and had often lived among the Xhosa at some period in 
their lives. This was not surprising, since whether a man or woman was Xhosa 
or Khoi was frequently as much a matter of personal political choice and of the 
accidents of individual biography as it was determined by descent. 
 The Kat River Settlement was thus born out of the conflict between the Cape 
Colony and the Xhosa. It was also seen by those who founded it as part of the 
bulwark by which the Colony could be protected from the inroads of the Xhosa 
in subsequent wars. Its inhabitants were effectively granted their lands under 
military tenure, that is to say the able-bodied men were required to serve in the 
British forces as a militia in the event, all too frequent as it turned out, of 
renewed clashes between the Colony and the Xhosa. 
 In retrospect, Stockenström was ambivalent about the value of what he had 
done for the settlers in the valley. On the one hand, he quoted a governor’s 
comments to him: ‘Well, Captain Stockenström [sic], if I were the creator of 
this settlement, I should fancy that I had done enough for one man’s life’.7 On 
the other, in the aftermath of the rebellion of 1851-3, he told the Cape 
Parliament:  
 
To benefit the forlorn remnants of the former possessors of South Africa, upon the 
basis of the 50th Ordinance, was undoubtedly one of my objects, but a secondary 
one. It was for the selfish purpose of turning the better and more efficient part of the 
[Khoikhoi] into a breastwork against an exasperated powerful enemy in the most 
vulnerable and dangerous part of the frontier that I decoyed them from those retreats 
where many of them were certainly not very comfortable, but where they were, at 
least, safe, and legally their own masters. By the bait of a speck of land in the vast 
territories of their fathers, I drew them into the slavery of constant watching, 
patrolling, half-starving upon ‘veld kost’, and the chance of any day getting their 
throats cut.8 
                                                 
6 Botha to Governor Sir Harry Smith, 23 June 1850, printed in J.J. Freeman, A Tour in 
South Africa (London, 1851), 183. 
7 A. Stockenström, Light and Shade as Shown in the Character of the Hottentots of the 
Kat River Settlement and in the Conduct of the Colonial Government towards Them 
(Cape Town, 1854), 14. 
8 Stockenström, Light and Shade, 5. 
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Within this context, questions of loyalty became of paramount importance. At 
least in the beginning the lines were clear. Those who lived in the settlement 
had accepted their land and their chance of a respectable life by virtue of the 
colonial expulsion of the Xhosa. Many had acquired their land as a reward for 
service in the colonial army. Others had been recommended by the missionaries 
and may thus be assumed to have chosen a way of life coincident with loyalty to 
the British. But such simplicities never last. Eventually a minority of the Khoi 
inhabitants of the valley joined the Xhosa in their fight against the British and 
proved to be among the most determined and successful of the resisters. The 
explanation for this volte-face, which the British themselves could not 
comprehend,9 lay in the combination of the impossibility of drawing a fixed line 
between the Xhosa and Khoi, the partial economic failure of the settlement 
partly as a result of its repeated destruction, and the assumption by many white 
colonists that the Kat River colonists were indeed disloyal or that they did not 
need to be treated with any consideration. Each of these processes became 
particularly apparent during the various wars of the settlement’s tortuous 
military history. 
 The wars between the Colony and the Xhosa were ultimately about land 
though also to some extent about labour.10 Both Dutch and, particularly, British 
colonialists were greedy for pastureland, and profligate with what they had, so 
always needed more. The Drang nach Osten was continual and the repeated 
assaults on the Xhosa were the results, in the last instance, of this pressure. 
However, the conflicts with the Xhosa and certainly the pressure on the Kat 
River Settlement derived as much from the animosity between black and white 
as from a crude desire for land. The deeper causes of that animosity may have 
lain in land hunger. Nevertheless, the viciousness of British settler hatred of the 
Kat River people was driven by the threat they formed to British perceptions of 
how the world should be, not by the hope of taking over what was admittedly a 
fertile piece of territory but which would have accommodated at most 25 
standard-sized settler farms and that was even more vulnerable than most of the 
Eastern Cape to Xhosa attacks. 
 The Settlement was involved in three major wars between the Colony and 
the Xhosa, beginning in the austral summer of 1834-5 (Hintsa’s War), in March 
1846 (the War of the Axe) and in the summer of 1850-1 (Mlanjeni’s War). In all 
of these battles, the Settlement was laid waste, most of its houses burnt to the 
ground and many of its agricultural improvements destroyed, at least 
temporarily. The majority of the settlers were required to abandon their 
                                                 
9 See for example, Sir Harry Smith to Earl Grey, 12 June 1851, British Parliamentary 
Paper (hereafter BPP) 1428 of 1852. 
10 In the case of the Kat River, labour played a minimal role. 
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dwellings and congregate in what can only be described as South Africa’s (and 
the world’s) first concentration camps, in conditions of great and frequently 
fatal hardship. They were set up by the British during the first two wars around 
Fort Armstrong, a position of natural strength in the centre of the settlement, 
and later at Eland’s Post, the modern town of Seymour. At the same time, most 
of the adult male population were enlisted into the British forces. Ninety per 
cent of the Kat River men fought in the War of the Axe, as opposed to 3 per 
cent of the white men in any of the country’s districts.11 They fought well and 
their arrival was primarily responsible for preventing the British army’s defeat 
at Burn’s Hill, when it had lost all its baggage. More generally, they, together 
with their regular fellows in the Cape Mounted Rifles, possessed the skills of 
irregular light infantrymen and cavalrymen which were needed in the bush 
warfare of the Eastern Cape,12 and which the heavily laden, red-coated British 
regiments singularly lacked. 
 
 
                                                
Hintsa’s War 
 
Despite the above-mentioned actions, the loyalty to the colony of at least some 
of the Kat River settlers was called into question, first during Hintsa’s War 
when they were falsely believed to be resisting the British forces. There were 
two reasons for this, neither of which were the responsibility of the Khoi. First, 
once the Xhosa had decided to launch an attack on the Colony, which only 
occurred in the weeks immediately preceding the invasion,13 their leaders, 
notably Maqoma, began spreading information that the Khoi had agreed to join 
them.14 While this was primarily designed to strengthen the resolve of their own 
 
11 Berkeley to Pottinger, 23 March 1847 in B. Le Cordeur & C. Saunders, The War of 
the Axe, 1847: Correspondence between the Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Henry 
Pottinger, and the Commander of the British Forces at the Cape, Sir George Berkeley, 
and Others (Johannesburg, 1981), 89. 
12 C.L. Stretch, The Journal of Charles Lennox Stretch, edited by B. Le Cordeur (Cape 
Town, 1988), 55; Read to Kitchingman, 9 May 1847, in B. Le Cordeur & C. Saunders 
(eds), The Kitchingman Papers (Johannesburg, 1976), 8. 
13 Statement by the Rev. John Ross of the Glasgow Missionary Society cited in N. 
Mostert, Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa 
People (London, 1992), 653; depositions by the Glasgow missionaries James Weir, 
John Bennie and William Chalmers, by the Xhosa chiefs Tyhali and Bhotomane, and 
the Khoi Klaas Plaatje and Louis Arnoldus, in BPP 503 of 1837, 76-77, 80-83, 237-38. 
14 R. Godlonton, A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern 
Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-1835 (Grahamstown, 1836), 14-15. Here, 
Godlonton discounted the rumours as Xhosa propaganda; thirty pages later, 46-47, he 
claimed that ‘the fears [of Khoi disaffection] entertained at the time were perfectly well 
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followers, the chiefs knew that the rumours would soon reach the Colony and 
spread dissension among their opponents. This duly happened. 
 Second, these rumours were taken up on the colonial side by Captain 
Armstrong, commandant of the fort that bore his name. While he initially 
dismissed the idea,15 on 17 January 1835 he wrote to the commandant of the 
Frontier, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Smith (later governor) of ‘an intrigue which 
is suspected to have been carried out with extreme subtlety between some of the 
people of the Kat River Settlement’ and the Xhosa. His argument, as he himself 
admitted, was based on a number of surmises and not on any observable 
occurrences during the first weeks of the war. The suggestions of Xhosa 
forbearance towards the Khoi were contradicted by the fact, as Armstrong 
admitted, that his prime suspects had lost property and had shot at least one 
raiding Xhosa.16 Rather the surmises are extrapolations from a number of facts 
in the past, as construed within Armstrong’s imagination. These were, first, that 
there had been considerable conflict within the Settlement in the previous year, 
in particular in regard of the government’s proposal to introduce a Vagrancy 
Ordinance; secondly, that the division between the supporters and the opponents 
of the Vagrancy Ordinance was conceived along racial lines, between the 
‘Bastards’ and the Khoikhoi in the Settlement;17 thirdly, that many of those in 
the Settlement were people of Gona extraction; fourthly, that the LMS 
missionary James Read, with his son (of the same name), had been active in the 
protests against the Vagrancy Ordinance; and fifthly that some of the Gona and 
James Read had both had regular contact with Maqoma in the past.18 
 The extrapolations which Armstrong made from these facts were threefold, 
and all very problematic. The first was that the genuine fear that many in the 
Kat River felt at the introduction of a Vagrancy Ordinance would manifest itself 
in rebellion against the British and allegiance with the Xhosa. Armstrong’s view 
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printed in BPP 503 of 1837, 84-86. 
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on the matter was moreover jaundiced by the fact that he had put pressure on 
the Kat River settlers to sign the memorial in favour of the Ordinance.19 The 
second derived from his failure to understand the complicated politics of 
identity and language common on the Eastern Frontier, and indeed throughout 
Southern Africa. For Armstrong, as for most Britons at the time, one was either 
Xhosa or Khoi – the possibility of having dual nationality did not occur to them. 
The Gona therefore presented a problematic taxonomic anomaly. As Armstrong 
described it: 
 
The Gonahs are a race between a [Xhosa] and a [Khoi]. At one time the [Xhosa] 
took a number of [Khoi] into their service; they compelled the [Khoi] women to live 
with them. The children are Gonahs, entertaining partly a [Xhosa] and partly a 
[Khoi] feeling.20 
 
They were however ‘aliens’ who were illegally in the settlement as a result of 
Read’s intrigues.  
 There were many people in the Kat River whose personal biographies 
crossed the vague but hardening boundaries of the Eastern Cape and many were 
bilingual in Xhosa and Khoi. By the mid-1830s, if not much earlier, they would 
have added Dutch to their linguistic repertoire and were probably beginning to 
lose their Khoi. Andries Stoffels, for instance, the most famous of the LMS’s 
converts, first came into contact with the missions when he arrived at 
Bethelsdorp in the company of a number of Xhosa chiefs for whom he was to 
act as interpreter.21 Many of the Kat River Khoi had kin among the Xhosa, just 
as there were many with kin among the boers. The two groups were not 
mutually exclusive. In the racist22 vision of men like Armstrong, this made the 
former group suspect. It could, however, be argued that by leaving, or not going 
to live in Xhosaland and taking up residence in the Kat River, these people had 
made a conscious political choice as a result of which their loyalty to the 
Colony would be firmer, not weaker. 
 The third problem with Armstrong's analysis was the assumption that the 
contacts which Read and Stoffels, among others, had with Maqoma had to be in 
some way connected with plans against the Colony. In the first place, contacts 
need not necessarily have entailed conspiracy or incitement. In the second, the 
likelihood is that Maqoma's decision to launch the attacks were only taken in 
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20 Footnote in Armstrong to Smith, 14 January 1835, BPP 503 of 1837, 85. 
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December 1834, and there is no evidence that anyone from the Kat River visited 
during this crucial period. 
 The whole episode derived from panic on the part of Captain Armstrong, 
whom Read described as ‘the most timid man ever seen’, and who in the days 
around Christmas 1834 had to be restrained by the Kat River settlers from 
abandoning the Settlement entirely and withdrawing to the comparative safety 
of Fort Beaufort.23 He would not have been the only British soldier in the 
nineteenth century to take the credit where none was due, in this case for 
snuffing out potential rebellion by resolute action.  
 There was also considerable animus against James Read in colonial circles. 
His consistent non-racialism, both in theory and even more discomfortingly in 
practice, was always a potential challenge. It gave him contacts and friendships 
outside colonial circles that were at once an affront and a threat to both his 
fellow clergymen and to the white society in general. As a result, he was 
continually suspected of involvement in all sorts of nefarious practices, and on 
20 January 1835, together with the rest of his family, he was ordered out of the 
Kat River Settlement.24 He would not return for three years, although his 
absence was extended by a visit to Great Britain.  
 As Le Cordeur and Saunders pointed out some years ago,25 it should have 
been obvious that it was not in the interests of the Kat River settlers to join the 
Xhosa. They would have been aware that the main demands of the Xhosa 
included the restitution of territory, most notably the valley in which they were 
now settled, and which they were transforming into agricultural land by 
arduously digging irrigation furrows.26 
 
 
The War of the Axe and ethnic cleansing 
 
In the War of the Axe, no such implication of treachery in matters military was 
made and although the Kat River men were considered first-class soldiers, they 
were not treated as such. The distinction between themselves and the whites 
alongside whom they fought, was all too clear. They were not paid – though this 
was largely at their own volition so as to give them more command over their 
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own services.27 They did not receive clothing, soap or coffee;28 and their 
dependants’ claim to rations was countermanded by the governor, Sir Henry 
Pottinger.29 They did not receive their full share of the booty;30 and the governor 
tried to impose even stricter conscription on the Khoi at a time when there were 
in fact no men capable of service who were not already under arms.31 By 
voicing their displeasure at the treatment they received, they were accused of 
being in a state ‘bordering on rebellion’, and were only kept quiet by the issuing 
of rations they needed to stay alive.32 The racist assumptions of colonial society, 
perhaps fuelled by the Khoi success in the war, were being imposed ever more 
stringently on the Khoi. 
 In the years after the War of the Axe, the British administration of the 
Settlement became more intrusive and oppressive. For the first time, a 
magistrate was appointed to oversee the district, a position awarded to a 
confirmed enemy of the Kat River settlers, T.J. Biddulph. After protests about 
his actions, he was transferred elsewhere but his position was taken over by 
T.H. Bowker, a man of much the same ilk. Between them, they did much to 
alienate the Kat River settlers from the colonial government. 
 Paradoxically, they did so by measures that at first sight might have been 
seen to favour the Khoi. In the years following its foundation, considerable 
numbers of Xhosa and Mfengu33 had come into the valley. The most notable of 
these was Hermanus Matroos, alias Ngxukumeshe, the son of an escaped slave 
and a Xhosa woman, who had worked on a white farm in his youth and as an 
interpreter for the British since at least 1819. He fell foul of the Xhosa chiefs at 
the time of Maqoma’s expulsion from the Kat River Valley, and later was 
                                                 
27 Read to Directors, LMS, 23 March 1847, Archives of the Congregational Council for 
World Mission (LMS), School of Oriental and African Studies, London, Incoming 
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128 Ross 
dismissed by the British, who suspected him of being untrustworthy.34 After 
some time wandering in the Eastern Cape, he received permission to settle on 
the Blinkwater River in the Settlement, even though he clearly did not belong to 
any of the categories for whom the land was reserved. It seems to have been 
largely his service on the colonial side during Hintza's War that led to this 
permission being granted.35 At any rate, by the late 1840s he was well 
established in the Middle Blinkwater as a Xhosa headman with four wives, one 
of whom had been a dependent of Maqoma’s,36 and with considerably more 
followers than the sixteen who had originally accompanied him. In the War of 
the Axe, he fought on the colonial side against the Xhosa, although his initial 
application to join had been refused by Sir Andries Stockenström who did not 
want him fighting against his own countrymen, and who had a long-standing 
distrust of the man who had managed to worm his way into the settlement. This 
decision was later overturned, but not to the extent that Hermanus was paid the 
money the Colony owed him for his services, as had been promised.37 
 The other Xhosa and Mfengu who came into the valley were less prominent 
and less independent but their relationship with the settlers was by no means 
uniform. Where the relationship between the settlers and the incomers was 
tenuous or competitive, the settlers attempted to have the newcomers expelled. 
There were petitions for the removal of illegal squatters in Fuller’s Hoek in the 
mountains of the south-west of the valley,38 and protests against the government 
allowing Mfengu to pasture their cattle in the Mancazana Valley. On the other 
hand there were many Mfengu who lived as clients of the settlers, herding stock 
and growing sorghum and maize on the commonage. The vagueness of the 
distinction between Xhosa and Khoi survived, as there were many Gona living 
around Buxton in particular, who seemed to have maintained a material culture 
which was largely Xhosa, but who were nevertheless clients, and often kin, of 
the settlers. 
 
The advice which the governor received from one of its officials, Charles Brownlee, 
was to send out of the settlement all [Xhosa] who had come into the settlement after 
the war [of the Axe] and who were suspected of having fought against the colony, 
whilst the Gonas and [Xhosa] who had resided in the Settlement before the war and 
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had assisted in repelling and conquering the enemy should be promised farms either 
at Kat River or elsewhere.39 
 
In practice those who suffered were the clients of the leading settlers and the 
missionaries, the first being a number of Mfengu who were acting as cattle 
herders for James Read Jr and the Rev. Arie van Rooyen, a man of Khoi descent 
and originally from Theopolis, who had been ordained as minister for 
Tidmanton in the Lower Blinkwater a few months earlier. In September 1849, 
the civil commissioner of Fort Beaufort, N.J. Borcherds, who was shortly 
afterwards to commit suicide as a near-bankrupt,40 led a party of police to burn a 
number of Mfengu huts around Tidmanton, even though the huts were there 
legally and there had never been any complaint against these families from 
settlers living in the neighbourhood.41  
 This, though, was only the beginning. Through the first half of 1850, the 
campaign by the local officials of the colonial state against the residents of the 
Blinkwater Valley and later in the adjacent area of the Upper Buxton River 
became steadily heavier. They had, in their own eyes, reason for their actions. 
There were certainly considerable numbers of Xhosa who had come into the 
area since the War of the Axe and were squatting in Fuller’s Hoek and the 
Koems Valley to its north who were a threat to the cattle of the farmers in the 
Koonap Valley across the mountains. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
officials and the Koonap farmers was too close for propriety. As James Read Sr 
wrote: ‘An Albany farmer will not do for magistrates for the [Khoikhoi], they 
are full of prejudice and will not rest until this is an English settlement.’42 
Certainly, Bowker had been levying fines upon the Gonas under Andries Botha 
(on whom more below) for what he claimed were stock offences, but had done 
so illegally. As a result, he earned a reprimand from the governor and was 
ordered to repay the fines, although he tried to put off doing so for as long as 
possible.43 At the same time there is clear evidence of corruption, of the use of 
office for personal pecuniary gain, on the part of one of Bowker’s subordinates 
at least, which further raised the level of tension.44 
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 Whatever the motives, in the winter of 1850 in a week of rain, wind and 
even snow, a party of Xhosa police in colonial service, led by a British officer, 
proceeded through the western part of the Settlement eliminating the 
homesteads of those they described as Xhosa ‘squatters’. Their first targets were 
the Xhosa in Fuller’s Hoek and the other kloofs on the western boundary of the 
Kat River Settlement. Some were relatively independent or at least the subjects 
of Xhosa chiefs, including Bhotomane. One of the leaders, a certain Mali, was 
known to have fought against the colony during the War of the Axe. Others 
claimed to be followers of Hermanus but were living outside the restricted area 
he had been allocated. The party then moved on to Buxton where they found 
more squatters than in any other place among the followers of Field Cornet 
Andries Botha. The men, women and children were then shepherded off to Fort 
Hare, together with their goats and cattle. In total, more than 300 huts were 
burned, and 145 men, 350 women and an unknown number of children were 
driven off the land, together with nearly 2,500 head of cattle and 1,400 goats.45 
 There were many offensive aspects to this campaign. The missionaries, and 
probably many of the settlers in the Kat River, disapproved of the police 
continuing their work of destruction on a Sunday. The expulsion of men, 
women and children in the dead of a Cape winter without warning and without 
any real provision for their future residence was widely seen as brutal, harsh 
treatment, although it might be argued that, unlike Maqoma and his followers 
21 years earlier, this meant that they did not have crops standing in the fields 
waiting to be harvested. But, as he complained of the matter to his old 
commander, Sir Andries Stockenström, Andries Botha took exception above all 
to two matters: those who destroyed the houses, and those whose houses were 
destroyed. 
 The Xhosa police force had been formed in the aftermath of Hintsa's War 
and its numbers had been more than doubled during and after the War of the 
Axe. In wartime, the police had had a dubious reputation as spies and scouts, 
while in peacetime they were primarily engaged in the fruitless task of 
preventing cattle thefts and smuggling. Not surprisingly, both colonists and the 
other Xhosa distrusted them. At the outbreak of Mlangeni's War though, the 
majority took up arms with their fellow Xhosa, taking with them several  
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thousand rounds of ammunition.46 Most recruits after 1847 were probably men 
impoverished during the war. Certainly, relatively few had fought with the 
British then, unlike Botha, of whom Stockenström wrote: ‘Her Majesty has not 
in her dominions a more loyal subject, nor braver soldier’. The police relished 
the reversal of roles, shouting ‘exultingly’ – but probably in isiXhosa so that 
their officers, unlike Botha, could not understand when they said, ‘To-day we 
burn Botha out of the Blinkwater as he burnt us out of the Amatola last war’.47 
 Nowhere is it made clear how the police force decided who were squatters 
and who should be expelled. The boundary between Xhosa and Khoi was 
always vague, especially when Gona were involved. Botha himself was 
identified by the Xhosa police as ‘a Ghona Kaffir’,48 but a man with the office 
of field cornet, a regularly granted erf and a rectangular wattle-and-daub house 
could not be considered a squatter.49 It might have been that those whose homes 
were destroyed had made the mistake of maintaining a round, beehive-style 
isiXhosa hut. According to Botha, many were among his friends and perhaps 
his kin who had come to the settlement from Xhosaland in 1829. Those who 
had settled in Balfour had received erfs immediately, and some of those who 
went to Philipton later got land, largely in the Lower Blinkwater. However, very 
few of those who had gone to Buxton or to the neighbouring settlement of 
Wilberforce in the Upper Blinkwater Valley, a more pastoral region where 
irrigated agriculture had failed, had been granted title to land, and many had 
since become adults. As was commented at the time: 
 
They have always been expecting to get erfs, according to promise, but it was not 
done, and as they were among the friends, and no complaints, we did not urge their 
leaving; thus they have remained among their friends until now. They were ready for 
any duty, paid regularly the taxes as long as we paid, went on patrols against the 
[Xhosa], and fought two wars.50 
 
Indeed, according to a list drawn up by the Reads, of 36 Gona ‘burnt out’ at 
Wilberforce and Buxton, 29 had been in the settlement for twenty years, i.e. 
since its foundation, five since the 1835 war, one (whose name would suggest 
that he had relatives among the others) for three years and for one no period of 
time was given. There were also ten Mfengu families who had come to the 
settlement in the wake of Hintsa's War and six who had been policemen and 
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were afraid to reside among the other Xhosa who had entered the Colony in 
1842, in part because they had fought with the Colony in the War of the Axe.51 
There were also those who worked as servants for the Kat River Settlers, 
including at least one case where the labour contract, for a year, had been 
registered by Bowker only four months before the labourer in question had his 
hut burnt.52 The repulsion which Botha, as the leader of the Buxton and 
Wilberforce community, felt at what had happened is understandable and, 
though it is not expressed in the historical record, that of the younger 
inhabitants of the area was as great, if not greater. The fact that the inquiry into 
this affair brought Bowker a reprimand and led to his being replaced as 
magistrate of the settlement did little to mollify them.53 
 The pressure on the inhabitants of the Blinkwater did not end with the 
burnings and the dismissal of Bowker. A stream of complaints of cattle and 
sheep thefts from the farmers of the Koonap against the followers continued 
unabated. As a result, the government appointed a commission to investigate the 
matter. It was scarcely impartial. One of its four members was Robert 
Godlonton, the editor of the Graham’s Town Journal and an inveterate enemy 
of the Kat River settlers. Another was Major J. Blakeway, whose family had 
made the most vocal complaints against Hermanus and the Fuller’s Hoek 
squatters and who was believed to be attempting to buy part of the Fuller’s 
Hoek commonage. Nevertheless, at Godlonton’s request, the commission was 
accompanied by James Read Jr and the Rev. Arie van Rooyen.54 For six days in 
November 1850, they poked around the huts and houses of the Blinkwater, 
trying to find evidence of stolen cattle. One was even reported to have put his 
hand inside cooking pots to discover whether they were still greasy. One of the 
places which they investigated was a cattle post belonging to Oerson 
Magerman, a Kat River settler James Read described as ‘one of the most 
respectable men of the Blinkwater’, who, together with Andries Botha’s son, 
had commanded one of the Kat River parties invading Xhosaland during the 
War of the Axe. Magerman arrived while they were doing so and complained 
that his servants were being interrogated while ‘he was master of the place and 
would answer everything that might be asked of him’. This led to a 
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confrontation in which blows, or at least shoves, were exchanged.55 The 
incident can only further have soured the fragile relations between the settlers 
and the government.  
 
 
Mlanjeni’s War and the Rebellion 
 
At the end of December 1850 after a period of mounting tension, war once 
again broke out between the Xhosa and the Colony. It was to be the longest and 
bloodiest war fought in South Africa in the nineteenth century. To the Xhosa, it 
is known as Mlanjeni’s War, after the prophet whose doctoring was believed, 
erroneously, to give them protection against British bullets. This time, in 
contrast to the previous wars, a number of the Khoikhoi from the Kat River 
Settlement joined the rebellion against the British and fought alongside the 
Xhosa. 
 The trigger for the involvement of Kat River men on the Xhosa side was the 
defection of Hermanus Matroos. At some stage, probably after the assaults on 
the Blinkwater Xhosa in the winter of 1850, he had made his peace with the 
Xhosa chiefs and was privy to their plans to attack the Colony. He too began 
slaughtering his dun-coloured cattle, as Mlanjeni had ordered, sending their 
hides to the merchants at Fort Beaufort and to the shop in Tidmanton. His 
followers also did not cultivate that year, missing the opportunity to profit from 
the good rains.56 Certainly, he was aware of Xhosa plans to attack the Colony, 
which they did on Christmas Day 1850 after what they saw as an unsuccessful 
attempt to arrest the Ngqika chief Sandile. Thereafter Hermanus Matroos 
revolted too, although not until after he had been issued with guns and 
ammunition from the British armoury in Fort Beaufort.57 He collected all the 
men he could around him and forced the Khoi in the neighbourhood to join him. 
Deprived of their arms and with only 90 Khoi surrounded by 900 Xhosa, there 
was little they could do to oppose him. The Rev. Arie van Rooyen, the LMS 
minister at the Blinkwater, tried to persuade Hermanus not to impress the men 
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and sent messages requesting assistance to both the magistrate of the 
Settlement, J.H.B. Weinand, and Commandant Groepe in Fort Armstrong. 
Neither could spare forces to relieve or give assistance to the Blinkwater Khoi, a 
fact that was to exacerbate the spread of the rebellion. This message was carried 
by Oerson Magerman, the man who had been gravely insulted by the 
Blinkwater commission a couple of months earlier and who would later join the 
rebellion – although as yet I do not know under what circumstances.58 
 Hermanus began by capturing the fortified farmhouse belonging to W. 
Gilbert, who had been one of the Blinkwater commissioners, near Fuller’s 
Hoek. Then after a few days, he launched an attack on the British forces in Fort 
Armstrong. The British, however, were forewarned, largely because James 
Read had sent a message to the army that rumours of such an attack were 
circulating in the valley. Hermanus was killed in the streets of the town and the 
attack beaten off. Nevertheless, a number of those who had been pressed into 
accompanying him continued the rebellion, even when they had the opportunity 
to escape to the missionaries (and thus the British) in the coming weeks. 
 The rebellion began to attract adherents from outside the Kat River 
Settlement. Within the first week, considerable numbers of farm labourers and 
tenants from the Winterberg and the Koonap to the west of the Kat River Valley 
began to take advantage of their employers’ isolation and to react to the 
aggression which the farmers were showing towards them. There had been 
attempts before the rebellion begun to persuade the farm labourers in the area to 
join the rebellion.59 Indeed when the Winterberg farmers went into laager, their 
Khoi servants accompanied them but then went over to the rebels taking with 
them the guns they had received for the defence of the camp.60 By 2 January, 
they had come to the rebel camp in the Blinkwater, with some of the spoils of 
their actions. James Read Jr went out with one of his deacons to meet them 
there in an attempt to persuade them to leave the rebellion. He found that the 
camp was in a carnival mood. 
 
Now we saw the fatherlander sheep browsing – one slaughtered (sometimes two) in 
each house, pots boiling, meat roasting, and bread, cakes, and pancakes baking in 
abundance, while the whole scene seemed frantic with mirth and good cheer; and yet 
                                                 
58 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 8, 82; BPP 635 of 1851, 474; Cape Parliamentary 
Paper G18 59, 40; Oerson Magerman was in Philipton on 25 February when General 
Somerset marched into the place (see below) prima facie suggesting that he was at that 
time loyal. 
59 Elbourne, ‘Race, Warfare and Religion in Mid-Nineteenth Century Southern Africa: 
The Khoikhoi Rebellion against the Cape Colony and its Uses, 1850-1858’, Journal of 
African Cultural Studies, 13 (2000), 21. 
60 I. Staples, A Narrative of the Eighth Frontier War of 1851-1853 (Pretoria, 1974), 13. 
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there was a pensive but wrought-up solemnity – so characteristic of the [Khoi] – but 
which occasionally broke loose in unbounded laughter.61 
 
Nevertheless, there were a number of Khoi from within the settlement who 
joined in the rebellion, either immediately or later. The Reads, who saw the 
rebellion, correctly, as ruining their lives’ work, tended to portray the 
participants as giddy young men – not surprisingly as the young are always 
likely to be the most radical – while the loyalists were the established, 
respectable farmers.62 Statistically there is considerable support for this. On the 
basis of the Reads’ figures, it can be calculated that 22 per cent of those in 
possession of an erf joined the rebellion, as opposed to 45 per cent of the Khoi 
inhabitants of the valley who did not own an erf.63 The rebel erfholders, most 
common in the west of the valley where they had been pressed by Hermanus, 
had suffered most from government actions in 1850 and in general, they had 
been less likely to recover from the depredations of the War of the Axe. There 
were also many rebels among the people in those parts of the north of the valley 
that were laid waste by the British army and the white settler militias in 
February 1851.64 
 Such sociological comments cannot disguise the fact that among the rebels a 
substantial number of the established figures of the Settlement had joined the 
rebellion, and that others, including the two most prominent military figures, 
Field Commandant Christian Groepe and Field Cornet Andres Botha, were 
suspected of, at the very least, not being totally committed to its suppression.65 
There were a number of reasons for this. Certainly both Botha and Groepe were 
held back by the presence of one or more of their sons among the rebels,66 and 
the shearing loyalties of civil war in a close, small community must have been 
difficult for many on both sides.67 More generally, British settlers in the militia 
                                                 
61 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 23. 
62 Andries Botha commented that ‘All is up; my sons and all the young people have left 
me, and I, my wife and the old people are all that are left’. See Read, Kat River 
Settlement in 1851, 22. 
63 Calculated on the basis of Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, Appendix, 3. 
64 See below. 
65 Botha was tried and convicted of high treason as a result of his actions, not a verdict I 
would endorse, on the basis of the evidence led in his trial, Trial of Andries Botha (Cape 
Town, 1852); for Groepe, see ‘Answer to an Address of the House of Assembly to the 
Lieut. Governor’, dated 20 July 1854, for the Reports of the Commissioners Appointed 
for Investigating into the Causes of the Kat River Rebellion’, Cape Parliamentary Paper 
(1854), 2. 
66 D. Williams, When Races Meet: The Life and Times of William Ritchie Thomson 
(Johannesburg, 1967), 148-49, and above note 60. 
67 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 59. 
  
 Ambiguities of resistance and collaboration on the Eastern Cape Frontier 137 
and the British army were driven by the widely articulated belief that Mlanjeni’s 
War was a struggle between black and white, with no room for the greys (or 
browns) of the Kat River,68 and were unable, or more probably unwilling, to 
distinguish friend from foe. There were certainly loyalists who were killed by 
British forces in the belief that they must have been rebels.69 A party of loyalists 
from the Kat River was fired upon by the inhabitants of the town while 
escorting the magistrate into Fort Beaufort, exacerbating the anti-colonial 
feelings of those involved. These included Andries Botha, who exclaimed later 
that ‘he would join the rebels...take Fort Beaufort and convince the inhabitants 
that they had a different man than Hermanus to deal with’.70 Later, as General 
Somerset together with units of the army and the white militia swung through 
the Settlement, their forces took the opportunity to impose themselves on the 
Khoikhoi and the missionaries who had threatened their vision of the true order 
of the world. Some of the ‘Gentlemen Settlers’, as James Read Sr ironically 
called them, had marched up the valley flying a red flag with the word 
‘extermination’ affixed to it. The burgher militia burnt the houses and crops of 
the loyalists in Readsdale, Bruceton, Wilsonton and among the Groepes, for 
instance, as readily as they destroyed those of the rebels. The schoolhouses of 
the LMS seem to have been marked out for specific treatment in this regard, 
both out of prejudice against the mission and no doubt in protest against their 
potential role in removing the Khoi from dependence on the whites.71 Andries 
Botha, afraid of being lynched, spent several nights in the bush before giving 
himself up to army commanders, an action that was to lead to his being 
condemned to death for high treason.72 He was certainly not the only one of the 
                                                 
68 Elbourne, ‘Khoikhoi Rebellion’, 26-27. 
69 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 48. 
70 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 61-62. The quotation comes from the evidence of 
John Green, a hostile witness, in Trial of Andries Botha, 65; if it was not a fabrication of 
Green's imagination (which I do not believe, though I have no evidence either way), it 
was merely the explosion of momentary anger. See also Trial, 72-73, 233. 
71 Read to Freeman, 13 April 1851, LMS-SA 26/1/C; Read, Kat River Settlement in 
1851, 79-80, 97; Evidence of the Rev. H. Renton, BPP 635 of 1851, 427. 
72 The court that condemned Botha in what was perhaps South Africa’s first political 
trial saw matters differently, believing that he had connived with the rebels during the 
days in which his movements were unaccounted for. On reading the evidence, I am 
more persuaded by the arguments of the defence, which I am here recounting, than by 
those of the prosecution. See Trial of Andries Botha, passim. Botha’s sentence was 
commuted and he was released after a short stay in gaol. This might seem to suggest 
that the prosecuting counsel, William Porter, had convinced himself somewhat less fully 
than he had convinced the jury that Botha was guilty. As Attorney-General, he would 
have had some say in Botha’s release. 
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Khoi to take such an action.73 Though he did not condone all the actions of the 
men under his command, Somerset took no measures to restrain them. Certainly 
he accepted their ideas as to the responsibility for the uprising, writing in an 
official despatch that Philipton, the residence of the Reads and the main mission 
settlement,  
 
…so proverbially stated to be loyal, had in fact been the focus of almost all the 
disaffected in the settlement. ...I found, upon undoubted evidence, that from this 
body of people detachments had been furnished to support the rebels in their 
desultory attacks on the farms in the colony; in fact that the most disgraceful 
deception had been carried on to an incredible extent.74 
 
This sort of taxonomic lumping did much to drive doubters into the rebel camp. 
 All the same, the rebellion was driven on, in part at least, by a Khoikhoi 
ethnic consciousness that was certainly not called into existence by the actions 
and categorizations of the Europeans. As has been shown elsewhere,75 it had a 
history in the Kat River Valley that went back at least to the 1830s, and it was 
used to mobilize and justify the actions of the rebels. The Xhosa certainly 
played on it in an attempt to persuade the Khoi to join them. At one meeting, 
held at Sandile’s ‘Great Place’, the Ngqika chief proclaimed: 
 
I shall re-establish the Kingdom of Chama [one of the old Khoi chiefs, James Read 
noted]. Do you know of any of the heirs of the old [Khoi] dynasty? If so, I shall give 
my sanction to their again assuming the rank of their fathers. I see that 
notwithstanding all the assistance you have given the Government to fight against us 
in every war, and all your toil for the white man, you are still very poor... If you will 
join me, ....you may trust my word, that you shall be completed with cattle and all 
that a man should have; and farther, the first cattle that shall be taken will be 
distributed to the children of Chama.76 
 
The Khoi themselves articulated such ideas, for instance in two of the letters 
written by rebel leaders to urge others to join their cause. In the first, Speelman 
Kieviet wrote in the first days of the rebellion:  
 
                                                 
73 Read, Kat River Settlement in 1851, 80. This, it should be pointed out, was written 
before Botha was arrested and charged. 
74 Somerset to Smith, 28 February 1851, BPP 1352 of 1851, 13. 
75 Trapido, The Emergence of Liberalism; Ross, ‘The Kat River Rebellion and Khoikhoi 
Nationalism’; Elbourne, ‘Race, Warfare and Religion’. 
76 J. Read Sr to Freeman, 13 April 1851, LMS-SA 26/1/C; Read, Kat River Settlement in 
1851, 41. 
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Our circumstances as the Hottentot nation...are now become very melancholy and on 
this account we have put our hands to a work from which we have no wish to retreat. 
We have done this without acquainting all of you who belong to our nation, and in this 
we have acted very improperly...but with this we take the liberty to acquaint you, as our 
nation, that we have commenced war with the settlers (meaning the English), and to call 
upon you as our nation to assist us. Break the bands of indecision or [sic] come at once 
with all speed to assist us in this great and important matter. Time is important. It is a 
national cause and can you as a nation remain inactive? Arise courageously and work 
for your motherland and freedom. ...The world is against us and who will be for us.77 
 
Five months later, Willem Uithaalder, commander of the rebel forces in the 
Amatola Mountains, had a letter written to Adam Kok III, Captain of the 
Philippolis Griquas, in which he called upon Kok to:  
 
Rise manfully and unanimously as a nation and children of one house to engage 
yourselves in this important work, a work which concerns your mother country, for 
not a single person of colour, wherever he may be, will escape this law. Trust, 
therefore, in the Lord (whose character is known to be unfriendly to injustice), and 
undertake your work, and he will give us prosperity – a work for your motherland 
and freedom, for it is now the time, yea, the appointed time, and no other.78 
 
For both Kieviet and Uithaalder, and for most of their followers, the nationalism 
they propagated was a very Christian nationalism, building on a long tradition 
of socially engaged mission Protestantism, which went back to the 
establishment of the LMS mission in the Eastern Cape. At the same time it was 
highly ethnic. Ethnicity, as ever, was a way to think about matters beyond the 
existential which it propounds on the surface, thus not just ‘Who am I?’ but also 
‘Why is this happening to me?’ The rebellion was explicitly not just an 
assertion of Khoi ethnicity: it was a protest against the threats of settler rule, 
which the Khoi saw, not unjustly, in the proposed establishment of the Cape 
Parliament. At one extreme there were those who hoped for the establishment of 
a Khoi state – a monarchy or republic – in the Eastern Cape.79 Those who were 
somewhat more realistic saw their protests primarily aimed at the European 
settlers in the Colony, and particularly at the possibility, which had been 
mooted by various of the farmers, of the reintroduction of measures that it was 
believed would reduce the Khoi once again to bondage, notably a Vagrancy 
                                                 
77 BPP 1635 of 1853, 171, Speelman Kieviet to [Peffer], 10 January 1851. 
78 BPP 1635 of 1853, Willem Uithaalder to Adam Kok. 11 June 1851. (The original is in 
the Free State Archives, HC 1/1/3.) 
79 Cited in Godlonton & Irving, ‘Narrative’, 176, from The South African Commercial 
Advertiser (they do not give the date). 
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Act.80 The hopes and fears were enough to make them risk what they had built 
up in the hope, forlorn as it turned out, that they would be able to reconstruct 
their lives. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the whole of what was to become South 
Africa was under colonial rule. A couple of years later it was all under British 
rule. This is not surprising. British power was vastly superior to that of all other 
South African groups and when it was called upon it could, eventually, 
steamroller them. Moreover, the British, or at least some of them, had an almost 
teleological sense that they would master the sub-continent. It was a decision 
based on ideas of racial supremacy and racial difference, or at the very least on 
an ethnic consciousness which the British assumed for themselves and which 
they imputed to all the others with whom they came into contact. In the course 
of this process of ethnic labelling, they decided, effectively, who were to be 
their opponents.81 
 Matters seem very different and certainly more complicated when the point 
of view shifts to that of the non-British. As the history of the Kat River 
Settlement shows, the British perspective was usually based on an accurate 
assessment of the true motives and intentions of people to whom the British 
attributed hostility. Ethnicity, in particular, was not necessarily as evident a 
motive as the British assumed. It was not unusual for those who had thrown in 
their lot with the British to be rejected by them because of their association, in 
the eyes of the British though not in their own, with people who, at that 
moment, the British assumed to be their enemies. Many Kat River settlers 
rebelled because they were declared to be rebels, and even then many of those 
who were considered to be disloyal to the Cape Colony struggled as hard as 
they could to preserve their loyalty and to hold to the course they had chosen. 
What was called ‘loyalty’ was, in its way, just as much ‘resistance’ as was 
taking up arms. Loyalty was resistance to the increasingly racialized bifurcation 
of colonial South African society, while fighting, paradoxically, was an 
affirmation of that division. 
 
 
80 Elbourne, ‘Fit for Freedom’; Memorandum by John Montagu, Colonial Secretary, 2 
February 1852, BPP 1636 of 1852-3, 109. 
81 For an analogous case, see S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances 
in Natal (Oxford, 1970). 
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African mutinies in the Netherlands East Indies: 
A nineteenth-century colonial paradox 
 
Ineke van Kessel 
 
 
Between 1831 and 1872, the Dutch government recruited 
3,000 Africans from the Gold Coast and Ashanti for service 
in the colonial army in the Netherlands East Indies. The 
majority of them were ex-slaves but were promised that their 
conditions of service would be the same as those of 
Europeans. With the ‘equal treatment’ clause, the Dutch 
government defended itself against British accusations that 
the recruitment operation amounted to a covert form of slave 
trading. While this policy made sense in the context of the 
pre-colonial relations prevailing in the Gold Coast, its merits 
were less obvious in the East Indies. The colonial army here 
was the instrument of empire building but mutinies among 
African troops stationed on Java and Sumatra caused it to 
rethink its policy concerning African soldiers. This chapter 
explores the background to these rebellions. 
 
‘Wherever the Negro soldiers served together in a company, 
they have banded together in mutiny, under the pretext that 
infringements had been made on the promise of equal 
treatment with the European soldier.’1 (Major-General 
Cochius to the Department of Colonies in The Hague, 8 
August 1840) 
 
 
                                                 
1 Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Ministerie van Koloniën na 1850 (hereafter Kol.), 
Generaal Overzigt van hetgeen betrekking heeft tot de werving van Afrikanen en van de 
verkregen resultaten, nr 49, exh. 4-11-1850, Missive van den kommandant van het 
leger, dd 8 augustus 1840, geheim. 
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Introduction 
 
Revolts and resistance by Africans occurred not only on the African continent 
but also among Africans in the diaspora. The best-known examples are the slave 
rebellions in the western hemisphere, where historians have also explored and 
described patterns of accommodation and acquiescence among slave 
populations. However, very little is known about instances of resistance and 
patterns of accommodation among other groups of Africans in the diaspora. 
This chapter deals with a series of mutinies by West Africans recruited in the 
nineteenth century as soldiers in the Dutch colonial army in the Netherlands 
East Indies, present-day Indonesia. 
The vast majority of the 3,000 Africans who were shipped to Java between 
1831 and 1872 had previously been of slave status. Their freedom had been 
purchased with an advance on their army pay. Although they entered army 
service as free men, there is reason to doubt the voluntary nature of their 
enlistment. But the Africans in the East Indies did not rise in protest against 
their conscription into the Dutch army. On the contrary, they fully identified 
with their prescribed role. They had been recruited with the promise of equal 
treatment with the European soldiers, and they insisted that the promise be kept 
in every detail. The series of mutinies erupted in protest against repeated 
infringements on their status as European soldiers. With their newly acquired 
corporate identity as 'African soldiers' or 'Negro soldiers', these men of 
disparate ethnic origins and largely of slave descent banded together in 
solidarity to demand that their European status be respected to the letter. 
Enlisting Africans in colonial armies was of course common practice during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Like the Africans in the Dutch East 
Indies army, the famous Tirailleurs Sénégalais, established in 1857, were also 
largely of servile descent. As Myron Echenberg pointed out, the roots of the 
African Tirailleurs are much older and can be traced back to the era of company 
rule in Senegambia in the seventeenth century.2 African soldiers were not only 
instrumental in wars of conquest and in the consolidation of empire in Africa 
but were also used for military expeditions overseas. In 1827, the French sent 
200 Wolof soldiers to Madagascar, followed in 1831 by the despatching of 220 
troops to Guyana. In Sierra Leone, the British recruited among freed slaves to 
swell the ranks of the British West Indies regiments. In the twentieth century, 
the King's African Rifles played a vital role in the consolidation of British rule 
                                                 
2 M. Echenberg, ‘Slaves into Soldiers: Social Origins of the Tirailleurs Sénégalais’, in 
P. Lovejoy (ed.), Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade 
(Madison, 1986); M. Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in 
French West Africa, 1857-1960 (Portsmouth NH, 1991). 
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in East Africa.3 The rationale for African recruitment was remarkably similar in 
all cases: a shortage of European recruits and high mortality rates among 
European soldiers who, voluntarily or involuntarily, were despatched to the 
tropics. The lower cost of local personnel could also have been a compelling 
argument, although there were obvious limitations to cost cutting. The loyalty 
of African troops was generally ensured by granting them special benefits and 
privileges. Thus, even when they were of servile origins, African soldiers used 
their newly acquired corporate identity as military men to enhance their status 
vis-à-vis civilian society. It fitted the purposes of colonial rulers to instil their 
African soldiers with a sense of superiority over their civilian colonial subjects. 
In his history of the King's African Rifles, Timothy Parsons pointed out that 
African servicemen both consciously and unconsciously exploited the 
contradictions of the colonial state to seek greater rights and status. He aptly 
quotes Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper who remind us that: ‘One of the 
most basic forms of colonial control (...) depended on soldiers who were 
simultaneously coerced and coercing, who enforced the will of the elite yet 
made demands themselves’.4 
Certainly in the phase of conquest and early consolidation, imperial rulers 
generally deemed it advisable to use foreign-born Africans rather than locals. 
But even foreign-born African soldiers were not always reliable tools of 
imperial expansion. It is noteworthy that, in the phase of conquest, the British 
preferred to strengthen their colonial forces in East Africa with Indian troops. 
As the Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles put it bluntly in 1912: 
‘The Indian contingents were introduced in order than we might have a body of 
troops with no religious or local sympathies, and therefore no incentive for 
throwing in their lot with the native inhabitants’. The same rationale 
underpinned the Dutch decision to recruit African soldiers for the East Indies 
rather than expand local recruitment in the Indies.  
Yet, the story of African recruitment for the Dutch East Indies is somewhat 
different from the British and the French experiences. Unlike the British and the 
French, the Dutch exercised no territorial control on the Gold Coast and 
fostered no colonial ambitions in West Africa. The African soldiers for the East 
Indies army were not despatched as an expeditionary force to be repatriated 
after the campaign was over. If the experience with African recruits proved 
satisfactory, the African presence was envisaged as a permanent feature of the 
East Indies army. After the expiry of their long-term contracts (on average 12 to 
                                                 
3 T.H. Parsons, The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military 
Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902-1964 (Portsmouth NH, 1999). 
4 Ibid. 6. 
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15 years), they could opt for re-enlistment, repatriation to the Gold Coast, or 
permanent residence on Java.  
While the Netherlands had no colonial ambitions in West Africa, the East 
Indies was the mainstay of its overseas empire. By 1830, the Dutch had re-
established colonial control over Java. During the Napoleonic wars the island 
had been under British rule. Subsequently Dutch rule was undermined by a 
major uprising, known as the Java War or the Diponegoro War, after its 
princely instigator. As many rebels found a refuge on the southern and western 
parts of Sumatra, this became the scene of future military campaigns. In the 
1820s, three Islamic leaders from these parts of Sumatra went on a pilgrimage 
to Mecca, from where they returned full of zeal to launch an orthodox reform 
movement in their home areas. The hadjis engaged the infidel Dutch intruders 
in a series of armed conflicts, known as the Padri Wars, which, with some 
interruptions, would last for about 20 years. The mutinies to be explored in this 
chapter took place both on Sumatra and on Java.  
But before turning to the 1840-1841 mutinies, I will first make some remarks 
on the information sources and the historical context. Since the African 
recruitment was launched as an experiment, the colonial army documented in 
considerable detail both the positive and the negative experiences they 
encountered with the Africans as soldiers. The abundance of army records 
allows us today to describe the rebellions in some detail. What were the 
grievances of the Africans? How did the Africans view their predicament? What 
was the response of their commanding officers? Apart from its inherent interest, 
the story of the mutinies provides an intriguing insight into colonial ambiguities 
with regard to race and social status. The military archives offer a mine of 
information on the army careers of the African soldiers: it is unusual to have 
such a wealth of information on individuals of low social status in a nineteenth-
century colonial setting. By their very nature, army sources have their obvious 
limitations since the army was interested in the Africans as soldiers and paid 
little attention to other dimensions of their experience. As for the Africans' own 
interpretations of their predicament, we have unfortunately no direct sources. 
The vast majority were illiterate. A handful of soldiers of mixed Dutch-African 
parentage, recruited in the experimental phase in the early 1830s, were literate 
in Dutch but unfortunately their writings have not survived, to my knowledge. 
An additional source of information is to be found in the memoirs published by 
Dutch army officers who served in the East Indies. Some were prolific writers 
who recorded military campaigns and daily life in great detail. African soldiers 
indeed figure in some of these accounts but usually only on the margins: 
officers tend to elaborate on their own feats and those of fellow officers, not on 
the exploits of soldiers and NCOs. In these memoirs, we again see the Africans 
through the eyes of Dutch officers. From some of these accounts, it clearly 
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transpires that at least some of the Dutch officers did not accept the rigid racial 
stratification of the colonial army as a natural order with a self-evident logic.5 
The professional publications by and for the military are a third important 
source of information but they only came into existence in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century.6 A final word of caution: the present chapter very much 
represents ‘work in progress’ as I am still delving my way through vast amounts 
of archival records. In order to capture the atmosphere of the time and the place, 
I have used extensive quotations from these nineteenth-century sources, 
although some of the racial qualifications are out of tune with present codes of 
correctness. 
The military records allow a fairly detailed reconstruction of the story of the 
1840-1841 mutinies on Java and Sumatra within the colonial setting of the mid-
nineteenth century, a period of rapid Dutch expansion in the vast Indonesian 
archipelago. The consolidation of Dutch rule also meant that the Dutch East 
Indies were shaped as a colonial society with a rigid social and racial 
stratification, with the inherent racial stereotypes underpinning white 
domination. By contrast, the Gold Coast presented a radically different picture 
in the mid-nineteenth century. In the pre-colonial balance of power, the 
Europeans on the Gold Coast were heavily dependent on the cooperation of 
local rulers and middlemen. In spite of the grand name of the ‘Dutch 
possessions on the Guinea Coast’, the Dutch ‘possessed’ only a tenuous 
foothold in a few coastal settlements, symbolized by a string of derelict and 
partly deserted forts, remnants of the days of the now-defunct Dutch West India 
Company. Trade had almost come to a standstill and attempts to revitalize these 
‘possessions’ by the introduction of plantations and the exploitation of 
goldmines – mining had always been fully controlled by local rulers – failed 
miserably. For any endeavour, including the recruitment of soldiers, the Dutch 
were heavily dependent on the cooperation of local rulers. Under these 
conditions, it makes sense that race relations on the Gold Coast were still far 
more fluid than in the East Indies. In Dutch-African relations, social status was 
a more important category than pigmentation. In the Netherlands itself, soldiers 
were a social category held in very low esteem, and this was even more true for 
the soldiers who entered colonial service. The colonial recruiting depot in 
Harderwijk, the assembly point for ‘volunteers’ from many European nations, 
was known as ‘the sinkhole of Europe’. 
Colonial domination could only be maintained with the cooperation and 
collaboration of the subject population. Throughout most of the nineteenth 
                                                 
5 See for example the prolific writings of W.A. van Rees. 
6 The Indisch Militair Tijdschrift, the main professional periodical of the East Indies 
Army, began publication in 1870. 
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century, half of the Dutch colonial army in the East Indies consisted of native 
soldiers. It was considered too risky to increase the native component beyond 
this 50% mark because the native soldiers might be tempted to use their 
weapons and their training against their colonial masters, as some of them did in 
the Java War (1825-1830). Therefore, the other half needed to be European 
soldiers, who were unlikely to make common cause with the natives. As an 
instrument of colonial domination, the army itself was organized on racial and 
ethnic principles: Europeans were at the top of this racial hierarchy and the 
natives at the bottom, with an intermediate category of Amboinese, soldiers of 
privileged status from the Moluccan islands. As Christians, the Amboinese were 
unlikely to fraternize with the largely Moslem Javanese and Sumatrans. By 
allocating European status to the Africans, the colonial power minimized any 
danger of the Africans being tempted to fraternize with the native population. 
But when the Africans took their European status seriously, they undermined 
the colonial logic, which held that people of colour ought to fear and respect the 
superiority of the white man. 
In this respect, there are certain parallels between the African mutinies in the 
East Indies and African protest movements in colonial Africa. In many 
instances of so-called anti-colonial protest, Africans did not challenge colonial 
rule as such but demanded their rightful place in the colonial order. The demand 
for equality, for equal rights and privileges as enjoyed by the Europeans, was 
often a more pervasive theme than the desire to undo the process of 
colonization. Nevertheless, acceding to these demands undermined the logic of 
the colonial state and inevitably led to the demise of the colonial order. The 
African soldiers in the East Indies did not challenge colonial rule or the racial 
hierarchy of a colonial state. They insisted on their rightful place in this racial 
hierarchy: as African soldiers they were entitled to 'European status'. Before 
turning to the mutinies, we need to explore the preceding decade, which marked 
the beginning of the experiment with African recruitment. 
 
 
African recruitment: An experiment 
 
The idea of recruiting Africans to compensate for the lack of European army 
volunteers came from Dutch army officers who had served in Surinam and the 
Dutch West Indies. They had been impressed with the performance of the 
blacks in the British West Indies regiments and suggested to the government in 
The Hague that the Dutch footholds on the Guinea coast be used to recruit 
blacks for the East Indies army. After several years of discussion about the 
manpower problem in the East Indies army, the Department of Colonies 
decided to experiment with a detachment of 150 volunteers from the Guinea 
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Coast. If all went well, recruitment would be stepped up to achieve a target 
number of 1,800 Africans. In 1831 and 1832, three ships were contracted to 
collect the volunteers in Elmina, the headquarters of the Dutch on the Guinea 
Coast, and take them to Java. However, as Governor Last in Elmina had already 
warned, young African men were less than enthusiastic about a military career 
in a foreign army in unknown lands. His instructions specified that recruitment 
be limited to free men, without the use of force or coercion. The three ships 
collected no more than 44 volunteers. The low numbers resulted in astronomical 
costs. Governor-General Van den Bosch in the East Indies calculated that the 44 
African volunteers had cost the enormous amount of Dfl 1,232 per head, while 
European soldiers were shipped to Batavia for Dfl 120 per head. Initial reports 
on the military qualities of the recruits were highly favourable but the governor 
suggested stopping the experiment because of the excessive costs. 
Recruitment at the Guinea Coast proceeded nevertheless but with meagre 
results. At the request of the Dutch governor in Elmina, the king of Ashanti 
promised to send some slaves as ‘army volunteers’ but these recruits never 
materialized. To comply with his instructions from The Hague, the new 
governor, Lans, therefore decided to purchase some slaves himself, who were 
then shipped off to Batavia as ‘army volunteers’. In 1836, the Dutch 
government decided to send a high-level mission, headed by Major-General Jan 
Verveer, to the Ashanti king in Kumasi to obtain 2,000 recruits in exchange for 
6,000 to 8,000 guns and 2,000 tons of gunpowder.7 
As a first step, Verveer opened a recruiting station in Elmina but 
subsequently had to report that coastal Negroes would not volunteer for army 
service and that therefore the only option was the recruitment of slaves.8 His 
mission to Kumasi seemed successful: the Asantehene Kwaku Dua did indeed 
sign a treaty promising to deliver 1,000 recruits within a year and permitting the 
Dutch to open a recruitment station in the Ashanti capital. As proof of good 
faith between the contracting partners, the Asantehene trusted his son and 
nephew into the care of Verveer, with the request that they be given a European 
education. The story of Kwame Poku and Kwasi Boakye has acquired deserved 
fame with the publication of Arthur Japin's historical novel on the life of these 
two Ashanti princes.9 
Verveer's initial hope of recruiting Ashanti men, reputed for their warrior 
qualities, proved unrealistic. Ashanti warriors were not available as mercenary 
forces for foreign armies. The recruiting process was, therefore, limited to 
                                                 
7 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, KB 11 mei 1836, no. 91. 
8 Kol. na 1850, nr 5820, Nota betrekkelijk de negerwerving, exh. 16 april 1839, no. 20. 
9 A. Japin, De Zwarte met het Witte Hart (Amsterdam, 1997); English translation: A. 
Japin, The Two Hearts of Kwasi Boach (London, 2001). 
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slaves, known as Donkos. The king delivered a number of Donkos, while 
individual Ashanti could also bring their slaves to the Dutch recruiting station. 
Their freedom was purchased with an advance on their army pay. With a 
document of manumission, they went to the Indies as free men, although it is 
not clear to what extent their army career was a voluntary choice.10 The 
promised large numbers of slaves did not materialize, possibly because the 
amount of money offered by the Dutch – about 100 Dutch Guilders (Dfl) a head 
– was less than could be obtained for healthy young males in the illegal slave 
trade. Another possibility is that the supply of marketable slaves in Kumasi was 
less bountiful than the Dutch had imagined, or that the Northern trade had 
overtaken the coastal trade in importance. 
Nevertheless, between 1837 and 1841, over 2,000 African recruits were 
shipped from Elmina to Batavia. This was not only a quantitative but also a 
qualitative shift in the African recruitment operation. Initially, the army in the 
Indies absorbed dozens of African recruits without many problems. As these 
men were recruited on the coast, they were familiar with Europeans. Some 
spoke Dutch – more or less fluently – and could be used as interpreters and 
mediators in cases of misunderstanding. A few had had previous military 
experience serving in the Elmina garrison. All of them probably understood 
Fante and/or Twi and a few of the coastal mulattos were even literate in Dutch. 
The massive numbers enlisted from the interior were not familiar with ships, 
the world of Europeans or European concepts of armies and soldiers. Many of 
them, originating from north of the Akan-speaking region, probably did not 
understand Fante or Twi. None could serve as interpreter or mediator and 
communication problems caused numerous misunderstandings as the lingua 
franca in the East Indies army was Dutch or Malay. Moreover, the Africans 
were counted as part of the European component of the army. The annual troop 
supplements shipped from the Netherlands were now to a large extent replaced 
by Africans. Training the African troops took up more time and involved more 
communication problems than with European or native troops. The massive 
replacement of the regular troop supplements from Europe by Africans must 
have overwhelmed the European officers in the Indies, who were totally 
unprepared for this new development. From the perspective of Dutch army 
                                                 
10 Larry Yarak argues that slaves on the Gold Coast could in fact make their own 
choices, at least to a certain extent. He therefore concludes that the Dutch recruitment 
operation should not be seen as a revival of the slave trade but rather as a form of 
nineteenth-century indentured labour recruitment. See L.W. Yarak, ‘New Sources for 
the Study of Akan Slavery and Slave Trade: Dutch Military Recruitment in the Gold 
Coast and Asante, 1831-1872’, in R. Law (ed.), Source Material for Studying the Slave 
Trade and the African Diaspora Papers from a Conference of the Centre for 
Commonwealth Studies (Stirling, 1996), 35-60.  
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officers, it made little sense that these untested newcomers were entitled to 
better pay and better treatment than the loyal Amboinese who were reputed to 
make good soldiers and NCOs. 
The instructions flowing from Verveer's treaty with the Ashanti king were 
quite clear: the African soldiers were to be treated as Europeans with regard to 
pay, promotion, clothing, food and in all other respects. This policy made sense 
in the conditions of the Gold Coast and Europe, where the Dutch were very 
concerned to counter British allegations that the recruitment operation 
amounted to a covert form of slave trading. The situation in the East Indies was 
more ambivalent. On the one hand, it made sense to treat the Africans as 
Europeans because as Europeans they were unlikely to fraternize with the 
natives. On the other hand, treating people of colour as equals undermined the 
logic of the colonial state.  
In later years, the Ashanti prince Kwasi Boakye fell victim to the same 
colonial contradiction. While pursuing a classical education in the Netherlands, 
Boakye and his cousin may have aroused curiosity because of their unusual 
appearance but their status was first and foremost determined by their royal 
lineage. They were welcome visitors at the Dutch royal court. After graduating 
in Delft as a mining engineer, Boakye opted for a career in the Netherlands East 
Indies. The Governor-General in Batavia objected. In a letter to the Minister of 
Colonies, he argued that: ‘The principle of la noblesse de peau and of the moral 
and intellectual superiority of the white race above the brown, upon which our 
domination in the Indies rests, would receive a severe blow by this 
[appointment]’. His objections were overruled and Boakye was given his 
appointment but with the title of ‘extraordinary engineer'. Secret instructions 
from the Minister of Colonies ensured that Boakye was never promoted to a 
position in which he would exercise authority over Dutch officials. 11 
 
 
Mud and mattresses 
 
A series of incidents that culminated in the armed mutinies had in fact begun 
with some economizing measures that initially affected the Amboinese but were 
later extended to the Africans. From 1835, the Amboinese were no longer 
issued with straw mattresses (bultzakken) as the Europeans were, but with 
native sleeping mats and leather pillows. The measure was of course advertised 
                                                 
11 L.W. Yarak, ‘Kwasi Boakye and Kwame Poku: Dutch-Educated Asante “Princes”’, in 
E. Schildkrout (ed.), The Golden Stool: Studies of the Ashante Center and Periphery 
Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, vol. 65, part I, 
(New York, 1987), 140. 
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as being in the best interests of the health of the Amboinese. The argument was 
that the Amboinese, not being used to straw mattresses anyway, did not know 
how to keep their sleeping quarters clean. Unlike the native soldiers, the 
Amboinese were entitled to wear shoes. As this privilege was equated with 
European status, the Amboinese would never leave their barracks without this 
important attribute. While shoes were an important status attribute, they were 
not necessarily comfortable. Inside military quarters, the Amboinese thus often 
walked barefoot, muddying their mattresses. When the army decided that they 
had to change their mattresses for sleeping mats, the Amboinese accepted this 
ruling without protest. 
In 1838 this measure was extended to the African soldiers.12 Like the 
Amboinese, the Africans took off their shoes inside their army quarters and, 
according to documents from army headquarters in Batavia, ‘were known to be 
of an uncleanly nature, to have a greasy skin, greasy hair and a peculiarly strong 
and unpleasant smell’.13 Thus, the army reasoned that native sleeping mats 
would make more suitable bedding for the Africans too. 
The Sumatra revolt was sparked off by the replacement of mattresses with 
native mats, while the issue of bedding is also mentioned among the grievances 
of the mutineers in Kedong Kebo, in central Java. Discontent had, however, 
apparently been brewing for some years. On 16 March 1838, the commander of 
the 1st battalion had already reported a ‘spirit of discontent’. He advised against 
having more than one company of Africans per battalion, as the Africans were 
‘choleric, quick-tempered and extremely insolent’ and could easily band 
together to cause mischief.14 Army organization prescribed that ten battalions 
would each have one African company, with the other companies consisting of 
natives, Europeans and perhaps Amboinese. Two battalions would each have 
three African companies, while the other half of these battalions would then 
consist of three companies with only Europeans. 
 
 
                                                
Courageous but ill-disciplined 
 
In 1838, seven years after the start of African recruitment, the commander of 
the colonial army started to receive regular reports of disturbances in the 
African companies and several cases of desertion and protest. Army 
headquarters reported to the colonial government the difficulties they had when 
 
12 Kol. na 1850, Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den kommandant van het 
observatiekorps dd 6 februarij 1838, no. 186. 
13 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, bijlage La G, Aantekeningen op nevenstaande memorie. 
14 Ibid. 
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dealing with the Africans and warned that it would require much patience and 
caution to obtain the desired results. But in spite of the manifold difficulties, the 
overall opinion of the Africans as soldiers was still largely positive, as is 
evident from reports sent in 1838 by battalion commanders with Africans under 
their command.15 As this is a combined report covering various regions and 
battalions, it is worth summarizing extensively. According to their commanders:  
 
The Africans had adjusted well to the military way of life, but they had little notion 
of subordination and showed little respect for non-commissioned officers and 
corporals. Yet they were rarely punished, as the army command had given 
instructions for lenient treatment. Much patience was required to make capable and 
orderly soldiers out of the African recruits, with communication problems being the 
main obstacle. The Africans spoke and understood neither Dutch nor Malay, the 
languages of instruction in the army. They spoke a variety of African languages, so 
that even among themselves communication problems persisted. As a consequence 
of the communication problem, it was not yet possible to submit the Africans fully 
to the rules of army discipline. 
Their cleanliness left much to be desired, they did not know very well how to 
handle their clothes, but demonstrated more interest in cleaning and maintaining 
their weapons. Initially diseases were widespread, notably stomach problems, skin 
infections (due to laziness resulting in uncleanliness), syphilis, and worms in their 
legs. But most of these problems had been overcome. 
The Africans kept their distance from both Europeans and natives. They were 
very distrustful and always worried that they were being cheated (with good reason, 
as will be shown later). Some spoke a bit of broken Dutch and a little Malay, just 
enough for shopping in the bazaar. The Donkos from the interior were less 
intelligent than coastal Negroes. In the third battalion, Lieutenant De Villepois had 
organized a daily language class with the Eurafrican Corporal Ruhle, while the 4th 
battalion had admitted eight of the most ambitious Africans to the garrison school. 
Arms instruction took a lot of time, due to language problems. 
According to their commanding officers, the nature of these Africans was hot-
tempered, irascible and often very insolent. Used to having one master only, they 
could not understand that so many were giving them orders. They were of a rough 
nature, jealous, distrustful and greedy. On the other hand, they were honest men; no 
traces of thievery had been reported. They were mostly strong, muscled, 
indefatigable and very adapted to the tropical climate. During military expeditions 
they demonstrated bravery and fearlessness, even more so than the Europeans. In 
combat their ardour needed to be tempered, otherwise they ignored the orders of 
their officers. Some reports mention a substantial use of alcohol, but less so than 
with the European soldiers. Much friction was reported between the various tribes, 
notably between coastal Africans and those recruited from the interior, known as 
Donkos. It was repeatedly emphasized that the Africans looked down on the native 
population. 
                                                 
15 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Verslag over bij het leger dienende Afrikanen, attached to 
Missive van het militair departement dd 3 september 1838, no. 3 geheim. 
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Their main vice was laziness. Their greatest pleasure was doing nothing, or lying 
down to smoke tobacco. Therefore it required constant attention to make them 
attend to cleanliness, but otherwise their conduct was deemed satisfactory. The 
reports advised strongly against plans for the formation of a separate African corps 
in the East Indies Army. This proposal was put forward by the Department of 
Colonies in The Hague, but in the Indies it was feared that then the Africans would 
develop a too dominant esprit de corps, which would go against military 
subordination. With too many Negroes in one corps, they might become 
ungovernable and as they were already inclined to mutinies, they would then cause 
great mischief. Summing up, the conclusion of the battalion commanders was 
overwhelmingly positive: the Africans were to be preferred even above Europeans, 
and it was therefore deemed desirable that African recruitment be maintained. 
 
Yet, only three years later, African recruitment was reduced to 200 new 
recruits annually, and shortly afterwards, in December 1841, recruitment in 
West Africa was stopped altogether.16 Then the Minister of Colonies in The 
Hague even proposed schemes to rid the army of the Africans as far as possible 
and as soon as possible, by assigning them coolie duties or employing them as 
rowers and crew on navy or transport ships in the Indies. These proposals were 
never implemented but are indicative of the drastic change in perception in 
official Dutch minds. What had happened to cause this startling reversal of 
judgment? 
 
 
A series of mutinies 1838-1841 
 
In June 1841, 37 fully armed African soldiers of the 10th infantry battalion 
walked out of the Dutch fortress of Van der Capellen on the west coast of 
Sumatra after repeated refusals to obey orders. A detachment of soldiers was 
sent in pursuit and met the deserters near Fort Kayoetanam on the way to 
Padang. Attempts to persuade the Africans to return to their duties were futile. 
They were obviously prepared to resist attempts to escort them back. When the 
pursuing party attempted to take them by force, a fight ensued, leaving two 
Africans dead and four badly wounded. The remainder were taken prisoner.17  
A year before, in April 1840, African soldiers of the 4th infantry battalion in 
the garrison town of Kedong Kebo (Purworejo) in central Java had staged an 
                                                 
16 By Royal Decree of 17 December 1841, African recruitment at the Guinea Coast was 
abandoned altogether. The decree specifically cited the African mutiny of 1841 in the 
10th infantry battalion on the west coast of Sumatra as the reason for stopping African 
recruitment. 
17 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den militairen kommandant ter Sumatra’s 
Westkust dd 9 julij 1841, no. 1143/84. 
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armed revolt after a row regarding their pay. This 4th battalion was unusual in 
that it had three African companies, numbers 3, 4 and 5. Discontent had been 
brewing among them because of infringements on promises made to them in 
Elmina of equal treatment with Europeans. With regard to pay, clothing 
(underpants) and bedding, these promises had not been kept. With the formation 
of a third African company, the Africans apparently gained confidence and 
began to protest openly. It had been reported to the commander of this battalion 
that the Africans had gathered in the moonlight and had sworn an oath that on 
16 April they would insist on receiving equal pay with the Europeans or 
otherwise would go on strike. On this day, the Africans of the 3rd and 5th 
companies disobeyed their officers, stormed into the kitchen and returned armed 
with wooden sticks. Shouting rebellious slogans, they returned to the barracks 
to get hold of guns. Meanwhile, the 4th company had already armed itself. As 
the commander had had prior warning, the European troops had already 
occupied the barracks to prevent the Africans from taking the guns. The 
mutineers were dispersed and armed patrols were sent out in pursuit. They 
succeeded in apprehending 85 Africans, while three men managed to escape. 
The African NCOs and corporals did not take part in the rebellion but it was 
assumed that they were not totally innocent of this conspiracy.18  
The commander of the 2nd military department on Java, Colonel Le Bron de 
Vexala, had now had enough. He sent the battalion commander’s report to army 
headquarters and recommended imposing an exemplary punishment as the only 
way to clip the mutinous instincts of the Africans. He asked government 
permission to shoot the instigators of the mutiny. If the instigators could not be 
identified, a certain number of the Africans who had participated in the uprising 
would be shot as an example to the others. Thus far, insubordination had been 
punished by disciplinary measures (i.e. caning), but Colonel Le Bron de Vexala 
believed that this had led the Africans to the wrong conclusion. They no longer 
behaved with the usual respect towards their officers and were getting out of 
control.19  
 
                                                 
18 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den militairen kommandant te Kedong Kebo, 17 
april 1840, (no number). 
19 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den kommandant der 2e militaire afdeeling dd 
18 april 1840, L D. 
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Map 6.1  Netherlands East Indies: Java and Sumatra
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Court martial 
 
The commander-in-chief chose to ignore this hotheaded recommendation and 
asked the military prosecutor to start an investigation.20 The prosecutor agreed 
that vigorous action was necessary but pointed out that if the accused Africans 
were not familiar with the army's disciplinary code, the judge might decide that 
the Africans could not be held responsible.21 An investigation by army 
headquarters brought to light the fact that there was no uniform procedure to 
make Africans familiar with the disciplinary code that dealt with offences such 
as desertion, treason, insubordination and theft. In the 4th battalion, the scene of 
the Kedong Kebo Mutiny, the articles of the code were read monthly in the 
Malay language, as the Africans were more familiar with Malay than with 
Dutch, as a result of their contacts with native women. Elsewhere, a translation 
of the disciplinary code in the Ashanti language was read to the troops every 
month, while the 1st battalion on Sumatra’s west coast used a translation ‘in the 
African language’. No procedure existed to acquaint the Africans who had been 
assigned to artillery and cavalry battalions with the rules. The various 
translations were now circulated through the different battalions to find out 
whether the Africans understood the contents. 
For the first time, insubordination by Africans was now referred to the 
military courts. The Supreme Military Tribunal in Semarang passed sentence in 
the Kedong Kebo case on 18 December 1840. The sentences read as follows: 
the five ringleaders were sentenced to 25 lashes (klingslagen) and two years in 
prison; six were sentenced to 25 strokes and one year in prison; four to 25 
lashes and 6 months in prison; 18 mutineers received a sentence of one month 
in prison; 50 Africans were sentenced to 14 days in prison and one African was 
acquitted.22 
On 29 November 1841, the ringleaders of the 1841 mutiny on Sumatra were 
tried by the military court in Padang. The Supreme Military Court confirmed 
the sentences on 8 April 1842. Two suspects, Coffie Prins and Kudjo Serroe, 
were identified as the instigators and leaders of the mutiny. They were 
sentenced to death but the Governor-General exercised his prerogative to 
change the verdict to ten years in prison. After serving their prison sentences, 
Coffie Prins and Kudjo Serroe were discharged from the army and shipped back 
                                                 
20 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den kommandant van het leger dd 21 april 
1840, no. 12 spoed. 
21 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van den Advocaat Fiscaal voor de Land- en 
Zeemagt dd 22 april 1840, no. 171 spoed. 
22 ARA, Stamboeken onderofficieren en minderen van het Nederlandsch Oostindisch 
Leger. Some of the military personnel registers for this period are missing. This list of 
verdicts, therefore, may not represent the complete picture. 
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to Elmina. Three ringleaders were sentenced to 6 months detention and 25 
strokes each, while six convicted mutineers got off only with 25 lashes.23 In 
army terms, these were remarkably lenient sentences. 
Who were the mutineers? Coffie Prins, Kudjo Serroe and their associates 
were former slaves but they had been recruited in coastal settlements such as 
Elmina and Accra and were therefore probably quite accustomed to the world of 
Europeans and unlikely to have been overawed by their white commanders. If 
the ringleaders were indeed correctly identified, we can discern much the same 
pattern in the sentences passed both in the Sumatra case and the Kedong Kebo 
case. The ringleaders – those who were sentenced to prison sentences of six 
months or more – were all slaves from coastal towns. Their followers – those 
who got off with 25 strokes and perhaps a few weeks in prison – were a mixed 
bunch of former slaves from the coast and from the interior, including Ashanti. 
Only one of the mutineers was of free descent: Kobbena Esson from Elmina 
enlisted as a free man who needed the advance on his army pay to pay off his 
debts. With a sentence of two years and 25 lashes for his part in the Kedong 
Kebo Mutiny, he was obviously among the perceived ringleaders. 
The mutiny in Kedong Kebo was the final straw for the commander-in-chief 
of the East Indies Army, General Cochius. He concluded that the experiment 
had failed. Experience had shown that the ‘Negro race’ was not as suitable for 
the army as had initially been thought. Moreover, he believed that the promise 
of equal treatment had been a serious psychological error and that the 
immediate and total emancipation of former slaves inevitably caused problems, 
even with those who had previously been exposed to the civilizing influences of 
European masters. Even more so would this apply to slaves who had recently 
been liberated from the most abject state of slavery where they had been treated 
as cattle waiting to be slaughtered at the whims of their Ashanti masters. This 
psychological misjudgement, he believed, was the cause of all the uprisings and 
mutinies. In any case, Cochius deemed equal treatment nearly impossible 
because of the ‘uncleanliness and the peculiar stinking exhalations’ of the 
Negro race, which made them most unfit to use the European type of bedding. 
In his opinion, the Africans had no need of mattresses in view of their previous 
life style. The army had not dared to take their shoes from them even though 
their performance as soldiers was hampered by this novelty to which they were 
not accustomed. The commander stated that their ‘childish conceit’ and ‘stupid 
pride’ should not be encouraged but suppressed. 
Cochius concluded that experience had shown that the Negro soldiers would 
never be a substitute for Europeans in the army: ‘Wherever the Negro soldiers 
served together in a company, they have banded together in mutiny, under the 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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pretext that infringements had been made on the promise of equal treatment 
with the European soldier.’ In support of this conclusion, he cited Colonel 
Michiels, who had commanded the expeditionary force on Sumatra: ‘They 
should not send us any more Negroes, as they are only fit to be used as beasts of 
burden, ruled by the whip. Even in combat they are not useful: they shout more 
than they have courage, are dirty and will never act in a disciplined manner.’ 
Cochius proposed halting the recruitment of Africans, or at the very least 
reducing their numbers and sending out more Europeans.24 
For army officers in the East Indies, it was difficult to understand why the 
Africans ought to be treated better than the tried and tested Amboinese soldiers. 
The privileged position of the Africans must have been puzzling to many Dutch, 
Amboinese and native soldiers alike. From the point of view of the Africans, the 
distinction between Amboinese and natives most likely made no sense. They 
had been promised equal treatment with the Europeans and vociferously 
objected to being treated as 'natives'. They were probably unimpressed when 
their commanders retorted that they were not being treated like natives at all but 
as Amboinese, and therefore as Christians. 
From the memoirs and sketches by W.A. van Rees, a retired army captain 
who later became a prolific writer, it is obvious that even contemporaries did 
not universally endorse the racial hierarchy of the army as the natural order of 
things. In one of his volumes, he presented a sketch of the tragic dilemma of 
native Lieutenant Saridin, a fictitious character who figures in the non-fictitious 
story of the African mutiny in Kedong Kebo.25 As a reward for his bravery and 
model behaviour, Saridin had made it to the rank of sergeant. Yet, as he now 
had ‘set foot on the road of civilization’, he became disgruntled with the 
discriminatory treatment of the Javanese in the army. ‘Javanese were 
undeniably stupid people, compared to Europeans, but they did not remain 
stupid. Old soldiers often performed better than quite a few Europeans.’ Yet 
they received lower pay and lesser quality food. They could not even hope to 
reach the status of the Amboinese. Enter the African soldiers, whose company 
was lodged next to Saridin's Javanese company. What had caused these ‘loud 
and throaty speaking people’ to be categorized above the Javanese? They were 
after all at least ten times, even twenty times, darker in complexion than the 
Javanese! As a native sergeant, Saridin, who was always impeccably dressed, 
was ordered to take off his shoes. Standing on guard duty with the African  
                                                 
24 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van de kommandant van het leger dd 8 augustus 
1840, no. 1, geheim. 
25 ‘Een Inlandsch Luitenant’, in W.A. van Rees, Historisch-Indische Schetsen: Leesboek 
voor den Militair (Arnhem, 1873), 238-58. 
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Native and African troops in the Netherlands East Indies army. The African soldier 
is wearing shoes, while the native is barefoot. 
Source: P.F. Brunings, Onze Krijgsmacht. ‘s Gravenhage: Charles Ewing, n.d. 
Collection: Legermuseum, Delft 
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Corporal Kidjekroe, Saridin noticed that he himself was standing barefoot while 
the African was wearing shoes on his big ungainly feet. Kidjekroe told his 
Javanese companion how, in Africa, he had been captured and carried off as a 
slave to be sold to the Dutch. Kidjekroe is pictured as the apex of barbarity. 
‘With eyes flashing with lust’, he related to Saridin, how in his native land, they 
used to slaughter their enemies and drink their blood. Now why did this African 
rank higher in status than the Javanese? Only because the Africans were not 
born on Java? Unlike the Amboinese, the Africans were not even Christians at 
the time of their recruitment. The African had been a slave in his native land, 
used to walk about naked, had no notion of morality and was much darker than 
the Javanese. Yet the Dutch had placed him above the Javanese! 
Incomprehensible! The brave and loyal Sergeant Saridin then is instrumental in 
quelling the African mutiny in Kedong Kebo, for which feat he is rewarded 
with promotion to the rank of second lieutenant – with the right to wear shoes. 
However, as an officer he is even more acutely aware of his inferior status, 
which means that he receives only half the pay of a European lieutenant while 
he has similar expenses. Saridin's musings reflect, of course, Van Rees's own 
doubts about the fairness and logic of this racial and ethnic hierarchy. Many 
contemporary European officers probably shared these sentiments. Moreover, it 
is quite conceivable that similar grumblings were to be heard in the Javanese 
and Amboinese barracks too. 
 
 
Causes of the mutinies: Two views 
 
The causes of the African mutinies are discussed at some length in a later 
memorandum and counter-memorandum, written respectively by J. de Bruijn 
who had accompanied Verveer on his mission to Kumasi, and by an anonymous 
author on behalf of the East Indies army, probably Cochius.26 De Bruijn was 
subsequently put in charge of matters relating to the African recruitment 
operation at the Department of Colonies in The Hague.  
De Bruijn identified one serious error as the cause of African discontent: the 
Africans had been treated as natives or Amboinese, not as Europeans. De Bruijn 
argued that in African religion (which he labels ‘fetish superstition’), God 
created only two kinds of men: whites and blacks. God gave brains to the white 
                                                 
26 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, bijlage La G, Pro memorie aan den heer secretaris generaal 
bij het ministerie van koloniën op den brief van den Gouverneur Generaal van 
Nederlandsch Indië dd 18 november 1838, 558/19, het berigt inhoudende van eene 
plaats gehad hebbende muiterij bij de Afrikaansche Kompagnie van het 1e Bataljon 
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man and gold to the black man, thus creating a balance between them. All 
people who are of mixed race thus deserved to be held in deep contempt by both 
whites and blacks. Naturally therefore, the Africans looked down on the Asians, 
who were neither white nor black. Africans had no reason to differentiate 
between Amboinese and other natives. According to De Bruijn, they looked 
down in contempt on all the peoples in the Indies and therefore found it 
unbearable to be treated like natives. Sleeping mats might have been suitable for 
the natives but the very fact that the Europeans had a different kind of bedding 
was sufficient reason for the Africans to reject the mats with indignation. 
Verveer equally believed that Africans detested anybody who is not Negro-
black or European-white.27 De Bruijn recalled that the issue of equal treatment 
was central to the African recruitment exercise. He had repeatedly witnessed 
how Verveer had assured hesitant recruits that they would be treated as ‘white 
soldiers’, acting in strict compliance with his instructions. Verveer also dwelled 
on the significance of religion. Africans from the Ashanti region presumably 
held a 'fetish' religion, which Verveer considered a point in their favour. If the 
African soldiers had been Moslems, they would possibly have been tempted to 
fraternize with the Javanese and Sumatran Moslems. But if their religion was 
'fetish', they could easily be persuaded to adopt ‘the external appearances’ of the 
Christian religion that would ensure they kept their distance from the Javanese 
and 'other Eastern tribes'.28 The Roman Catholic faith was deemed the most 
appropriate for this purpose. 
De Bruijn believed that Africans had a natural sense of justice. The African 
was inclined to respect whites as long as they did not offend his sense of justice. 
The issue was not, according to De Bruijn, whether native sleeping mats were 
adequate for the Africans. The issue was that infringements on the promise of 
equal treatment were felt as deeply humiliating. ‘Men who have so many talents 
to be proud, mighty and courageous soldiers risk becoming troublesome 
mutineers, not to be reined in by even the most severe application of military 
law, if the initial promises are not loyally implemented.’ Employment of 
African troops would only be profitable, stated De Bruijn, when they were 
treated as Europeans in every respect. Would it not be a wise policy to organize 
the Africans in a separate African corps, to protect them from the harmful 
influences of European soldiers, many of whom had been assigned to the East 
Indies by way of punishment for their misconduct in the Dutch army in the 
Netherlands? 
                                                 
27 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Gouvernements renvooi dd 3 julij 1837, no. 1 kabinet. 
28 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, bijlage La G. Verveer's message dd 11 November 1836 no. 1 
to the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies is quoted in this Memorandum. 
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According to the anonymous author (maybe Cochius) of the counter-
memorandum, the mutinous behaviour of the African company had nothing to 
do with the Africans’ sense of justice but with their presumptuous conduct now 
that they found themselves liberated from slavery and arbitrary masters. 
Coming from a position of extreme hardship where slaves were living in 
constant fear of becoming victims of a gruesome sacrificial death, the Africans 
in the Indies now found themselves in positions of relative wealth, thus 
becoming ‘intoxicated and presumptuous’. The anonymous author believed that 
De Bruijn’s explanation of the causes of the rebellions was mistaken: the 
Africans were not being treated as natives but as Amboinese. And the Africans 
had no reason at all to look down with contempt on the Amboinese, who had so 
often demonstrated that they made good and loyal soldiers. On the contrary, it 
would be most unfair to allow better treatment for Africans than for the 
Amboinese. 
The author of this counter-memorandum conceded that benign treatment of 
the Africans in the army was necessary, but with sufficient firmness. Immediate 
punishment had to be applied after misdemeanours until their rough characters 
became more civilized. He concluded that Africans could only be submitted to 
the European procedures of the army's disciplinary code once it has become 
possible to appeal to reason. With the massive influx of African recruits from 
1837 onwards, the government decided to suspend the application of military 
law for Africans in the army. Offenders were to be punished by disciplinary 
methods (usually by the withholding of pay or by caning) and the corps 
commanders were expected to send a detailed report of any incident to army 
headquarters in Batavia. Only very serious cases, involving murder or injuries, 
would be referred to the military court and then only after authorization by the 
military prosecutor. 29  
The reason for the mutinies seems clear: the Africans protested against 
infringements on the promise of equal treatment with Europeans. The Africans 
said as much and the European officers apparently understood these grievances 
perfectly. Time and again, this explanation was given in the army records 
dealing with this and other African mutinies. Nevertheless, a dense fog of 
mystification developed with regard to their motives. Why was the issue of 
equal treatment of such paramount importance to the Africans? And why was 
this so difficult to understand for the Europeans? 
In the reasoning of Dutch army officers, most recruits were of Donko origin 
and therefore used to a life of hard labour and arbitrary masters. They were men 
who, according to Verveer’s reports, walked for a whole day with a heavy load 
                                                 
29 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Kabinetsmissive van den Gouverneur-Generaal dd 18 april 
1838, no. 55. 
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and, sustained only by a few bananas and a handful of maize, slept nearly naked 
on the soil before continuing on their way at sunrise the next morning with their 
head-loads. They were not used to eating meat and had never tasted a drop of 
alcohol. Moreover, at any time they could be selected as sacrifices to 
accompany their deceased masters to the other world. Living in these 
conditions, entering Dutch military service must have been seen as the greatest 
luck that could befall them.30 Why would they now make such a fuss about the 
issue of equal treatment? 
The key to unravelling the psychological mindset of Africans and Europeans 
might be found in the privileged position of the Amboinese soldiers. To a 
European officer in the East Indies army, ‘being treated as Amboinese’ 
indicated a privileged status, usually enjoyed by Christians only. The Africans 
should have been grateful that they enjoyed equal status with the Amboinese. 
To the African soldiers, the Amboinese most likely were just another kind of 
native. And they were most determined not to be treated as natives. Had the 
Europeans slept on sleeping mats, they would undoubtedly not have objected to 
this bedding arrangement. But with their newly acquired corporate identity as 
‘African soldiers with European status’, they resented being put on the same 
footing as ‘natives’. 
 
 
Gradual erosion of status 
 
The Africans had good reason to jealously watch their status. While the promise 
of equal treatment was observed with the first detachment of 44 soldiers, later, 
when the operation assumed a larger scale, numerous infringements occurred. 
This began on board the troop ships. Unlike Europeans, African recruits were 
not paid for the duration of the voyage with the rationale being that this was in 
their best interests. Otherwise they would squander their three months’ salary 
accumulated during the trip soon after arrival, in the gambling houses of 
unscrupulous Chinese, and on drink and women. In other words, they would 
behave exactly like European soldiers disembarking in Batavia. On the ships 
they might not have noticed being disadvantaged but when their European 
comrades went off partying after disembarking, they surely must have sensed 
that something was not in order. 
During the voyage they were issued with their military outfits, minus a few 
items that were part of the standard European outfit such as sewing equipment, 
brushes, a knapsack and water bottles. On board, their daily ration of jenever 
(Dutch gin) was half that received by the Europeans but this measure might 
                                                 
30 Kol., gouvernementsrenvooi, dd 3 julij 1837, no. 1 kabinet. 
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indeed have been inspired by health concerns as some of the Africans, notably 
those from the interior who had never tasted alcohol before, reacted badly to 
this regular Dutch army ‘medicine’. In July 1838, the military department 
ordered that socks and underpants no longer be issued to African soldiers 
because, after all, Amboinese were not entitled to these articles either. 
Much thought and paper was devoted to the issue of delegatiën (delegated 
payments). At the time of recruitment, most, but not all, Africans had made 
arrangements that a part of their army pay would be transferred to relatives or in 
most cases to creditors. In the early stage of recruitment, most recruits were 
debtors or pawns. Army service was a way to pay off these debts. In view of the 
slow communication lines between the Indies, the Netherlands and the Guinea 
Coast, this was an administrative nightmare. Payments on the Gold Coast could 
continue for a year after the death of a soldier because it could easily take a year 
before the death notice reached Elmina. Soldiers in hospital did not receive any 
pay but nevertheless payments to relatives or creditors in Africa continued, 
usually at a rate of Dfl 2.50 a month. State treasury loss was the subject of much 
correspondence. In 1837, it was decided that 8.5 cents per day would be 
subtracted from the pay of every African in the army: they would thus earn Dfl 
2.55 a month less than Europeans. This way the government tried to limit the 
damage it sustained through the system of delegations although an exception 
was made for those 10 Africans already in the Indies and who had not delegated 
any money to family or creditors in Africa.31 
This meant that henceforth Africans were paid less than Europeans, not just 
on the basis of delegated payments to relatives or debtors, but by virtue of being 
African. This discriminatory measure was introduced to ease the bureaucratic 
nightmare of dealing with individual arrangements. It also meant that the 8.5 
cents were subtracted every day throughout the soldiers’ army careers, even 
when their debts in Africa had long been paid off. With the mission of Major-
General Verveer to Kumasi, the system of delegated payments was abandoned 
as it was too open to abuse. Governor Lans had himself pocketed the delegatiën 
from the slaves whom he had sent out as army volunteers. However, a new 
system was introduced whereby the recruit had to repay the money paid for his 
manumission. It became a bureaucratic headache for the East Indies army and a 
new cause of dissatisfaction on the part of the Africans. The chief of staff in the 
East Indies suggested simply continuing to deduct 8.5 cents a day but now for 
the purpose of repaying the money paid for manumission. But he realized that 
this system was unfair to those Africans who had enlisted as free men and who 
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were therefore entitled to a full European salary. The chief of staff suggested 
that the most honourable solution would be if the Dutch state paid for 
manumission, leaving the Africans fully entitled to their European salaries. 
Part of the cost could then be reclaimed by not paying salaries for the 
duration of the three-month sea voyage. In this way, the confusion surrounding 
money transfers would be avoided. The Governor-General decided that indeed 
no pay would be given for the duration of the voyage, while the issue of full pay 
or reduced pay was left to the government in the Netherlands.32 The final 
outcome of this drawn-out procedure was that 8.5 cents per day would be 
deducted throughout an African’s military career, even though the amount due 
to cover the costs of manumission (about Dfl 100) would have been paid off in 
about three years. The new rationale for the deductions was simply that the 
army’s budget could not sustain equal pay for Africans, and that recruitment in 
Africa had caused much unexpected expense anyway. Equal pay would have 
meant extra costs of about Dfl 41,685 annually, based on the 1,500 Africans 
still in active service in 1842. 
As a consequence of the deduction of 8.5 cents per day, a new ruling had to 
be issued with regard to the premium to be paid for every deserter brought back 
to the army. The captors of a European deserter would receive an amount of Dfl 
12, while the bounty for an Amboinese amounted to only Dfl 6. The rule was 
that this bounty money would be withheld from the deserter's salary over the 
following three months. It was therefore decided to put the African deserter on 
an equal footing with the Amboinese, as his pay would not sustain a restitution 
of Dfl 12.33  
An important difference between Africans and Europeans in the army was 
the duration of their term of service. The first batch of Africans signed contracts 
for six years, just like the Europeans. But the Africans recruited under the terms 
of Verveer's treaty were enlisted for an unspecified period of time. In 1844, 
after the mutinies, their terms of service were reduced to 15 years. When 
Africans signed up for another term of service after the expiry of their initial 
contract, their re-enlistment premium was lower than that of Europeans. And 
then, while grievances were already accumulating, the Africans were told that 
they were no longer entitled to their 'European' straw mattresses. This was 
obviously interpreted as another step in the gradual erosion of their status as 
European soldiers. 
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Another bone of contention was the career of Pieter Hermans, the only 
African who rose to the rank of officer in the course of the nineteenth century. 
His unusual career did not fit the colonial pattern and, therefore, became a 
source of conflict and considerable correspondence. The African sergeant had 
been appointed second lieutenant with the 1st infantry battalion, and received 
half the amount of pay to which a European second infantry lieutenant was 
entitled.34 That meant that he was treated as an Amboinese lieutenant. Not 
surprisingly, he complained. As a sergeant, he had received a regular European 
salary. Pieter Hermans, born in Axim in 1812, was literate and put his 
complaints in writing.35 He was probably of mixed Afro-European descent 
because his father's name was given as Jan Hermans while his mother is 
mentioned only as Johanna. He belonged to the very first detachment of recruits 
that had arrived on the ship Rotterdams Welvaren in Batavia on 15 March 1832. 
His career was quite successful. By April 1834 he had been promoted to 
sergeant, followed by this promotion to second lieutenant in 1837. Yet all was 
not well. Hermans complained about being paid as a ‘native lieutenant’ and he 
also added a number of grievances voiced by his mates who had travelled with 
him in 1832. The Africans complained about ill treatment and a lack of proper 
bedding and said that they received neither rice nor meat. The issue of 
maltreatment was investigated and was found to be ‘highly exaggerated’, while 
redress was given for unspecified ‘real grievances’.36  
Colonel Michiels, commander on the west coast of Sumatra, explained to 
Hermans that he was not being treated as a native but as an Amboinese, and 
therefore as a Christian. Hermans, baptized in 1835, remained deaf to this 
argument and insisted that the colonel put his grievances to the commander-in-
chief of the army in the Indies.37 His superiors warned the African lieutenant 
that his behaviour would block opportunities for advancement for his fellow 
Africans. Hermans’s military career came to an end due to his insistent demands 
for equal treatment. In 1842, the commander-in-chief proposed dismissing him 
since his ‘misconduct and lack of zeal’ was deemed harmful to the army. He 
was to be sent back to Africa via the Netherlands with an annual pension of Dfl 
184. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Besluit van den Gouverneur Generaal dd 1 december 1837, 
no. 7. 
35 Unfortunately his writings have not been preserved in the Dutch archives. 
36 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van het Militair Department dd 9 junij 1838, no. 7. 
37 Kol., Generaal Overzigt, Missive van het Militair Departement dd 10 october 1838, 
no. 1. 
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Accommodation and identification 
 
After the Sumatra mutiny, the situation calmed down. Throughout the 1840s, a 
few reports trickled in about new disturbances and fighting but army 
correspondence no longer reflected a sense of urgency. Obviously the army and 
the Africans had settled into a routine that both sides could live with. The 
disturbances apparently did not exceed normal patterns, and once or twice the 
commander-in-chief even concluded that the Africans had understandable 
grievances that needed redress. Some were indeed duly addressed but the 
position of the African soldiers remained ambiguous. They counted as part of 
the European formations and were treated as Europeans in many, but not all, 
respects. Sometimes they equalled Europeans, sometimes they were treated like 
the Amboinese, and in some respects – re-enlistment premiums and pensions in 
particular – specific regulations were introduced for Africans as a separate 
category.38 The deduction of 8.5 cents for the ‘restitution of the advance 
payment for manumission’ continued and was initially even extended to the 
second generation of Indo-African soldiers, men who were born free in the East 
Indies! In 1891(!), the Indisch Militair Tijdschrift carried an anonymous plea 
for the abolition of this unfair deduction.39 
The story of the Africans in the East Indies received a new and unexpected 
turn with the Third Expedition to Bali in 1849, a successful expedition 
following two previous failures, which was celebrated with much pomp and 
circumstance in the main square in Batavia. The untiring efforts of the Africans, 
their courage, loyalty, state of health, strength and endurance had greatly 
impressed the newly arrived commander-in-chief, Duke Bernhard van Saxen-
Weimar Eisenach. In his view, this experience proved that Africans were very 
suitable as troops. The Africans compared favourably with the European part of 
the army below the rank of officer, which mostly consisted of ‘soldiers with a 
criminal record, deserters from the Dutch national army, drunkards, deserters 
from the Belgian and French armies and Germans, most of whom are rascals 
and tramps, and for whom the service in this colony is a last refuge’. According 
to the new commander, the Africans could hardly be blamed for all the 
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problems that had been detailed in earlier military correspondence. They simply 
had been unable to understand that promises of equal treatment, which had been 
made in the name of the King, were not kept. And since they had been unable to 
express their grievances in Dutch or Malay, discontent had escalated to violent 
protest. For their part, the African soldiers readily conformed to their role as 
loyal European troops. At the parade in Batavia after the 1849 victorious 
campaign on Bali, one of the African sergeants proposed a toast: 
 
Gezigt Zwart Face Black 
Hart Wit Heart White 
Leve de Koning Long Live the King 
 
This anecdotal evidence is cited in several publications as proof that the 
Africans identified with their prescribed role.40 More convincingly perhaps, the 
local population did indeed perceive the African soldiers as Europeans: in 
Malay they were known as Belanda Hitam (Black Dutchmen) and in Javanese 
as Londo Ireng (Black White Men). 
The new commander-in-chief, supported by the new governor in Batavia, 
urged a resumption of African recruitment.41 The enthusiasm of the Duke is 
perhaps not so surprising. Twenty years earlier, he had been one of the main 
advocates of the recruitment of Negroes (either from America or from Africa) to 
solve the manpower problem of the army in the East Indies. The government in 
The Hague initially decided against a reopening of African recruitment but a 
decade later, in 1860, recruitment in Elmina was resumed albeit on a much 
smaller scale than in the 1830s. Measures were introduced to ensure that all 
recruits enlisted voluntarily, even if their pay and enlistment premiums were 
still used to pay off debts or to buy manumission from slavery. Between 1860 
and 1872, some 800 African recruits sailed from Elmina to the East Indies, 
where most of them served in the Atjeh (Aceh) war. The epic of African 
recruitment for the Netherlands East Indies army came to an end with the 
transfer of the Dutch Possessions on the Guinea Coast to Great Britain in 1872. 
 
 
A colonial paradox 
 
The Dutch position on the issue of equal treatment was ambivalent. On the one 
hand, emulating European standards was deemed necessary to heighten the 
sense of self-esteem on the part of the African soldiers. Therefore, the wearing 
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of shoes, for example, was indispensable. Army policy aimed at maintaining a 
social distance between the Africans and the indigenous population, notably the 
Javanese. 
Thus, Dutch army officers deemed it opportune to inculcate in the Africans a 
sense of superiority vis-à-vis the indigenous population of the East Indies. It 
was probably assumed that the Africans would look down on the Asians 
anyway, and this fitted the purpose of preventing too much fraternizing between 
the colonial army and the local population. From army records, it would seem 
that the Africans willingly adopted their prescribed role as ‘European soldiers’. 
But when they displayed a behaviour befitting this role – looking down on the 
natives for example – they were at the same time out of tune with prevailing 
notions about the proper racial hierarchy in the East Indies. In the view of some 
of their commanding officers, the Africans behaved unbearably arrogantly and 
were thought conceited and insolent. They expected the Africans to be grateful 
for their upliftment from an abject state of slavery to an almost-European status 
as soldier. Looking down on the natives was apparently only acceptable if the 
Africans would look up to the Europeans. But that did not make sense as the 
Africans had been told that they were indeed to be regarded as Europeans in the 
army’s racial hierarchy. 
The African soldiers in the East Indies were caught in a colonial paradox. As 
soldiers in a colonial army, they were encouraged to look down on the natives, 
to foster a corporate identity as soldiers who were above the colonized civilian 
population, and to maintain a status of Europeans. From the point of view of the 
army command, their loyalty would be ensured by their privileged position vis-
à-vis the natives. For this purpose, it was acceptable that the Africans be given 
European status. But the same army command found it difficult to cope with 
Africans who took their European status at face value and insisted that their 
treatment be accorded in every detail with that of Europeans. The African 
soldiers fully identified with their role as European soldiers. Their story is 
largely one of adaptation, accommodation and even identification with the 
Dutch colonial administration. The mutinies mentioned in this chapter were 
caused by encroachments on their status as Europeans. Once they felt that their 
rightful place in colonial society was being respected, they established a 
reputation of bravery and loyalty. In the course of the nineteenth century the 
African soldiers played their part in the process of Dutch colonial expansion in 
the Indonesian archipelago, notably in the decades-long Atjeh (Aceh) war. 
Their Indo-African grandsons and great-grandsons fought against Japan in the 
Second World War, suffered in prisoner-of-war camps and ultimately fought the 
Indonesian nationalists until the final transfer of sovereignty in 1949. For the 
majority of these Indo-African descendants, Sukarno was not the hero of the 
liberation struggle but the evil genius who was going to evict them from 
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paradise. After Indonesian independence, most Indo-Africans opted for 
repatriation to the Netherlands. 
Later judgments on the performance of the Africans in the East Indies Army 
were largely positive. As summed up in the Encyclopaedia of the Netherlands 
East Indies (1917): ‘These Africans were a highly valued element in the army: 
although their training was difficult and they were intemperate and ill 
disciplined in combat, they were also strong and courageous’. The mutinies 
around 1840 were now explained by ‘injudicious acts’ on the part of the army 
commanders.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Encyclopeadie van Nederlandsch Oost Indië I, (’s Gravenhage, 1917), 13-14. 
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Absence of evidence is no proof: Slave 
resistance under German colonial rule in  
East Africa 
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The chapter examines the lack of evidence regarding slave 
resistance in German East Africa and the related question 
of whether the colonial stereotype of the ‘docile slave’ is 
true. It starts with a brief surmise of the history of slavery 
and an analysis of slave actions in the period concerned 
(1890-1914). The labour history of population movements in 
Unyamwezi in central Tanzania is taken as a case study. 
The chapter concludes that the colonial stereotype of the 
submissive slave is highly misleading. The social 
heterogeneity of servility prevented slaves from taking 
concerted militant action. However, it should be 
acknowledged that this diversity was the result of protracted 
everyday struggles by individual slaves for a better life in 
their places of residence. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the issue of slave resistance in East Africa in the early 
colonial period. There is tentative evidence of concerted slave action in pre-
colonial times1 but so far historians of the early colonial period have not come 
up with any archival documentation concerning slave militancy, let alone full-
scale slave revolt. Oral historical sources seem to be absent on this topic as 
 
1 J. Glassman, Feasts and Riot. Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the 
Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (London, 1995), 109, 111-13.  
 Absence of evidence is no proof 171 
well.2 There may have been ‘Feasts and Riots’ in early colonial East Africa3 but 
these were neither exclusively nor predominantly slave riots, although slaves 
very likely took part in them. Could it be that the colonial stereotype of the 
‘docile slave’ was fairly accurate? This is the central question addressed in this 
chapter.  
The chapter is divided into four sections: the first briefly recounts the 
history of slavery in German East Africa, the second part examines the 
evidence regarding slave militancy and the colonial impact, the third section 
discusses the role of slave resistance in the development of the colonial 
economy by taking Unyamwezi as a case study and the chapter ends with a 
brief conclusion. 
 
 
Slavery under German colonial rule 
 
Slavery in the region was legally abolished in Tanganyika by the British in 
1922. Until then slaves could be freely bought and sold, inherited, taken as 
concubines or put up as sureties for credit. In contrast to the policy pursued by 
other colonial powers in Africa, the German colonial authorities officially 
recognized the legal status of slaves.4  
Slavery was not, however, a colonial or a German invention. In the late 
nineteenth century, slavery was the most widespread form of labour 
recruitment, generating the surplus on which many pre-colonial empires and 
their rulers and traders thrived, albeit at terrible cost to human life.5 This was 
the outcome of a development which had started much earlier in the century 
when, owing to the expansion of commerce and agricultural production, local 
slave populations began to increase rapidly. In Unyamwezi, this process was 
related to a growth in the caravan trade that provided the wealth to import large 
numbers of slaves into the area, as well as the need to do so. The coast  
                                                 
2 Cf. for example, M. Wright, Strategies of Slaves & Women. Life-Stories from 
East/Central Africa (London & New York, 1993). 
3 Glassman, Feasts and Riots, 146-74. 
4 See J.G. Deutsch, ‘Slavery under German Colonial Rule in East Africa, c. 1860-1914’, 
Habilitationsschrift, Humboldt University (Berlin 2001), 110-84. Also S. Miers & M.A. 
Klein, ‘Introduction’, in S. Miers & M.A. Klein (eds), Slavery and Colonial Rule in 
Africa (London, 1999), 1-15. 
5 For more details on the nineteenth-century slave trade, see E.A. Alpers, The East 
African Slave Trade (Nairobi, 1967) and A.H.M. Sheriff, Slaves, Spices & Ivory in 
Zanzibar. Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 
1770-1873 (London, 1987). For an overview, see A. Wirz, Sklaverei und 
Kapitalistisches Weltsystem (Frankfurt am Main, 1984). 
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Map 7.1  Slave populations resident in German East Africa, c. 1900  
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experienced a similar increase in local slave populations, mainly due to the 
development of clove plantations on the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, which 
necessitated the import of foodstuffs from the mainland that were produced by 
small-scale farmers and a growing number of plantation slaves, particularly in 
areas located along northern parts of the coast. 
At the turn of the century, the colonial authorities believed that the number 
of slaves resident in Tanganyika exceeded 400,000 or roughly 10 to 15 per cent 
of the entire population.6 In some areas, such as in coastal towns, they 
constituted up to 70 per cent of the urban population.7 Slaves could be found 
almost everywhere in Tanganyika but the majority lived in Unyamwezi in 
central Tanganyika (over 200,000) and in areas adjacent to the coast in eastern 
Tanzania (over 100,000). The geographical extent of these regions was 
imprecise at the time but there can be little doubt that slavery permeated all 
aspects of the societies resident there. 
These figures have their own problems. Apart from practical statistical 
considerations, their reliability hinges on the definition of what the colonial 
administration actually meant by the term ‘slave’. The German colonial 
authorities employed a judicial classificatory system. According to the relevant 
decrees, a slave was a person owned by another person. This definition formed 
the basis for all sorts of colonial regulations, for example compensation 
payments, or the ‘freeing’ of slaves by official certification and the 
enforcement of involuntary labour contracts.  
Several studies have shown that – as far as East Africa was concerned – 
ownership represented only one aspect of the relationship between slaves and 
their owners.8 Colonial classificatory systems are particularly unsatisfactory 
when it comes to understanding African social realities in the early colonial 
period. This has some bearing on the question of whether there was concerted 
slave action at that time. It could be argued that the general paucity of detailed 
historical data for this period coupled with a heavily skewed colonial 
classificatory system explains why there is no evidence of slave militancy in the 
colonial archives. There was determined slave action but it was not recognized 
as such by the colonial administration and nothing is known about it. Absence 
of evidence, as the argument goes, is no proof.  
                                                 
6 Bundesarchiv, Abteilungen Berlin, Reichskolonialamt (BAB RKolA) 7382/27: 42-93, 
‘Berichte der einzelnen Verwaltungsstellen in Deutsch-Ostafrika über die Sklaverei’, 
n.d. (c. 1900). 
7 A. Leue, ‘Bagamoyo’, Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialwirtschaft, 
1900/1901, 11-31. 
8 See F.L. Cooper, ‘The Problem of Slavery in African Studies’, Journal of African 
History, 20, 1 (1979) 103-25. 
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Struggles without a class 
 
There is more to this peculiar absence of evidence. As already indicated, the 
colonial definition of a slave is reductionist in the extreme. Slaves were 
peasants, sharecroppers, pawns, squatters, traders, artisans, day labourers, 
caravan porters, trusted advisers, religious leaders and destitute beggars. In fact, 
in late nineteenth-century East Africa, slaves could be found in almost any 
profession, strata or social position.9  
Some slaves on the coast called themselves Waungwana (free born) to 
obscure their humble origins, others called themselves Waswahili in order to 
underline their aspirations of participating in coastal society on an equal 
footing. Slaves were mothers and fathers who succeeded in marrying off their 
children, thereby gaining access to intricate networks of kinship relationships 
by which they were socially defined – families whose freeborn members had 
little reason to advertise the lowly status of their new in-laws. It was not 
uncommon for female slaves to become wives of freeborn husbands and their 
children were regarded as free, i.e. as having the same rights and obligations as 
other children in the household. Some male slaves became the husbands of 
freeborn women, often widows whose first husbands had died, or divorcees 
who had been abandoned by their previous husband’s family.  
On the coast, slaves were owned by the rich but also by the poor, the pious 
and the bigots, and sometimes even by other slaves. Most lived in the 
countryside but the largest numbers of slaves relative to the freeborn population 
were found in the coastal towns and chiefly residences in the interior. Slaves 
took part in various aspects of social life, gaining entry for instance to religious 
groups, frequently Muslim brotherhoods, whose leaders preached the equality 
of all believers before God. 
The social position of slaves differed as much between societies as they 
varied within them. Beyond their precarious marginal social position, female 
and male slaves residing in Unyamwezi in central Tanzania, for example, and 
those living on the coast had little in common. They were divided by religion, 
kinship ideas, language and culture, work and pastimes. Professional life, 
family relationships and religious affiliations were contested social terrains – 
honour as much as personal autonomy had to be earned and was not 
infrequently denied – but the defining feature of slavery in East Africa was the 
heterogeneity of the slaves’ social, political and economic position. 
                                                 
9 This and the following paragraphs are based on Deutsch, ‘Slavery’, 15-56; Glassman, 
Feasts and Riots, 79-111 and F.L. Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of 
Africa (New Haven, 1977), 23-149. 
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In short, while slaves were persons owned by other persons, they were not 
just that. Except perhaps for a few small areas dominated by commercial 
plantation agriculture, slaves (as well as their owners) did not constitute a class 
in any meaningful historical sense because they had so little in common which 
is – after all – the basis for concerted social or political action. Slaves, like 
those who believed themselves to be free, had multiple social identities and 
their slave status was not the dominant feature of everyday interaction. Rather 
than constituting a class, slaves perceived themselves as semi-autonomous 
clients, wives, tenants or distant kin – social positions that they anxiously 
sought to defend.10 Thus the absence of evidence regarding slave revolts or 
slave resistance in colonial archives arguably reflects the social heterogeneity 
of servility in East Africa. If slave resistance was a class struggle, then it was 
one without a class. 
 
 
                                                
Slave resistance 
 
The social heterogeneity that defined slavery in East Africa was not a given 
historical phenomenon. It evolved from the long struggle by slaves to better 
their lives in the societies into which they had been born or brought. From the 
moment of purchase or capture, slaves strove constantly to improve their social 
and living conditions and to reduce their marginal position in society.11 They 
tried as far as possible to evade the demands of their owners for their time, 
efforts and reverence. The most famous example of slave militancy in the 
nineteenth century comes from a coastal village called Makorora near the town 
of Pangani.12 Owing to the harsh treatment they had received from their owners, 
a group of plantation slaves – men, women, and children – fled the sugar estates 
in the Pangani Valley in 1873 and established a watoro (runaway) community. 
According to oral history sources, their owners made several attempts to 
recapture the slaves but their forces, numbering several thousand mercenaries, 
were unable to overcome the heavy fortifications of Makorora, which was 
stalwartly defended by its slave inhabitants. In the end, the slave owners were 
forced to give up their plans and Makorora was left alone. However, such 
 
10 See Glassman, Feasts and Riots, 106-14 and also his earlier article ‘The Bondsman’s 
New Clothes. The Contradictory Consciousness of Slave Resistance on the Swahili 
Coast’, Journal of African History, 32, 2 (1991) 277-312. 
11 See I. Kopytoff & S. Miers, ‘Introduction. African ”Slavery” as an Institution of 
Marginality’, in S. Miers & I. Kopytoff (eds), Slavery in Africa. Historical and 
Anthropological Perspectives (Madison, 1977), 3-81. 
12 Glassman, Feasts and Riots, 109f. 
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examples are rare. Far more often, slaves endeavoured to improve their lowly 
position within the confines of their social situation. The historian Marcia 
Wright collected several female slave biographies that underline precisely this 
point.13 The life stories of Narvimba, Msatulwa Mwachitete and Chisi-
Ndjurisiye-Sichyajunga showed how slave women employed several strategies 
to improve their lot: by attaching themselves to powerful patrons, by finding 
suitable new ‘husbands’ or by repeated flight.14 Even if they could not leave, 
they tried to withhold as much of their labour and honour as possible from their 
owners. The ‘insolent, lazy slave’ about whom African slave owners later so 
frequently complained to the German colonial administration was thus not 
merely a figment of the imagination15 but more often than not an accurate, if 
somewhat biased, description of a social practice with a long history.16 
The struggle between owners and slaves was highly uneven and there were 
in fact many struggles within the bigger struggle. First of all, not all slaves took 
an active part in it. There were slaves who for whatever reason – such as 
loyalty to their owners – did not want to change their lives or lowly social 
position. Slavery in East Africa was characterized, as elsewhere, not only by 
resistance and contestation but also by accommodation and acquiescence. 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, slave owners and slaves competed for 
wealth, honour and power in the historical setting of a particular locality. The 
outcome of these conflicts depended on the material and ideological resources 
available to the individual or collective contestants at a given moment in time 
in that particular locality and these, as argued above, varied greatly between 
and within societies according to the age, gender and descent of the slave, his 
or her skills and upbringing, the profession of the owner, and the local political 
set-up. Thus, while slaves struggled in a piecemeal fashion for a better life, 
their individual successes and the ensuing heterogenization of slavery 
precluded concerted militant action against slave owners.  
As has been observed in many African societies, slaves and especially those 
brought to their owner’s localities by force to occupy the very margins of 
society forged social ties over time and acquired protective rights of various 
                                                 
13 Wright, Strategies, 21-121. 
14 Ibid. 163-65. See also E.A. Alpers, ‘The Story of Swema. Female Vulnerability in 
Nineteenth Century East Africa’, in C.C. Robertson and M.A. Klein (eds), Women and 
Slavery in Africa (Madison, 1983), 185-219. 
15 For a description of slave beatings by district officials, see BAB RKolA 1004/97: 8, 
‘Bericht des Bezirksamts Bagamoyo’, 14 September 1897. 
16 For a much more sophisticated elaboration of this argument, see J.C. Scott, 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven & London, 
1990). 
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descriptions, sometimes even a measure of honour. By gradually becoming 
‘insiders’, their social marginality was slowly reduced.17  
Demarginalization was arguably a precondition for the permanent 
subordination of slaves. The host societies had not (yet) developed a state 
apparatus capable of controlling the movement of people, and the only way to 
keep slaves in their place was to offer them an existence that seemed more 
promising than the alternative, namely, flight. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, runaway slaves formed communities on the fringes of the 
societies from which they had escaped, far enough away not to be militarily 
defeated but near enough to participate in markets that satisfied certain needs, 
particularly arms and ammunition, and often in exchange for slaves.18 Desertion 
was an ever-present option for slaves especially for those, in particular young 
men, who had not yet formed a firm attachment to their places of residence. 
Flight was a risky undertaking in nineteenth-century East Africa. Fugitive 
slaves were often re-enslaved so that their oppression continued. As one acute 
observer noted, slaves would usually run away ‘only...when the slave knows of 
some place to which he can go with reasonable chance of escaping recapture’.19 
There was no guarantee of personal safety in the hinterland,20 especially in the 
nineteenth century, as, for instance, a group of children found out to their peril 
when they were caught by slave traders and kidnappers and sold abroad.21 
Consequently, comparatively few slaves dared to run away. 
 
 
The colonial impact 
 
Conquest and the establishment of colonial rule had little immediate impact on 
the character of slavery in East Africa. Despite the anti-slavery rhetoric at 
home, neither the colonial administration nor the missionary societies in 
Tanganyika were prepared to undertake measures which would effectively 
weaken or even eradicate slavery because it was perceived to be one of the 
                                                 
17 For this argument, see Kopytoff & Miers, ‘Introduction’, 3-81. 
18 Glassman, Feasts and Riots, 111-13. 
19 S.T. Pruen, The Arab and the African. Experiences in Eastern Equatorial Africa 
during a Residence of Three Years (London, 1891), 236.  
20 S. Feierman, ‘A Century of Ironies in East Africa (c. 1780-1890)’, in P. Curtin, S. 
Feierman, S. Thompson & J. Vansina (eds), African History. From Earliest Times to 
Independence (London, 1995), 352-76. 
21 C. Velten, ‘Sitten und Gebräche der Suaheli’, Mittheilungen des Seminars für 
orientalische Sprachen. Afrikanische Studien I (Berlin, 1898), 76. 
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main pillars of colonial rule.22 This policy was justified on the grounds that, on 
the whole, owners were supposedly treating their slaves extremely well. 
Consequently, the colonial authorities described the attitude of slaves as 
‘docile’, almost like animals that, when properly fed and fairly treated, are by 
and large satisfied with their condition.23 This obviously served the interests of 
colonial propaganda and reflected the preference of both slave owners and the 
administration to maintain the status quo. 
In any case, since all Africans were seen as colonial subjects with strictly 
limited rights, it did not matter to the administration whether those who were 
called upon to provide free labour for the building and maintenance of roads, 
agricultural projects, plantations or the district offices were of servile or 
freeborn origin or status. As far as local society was concerned, slavery 
mattered a great deal but in their external interaction with the colonial 
administration, slaves and their owners were treated more or less as equals, that 
is, as colonial subjects. It is reasonable to assume that slaves took part in anti-
colonial resistance movements, notably the Maji Maji Uprising of 1905-7 but 
they probably did so as millenarian believers and not as slaves. So far, no 
missionary or administrative evidence has come to light that specifically refers 
to slaves taking part in the war. Rather, the colonial government put the blame 
on slave owners who were accused of having joined the Maji Maji movement 
for fear the government would eventually get rid of the ‘evil institution’ and 
forcefully liberate slaves.24  
Instead of outlawing slavery, the colonial authorities embarked on a policy 
of obfuscation that left core issues deliberately unclear, such as whether district 
officers were officially required to return fugitive slaves to their rightful 
owners. The consequence was, as it was put at the time, that ‘nobody knew 
what the score [was]’25 because administrative practices varied greatly between 
the districts and over time. The colonial government gradually suppressed 
wholesale slave raiding and commercial slave trading in the areas under its 
                                                 
22 Deutsch, ‘Slavery’, 110-83. 
23 See for instance, F. Weidner, Die Haussklaverei in Ostafrika (Jena, 1915). 
24 See for instance, Reichstag Anlagen, 11. Legislaturperiode, 2. Session, 1905/1906, 
Nr. 194, G. A. von Götzen: Denkschrift über die Ursachen des Aufstandes in Ostafrika, 
1905. This was most likely a deliberate strategy to deflect criticism from the 
government. Internal government reports explicitly stated that there was no proof of 
either slave or owner participation. See BAB RKolA 726:91, G. von Winterfeld, 
‘Bericht der zur Erforschung der Ursachen des Aufstandes eingesetzten Kommission’, 4. 
December 1905. 
25 See A. Leue ‘Die Sklaverei in Ostafrika’, Beiträge zur Kolonialpolitik und 
Kolonialwirtschaft, 1900/1901, 608 [translation by the author]. For a similar view, see 
BAB RKolA 1004/97: 8, ‘Bericht des Bezirksamts Bagamoyo’, 14 September 1897. 
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control, particularly the kind of warlordism that had previously guaranteed 
owners a steady supply of cheap captives. It thus became increasingly difficult 
for owners to replace any slaves lost through flight or natural death. However, 
direct government intervention was limited in effect and, as far as the 
relationship between slaves and their owners was concerned, of secondary 
importance only.  
The development of the colonial economy in German East Africa was of far 
greater consequence in this respect because it strengthened the bargaining 
position of slaves vis-à-vis their owners.26 By forcing open roads and markets, 
the colonial administration inadvertently removed major obstacles which had 
previously kept slaves in their place. Flight became a viable alternative to 
merely seeking a better life in the slave-holding society. Huge numbers of 
slaves took up paid work with European employers without their owners’ 
consent, particularly after the turn of the century when wage employment 
rapidly increased. Unyamwezi in particular experienced a tremendous 
population loss as tens of thousands of people, including slaves, left for the 
coastal plantations.  
During the 1890s and again after 1904, German plantations experienced 
severe shortages of labour, a pattern which did not change until the outbreak of 
the First World War.27 The shortages resulted from the rapid growth of the 
industry itself, especially of the sisal plantations in Tanga District in the late 
1900s and early 1910s. The number of people employed on European 
plantations in German East Africa between 1900 and 1914 is an indication of 
this expansion. In 1902, German plantation companies employed about 5,000 
people28 and just eleven years later, in 1913, they employed over 92,000 people. 
The railway companies, particularly those involved in the construction of the 
central line to Lake Tanganyika, also employed large number of workers, with 
an increase in numbers from 6,000 in 1906 to a peak of about 25,000 in 
1910/11.29 All in all, some 172,000 people or roughly 20 per cent of the total 
African labour force were believed to be in paid employment in 1913, about 
140,000 of whom worked for German or other European employers, mainly in 
                                                 
26 Deutsch, ‘Slavery’, 232-54. 
27 C. Pfrank, Die Landarbeiterfrage in Deutsch-Ostafrika (Berlin, 1919), 25. 
28 BAB RKolA 6475/13: 62-5, ‘Denkschrift über die Entwicklung der deutschen 
Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee 1901/1902. Anlage VII. Nachweis über die in 
Deutsch-Ostafrika vorhandenen Plantagen und deren Stand am 1. Januar 1902’, n.d. 
[1902].  
29 J. Koponen, Development for Exploitation. German Colonial Policies in Mainland 
Tanzania, 1884-1914 (Helsinki & Hamburg, 1995), 609. 
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private companies, the government, the railways and the missions.30 In 
comparison, the number of people employed by Africans in the caravan trade in 
1913 was estimated to have been about 15,000.31  
 
 
Unyamwezi: A case study 
 
In the early 1890s, the plantation companies had already tried to persuade 
Wanyamwezi caravan porters to work on the plantations. Around this time they 
were still coming in their tens of thousands to the northern coast and 
particularly to Bagamoyo, which was then the centre of both the colonial 
administration and European commerce.32 However, the independent ‘workers 
of African trade’ were not keen on becoming dependent wage labourers on the 
plantations, at least not at this early stage.33 Consequently, in the mid-1890s the 
plantation companies sent labour recruiters into the interior, especially to 
Unyamwezi in central Tanganyika, to the southern coast, and even to northern 
Mozambique.34 These early attempts at private labour recruitment did not enjoy 
great success.35 A series of scandals occurred involving false declarations of 
advances, headhunting by recruiters, the deception of labourers, and fraud.36  
Despite these inauspicious beginnings, more and more labourers came to the 
coast from Unyamwezi around the turn of the century, and some stayed there 
permanently.37 They maintained contact with their areas of origin and 
persuaded others – neighbours, friends and others – to migrate to the coast. 
This is why some plantations employed large numbers of workers from the 
same areas in Unyamwezi.38 In the 1900s, migrants from Unyamwezi 
                                                 
30 J. Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), 157. 
31 Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 31. 
32 For the development of the caravan trade in the German period, see Iliffe, Modern 
History, 129. 
33 Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 25-27. The phrase ‘workers of African trade’ refers to the 
title of the ground-breaking volume on porterage in West Africa by C. Coquery-
Vidrovitch & P. Lovejoy (eds), The Workers of African Trade (Beverly Hills, 1985). 
34 Iliffe, Modern History, 160. See also Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 11. 
35 Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 112. 
36 Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 25-27. See also F.P. Nolan, ‘Christianity in Unyamwezi, 
1878-1928’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge (1977), 217. 
37 The following paragraphs are largely based on Pfrank, Landarbeiterfrage, 113- 15, 
Iliffe, Modern History, 151-63 and Koponen, Development, 348-53.  
38 Hpt. Charisius, ‘Aus dem Bezirk Tabora’, Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 18 (1907), 461. 
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dominated the coastal labour market. According to Iliffe, more than a quarter of 
Dar es Salaam’s 23,000 inhabitants in 1905 were believed to be Wanyamwezi.39  
In the early 1900s labour recruitment became more formalized.40 It involved 
the signing of two contracts, one between the labour recruiters and the 
companies concerning the supply of labour, and one between the companies 
and the workers in question. The latter was the all-important labour contract, 
specifying wages, the length of contract and the type of work labourers were 
expected to do. The contract between recruiters and companies usually 
contained the number of labourers the recruiter was to bring to the plantation, 
the kind of work contract labourers were to sign, the advance payment 
recruiters were to receive for their services and the fee to be paid to the 
recruiter by the companies for each labourer delivered. According to one 
source, these fees could be up to 60 rupees for each labourer delivered to the 
company although 20 rupees per labourer was the more common sum.41 
Because there were so many recruiters – in 1913 over a thousand in Tabora 
District alone 42 – competition was fierce.43  
Later migration patterns from Unyamwezi changed. From about 1907 
onwards, fewer and fewer migrant labourers left Unyamwezi to work on the 
coast.44 Instead they went to work for construction companies that were 
building the central railway line between Lake Tanganyika and the coast. 
Construction began in 1905 and in the first two years, the companies involved 
employed mainly migrant labourers but also tax defaulters and war captives 
(1,500) from the Maji Maji Uprising.45 The Dar es Salaam to Morogoro section 
of the line was completed in 1907 and then it took five years for the line to be 
extended to Tabora (1912) and another two years to reach Kigoma on Lake 
Tanganyika.46 From about 1908 on, growing numbers of Wanyamwezi labourers 
began to work on the railway line. In 1913, the construction companies 
                                                 
39 Iliffe, Modern History, 161. 
40 T. Sunseri, ‘Dispersing the Fields. Railway Labour and Rural Change in Early 
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42 Iliffe, Modern History, 160. 
43 For more details on recruitment practices, see Sunseri, ‘Dispersing’, 564. 
44 Iliffe, Modern History, 159. 
45 Tetzlaff, Koloniale Entwicklung, 88. 
46 For more detailed information on the construction of the central railway, see Tetzlaff, 
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employed over 16,000 people, the majority of whom were believed to have 
come from Tabora District. The building of the railway line caused a dramatic 
decline in the caravan trade between Tabora and the coast. By 1912, less than a 
hundred porters had arrived in Bagamoyo from the interior, whereas only ten 
years earlier tens of thousands had done so each year.47  
The move of Unyamwezi migrant labourers into paid employment was 
accompanied by a massive decline in the resident population of some parts of 
Tabora District.48 In the 1900s, labourers, especially men, were often absent for 
years. Villages that had teemed with people in the 1890s were almost deserted 
as only the aged, and women and children remained.49 According to the 
missionary Van der Burgt who had been working in Unyamwezi since 1892, the 
population declined by over 50 per cent in some places between 1890 and 
1912.50 An official report from Tabora claimed that in 1912/13 only ten out of 
every hundred taxpayers in the district were able-bodied men.51 The issue 
raised enormous political interest and criticism, even in the Reichstag.52  
The involvement of Wanyamwezi labourers in the plantation economy of the 
northern coastal districts and subsequently in the construction of the central 
railway line cannot solely be explained by the trickery of labour recruiters, the 
application of forced labour policies or taxation. Although force was not totally 
absent, on the whole the colonial administration did not use coercive means – 
taxation or the labour card system – to induce Wanyamwezi labourers to take 
jobs on the plantations or the railways.53 Moreover, although labour recruiters 
often tried to lure people into wage labour employment with all kinds of false 
promises and material inducements, the actual work contract still had to be 
signed by the labourers themselves, and in the case of railway employees in the 
presence of district officials. All the available evidence suggests that this was 
                                                 
47 Iliffe, Modern History, 137. 
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49 Ibid. 
50 J.M.M. van der Burgt, ‘Zur Entvölkerungsfrage Unjamwesis und Usumbwas’, 
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51 This report was cited by Gustav Noske, a member of the Social Democratic Party, in a 
Reichstag debate in 1913. See Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des 
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done voluntarily in the great majority of cases.54 It raises the question of what 
motivated people to seek wage labour employment in such large numbers.55 
Any analysis which exclusively focuses on external factors to explain the 
large-scale migration of Unyamwezi labourers to the coast and to the railway 
construction sites fails to take into account the agency of those who were most 
directly concerned with this process, the labourers themselves.56 Admittedly, 
evidence on this issue is exceedingly scarce but it appears that in the early 
1890s some chiefs sold their subjects to labour recruiters and travelling traders 
for a small fee, probably to recoup the losses sustained during the rinderpest 
epidemic of 1891.57 Many labourers never came back to their previous places of 
residence, preferring instead to remain on the coast or move to Tabora Town 
where better income opportunities were available.58 Fearing the permanent loss 
of their subjects, which was after all the basis of their power and prestige, some 
chiefs introduced a new custom.59 According to the most detailed contemporary 
document on this issue, these chiefs decreed that their serfs (Hörige) were not 
allowed to leave the villages and hamlets without the explicit permission of 
their chief. This permission could be acquired by the payment of a lump sum – 
a ransom – whereby the prospective migrant was relieved forever of his or her 
supposed duty to pay tribute to the chief.60 
It appears that in the late 1890s and early 1900s some Unyamwezi chiefs 
permitted their subjects to travel to the coast, presumably after receiving a 
small monetary inducement from labour recruiters.61 However, realizing that 
the migrants were not going to return, the fee was subsequently raised by the 
chiefs to approximate their putative future tribute payments or labour service, 
i.e. his or her commercial value. Thus, on the point of departure to the coast, 
some supposedly free chiefly subjects (serfs) seem to have become commercial 
slaves. Archival evidence points to widespread buying and selling of persons in 
Unyamwezi, regardless of whether they were supposed to be free or 
commercial slaves. In 1900, the Tabora district officer informed the colonial 
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government in Dar es Salaam that ‘only well-to-do owners sold their slaves, as 
the poorer ones were afraid of losing their only labourers’.62 Ten years later, the 
widely respected district judge, Karstedt, observed that hundreds of people 
were being sold in Tabora District each year.63  
The power of the chiefs to sell slaves was limited. The Tabora district 
officer, Puder, reported in 1898 that ‘owners treat their slaves well, for fear 
they might run away’.64 The reason for this development was that labour 
recruiters paid advances to anyone who wished to work on the coast, 
irrespective of the status of the person involved.65 By the turn of the century, 
flight had become a matter of choice and the authority of slave owners and 
chiefs consequently declined.66 According to Koponen, this development 
occurred in the first half of the 1900s. He relates that when the former district 
officer of Tanga, Meyer, visited Unyamwezi in 1906, he found that ‘some 90 
percent of those who had gone to European farms had done so without the order 
of their chiefs and not seldom against it. The people sent by the chiefs were 
their slaves in most cases.’67 Meyer also stated that Nyamwezi workers on the 
coast generally belonged to the lower classes.68 Thus, it appears that labour 
recruitment gave slaves an opportunity to leave their owners. It also enabled the 
subjects of the chiefs to escape from their rapacious rulers.69 
When the railway companies arrived in the area in 1907, the process was 
already well advanced. According to one observer, by that time the chiefs and 
slave owners were no longer able to extract labour or tribute from their slaves 
and/or subjects.70 The latter were free to move and this arguably explains why 
they were able to set off in such large numbers to the construction sites or leave 
the villages for smaller, more autonomous settlements of family units. It also 
explains why slave ransoming prices in Unyamwezi rose in the late colonial 
                                                 
62 BAB RKolA 7382/27: 89, ‘Berichte der einzelnen Verwaltungsstellen in Deutsch-
Ostafrika über die Sklaverei’, Station Tabora, Berichterstatter: Hauptmann Puder, n.d. 
[1900]. [translation by the author] 
63 F.O. Karstedt, ‘Zur Sklavenfrage in Deutsch-Ostafrika’, Koloniale Rundschau (1913), 
619f.  
64 BAB RKolA 7382/27: 89, ‘Berichte der einzelnen Verwaltungsstellen in Deutsch-
Ostafrika über die Sklaverei’, Station Tabora, Berichterstatter: Hauptmann Puder, n.d. 
[1900] (translation by the author). 
65 Charisius, ‘Tabora’, 459.  
66 RKolA 1007: 65, ‘Aufzeichnung des Bezirksamtmann Löhr’, 31 May 1916. 
67 Meyer, quoted in Koponen, Development, 352.  
68 Ibid. 
69 For a similar view, see Nolan, ‘Christianity’, 154.  
70 Seibt, ‘Fragebogen-Beantwortung’, 206 
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period: there were fewer slaves to be ransomed.71 This argument is supported 
by circumstantial evidence. Seibt, a missionary who worked in Unyamwezi, 
reported in 1910 that slaves who had once been forced to live in the same 
village as their owner could now freely choose their place of residence.72 
Löbner, another missionary, observed that by 1910 a significant sector of the 
slave population had been absorbed into the general population.73 
The available evidence does not allow a distinction between the actions of 
those who were regarded as slaves and those who were assumed to be free but 
were subject to the whims of Unyamwezi chiefs. Sources are also silent about 
who was actually regarded as a chief. Were they ‘sultans’ appointed by the 
government as administrative agents and tax collectors, village heads who ruled 
over only a limited number of people or merely commercial slave owners who 
had acquired slaves in the 1880s to relieve labour shortages in their extended 
households?74 
It is reasonable to assume that a significant number of the estimated 100,000 
to 200,000 Wanyamwezi who left their villages to work in the wage labour 
economy between 1900 and 1914 were slaves who were trying to improve their 
lives through migration.75 Clearly, new kinds of employment opportunities 
opened up for both the free and the slaves. However, as constraints on them 
diminished, the ‘unfree’ probably responded more quickly to these 
opportunities than the free, since on the whole they had less to lose.76  
The account above suggests that in the early colonial period the slaves and 
the free in Unyamwezi began to merge imperceptibly, as both groups applied 
the same strategies to make use of the wider opportunities available through the 
imposition of colonial rule and the development of the colonial economy. It 
became increasingly impossible for many observers – both local and foreign – 
to tell the two groups apart.77  
It thus appears that while German colonial rule provided the means to 
destroy the power of the slave owner in Unyamwezi, namely wage labour 
employment and a minimum degree of personal security, it was left to the 
                                                 
71 Nolan, ‘Christianity’, 267.  
72 Seibt, ‘Fragebogen-Beantwortung’, 187. 
73 M.H. Löbner, ‘Fragebogen-Beantwortung für ganz Wanyamwezi durch Missionar M. 
H. Löbner, stationiert bei Tabora [Usoke, March 1910]’, in A. Gottberg, Unyamwesi. 
Quellensammlung und Geschichte (Berlin, 1971), 129. See also by the same author ‘Zur 
Entvölkerungsfrage Unyamwezis’, Koloniale Rundschau, 1914, 267-70. 
74 R.G. Abrahams, The Peoples of Greater Unyamwezi, Tanzania. Nyamwezi, Sukuma, 
Sumbwa, Kimbu, Konongo (London, 1967), 45f. 
75 For these estimates, see Tetzlaff, Koloniale Entwicklung, 252, 287. 
76 See Wright, Strategies, 42. 
77 Nolan, ‘Christianity’, 154. 
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slaves to commit the deed themselves. In other words, the runaway slaves of the 
late nineteenth century became the labour migrants of the early twentieth 
century. Labour migration helped to bring slavery in Unyamwezi to an end. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter it was argued that the social heterogeneity of servility in East 
Africa prevented slaves from taking concerted militant action. At the same time 
this very diversity was the result of protracted individual everyday struggles by 
slaves for a better life, be it to ensure physical survival or to obtain a measure 
of honour and autonomy or partial independence in their different places of 
residence. The colonial stereotype of the ‘docile slave’ is thus highly 
misleading.  
Moreover, slave resistance can be said to have brought slavery in East 
Africa to an end. Yet, slaves did not militantly challenge or seek to reform 
slavery through concerted action but when they had the opportunity, they 
completely rejected their personal subjugation. In the pre-colonial nineteenth 
century, this rejection generally took the form of flight. By the early colonial 
period flight was no longer required since migration would fulfil a similar 
purpose. But, because of the number of people involved, these seemingly 
isolated and personal strategies of advancement had a major social and political 
impact on the societies concerned as well as on the region as whole. Without 
the need for a formal organization or concerted action, by leaving their places 
of residence in large numbers slaves ultimately undermined the evil institution. 
Slavery in East Africa persisted throughout the German colonial period but the 
number of slaves who were prepared to accept their marginal social position, 
their dependence and exploitation declined dramatically. 
The migrant slaves became (temporary) wage earners on European-owned 
plantations and urban informal-sector workers, hoping to and often succeeding 
in ultimately joining the ranks of the free independent peasantry. It is strange 
that those who have written so much about ‘resistance to capitalist 
encroachment’ by the peasantry and about the ‘development of exploitation’ in 
East Africa seem to have overlooked the social origins of those who made early 
colonial capitalism work.  
The history of the end of slavery has wider implications for the study of 
resistance in Africa and elsewhere. There is a danger of romanticizing 
resistance, of reading legitimate current concerns about the marginal social 
position of various social, political and ethnic groups and their apparent lack of 
political leadership, ideology and militancy backwards into (African) history. 
The fact that there was no Spartacus leading the servile masses of East Africa 
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into freedom does not mean that slaves did not struggle for a better life. It is all 
too easy to overlook the fact that marginalized people are able to confront 
effectively social, political and economic hegemony and that they can do so in 
their everyday lives without being represented by a formal organization, taking 
part in concerted militant actions or subscribing to an overarching political 
ideology. Although the colonial subordination of a large part of the world 
brought untold misery and suffering to most of its inhabitants, this should not 
prevent historians from critically appreciating the motives of those marginal 
groups who apparently wholeheartedly embraced it. 
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The Kawousan War reconsidered 
 
Kimba Idrissa 
 
 
The Kawousan War was one of the longest periods of 
resistance known in Niger and through it the local people – 
Tuareg, Hausa and others – fought to free their society 
from French colonial domination. Unlike other 
interpretations, this chapter looks at the structural causes 
of the war related to the ecology and economy of the area, 
the influence of French colonial politics on the nomadic 
lifestyle, and Islam. It also considers the decisive role of the 
individual leaders, the breakdown of Tuareg confederations 
and the creation of new political unities, and the reduction 
in the powers of the regional chiefs. The effect the 
Kawousan War had on regions outside the immediate 
vicinity of the fighting is also investigated. The causes of the 
war were multi-faceted and made it more than purely a 
religiously inspired revolt. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The most important anti-colonial period of resistance in Niger in popular 
memory is the Yakin Kawousan or the Kawousan War, which may well have 
been the longest, the best organized and equipped of all previous anti-colonial 
wars of resistance. The military post at Agadez was under siege for about 80 
days from 13 December 1916 to 3 March 1917 and the war then continued in 
the mountainous Ayir region, ending only with the deaths of the main leaders: 
Kawousan on 5 January 1919 and Tagama during the night of 29-30 April 1920. 
The fierce fighting and opposition to the colonial system lasted for some 40 
months.  
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 The Kawousan War was the subject of numerous reports at the time.1 Many 
historians and anthropologists have taken an interest in the events that raised so 
much controversy.2 The various interpretations have their weaknesses as they 
have tended to focus on a description of events, especially on political and 
military issues. The revolt has also been likened to a simple act of looting or 
pillage, or at the most to a Sanûssi-influenced3 anti-French religious movement 
organized by Italy and Germany against France. These judgements hide the 
complexity of an event whose deeper roots resurfaced at the start of colonial 
occupation. In this chapter I critically analyse various types of material: oral 
historical sources from a visit to Agadez during July and August 1985, AOF4 
archival material in Dakar, information gleaned from the archives of the former 
Cercles of Zinder, Agadez and Niamey, documents written at the time, and 
other related works on the subject. 
 To be interpreted correctly, the Kawousan War has to be placed in the 
region’s socio-political and economic context of the time since the actual causes 
of the revolt were essentially socio-political and economic and such 
explanations often have deep structural causes. Here I propose to show the 
impact of colonial domination on socio-economic life, to discuss the true role of 
the chiefs and local noblemen, and to describe the repercussions of the revolt in 
other regions. This information is used to analyse the different interpretations 
for the reasons behind this revolt and to propose an alternative view. 
                                                 
1 M. Allane, Relations de Voyage de Mohamed Allane à Djanet et à Ghât, recueillie M. 
Abridat, officier interprète de reserve (undated); H. Boubou, ‘Documents Nigériens, 
tome I, l’Aïr’; R. Gaffiot, L’Aïr en Feu, ronéo (undated); P. Mangeot, ‘Le Siège 
d’Agadez Raconté par un Prisonnier de Kaosen’, Renseignements Coloniaux et 
Documents, 8 (1930), 479-82; Colonel Abadie, Afrique Centrale: La Colonie du Niger 
(Paris, 1927).  
2 A. Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens, la Senousiya et les Révoltes Twareg de 
l’Aïr de 1916-1917’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 69-70, XVIII, 1-2 (1978), 159-85; F. 
Fuglestad, ‘Les Révoltes des Tuareg du Niger (1916-1917)’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
Africaines, 13 (1973), 49; K. Muhammad Zubairu, ‘The Kaoussen Rebellion of 1916-
1918 with Particular Reference to its Impact on Northern Nigeria’, PhD thesis, Ahmadu 
Bello University (Zaria, 1973); H.T. Norris, The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and its 
Diffusion in the Sahel (Warminster, 1975); Y. Riou, La Révolte de Kaocen et le Siège 
d’Agadez, 1916-1917, ronéo (1968); J.L. Triaud, ‘Un Episode Oubliée de la Guerre de 
Kaossen: La Lettre des Marabouts d’Agadez au Colonel Mourin (4 mars 1917)’, 
Annales de l’Université de Niamey, no. 2 (1978), 263-71; A. Salifou, Kawousan ou la 
Révolte Sénoussiste, Etudes Nigériennes no. 33 (Niamey, 1973). 
3 The Sanûssi is an Islamic brotherhood that organized resistance to the French. 
  
4 Afrique Occidentale Française. 
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Map 8.1  Areas of resistance during the Kawousan War
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The roots of the revolt 
 
The occupation and administration of the Ayir, Kawar and Djado 
To connect its possessions in North Africa with the Atlantic Coast and to build 
a French-African bloc, France had first to conquer the Sahara and central and 
western Sudan. The Sahara served not only as military and political cover vis-à-
vis Nigeria and as a protective barrier for the Algerian hinterland but also 
provided a transit route and link for trade between the Mediterranean and 
Sudan. 
 The first official French military mission to the Niger Sahara is known as the 
Foureau-Lamy Mission and is recognized as the first act of French colonization 
in the Ayir region. This mission’s aim was to join the Sahara with the French 
Sudan,5 and to mark the French presence in the region, thus preventing the 
ambitions of the Ottoman Empire in Kawar. The treaties signed between August 
and November 1899 with the Sultans of Agadez, Tessaoua and Zinder and the 
delegates of the Sultan of Bilma helped to consolidate the French position in the 
region. The conquest and subsequent occupation of the Nigerian Sahara had five 
objectives: to stop the progressive expansion of the Turks; to prevent any 
German ambitions in the area; to access Niger from Algeria and to find the best 
way to supply Niger militarily from there; to ensure the safety of caravan routes 
between Damergou and Damagaram and those coming from Tripoli;6 and to 
prepare for the conquest of Tibesti. 
 According to the political and administrative plans in these regions, French 
colonization aimed to reduce the authority of the regional chiefs and to 
consciously maintain a degree of tension between the nomadic and sedentary 
populations, and between the warring and religious nobles. For example, the 
colonial administration put pressure on the Tuareg imajaren (warrior) clan until 
the start of the Kawousan War. After the repression came a period of ‘political 
maraboutism’ with the election of the marabouts’ chiefs (ineslimen). The 
French occupiers could not tolerate the lifestyle of these desert populations, 
particularly that of the nomadic Tuareg who carried out raids, were involved in 
itinerant animal husbandry and observed a strong social hierarchy. This way of 
life was not compatible with a modern state system with the values of equality 
for all, and where the control of people and resources was pivotal to all political 
                                                 
5 It had to join Lake Chad with the Voulet-Chanoine mission in Central Africa and the 
Congo-Chad mission led by Gentil. 
  
6 A.N.F. Paris, Vincennes, S.H.A., Niger 3, dossier III, Sous/dossier a, pièce 2, Sous-
lieutenant Jean, commandant la colonne du Damergou: Rapport sur la Question de 
l’Azbin, Djajidouna, 18 mars 1904. A.N.N., Niamey, Instructions du Résident à Zinder, 
Peroz, au commandant du poste de Guidjigaoua, RASH Y (1972), 60. 
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activities. The aristocratic Tuareg, therefore, had to be disbanded. This 
dislocation passed for the suppression of slavery under the form of collective 
dependency in breaking the ties of bondage and in encouraging the autonomy of 
servile tribes and their dependants. In return, reports of social domestic 
servitude were ignored and the aristocratic Tuareg were allowed to keep their 
domestic slaves.7  
 The break-up of the aristocratic Tuareg followed the abandonment of 
confederations and the establishment, in their place, of a policy of enforced 
sedentarization. In the Tuareg nomadic zones, artificial political groups were 
created with their own autonomy8 and formerly independent tribes were placed 
under the authority of the Sultan of Agadez. In the Kawar, in spite of its low 
population density and an acephalous political system, previously stateless 
communities were regrouped into three cantons called ‘sultanates’.9 
 
 
Socio-economic causes 
 
The decline in caravan traffic 
The logic of French policy declared that the submission of the aristocratic 
Tuareg groups could be realized by depriving them of their military and 
economic power – the Trans-Saharan caravan traffic.10  
 Military operations were the most important factor in the decline of the inter-
regional caravan traffic. Operations of conquest and pacification deprived the 
local people of the capital that was the main focus of long-distance exchanges, 
namely camels. Massive reductions in the number of camels resulted in a loss of 
livelihood for an important group of Tuareg who lived off this commercial 
trade, as well as for all the other people involved such as guides and escorts. 
                                                 
7 This emancipation of dependants remained formal. Slavery in itself rarely led to 
uncertainty and the trade in slaves was pursued in this region to such an extent that 
trans-Saharan trade kept its dynamism.  
8 See P. Bonte, ‘Esclavage et Relation de Dépendance chez les Tuareg Kel Gress’, in C. 
Meillassoux (ed.), L’Esclavage en Afrique Précoloniale (Maspéro, 1975), 49-76; E. & 
S. Bernus, ‘L’Evolution de la Condition Servile chez les Tuaregs Sahéliens’, in C. 
Meillassoux (ed.), L’Esclavage en Afrique Précoloniale (Maspéro, 1975), 27-48. 
9 Capitaine Hautefeuille, ‘Les Origines de l’Islam au Kawar’, Documents du Centre des 
Hautes Etudes sur l’Afrique Noire, 1654 (1950), 7; J. Chapelle, Nomades Noirs du 
Sahara (Paris, 1957). 
10 Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens’, 162-65. 
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Losses increased to around 40% in the Cercle of Zinder, 30% in the Cercle of 
Madaoua and 60% in the Cercle of Agadez, according to official reports.11 
  
The 1912-1915 famine 
While trade was declining in the north, Niger as a whole was experiencing an 
exceptionally bad famine that lasted from 1912 to 1915. Fiscal pressures, 
problems in the caravan trade as well as levies on foodstuffs and livestock all 
contributed to the effects of the famine in the Ayir in 1913: 
 
Il sévit actuellement dans tout le cercle d’Agadez une disette qui fait de nombreuses 
victimes. Les habitants sont partis en masse vers le sud et il ne reste plus personne 
au nord d’Agadez. Ceux qui y sont encore mangent les quelques graines et fruits 
comestibles des arbres de la zone désertique mais cette nourriture peu substantielle 
ne les soutient guère et ils meurent de faim en grand nombre…12 
 
Economic consequences of the conquest of Tibesti 
The conquest of Tibesti started in September 1913 and lasted until July 1916 
when it was finally evacuated and then abandoned, with the requisitioning of 
men, food products and camels from neighbouring areas, first Agadez and later 
N’guigmi, Zinder and Madaoua. 
 
Une grande partie des animaux de l’azalai fut réquisitionnée à Bilma pour la 
colonne du Tibesti et bien peu revinrent: les propriétaires ne furent pas 
dédommagés de leurs pertes; le mécontentement qui en résulta ne compta-t-il pas 
pour beaucoup dans les raisons qui menèrent à la révolte? On peut le 
supposer…Cette question est importante et est le gros sujet de mécontentement des 
tribus nomades dont la principale, presque l’unique ressource est le chameau…13 
 
In 1915 the people in Ayir provided about 850 camels for the Tibesti caravans 
in response to 1,100 requests for animals.14 The drought and a lack of pasture 
exacerbated losses and resulted in a decline in the north-south caravan trade 
with the number of caravans being cut to half their original number between 
                                                 
11 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 G 14-4, NIGER à AOF, Rapport Agricole, 
4ème trimestre 1914, 7. 
12 Archives Nationales du Niger, Rapport Politique du Cercle d’Agadez, 2ème trimestre 
1914, Agadez le 30 juin 1914. 
13 Capitaine Fonferrier, ‘Etudes Historiques sur le Mouvement Caravanier dans le 
Cercle d’Agadez’, Bulletin du Comité d’Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l’A.O.F. 
(1932), 305. 
  
14 Archives Nationales du Niger, Agadez, Commandant du Cercle d’Agadez au 
Lieutenant-Colonel Commissaire du Gouvernement Général au Territoire Militaire du 
Niger, Agadez le 9 juin 1916. 
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1912 and 1914. At the time of the 1912 annual caravan, 16,821 camels were 
recorded in Bilma and 6,721 in Fachi as compared to 8,220 and 2,410 
respectively in 1914.15 
 
 
The political and military situation before the revolt 
 
On 27 July 1916, Sub-lieutenant Lenoir, commander of the forces at Tibesti, 
decided to evacuate the posts at Bardaye and Zouar and to abandon Tibesti. The 
official reason given was the problem in defending the post in the face of an 
imminent Sanûssi attack.16 Lenoir had undoubtedly seen that the political 
situation was giving cause for concern. Unrest was spreading in the north and 
the northeast and especially in the Ayir region. Echoes of the fighting by the 
Sanûssi in the north, the revolt by the Tuareg in the west,17 and finally the 
hurried departure of the French troops from Tibesti all contributed to the 
radicalization of local anti-colonial resistance. Regular raids started to spread 
from Ayir to Damergou, Ader and Tarka.18 Such acts, however, remained 
unpunished, testifying once again to a reduction in the power and influence of 
the colonizers. 
 The French administration was being threatened from all sides and was 
incapable of containing demonstrations against its presence, in part because of 
the influence of the First World War raging in Europe. Captain Sabatié, Captain 
Bosch’s successor as head of the Cercle of Agadez as of 1 December 1916, 
inherited a precarious situation because the second company of the 3rd 
Senegalese rifle battalion based at Agadez was weak and widely dispersed. 
Captain Sabatié tried to reinforce the defence of the post of Agadez and 
demanded reinforcements from Zinder. By deciding to take a different approach 
from that suggested by his predecessor, Captain Sabatié displayed a certain 
amount of flair just a few days before the attack. Who were the leaders of this 
famous revolt? How was it planned and who was involved? 
                                                 
15 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, Cercle d’Agadez, Rapport Politique, 4ème 
trimestre 1912 et 1914. 
16 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 21-0-29, ‘Rapport du Sous-Lieutenant Lenoir 
commandant le confrérieur du Tibesti et le poste de Bardaye sur les circonstances qui 
ont amené cet officier à abandonner les postes de Bardaye et de Zouar, et à évacuer le 
Tibesti’, Faya le 25 août 1916, 23 pages manuscrites. 
17 It concerns primarily the revolt of Firhoun. 
18 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 G 16-13, Niger à AOF, Rapport Politique, 
3ème trimestre 1916, Zinder le 28 octobre 1916. 
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Kawousan ag Kedda 
Copyright: ‘Touaregs exil et résistance’, Revue du Monde Musulman et de la 
Méditerranée, 57 (Paris, 1990) 
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The leaders and their doctrine 
 
Mouhamad Kawousan ag Gedda 
Mouhamad Kawousan ag Gedda was an Ikaskazen Igerzawen born in the Ayir 
towards the end of the nineteenth century.19 He did not inherit a title from his 
father nor was he born into a chiefdom endowed with incarnate politico-military 
power. His tribe was not descended from a political power. He was affiliated to 
a junior line that hierarchically occupied a subordinate position and could not 
accede to a title of aghola or tribal chief.20 By way of compensation, his mother 
was a noble in the Igerzawen chieftaincy.21 
 As a young man, Kawousan had taken part in the exodus of certain Tuareg 
groups that wanted to withdraw from French domination and he stayed in 
Kanem where he participated in the anti-colonial struggle against the French. 
He was in Gouro when he got in contact with – or attached himself to, 
according to some – the anti-European El Hirwan (The Brothers) movement 
connected to the Sanûssi.22 This would have been in August 1909. In November 
of the same year, he participated on the side of Abdallah Tower, chief of the 
Sanûssi Zawiya of Aïn Galaka, in the attack on the French camp of Washenkale 
commanded by Lieutenant Moutot.23 Progressively, and thanks to his courage 
and intelligence, Kawousan acquired the esteem of the powerful brotherhood’s 
leader. He developed a strong friendship with Sidi Ahmed Sherif, the head of 
the Sanûssiya, who appointed him Governor of Ennedi. He was involved in the 
war for a while with the Italians and later was harassed by the French troops of 
Commmander Hilaire and forced to take refuge in Darfour for nine months from 
August 1910 to May 1911. He left Darfour in August 1912 at the end of the 
conflict with the powerful sultan, Ali Dinar. Threatened on all fronts, he gave 
himself up to the French who put camels at his disposal allowing him to 
proceed towards Ounyanga Kebir in the Ennedi region. The Turks had just 
installed themselves in Borkou, and Kawousan offered his services to their 
                                                 
19 All the authors then adopted, according to colonial archives, the name Wan Teggida 
which was unknown to the population. According to the same authors, Kawousan 
would have been born in Damergou around 1880. H. Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et 
Résistance ou la Continuité Touarègue’, Revue du Monde Musulman et de 
Méditerranée, 57 (1990), 29. 
20 A. Bourgeot, ‘Révoltes et Rébellions en Pays Tuareg’, Afrique Contemporaine, 170 
(1994), 8. 
21 Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et Résistance’, 30. 
22 Information Rhoubeidi, Agadez, August 1985. 
23 Archives Nationales du Niger, AGADEZ, Territoire Tchad au Territoire Niger, 30 
janvier 1917. 
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leader, Kaïmakan d’Aïn Galaka, and followed him to Ennedi. In May 1913 they 
found themselves involved in the Battle of Oum-Et-Adam on the side of the 
Sanûssi overthrown by French troops. Kawousan regrouped, left Borkou and 
withdrew to the oasis at Timmerin. There is no information about his activities 
there until April 1915 when he helped his friend Sidi Mahdi Souni, the son of 
Mohammed Souni, against the Italians. In February 1916, he was seen in the 
Tripolitanian Djebel. He returned to Ghât in August after the Italians had 
occupied Janet with an army estimated to be made up of 200 regular soldiers 
and six canons. Four months later, Kawousan besieged the French post at 
Agadez with the help of Sultan Tagama. 
 
Abderahamane Tagama Ag Bagari 
Abderahamane Tagama Ag Bagari was roughly 40 years of age in December 
1916, about the same age as Kawousan. From a young age he had studied the 
Koran in Agadez and had then become involved in petty trade, following the 
caravans south to the markets along the Kano-Katsina-Sokoto road. He lived in 
Bornou and then in Kano where he resumed his studies but at a higher level. He 
was still in Kano when he was asked to take up the head of the sultanate. He 
ascended the throne in 1908 as successor to Ibrahim Ed-Dasouqi who was 
judged ‘feeble and incapable’ by the French.24 Although put in place by 
colonization, Tagama, like his father Sultan Mohammed Al Baqary dit Bâ 
Sôfô,25 lived modestly and was generous towards his people, especially during 
the 1912-1915 famine.26 
 In addition to these two leaders, two other people who played a decisive role 
in this event should be mentioned. As chiefs of war, political leaders and 
members of the aristocracy, the participation of Fona and El Moctar Kodogo 
Ben Mohamed brought about a loyalty between the elements of the warring 
group in the Kawousan War. Fona was an agholla (chief) of Kel Tafidet who 
participated in all the major battles against the French before 1916 in the Ayir, 
Damergou, Agram and Tibesti. After becoming Kawousan’s lieutenant, he led 
the resistance in Tibesti and Kawar where he participated in the sacking of 
                                                 
24 Information Malam Yaro, Agadez, August 1985. 
25 ‘Al Baqary est considéré comme un roi philosophe, (Waliyi-n-sarki) qui refuse de 
puiser sa nourriture dans les finances de la ville et qui vit très modestement. Il est l’un 
des rares sultans à être enterré dans le cimetière du palais.’ A. Adamou, Agadez et sa 
Région, Thèse de 3ème cycle en géographie (1976), 81. 
  
26 The famine was first called Yunwa Tagama (the ‘Famine of Tagama’) due to the 
important quantities of food the Sultan procured from his own personal resources to 
distribute to the people. 
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Fachi in 1918. Kodogo was the son of an old Ikaskazen chief. He left in 
dissidence, as did Kawousan.  
 
 
The siege of the French post at Agadez 
 
The revolt extended beyond the borders of the Ayir region. Virtually all the 
groups in the Ayir were involved in the action in one way or another and to 
varying degrees over time. Groups of people alone or under the leadership of 
their chiefs joined the resistance fighters. The Kel Ajjer made up Kawousan’s 
original force before his arrival in the Ayir; Moussa ag Amastane was in charge 
of the Kel Ahaggar; Mohammed Ibrahim – the chief of the Almouskare – led 
the Arabs from Tahoua, and the Amenokal Al Khorar led the Kel Dinnik. The 
Kel Nan of Azawak, Taitoq of In Gall, Ifadayen, Toubou of Kawar and Tibesti, 
all people of the Damergou and certain villages in the sedentary cantons close to 
the desert regions of Manga and Damagaram also took part in the uprising. 
 How can such enthusiasm be explained? It came without doubt initially as a 
result of people’s declining living conditions, and historical ties through 
religious and tribal solidarity also united these people. The role of the leaders 
should not, however, be underestimated. Without pretending to put the results 
of history down only to the role of great men, it is enough to stress the real 
impact politicians can have on their people and in the process of revolt. As far 
as Abderahamane Tagama was concerned, his role was decisive and central 
although this does not emerge from written documents. He was at the heart of 
this resistance movement because he knew how to channel the diverse 
dissatisfactions and to assemble around him the necessary forces required for 
the fight, not in order to realize his own personal ambitions but to respond to 
collective aspirations. 
 
Kawousan et Tagama ont conjugé leurs efforts. La révolte aurait pu être déclenchée 
sans Kawousan s’il y avait des armes, Kawousan a apporté les armes. Mais c’est un 
inconnu. Rien n’aurait pu être entrepris sans Tagama à qui appartient le pays et qui 
jouissait de l’estime des populations.27  
 
Bourgeot supports this point of view: ‘Tegama demeure un allié irréprochable 
sans lequel Kaosen et ses partisans n’auraient été que des bandes de pillard’.28 
 More so than Kawousan, Tagama was the spiritual leader and the ideological 
force behind the resistance, and was the most politically minded of the people 
                                                 
27 Information Rhoubeidi. 
28 Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens’, 171, note 24. 
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involved in the movement. He was not a professional military man but more an 
ideologist and an active propagandist who knew how to undertake patiently, 
discretely and methodically the job of mobilizing and sensitizing the local 
people, whose interests and positions were not always convergent. The Ayir, in 
spite of its relative ethnic homogeneity, did not constitute a unified political 
whole: three zones of political influence split the region. The eastern and 
mountainous areas were under the political and military control of the Kel 
Ewey, legally the dependants of the Anastafidet. They were constantly fighting 
the Tuareg of Damergou who regularly pilfered their caravans. The In Gall 
region was under the influence of the Kel Fadey while the Kel Ferwam was the 
predominant group in Agadez and in the western highlands, regions where 
theoretically the Sultan’s power was limited. In addition, there was the original 
sedentary population of Songhay origin who were Hausa speaking and 
accounted for a large part of the population of Agadez. The town and the 
surrounding regions had 2,490 and 25,872 inhabitants respectively in 1916.29 
 Tagama’s chief merit was to have been able, through dialogue, to realize a 
large regrouping of volunteers and to organize and unite them as a group against 
the common enemy, in spite of the cleavages created by wars in the nineteenth 
century, and the policy of division and terror pursued by the French colonial 
administration. It is equally to the credit of these populations that they were able 
to reach a degree of consciousness and establish a sense of internal cohesion. It 
is now possible, thanks to the written evidence of witnesses received by the 
colonial authorities after the revolt, to assess the central role Tagama played in 
the events.30  
 
Tégama était le seul maître: tout le monde lui obéissait31 
Tégama commandait à tous32  
 
Tagama was the movement’s principal leader who, both ideologically and 
politically, was able to inspire people and develop strategies. He discretely 
made preparations before Kawousan’s arrival. 
 
                                                 
29 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 22 G 33: Niger. Statistiques Générales 1916. 
Annuaire de l’A.O.F. 1916. 
30 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, ‘Affaire Tegama’, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2. 
31 Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2, no. 2, dépositions du témoin 
Massadou. 
  
32 Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2, no. 3, dépositions du témoin 
Mamadou. 
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Seul Tagama savait quand Kawousan arriverait. Personne n’était dans le secret. 
C’est un homme extrêmement discret et rusé.33 
 
Available data do not allow an accurate description of preparations or of the 
first contacts between Kawousan and Tagama, although a letter from Sidi 
Mohammed El Labid to the Sultan is dated 1913 or 1914. By the beginning of 
1916, Tagama was diverting the attention of Captain Bosch from the troubles 
that were unfolding in Ayir. From April 1916, the commander of the cercle 
issued orders demanding that the post be defended.34 
 Tagama continued his diversionary actions until Captain Sabatié took up his 
position and recognized the extraordinary effort that Tagama had made to curb 
the colonial administration’s power in Agadez without arising any suspicions 
and to ease the infiltration of the Sanûssi.35 It was during the first part of 1916 
that Tagama could skilfully have had assassinated one of his closest 
collaborators, Elhadj Tourawa Melle, who was on very good terms with the 
French.36 Then Tagama undertook the construction of housing for Kawousan 
and his men, explaining that the building was destined to ‘héberger des hôtes 
illustres, de grands marabouts’.37 
 Kawousan’s army, which had to reach Agadez via Djado and Iférouwane, 
was made up of mainly Chaamba Arabs originally from southern Algeria, of 
Toubou and of Tuareg Kel Ajjer, Kel Ewey, Kel Fadey and Ikaskazen. With 
modern equipment (rapid-fire guns, machine guns and canons), the army was in 
a strong position to be able to recruit a large proportion of professional soldiers, 
notably deserters from the Italian army (askaris) and from French Saharan 
camelry units that had already gained some experience with modern warfare. 
 The first part of the column making up the advanced guard was led by the 
chief of a group of Tuareg Ikaskazen, Agali Touboushkouwan. They arrived in 
Agadez during the night of 12-13 December 1916. According to Tairou, the 
                                                 
33 Elhadj Aman Bougounou, Agadez, August 1985. 
34 Archives du Cercle d’Agadez, Commandant du Territoire au Commandant du Cercle 
d’Agadez: Note confidentielle no. 99 C du 14 avril 1916. On this point it seems 
dangerous to say that ‘le capitaine Bosch était sans doute de connivence avec le sultan 
Tagama’, Salifou, Kawousan, 62, note 83. There is no proof of this. 
35 Archives Nationales de France, Vincennes, Fonds A.O.F. Section Niger, V: Rapport 
du Capitaine Sabatié, commandant le poste d’Agadez sur le siège du poste, 13 décembre 
1916 au 3 mars 1917 inclus. p. 1-2. 
36 Elhadj Tourawa Mellé was Sarkin Tourawa (leader of the Arabs) and with this title 
was second in command under the Sultan. He was both Chief of War and Chief of 
Caravans of Bilma. 
37 Malam Yaro, Agadez, August 1985. 
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group of about 200 riflemen, who were received and put up by Tagama, 38 was 
made up of Ikaskazan, Kel Fadeye, Kel Tedele, Ifadeyan and Kel Ferwane. It 
was the following day that Tagama sent several missions to various tribal chiefs 
in order to win back Agadez. The Ikaskazan, Ifadayen, Kel Gharous, Kel 
Ferwane, Almousakarès and Kel Dinnik responded first and went to set up 
camp just outside the town. The same requests were sent to chiefs Moussa Ag 
Amastane of the Kel Ahaggar, Attati of the Esharifane, Kel Ewey and Kel 
Gres.39 Tagama then gave the order to stop all people who had contacts with the 
French: boys, cooks, interpreters, riflemen’s wives, and certain traders including 
the Tunisian negotiator Mohammed Allane. Most were held in prison, although 
a few, such as Samba the interpreter at the French post, were executed.40 
 Aghali’s army began to attack the post early in the morning of 13 December 
1916. Captain Sabatié, alerted by Samba’s widow, just had enough time to 
move arms, ammunition and money that had been left outside the keep. They 
organized the defence of the post with the equipment they had at their 
disposal.41 
 Kawousan reached Agadez with the main part of the column, the canon and 
the machine guns on 17 December: 
 
Le lendemain, grande palabre. Tégama préside, Agali et Kaossen y prennent part. 
Kaossen déclare être venu sur l’invitation de Tégama pour chasser les Français. 
Des messages écrits sont envoyés à toutes les tribus de l’Aïr, par les hommes de 
Tégama. Il y était dit que les Français allaient être détruits et chassés par la force; 
que ceux qui ne se déclareraient pas pour Tégama seraient considérés comme 
ennemis, attaqués et punis après la prise du poste d’Agadez. Au bout de quinze 
jours, le résultat était acquis : toutes les tribus s’étaient rendues à Agadez, plus ou 
moins volontairement. Les plus récalcitrantes (tels que les Kel Ewey) avaient été 
visitées par l’anastafidet Ekade et Kaossen lui-même. Un message avait été envoyé 
au Sultan de Kano pour le prévenir des événements qui allaient se passer.42 
                                                 
38 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2-7-2. Déposition du Témoin Tairou, p. 1. 
39 Salifou, Kaoussan, 61. From a document by Malam Bohary Tanode d’Agadez à 
Boubou Hama; see Boubou, ‘Documents Nigériens’, 172. 
40 Allane, Relations de Voyage, 6-9. Archives Nationales du Niger, 2-7-2, dépositions 
des témoins Mamadou et Massadou. They talk ‘d’un sujet anglais de couleur le nommé 
Marc Farlane, agent de la London Kano Company Limited’ who would have been 
assassinated by Tagama’s men. Archives du Cercle de Zinder: Le Capitaine 
commandant le cercle de Zinder au Commissaire du Gouvernement Général au 
Territoire Militaire du Niger, Zinder, le 9 janvier 1917. 
41 Archives Nationales de France, Vincennes, A.O.F., Niger, V: Rapport du Capitaine 
Sabatié sur le siège d’Agadez, p. 6. 
  
42 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2-7-2: Affaire Tégama, déposition du témoin 
Tairou, p. 2. 
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Tagama again seems to have played a pivotal role during the siege in a military, 
ideological and political sense. It was he who assembled the arms and 
ammunition, assumed the coordination of the operation and organized the 
fighting against the French troops sent to assist their soldiers.43 
Agadez was under siege, a state that would last for 80 days and even then the 
war would not be finished and would last for long months in the mountains, in 
Kawar and in Fezzan. This military episode is well known44 so our attention now 
turns to the direct and indirect repercussions of the attack of Agadez on other 
regions. 
 
 
Repercussions of the attack on Agadez on other regions 
 
The long Kawousan War provoked violent and open actions throughout the rest 
of the region. In the Azawak, Tamesna and Ahaggar, numerous groups of 
fighters soon joined Kawousan’s troops.45 Further to the south, participation by 
Damagaram, Damergou and Manga was invaluable, even decisive, in certain 
places. Control over this area, traditionally seen as the grain reserve of the 
northern region, was more than once at stake during the struggle, with both 
sides wanting to command access to it. The resistance forces were able to 
infiltrate the area and receive protection and assistance from the people near 
Gouré, Zinder and Madaoua.46 
 In the west of Niger and mainly in the subdivision of Filingué, the sedentary 
bella people in the cantons of Imanan and Tegraza were cautious following the 
                                                 
43 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2-7-2: Affaire Tégama, p. 1-4. 
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46 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, 2G17-12. Rapport Politique, 2ème trimestre 1917; 
Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle de Zinder. Rapport Politique du Cercle de Zinder, 
4ème trimestre 1917; Archives Nationales du Niger, cercle de Gouré, 4ème trimestre 1917. 
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failure and repression of the revolt of Firhoun. They therefore had some 
reservations after the announcement of the siege of Agadez. The military 
precautions taken (and enforced by the French administration in Niamey), which 
included the disarming of the population and the sending of a reconnaissance 
patrol, hardly favoured a manifestation of open revolt.47 
 In neighbouring Nigeria, Governor Lugard received a telegram on 23 
December from Dakar informing him of the invasion of the French Sahara by 
the Sanûssi. A day later, news of the siege of Agadez arrived as well as a request 
from the Secretary-General of the AOF, Fournier, who demanded safe passage 
between Kano and Zinder for troops sent from Dakar. At the same time, 
Fournier informed Lugard of the instructions issued by the head of the military 
forces in Zinder to call on the nearby British garrison in case of emergency. 
Lugard, deeply concerned by the developing situation in Niger, declared a state 
of emergency on 3 January 1917. 
 Captain Faulque de Jonquières demanded reinforcements from Lugard in the 
middle of January 1917 and British colonial soldiers were given the role of 
protecting the sedentary zones of Tahoua, Maradi and Madaoua and of quashing 
any sign of incursion by resistance fighters in the south. Two British columns 
were sent to the military area in Niger. One, led by Colonel Coles, left Katsina 
with two mounted companies, one canon and two machine guns. The contingent 
arrived in Maradi on 13 January and received orders to meet at Tessaoua on 19 
January.48 The second column, coming from Sokoto, was commanded by 
Captain Randall and was made up of 65 riflemen on foot, a mounted company of 
85 men and two machine guns. It was sent to Tahoua where it arrived on 20 
January. Lugard did not want his men to intervene in the fighting around Ayir 
and their role was principally to offer help in patrolling and in setting up several 
mobile posts. After staying about four months in the military zone in Niger 
(from mid-January to mid-May 1917), the two British columns returned to their 
respective bases in Nigeria. 
 As a result of this cooperation with the British administration in Nigeria, the 
French had at their disposal some 2,000 extra riflemen, 8 machine guns, 6 
                                                 
47 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, 2G17-12. Rapport Politique, 2ème trimestre 1917; 
Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle de Zinder. Rapport Politique du Cercle de Zinder, 
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48 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey; Lieutenant-Colonel Coles commandant la 
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Commissaire du Gouvernement Général au Territoire Militaire du Niger. Kaduna le I 
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canons, 394 camels, 109 mounted soldiers and 17 tonnes of equipment. This 
equipment would allow the French army to consolidate its positions in Niamey, 
Bilma, N’Guigmi, Filingué and Tahoua and to deploy more forces in the centre 
of the area of resistance49 with the men who were already in Ayir to liberate 
Agadez. 
 Alongside this military assistance, the British authorities adopted a number 
of political and administrative measures in areas adjacent to the military zones 
likely to assist the French: a reintegration of immigrant populations into the area, 
the policing of nomadic groups that were allied to the resistance movement, the 
requisitioning of camels, horses and porters for provisioning, a constant 
exchange of political information of the highest importance etc.50 
 What evidence is there of allegations about relations between the resistance 
leaders and Nigeria? The French authorities’ reports are based on 
correspondence found after the liberation of Agadez or from their intelligence 
agents. 
 The first item in the dossier would be Kawousan’s letter of October 1916 to 
his uncles El Hajj Mousa and Adambar in which he stated that the Germans and 
the Turks had to join forces at Kano with the columns coming down from 
Tripolitania.51 In May 1917, the chief of battalion, Laforge, asked the Ayir 
commander to order an inquiry ‘pour savoir si Kaossen au cours du siège 
d’Agadez a adressé des lettres ou envoyé des émissaires à des sultans de la 
Nigéria et plus particulièrement à celui de Kano’.52 
 Accusations were laid first against the Emir of Kano and then the Sultan of 
Sokoto. The chief colonial officer of Niger passed his information on to Lugard 
and Sarkin Musulmin of Sokoto would be constantly in touch with Kawousan to 
whom he had promised his help if the Sanûssi managed to enter the town.53 
Lugard wanted to verify all the details so set off on a journey to the north of 
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51 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2.7.2; Mangeot, ‘Le Siège d’Agadez’, 479-
82. 
52 Archives Nationales du Niger, Agadez. Note confidentielle, Chef de bataillon 
Laforgue chargé de l’expédition des affaires au Territoire militaire du Niger au 
commandant de la colonne de l’Aîr, Zinder le 10 mai 1917; M. Zbairu Kolo, ‘The 
Kawousan Rebellion of 1916-1918 with Particular Reference to its Impact on Northern 
Nigeria’, PhD thesis, Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria, 1973). 
53 J. Osuntokun, ‘The Response of the British Colonial Government in Nigeria to the 
Islamic Insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara during the First World War’, 
Bulletin de l’I.F.A.N, XXXVI, B, 1 (1974), 23. 
208 Idrissa 
Nigeria to check on the loyalty of the emirs vis-à-vis the British administration. 
No evidence of their relations with Kawousan or Tagama could be detected. 
 Alongside these rumours and police indications, the affirmation by Séré de 
Rivières and by Fuglestad should be mentioned, according to whom, before the 
end of the siege of Agadez, ‘des éléments sanûssi installés au Nigéria 
septentrional avaient organisé un convoi de ravitaillement destiné à Kaocen et 
ses hommes. Mais le convoi fut intercepté et capturé par un détachement 
français, assisté des Kanouri de Goudoumaria’.54 As far as oral tradition is 
concerned, the information is contradictory. While Elhadj Aman Bougounou 
remained quiet,55 the others were more outspoken: 
     
Tagama était en relation avec Sarkin Katsina qui confectionnait les gris-gris et les 
envoyaient à Agadez par des émissaires. Tagama a informé Sarkin Katsina du 
plan.56 
 
Finally, were relations between Kawousan, Tagama and the traditional 
authorities of northern Nigeria myth or reality? Undoubtedly the colonial 
authorities gave the question some thought. Whatever credit is placed on these 
sources, it is likely that the emirs of northern Nigeria would have been informed 
of the situation in Agadez. However, they reacted according to their own 
interests and to the situation in their own territories: with discretion and 
flexibility in Borno, Kano and Sokoto where Tagama had numerous contacts, 
but also with manifest opposition in Kabi which was clearly on the side of the 
colonial authorities. The situation was delicate for the emirs who had fresh and 
recent memories of the deportation to Ilorin of defeated colleagues who had 
collaborated in the revolts of 1915-1916. They had to proceed with caution and 
tact as ‘one never knows what will happen’. Their loyalties were divided 
between Islamic loyalty for their Muslim brothers and their loyalty vis-à-vis the 
administration. It was the latter which ultimately carried more weight. 
 
 
                                                
Interpretation 
 
The Kawousan War extended beyond traditional political players, witnessed the 
use of modern armaments and received support from external sources. The 
involvement of the many colonial powers of the time – France, Italy, Great 
Britain, Germany and Turkey – and the alliance with the Sanûssiya gave it an 
 
54 Fuglestad, ‘Les Révoltes des Touraeg’, 107; Séré de Rivières, Histoire du Niger, 226. 
55 Information Elhadj Aman Bougounou, Agadez. 
  
56 Information Malam Yaro, Agadez. 
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international dimension, which is probably why it attracted so much attention 
and was so widely debated by writers at the time. Four principle theses 
constitute the fundamental axes of the different approaches: (i) the bandits 
pillards (plundering bandits) theory; (ii) the révolte sénoussiste (Sénoussiste 
revolt) theory which emphasized the religious factors and attributed the 
Sanûssiya with a decisive role in the conflict; (iii) the war-against-the-French 
theory; and (iv) the modernist theory put forward by the leaders of political 
parties fighting for independence as well as the recent Tuareg rebellion in 
Niger. 
 
The ‘bandits pillards’ theory 
This interpretation does not consider the Kawousan War as a revolt but more as 
a raid, an opportunity to plunder and loot. Fuglestad, who supports this theory, 
wrote that the Kawousan War ‘ajouta seulement une bande supplémentaire à 
toutes les bandes qui parcouraient le pays’.57 He ignores the political dimension 
of the movement dismissing it as a simple pillaging operation that was 
essentially materialistic in origin. In this way he puts all Tuareg raiding actions 
down to reaction against colonial domination. At the same time it implies an 
ineptitude on the part of the Tuareg to rise above their internal rivalries to unite 
against a common enemy. This all translates into a profound misunderstanding 
of the double defence strategies adopted by the Tuareg from the outset of 
colonial penetration. This consisted in part of establishing internal and external 
alliances with a view to reinforcing their defences and also of organizing the 
raids against the enemy to weaken and defeat its army.58 Actions varied from 
escape and evasion (avoiding the enemy and playing for time) to armed 
resistance, but also the use of submission, diplomacy, underground tactics and 
exile. 
 
A Sénoussiste revolt? A Muslim plot? 
Islam, and the Sanûssiya in particular, have been considered by various writers 
as the driving force behind the Kawousan War. This interpretation came largely 
from colonial sources and was subsequently reproduced in numerous 
publications. Abadie spoke of the Mouvement Sénoussiste59 and for Séré de 
Rivières it was all about un complexe de guerre sainte (a complex religious 
war).60 André Salifou’s book was entitled Kaoussan ou la Révolte Sénoussiste, 
and one of the chapters in Norris’s book was ‘The Twareg Jihâd against the 
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French’.61 Finally Casajus describes the role of the religious engagement in the 
resistance.62 Clarification of the role of the Sanûssiya in this revolt involves 
returning to the political and ideological roots of the revolt and determining the 
nature of the alliance between the resistance and the Sanûssiya. 
 The Sanûssiya and their brothers – a group of individuals joined by the same 
doctrine and the same religious philosophy – were established in 1837 by 
Mohamed Ben Ali es Sanûssi el Hassani el Idrisi who was born in 1792 in 
Torch in Oranie.63 The Sanûssiya enjoyed considerable success and its leaders 
had complete authority throughout Libya and northern Chad. They had 
numerous disciples in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, eastern 
Sudan and Somalia and its influence spread through Mesopotamia as far as 
Indonesia. In Nigeria, the Kawar, the Ayir, the Damagaram and the Damergou 
were the main areas of Sanûssiya influence between 1860 and 1899. Many 
Zawiya including schools and mosques were founded in Bilma and Zinder and 
in the Ader and Ayir. 
 The Sanûssiya are orthodox and similar to the Wahhâbist order set up in 
Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Mohammed ibn 
Abd-al-Wahhab.64 The Sanûssiya and the Wahhâbites represented ‘les 
tendances conservatrices des mouvements islamiques prémodernistes de 
réforme’.65 Like the Wahhâbites, the Sanûssi can be identified by a rigorous 
adherence to a pure and primitive Islam, rejecting all that was introduced later 
including the cult of saints, tombs, relics etc. that are considered to negatively 
influence the true belief.66 The Sanûssiya totally reject the doctrine of union 
with God conceived by Sufism and substitute a mystical union with the spirit of 
the prophet Mohammed. This is the origin of the name Mohammediya tariqa 
sometimes given to the movement. It equally rejects Islamic intellectual 
tendencies and preaches a direct interpretation of its origins without erudition. 
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In addition, the Sanûssiya opt for the promotion of a moral and Islamic 
solidarity based on honesty, egalitarianism, Islamic cooperation and economic 
justice.67 They thus set up cooperative farms and undertook commercial 
activities. The Sanûssiya relied on the Zawiya, a monastic group with places 
where educational retreats could be held of a religious and cultural nature.68 
Except for these distinctive traits, the aims of Sanûssiya dogma were generally 
the same as other brotherhoods, especially regarding the step-by-step 
reunification of African Muslims and the creation of a Muslim empire that 
would be united, pure and respectful of the authentic teachings of the prophet. 
 It was with all these considerations in mind that the colonial authorities at 
the time called the brotherhood movement ‘xénophobe, militant, agressif et 
fanatique’ and ‘anti-européen’.69 In reality, the newly founded brotherhood 
wanted to affirm its orthodoxy in relation to existing practices that it considered 
tainted by pernicious influences. It wanted to withdraw from these and promote 
emigration or jihad (holy war) and to retreat into the austerity of the Sahel to 
preserve the purity of an original Islam. Subsequently its anti-colonial activities 
were more or less force of circumstance. 
 It was in the name of all these principles that the Sanûssiya established 
contact with the leaders of the Ayir. The strength of relations before the siege of 
Agadez between Tagama, Kawousan and Sanûssiya chiefs is acknowledged by 
oral tradition and colonial archive material. Sidi Mohammed El Labid, the 
representative of the Sanûssiya in Fezzan, wrote a letter dated 1914 to 
Tagama.70 The two had never met but their correspondence suggests a secret 
project dating from around this time. Let us now consider the position of the 
main leaders and the population vis-à-vis the Sanûssiya. 
 To fully appreciate Kawousan’s relations with the Sanûssiya, it is necessary 
to look at his time in exile and analyse the nature of the alliances he had with 
the different camps. What is most remarkable is the diversity of the alliances 
and the different volte-face. Kawousan always seems to have been guided by 
the need to set up and maintain a strong and modern army. This was the main 
motivation behind all his actions. He received arms from the Sanûssi who he 
helped fight against the French between 1909 and 1912, then from the French 
                                                 
67 Fazlur, ‘Revival and Reform’, 638-39. 
68 Following a policy of systematic Islamization, the Sanûssi gradually opened schools 
everywhere and bought young slaves in Chad who they taught before sending them 
back to their own country to spread the word of the Koran. 
69 Gouilly, L’Islam dans l’A.O.F., 166. 
70 Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle d’Agadez: Lettre de Sidi Mohamed el Labid au 
Sultan d’Agadez, écrite à la fin de kaada 1332 (1914). Traduction de l’officier interprète 
de deuxième classe, Gisselbrecht, Agadez le 10 mars 1917. 
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with whom he fought from 1912 to 1915, then the Turks and finally again the 
Sanûssi during his stay in Tripolitania in 1916 before going to the Ayir region. 
Even after the retreat of resistance fighters outside Agadez (13 July 1917) and 
then from the Ayir (25 March 1918), he adopted the same attitude. Initially 
allied to the Turks in Fezzan, he then formed an alliance with the Sanûssi who 
provided him with significant quantities of arms and ammunition. Kawousan 
played this game of double alliances until the end and eventually it was the 
cause of his own death. Having received vital armaments from the Sanûssi, he 
wanted to conclude an alliance with the Turks in Tibesti. They, however, were 
aware of his tactics, and attacked, captured and hung him. 
 In this game of reverse alliances, there is no place for ideology and 
Kawousan did not concern himself with such trivialities. He was pragmatic, 
manipulating with a rare persuasive power the Sanûssi, the Turks, the French 
and the Italians depending on the circumstances. He no doubt fully understood 
the context of the colonial complexities in which each of the camps had its own 
colonial agenda. His references to Islam and to the holy war in his 
correspondence with Tagama and other Tuareg leaders is based on political 
propaganda. Kawousan knew that Islam alone could convince the population to 
accept resistance and enrol their children in his army. In the political context of 
the time, only Islam could play a unifying role because it could overcome 
internal political opposition within Tuareg groups. In this respect, Islam – and 
the Sanûssi – could only have had an instrumental function and did not assume 
any ideological role. Elsewhere, Kawousan always rose up against the blind 
fanaticism of fighters who wanted to engage in a holy war and pronounced 
religious incantations and honour against the bullets of adversaries. He wanted a 
well-structured and disciplined army with soldiers knowledgeable about the 
tactics of modern warfare, like those led by his European enemies.71 
 Regarding the position of Tagama, Bourgeot may have been right when he 
affirmed that ‘Tegama était probablement le plus senoussiste des dissidents – ce 
qui est inhérent à la fonction de sultan, qui doit assurer un rôle religieux?’72 In 
Agadez, only one informant could confirm Tagama’s affiliation with the 
Sanûssi with any certainty: 
 
Tagama a étudié au Borno et à Kano. Il était à Kano lorsqu’on fit appel à lui 
pour diriger le sultanat. C’est un grand musulman et un grand marabout. 
C’est une fois devenu sultan qu’il a été converti à la Sanûssiya par Sidikou, 
un marabout arabe de Ghât installé à Agadez.73 
                                                 
71 Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et Résistance’, 36. 
72 Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens’, 171.  
  
73 Oral information Aman Dan Mallam, Agadez, July 1985. 
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Elhadj Bougounou was more nuanced: 
 
Tagama sénoussiste? Non … C’est difficile de dire à quelle confrérie il appartenait. 
Il est musulman. C’est tout. C’était là la base de ses relations avec Kawousan. La 
raison du ralliement de Tagama à la révolte, c’est l’islam. Il ne pouvait accepter 
d’être un subordonné des Français, des Kafrs… C’est une guerre contre les 
Français qui voulaient imposer leur coutume et altérer l’islam. Au moment de tirer, 
les résistants s’écriaient: ‘La illaha illala, jihadi fi sabih allah’. C’était une jihad, 
pas pour le pillage ou le butin mais pour défendre l’islam. Les combattants ont fait 
la guerre aux Français mais pas aux musulmans.74 
 
This is a similar point of view to Malam Alfaki Almoustapha’s, according to 
whom Kawousan would have obtained Tagama’s agreement by stressing the 
following theme: 
 
 
Mou kori kafiray, mou samou kassan mou.  
Guerre aux kafrs, libérons notre pays.75  
 
This slogan agreed with the interests of the resistance fighters and Tagama. The 
rallying of Tagama to the resistance was in accordance with his political and 
religious beliefs. Were external threats not the main cause of the creation of the 
Sultanate? Ayir traditions bestowed the official title of Imam Amir-al-Mouminin 
(Commander of the Believers) on the Sultan. His legitimacy in the eyes of his 
people was related to his devotion to Islam. The fight also offered him the 
chance to increase his political power – limited until now – and to impose an 
authority weakened by political rivalries dividing the Kel Ayir. Alliances with 
Kawousan and above all with the Sanûssi allowed him to bask in his prestige. In 
this Muslim country, the words ‘Guerre aux Kafrs, libérons notre pays’ were 
mobilizing. It was a political programme that conformed to the immediate 
interests of the population. It was the religious and political duty of the Sultan to 
whom he had pledged to fight this war with the infidels and to liberate his 
country from French domination. This all conforms to the Islamic vision that 
divided the world into two domains: dar al islam (the land of Islam) and dar ek 
kufr (the land of the infidels). Islam demands that men live according to Muslim 
authorities. The power of the unfaithful over Muslims represents a situation of 
scandal in their faith. Islam preaches either jihad (holy war) or hijra 
(emigration) for believers in order to cleanse themselves of the power of the 
                                                 
74 Oral information Elhadj Bougounou, Agadez, July 1985. 
75 Oral information Malam Alfaki Moustapha, Agadez, July 1985. 
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infidel. Kawousan and Tagama opted for a holy war because it better fulfilled 
their purposes. Islam or Sanûssiya served to overcome political opposition, to 
assemble and mobilize the people, and to recruit fighters. 
 How did the people interpret this resistance? Firstly, popular history 
remembers this period by the name of Yakin Kawousan. This highlights the 
importance accorded to Kawousan, who is considered the one who won the war 
at Agadez and was seen as the main military leader. Secondly, when analysing 
the same oral sources, it becomes apparent that Tagama was showered in 
eulogies for the period prior to the resistance but judgements were severe and 
criticism harsh when one considers the revolt. The Sultan would have brought 
bad luck to Agadez by allying with Kawousan and by wanting to fight the 
French who were judged as being too powerful. Informants described the 
opinion of the people of Agadez at that time as follows: ‘Tagama ya cu ce mu’ 
meaning ‘Tagama has hurt us’.76 Oral tradition retains the negative character of 
the war to highlight the harsh repression that was endured by Agadez and the 
whole of the Ayir. Responsibility for this is laid squarely on the shoulders of 
Tagama who wanted to fight the French who were clearly too strong for him. 
The Ayir was ruined and the region lost half its population. However in no way 
was the resistance seen as a religious war supported by the Sanûssiya. 
 Between Tagama, Kawousan and the Sanûssiya there was a tactical alliance, 
a convergence of military, political, religious and economic interests. The 
Sanûssiya certainly supplied Kawousan’s army. However all the objective 
conditions of a revolt were laid down well before Kawousan and his men’s 
arrival in the Ayir. Identifying the resistance as a Sanûssiya movement appears 
to be too hasty a conclusion to draw and diminishes the complexity of the revolt 
at the same time as simplifying its meaning and its extent. To consider the 
Kawousan War as a Sénoussiste revolt tends to corroborate the thesis of a war 
led from outside by the Sanûssi supported by Turkish-German agents of which 
Kawousan was a part. Adherence to the Sanûssiya and adhesion to the 
resistance movement do not cover the same reality. This false interpretation of 
the revolt led the French troops to indiscriminately exterminate all Muslim 
groups in Agadez. More than 100 Muslim scholars assembled in a mosque were 
massacred in March 1917 even though they had told Colonel Mourin in a letter 
that they denied all responsibility for what had happened.77 
 
                                                 
76 Information Elhadj Aman Bougounou, Agadez, August 1985. 
  
77 Triaud, ‘Un Episode Oubliée’, 263-71. 
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An anti-French war? 
This theory sees the revolt as a simple prolongation of the First World War, a 
movement armed and financed by the Germans. For the French, the causes of 
the war were external. In their opinion, it was a vast Muslim plot supported 
ideologically by the Sanûssiya, and materially by Turkey and Germany.78 It is 
only colonial mythology that involves people like Dr Frobenius with the revolt 
and magnifies facts to make it appear as if the revolt was due to the power of 
the Sanûssiya or was an alleged holy war backed by a German-Turkish alliance 
to attack French bases in Africa.79 
 The authorities in Niger do not agree with this interpretation: 
 
…On ne peut guère admettre que ce soit là le vrai mobile qui ait poussé les 
insurgés. Il est vraisemblable et même probable que ces mouvements ont été 
encouragés par les nationaux allemands et turcs de la Tripolitaine, mais ces 
encouragements sont restés jusqu’ici purement platoniques ou tout au moins de bien 
faible importance. Il n’y a pas de lien entre la guerre européenne et les événements 
de l’Aïr. Les causes sont purement locales.80  
 
Two further reasons allow the European war and the Kawousan War to be 
separated. The Sanûssiya, as already mentioned, were militarily weak and 
politically in crisis. Additionally, any Sanûssiya alliance with a particular 
European country should not be overestimated. Sanûssiya alliances during the 
war experienced various fluctuations: they fought against the English in Egypt 
and in Sudan, then against the Italians in Libya until 1928. In 1943 they 
collaborated with the English and the French against the Italians in Libya. 
 
The War of Kawousan and contemporary nationalist movements 
For the leaders of the political parties who fought for independence and for the 
leaders of the recent Tuareg rebellion in Niger, there was more continuity 
between the different periods of resistance. They all identified with the 
Kawousan War. The Sawaba party led by Djibo Bakary declared in one of its 
publications: 
 
C’est de ce passé glorieux [les résistances anticoloniales], parfois douloureux et 
dramatique, que nous pouvons puiser à la fois des leçons de courage et de 
patriotisme et des éléments nécessaires pour réhabiliter notre culture et notre 
Histoire…N’étaient-ce pas les valeureux guerriers de l’Aîr, conduits par Kaoussen 
                                                 
78 Abadie, Afrique Centrale, 327-28. 
79 Séré de Rivières, Histoire du Niger, 224-25. 
80 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2G16-12. Niger à A.O.F. Rapport 
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et Tegama, qui, en 1916 infligèrent aux troupes françaises de dures défaites et 
vinrent mettre le siège devant Agadez où les Français durent s’enfermer dans un 
fort?81 
 
The leaders of the Tuareg rebellion in Niger established a link between the anti-
colonial revolts and recent rebellions. They have made a personalized history of 
Tuareg society based on the Kawousan War and still see this event as a step in 
the long process of a search for a certain modernity at the heart of Tuareg 
society in which the rebellion was inscribed and which continues to this day. 
Kawousan is considered as having brought an egalitarian society and 
democratic opposition to the conservatism represented by the aristocracy who 
wanted to maintain a social hierarchy directed by the old code of honour. 
Kawousan has been given the role of liberator, the federator seen as the unifier 
of the Tuareg world.82 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Kawousan War was undoubtedly the longest period of resistance ever 
known in Niger’s previous military history, extending beyond colonial frontiers 
and even traditional politics. However, its root causes were purely internal, 
linked to colonial domination and to local economic and political factors. 
Economically, the Ayir region had faced a long period of decline in the living 
conditions of the local pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose wealth was 
principally based on the trans-Saharan caravan trade that was declining 
significantly due to military operations in the area. French colonization had 
upset the way of life of these populations by the introduction of a policy of 
divide and rule, the breakdown of Tuareg confederations, the imposition of a 
policy of sedentarization, the creation of artificial political unities, the 
suppression of lines of bondage and the trafficking in slaves, the introduction of 
a double tax (a poll tax and a tax on cattle) and the huge requisitioning of men 
and livestock. In the eyes of the locals, these changes symbolized the 
establishment of dependent relationships and by extension, a policy of 
dependency and of servitude. 
 Neither a raid conducted by bandits pillards nor a Sénoussiste revolt, the 
Kawousan War was more than a simple Tuareg revolt. It was an anti-colonial 
                                                 
81 Sawaba Parti Politique, ‘Pour l’Indépendance Effective du Niger: Les Raisons de 
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82 Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et Résistance’, 32-33. 
  
 
 The Kawousan War reconsidered 217 
war through which the local populations attempted to free themselves from the 
yoke of colonialism and in particular French domination that had resulted in the 
loss of their main source of wealth – control of (trans) Saharan resources and 
trade – as well as their political independence. 
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Sawaba’s rebellion in Niger (1964-1965): 
Narrative and meaning 
 
Klaas van Walraven 
 
 
One of the least-studied revolts in post-colonial Africa, the 
invasion of Niger in 1964 by guerrillas of the outlawed 
Sawaba party was a dismal failure and culminated in a 
failed attempt on the life of President Diori in the spring of 
1965. Personal aspirations for higher education, access to 
jobs and social advancement, probably constituted the 
driving force of Sawaba’s rank and file. Lured by the party 
leader, Djibo Bakary, with promises of scholarships abroad, 
they went to the far corners of the world, for what turned out 
to be guerrilla training. The leadership’s motivations were 
grounded in a personal desire for political power, justified 
by a cocktail of militant nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoist beliefs. Sawaba, however, failed to grasp the 
weakness of its domestic support base. The mystifying 
dimensions of revolutionary ideologies may have 
encouraged Djibo to ignore the facts on the ground and 
order his foot soldiers to march to their deaths. 
 
This chapter attempts to reconstruct a neglected episode in the post-colonial 
history of Niger. It focuses on an abortive invasion of this West African country 
in the autumn of 1964 by members of a clandestine political party, Sawaba. On 
the orders of their leader-in-exile, Djibo Bakary, armed commandos infiltrated 
Niger and tried to instigate a popular insurrection against the regime of 
President Hamani Diori and his ruling Parti Progressiste Nigérienne (PPN). 
Despite elaborate preparations, the commandos were caught completely off 
guard by the hostile reception they received from the peasant population and the 
government had little trouble in rounding them up with the assistance of the 
peasantry. By the end of November 1964, barely two months after the invasion, 
the Sawaba commandos had been routed. A dozen men had been killed, several 
were wounded and more than a hundred taken prisoner, while the rest had fled 
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across the border. Several activists faced the death penalty or long terms of 
imprisonment. In April 1965, a last attempt was made to oust Niger’s 
government, when a young Sawabist tried to assassinate the president. The 
attempt failed as dismally as the autumn revolt the year before and marked 
Sawaba’s definitive exile into the political wilderness. 
The main interest of this episode, on which no scholarly research has ever 
been undertaken, derives from the insight it provides into a bitter power struggle 
between two rival political forces. The underlying cause was, at least ostensibly, 
the search for an ideological foundation and definition of the legitimacy of the 
new, post-colonial polity. The revolt1 and its failure also involved certain other 
dimensions that make it of more than a passing interest to observers of Africa’s 
past and contemporary politics. 
This chapter argues that, despite the existence of regional, if not ethnic, 
cleavages and rivalries, the insurrection was caused by various factors, and 
regional tensions were probably only contextual. Since Niger’s independence, its 
politics have to some extent been affected by regional fault lines that have set 
different regions and communities against each other. The principal fault line is 
the competition between the eastern parts of Niger, inhabited by Hausa-speaking 
communities, and the western regions of the country that are dominated by 
Zerma- and Songhai-speaking groups. While the groundnut-producing areas of 
the east constituted the main source of the country’s national income at 
independence, it was the western Zerma and Songhai groups that took control of 
Niger’s political system. 
Nevertheless, social-generational competition may have been a more 
important aspect in the revolt, as this set younger people – Hausa as well as non-
Hausa – apart from an older generation of Nigeriens who either belonged to 
Hausaland’s chiefly class or had monopolized the country’s public life and 
assumed control of the limited numbers of jobs and benefits. Part of Sawaba’s 
support base in the late 1950s was thus made up of relatively young men, some 
of Hausa origin and in particular, recent immigrants to Niger’s emergent urban 
areas. Many were traders, transporters or members of Muslim brotherhoods – 
such as the Tijaniyya – and retained links with their home region. As the most 
mobile and economically active members of their community, they resented the 
domination of Hausa society by the (neo)traditional canton chiefs or Sarkis – 
conservative elements whose interests did not necessarily coincide with those of 
the younger generation. Many youngsters, Hausas and non-Hausas alike, wanted 
access to modern education or aspired to wealth and new positions in society, 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘revolt’, ‘rebellion’ and ‘insurrection’ are used interchangeably here. The 
concept of ‘invasion’ points to the mode of, and the external-spatial dimension to, the 
rebellion. 
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which neither the Hausa chiefly class nor Niger’s state elite would provide. 
Sawaba’s appeal, in this context, stemmed not only from the more militant strain 
of African nationalism that it professed, but probably also from its ability to 
offer these young men the possibility to go abroad to see new countries and 
learn new trades – an offer that the more ambitious and adventurous among 
them found difficult to resist. The party’s ability to provide such attractive 
benefits depended on its charismatic leader, Djibo Bakary, who had long-
established contacts with the French communist party and had managed to build 
up a network of contacts in the Eastern bloc. 
His reliance on Eastern-bloc aid brought Sawaba’s violent bid for power 
squarely within a Cold-War ambit. As discussed below, Eastern European 
countries, the Soviet Union and especially communist China provided the party 
with political and military support. In fact, for the People’s Republic of China, 
assisting Sawaba’s revolt represented its first violent attempt to gain a foothold 
in West Africa. This in itself was not unique, since the Eastern bloc was, at the 
time, aiding nationalist parties and liberation movements in various Sub-Saharan 
countries, especially those still under colonial or settler suzerainty. However, for 
the communist bloc, Niger represented an attractive prize. While economically 
weak, the country was suspected, by the early 1960s, of having important 
deposits of uranium, one of the most strategic mineral resources of the Cold 
War. Secondly, the country was strategically located in West Africa between the 
region’s would-be superpower – Nigeria – and Algeria, France’s former 
mainstay that had also been its first nuclear testing ground. Thirdly, since 
Niger’s political leadership was closely allied to President Houphouët-Boigny of 
Ivory Coast – France’s staunchest and most anti-communist ally – a successful 
Sawaba takeover in Niger would have dealt a severe blow to the interests of 
France, the Western world and its African allies. Conversely, part of Sawaba’s 
failure to topple Niger’s government also stemmed from this Cold War context, 
as it led the French to defend their interests in Niger by trying to thwart 
Sawaba’s invasion plans. 
The Cold War context of Sawaba’s insurrection also accounted for another – 
astonishing – aspect of this story, namely the unfounded optimism with which 
the party’s leadership went about its business. As argued in the last section of 
this chapter, this may have been tied to an understudied dimension of Marxist-
inspired liberation ideologies, which involve a degree of romanticism about 
revolutionary struggle that can easily blur one’s view of reality. 
The principal cause for failure stemmed from Sawaba’s lack of domestic 
support. As will be shown, the party did not really have the backing of the Hausa 
peasantry, something which substantially weakened its internal support base that 
could, in practice, only sustain a ramshackle coalition of diverse interests 
between its leadership and the rank and file. That Sawaba drew at least some of 
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its backing from Hausa and non-Hausa youths could not compensate for the lack 
of support of the Hausa populace and may well have dissipated its strength in a 
political system that was partly affected by regional fault lines. This weakness 
may have been reinforced by the fact that the party’s rank and file was probably 
driven more by a mixture of personal aspirations and pragmatic opportunism 
than ethnic jealousies or revolutionary zeal per se. This assortment of 
motivations linked up with what was probably the main driving force behind 
Djibo Bakary’s decision to instigate an insurrection – a long-standing personal 
feud with, and the desire to capture power from, his main political adversary. 
However, this assessment can only be tentative since data on the motivations of 
the individual actors are still sketchy, particularly those of Sawaba’s rank and 
file. Further research is needed to gain a deeper understanding of what drove 
these men to their deaths or imprisonment. 
Lastly, in trying to reconstruct the exact trajectories that the Sawabists 
followed before they met their fate, this chapter touches on two other external 
dimensions – one which today would probably be portrayed as a typical example 
of globalization, and the other involving a striking resemblance to the subversive 
political networks marking the regional context of some of West Africa’s 
contemporary conflicts. Thus, the prelude of the rebellion took Sawaba activists 
to the far corners of the world, visiting, studying and training in Eastern Europe, 
the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, Chinese cities like Peking and Nanking, Cuba 
and, possibly, North Korea. Moreover, in the run-up to the insurrection, Sawaba 
activists spread throughout North and West Africa, keeping in touch with each 
other, building subversive contacts and acquiring support from different African 
governments. 
 
 
A note on sources 
 
Before tracing the revolt’s background, planning, execution and aftermath, and 
providing a tentative interpretation of its internal and external features, a few 
words are needed on the sources on which this reconstruction is based. The 
reconstruction of Sawaba’s insurrection is hindered by a dearth of sources, 
especially primary source material. The sources at hand consist mainly of 
secondary documents such as newspaper reports and journalistic articles, which 
do not cite sources and are partly based on interviews by Western journalists 
with Sawabists caught after the revolt. 
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Figure 9.1  ‘The theory of firing a gun’. A page from the exercise book allegedly 
found on écolier terroriste Hassane Djibo who was taught in French by North 
Vietnamese instructors in Nanking.  
Source: Fraternité Hebdo, 14 May 1965 
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One should be careful in interpreting such evidence, as it was usually 
obtained in the presence of government officials.2 These interviews, 
nevertheless, contain a wealth of information about the planning and execution 
of the invasion. The same is true for a speech given by Camille Aliali, Niger’s 
Foreign Minister, at the extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers 
in Lagos in June 1965, where the complicity of other West African countries in 
the insurrection was discussed. All these sources contain illustrative material 
such as photocopies of maps with the invasion plans and notes written in the 
personal notebooks of Sawaba guerrillas, which Niger’s government claimed 
were found on activists when they were arrested (Figure 9.1). In addition to 
notebooks, maps and invasion plans, they also included ideological tracts of a 
Marxist-Maoist nature and texts of oaths that activists swore to the Sawaba 
cause.3 
                                                 
2 The interview conducted by Wolfgang Bretholz (National Zeitung, Bern) with 
incarcerated Sawabists was reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo of 14 May 1965, the organ of 
the ruling party in Ivory Coast, an ally of Niger’s government. Entitled ‘Les Camps de 
Sofia, Nankin et Accra en Ont Fait un Tueur’, it was conducted in the presence of the 
Assistant Director of Niger’s Sûreté. Handcuffs were taken off during the interview. 
While treatment of the Sawabists was harsh, Bretholz’s interviewees said they were not 
maltreated but that they had been sentenced to death or might face the death penalty and 
that they did not know whether they would be pardoned. In the second part of the 
interview (reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo, 21 May 1965, as ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis Communistes Transforment de Jeunes Africains en Tueurs’) other Sawabists 
denounced Djibo Bakary’s ‘criminal policy’. Another journalist, J.P. Ruttiman, 
mentioned complaints over insufficient or poor food. He also noted that, at one moment 
in his interview, the Director of the Bureau of Coordination in the President’s Office, 
former French colonial governor Colombani, walked out and that the prisoners did not 
retract any statements. However, this interview took place in 1967 when the atmosphere 
in Niger had become more relaxed. Yet, this is an interesting source as it contains a 
description of a discussion between leadership and rank and file and their 
disagreements. Ruttiman also mentions that Ousmane Dan Galadima, the Sawabist who 
supervised the invasion in 1964, refused to sign the protocols of his interrogation, 
accusing government officials of twisting his words: J.P. Ruttiman, ‘Le Président 
Hamani Diori Nous Déclare: “Djibo Bakary ne Constitue pas Actuellement un Danger 
pour Nous, Mais...”’, Afrique Nouvelle, 1035 (8-13 June 1967). 
3 See Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’ and ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis Communistes’, and an interview by Randolph Braumann, ‘So Bildet China 
Mörder aus’, Rheinischer Merkur, 18 (30 April 1965), 14. This was reprinted in French 
in Fraternité Hebdo of 28 May, 4 June and 11 June 1965 as ‘Avec les Tueurs de la 
SAWABA’. Journalists were astonished that the Sawabists were caught with this 
material. Aliali’s OAU speech was reprinted in Fraternité Hebdo of 2, 9 and 16 July 
1965 as ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
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While this material should not be interpreted at face value,4 it seems unlikely, 
in view of the amount and wealth of detail, that it was all fabricated by 
Sawaba’s enemies. Much of it fits into a pattern of what is known about militant 
nationalism and movements of kindred organizations in other African states. 
Hence, it enables us to establish a picture of the patterns and meaning of the 
revolt when compared to other material, such as documentary sources retrieved 
from the National Archives of Ghana,5 whose government supported the 
invasion. Admittedly, the picture remains incomplete, notably with regard to the 
motivations of Sawaba’s foot soldiers. Djibo Bakary himself never publicly 
came back to the issue6 nor, it seems, did other high-ranking Sawaba 
functionaries. 
 
 
‘Thorez’ – The prehistory to exile 
 
In the 1950s, Djibo Bakary was a rising star in public life in Niger. The son of a 
Zerma chief from the west of the country, and of low birth, Djibo was brought 
up in the central town of Tahoua where he learned Hausa. He was a cousin of 
Hamani Diori, and for some time also his friend, until the two fell out. 
Nicknamed ‘Thorez’,7 Djibo became a charismatic nationalist, who would soon 
                                                 
4 Thus Bretholz’s interviews were clearly arranged by the governments of Ivory Coast 
and Niger. See ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Other journalists, like Jean-
Pierre Morillon and Gilbert Comte, were openly anti-communist and sympathetic 
towards Niger’s government, dubbing the Sawabists as terrorists. Georges Chaffard 
wrote a chapter containing the most detailed account of the insurrection in Les Carnets 
Secrets de la Décolonisation, vol. 2, (Paris, 1965), 269-332. While being less partisan 
and clearly having had access to some of the material mentioned above, Chaffard did 
not cite his sources. According to Finn Fuglestad, Chaffard was ‘brilliant but not always 
accurate’. F. Fuglestad, ‘Djibo Bakary, The French, and the Referendum of 1958 in 
Niger’, Journal of African History, 14, 2 (1973), 313 n. 1. Also his A History of Niger 
1850-1960 (Cambridge, 1983). 
5 Cited as ‘GNA’. An early secondary source that sheds light on this dimension is W.S. 
Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New 
State (Princeton, 1969). 
6 His autobiography ends in 1960 and in an interview at the end of the book, he evaded 
the issue. D. Bakary, Silence! On Décolonise ... Itinéraire Politique et Syndical d’un 
Militant Africain (Paris, 1992), 291. In an interview with J.R. de Benoist, he also 
stopped short of discussing political developments after 1960. ‘Djibo Bakary Parle’, 
Politique Africaine, 38 (June 1990), 98-110. 
7 After Maurice Thorez, leader of the French communist party, PCF. 
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antagonize the colonial administration with his militant rhetoric.8 He was an 
active trade unionist in emerging urban areas, organizing strikes that resulted in 
substantial salary increases for urban wage earners. Backed by his close alliance 
with the French communist party and trade-union federation, Djibo was 
independent of the colonial administration and soon considered a major 
troublemaker. He tried, with some success, to penetrate traditional youth 
movements, women’s organizations and crafts guilds, and built up some support 
among groundnut farmers in the west of the country. 
Until the mid 1950s, however, Djibo’s power base did not add up to an 
electoral majority. By 1956 this was in sight when his party, the Union 
Démocratique Nigérienne, merged with another political group that enjoyed 
backing in Hausaland, including that of many Sarkis or canton chiefs. Moreover, 
the ambitious Djibo decided to break with the communists, as association with a 
communist party was an electoral liability not only because of the hostility of the 
colonial administration but also in the face of attempts to gain a foothold in the 
more traditionally oriented Hausa areas. 
The Hausas generally resented the domination of the Zerma and Songhai in 
Diori’s PPN and the country’s civil service, especially as Hausa groundnut 
production contributed the largest share to the national income. While half of 
Djibo’s most prominent lieutenants came from other West African countries, his 
party was mainly staffed with Hausas, notably young, urban trade unionists who 
had, by the early 1960s, left the countryside and could help to spread the party 
message. Nevertheless, his followers now made for strange bedfellows. Besides 
the trade unionists, Djibo’s most faithful allies were local traders and followers 
of the Tijaniyya brotherhood, economically active people who opposed the 
traditional order represented by the party’s other allies, the Sarkis, against whom 
Djibo had been agitating at an earlier stage in his career. Moreover, the extent of 
his influence among the Hausa peasantry remained limited. 
Notwithstanding this shaky alliance, the new party managed to win the 
legislative elections of 1957, after which Djibo was appointed government 
leader acting under the supervision of the French colonial governor. The 
victorious party changed its name to Sawaba, a Hausa word variously translated 
as ‘freedom’, ‘independence’, or ‘tranquillity’. Tranquil was it not to be, 
however, since the French pushed through constitutional reforms allowing them 
to retain considerable influence over their African territories, even after their 
eventual independence. Djibo found it hard to accept this constitutional scenario, 
perhaps in part because of Sawaba’s ideological tenets – which involved 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Fuglestad, History of Niger, and ‘Djibo Bakary, The French, 
and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger’; Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets; and S. Decalo, 
Historical Dictionary of Niger (Lanham, MD & London, 1997). 
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relatively militant nationalist rhetoric and Pan-Africanist sentiments – and 
because he may have wanted the full command of state machinery to consolidate 
his fragile power base. While this made him oppose the plans, the French 
exerted heavy pressure on the population, including the chiefly class in 
Hausaland, to approve their reforms in a referendum. Consequently, an 
overwhelming majority of the electorate voted in favour of the reforms, even in 
the capital Niamey and the Hausa east. Djibo had to resign as government 
leader. When the PPN gained a majority in subsequent legislative elections, 
Hamani Diori succeeded Djibo in office. 
Thus, Sawaba was abandoned by most of Hausaland’s chiefs and peasants. In 
addition, it was now confronted by a hostile government intent on eliminating 
the party as an effective opposition force. In February 1959 Djibo left the 
country for Dakar, Senegal. Six months later, Diori’s government banned 
Sawaba, accusing it of colluding with foreign forces and planning subversion. In 
June 1960, eighteen Sawabists, including Abdoulaye Mamani, Adamou Sekou 
and Issaka Koke, were arrested on conspiracy charges. In September, barely a 
month after Niger had acceded to independence, sentence was passed, with 
Mamani facing the heaviest penalty – two years’ imprisonment – and Djibo 
Bakary and Ousmane Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Assistant Secretary-General, 
being sentenced in absentia. Although Mamani and other detainees were 
subsequently pardoned and reintegrated in the administration, Sawaba had been 
dealt a painful blow. 
The political significance of this was more than mere electoral defeat. In 
Niger’s traditional political cultures, including that of Hausaland, the position of 
the chiefly leader depended on his ability to muster ‘force’ or command ‘luck’ 
(Hausa: nasara k’arfi or arzika), which in turn depended on his relationship with 
the invisible world of deities that formed the ultimate sanctification of political 
rule. Evidence of the ruler’s favour with the divine beings could be his success 
in battle, good rains and harvests or, more generally, a flourishing political 
career.9 This political world-view provided Nigerien politics with a hard edge 
that rewards success and, if need be, ruthlessness but penalizes weakness and the 
decline of political fortune. The banning of Sawaba, therefore, showed to 
Niger’s electorate that its ‘luck’ was up and that it did not deserve further 
support. 
In contrast, Diori’s party managed to capture the highest office in the land, 
lead the country to independence and maintain vital relations with the French. In 
order to confront potential challenges, the country was governed by a 
triumvirate, made up of President Diori, Boubou Hama, the Chairman of the 
National Assembly, and Diamballa Yansambou Maïga, the Minister of the 
                                                 
9 This interpretation is based on Fuglestad, History of Niger, passim.  
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Interior. Maïga was its most powerful member and also represented the 
leadership’s ruthless core. Together with the uncompromising Hama, who was 
detested by segments of Niamey’s population, this enabled Diori to present the 
regime’s more benign and forgiving image.10 Yet Sawaba still enjoyed some 
support among the younger generation, the economically active, those aspiring 
to higher social status, and residents in the urban environment of Niamey. 
 
 
External and internal preparations 
 
In September 1959, Djibo relocated to Bamako in Mali where the atmosphere 
was more in tune with Sawaba’s militant posturing than that in Dakar. The 
headquarters of Mali’s ruling party in the eastern city of Gao served as a 
mailbox for Djibo and Sawaba’s underground leadership in Niger. Djibo was 
allowed to broadcast once a week on Radio Bamako and, in possession of a 
Malian passport, travelled to the Ghanaian capital Accra where he established a 
section of Sawaba among the local community of Nigeriens. Many were 
regional traders or people who had fallen out with Diori’s government. Djibo 
asked John Tettegah, leader of the Ghana-financed All-African Trade Union 
Federation for financial support, while trade unionists in Nigeria were asked to 
facilitate contacts with the Hausa communities living along the border with 
Niger.11 
Ghana, however, proved to be Djibo’s best regional source of support. Its 
president and fervent Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah, tried to spread his 
ideological tenets throughout Africa. The Nkrumah government invited 
liberation movements from countries still under white domination to establish 
groups in Ghana, but extended this hospitality also to nationals from 
independent African states whose regimes did not share Nkrumah’s political 
convictions.12 To assist its political allies, the Ghanaian government had 
established a Bureau of African Affairs (BAA), which developed into a semi-
autonomous nerve-centre for clandestine operations in other African states.13 
Consequently, Djibo got in touch with Nkrumah and asked for training facilities 
                                                 
10 G. Comte, ‘Les Principaux Dirigeants Nigériens: Un Triumvirat Surprenant’, Europe-
France-Outremer, 430 (November 1965), 16-20, and Decalo, Historical Dictionary of 
Niger, 157 & 201. 
11 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307. 
12 Details in Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy; I.W. Zartman, International Relations 
in the New Africa (Englewood Cliffs, 1966); and K. van Walraven, Dreams of Power: 
The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993 
(Aldershot, 1999), Chapters 3-4.  
13 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 107 & 222-26. 
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for guerrillas who he hoped to send to Niger at some time in the future. At least 
in ideological respects, the two men had roughly similar, or potentially 
compatible, interests. The close friendship of the Diori government with 
President Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Nkrumah’s principal rival, 
facilitated the establishment of political relations with the Sawaba leader.14 
Thus, Djibo opened a bank account in Accra, fed by local Nigerien traders and 
the BAA.15 
Djibo also established contact with the Algerian government, Morocco, the 
People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam. There are not many details 
available about how Djibo achieved this, although Sawaba later established 
military training camps in several of these countries. Djibo may have met with 
Ben Bella in Oujda in Algeria in 1962,16 while in January of that year he had a 
meeting with the chairman of the East German Afro-Asian Solidarity 
Committee, Eggebrecht, in East Berlin. The Sawaba leader was promised arms 
in return for future repayment and preferential prospecting of Niger’s sub-soil 
resources, once Djibo came to power.17 The year before, Salle Dan Koulou, a 
member of Sawaba’s political bureau, was sent with a delegation to a Marxist-
inspired youth festival in Helsinki where he got in touch with eight Nigeriens 
from the Soviet Union. They impressed him with stories about insurgency 
training in the Eastern bloc, which Dan Koulou reported to Djibo.18 
By 1962, Sawaba’s section in Ghana had built up some influence with the 
government.19 The party had to maintain a lower profile in Mali, as the 
government there was prepared to turn a blind eye to Sawaba’s presence but still 
wanted to improve its own ties with France. Moreover, Ardaly Daouda, a 
Sawabist responsible for youth matters, was assassinated in Bamako in May 
                                                 
14 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307, who wrote that Nkrumah was one of Djibo’s 
friends. Thompson (Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 245-46) denies this, however. It appears 
that they met each other in April 1964 to discuss events in Niger. See Nkrumah’s 
Subversion in Africa: Documentary Evidence of Nkrumah’s Interference in the Affairs 
of Other African States (Ministry of Information: Accra, n.d.), 39. R.A. Higgot 
(‘Colonial Origins and Environmental Influences on the Foreign Relations of a West 
African Land-Locked State: The Case of Niger’, PhD thesis, University of Birmingham 
(1979), 306, n. 93) speaks of a personal allowance for Djibo by the BAA of ₤1,500 a 
year as of 1962. 
15 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 309.  
16 J.P. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’, Est et Ouest, 342 (16-31 
May 1965), 22. 
17 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 307-8. An obvious reference to uranium, the presence 
of which was already suspected. 
18 Le Monde, 4 February 1965, and G. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, National 
Review: A Journal of Fact and Opinion, 7 (New York, 15 June 1965), 509-10. 
19 An example is given by Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 366. 
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1962, possibly as a result of an argument with Djibo over money and women, 
after which Sawaba’s leader relocated to Accra.20 
The cadres necessary for an onslaught on the Diori regime were recruited as 
early as 1961.21 Sawaba emissaries, disguised as itinerant marabouts or traders, 
travelled through Niger and contacted youngsters who, as Chaffard described, 
were promised scholarships and the chance to study abroad. Possibly some three 
hundred men were persuaded to leave for Bamako, which served as the point of 
rendez-vous before they travelled on to their educational destinations. These 
destinations consisted, however, of a network of camps spread across West and 
North Africa and beyond, whose principal goal was military training and 
political indoctrination. The Bamako office was manned by Salou Damana, who 
had had trade-union education and military training in Guinea-Conakry and 
Morocco. He was charged with welcoming recruits and maintaining relations 
with foreign embassies. He was assisted by Issaka Koke, who had fled Niger 
after his pardon and worked as an employee of a French technical assistance 
scheme in the Malian capital.22 
After Bamako, some activists were sent to North Africa where Sawaba was 
allowed to use a camp belonging to the Algerian FLN (Front de Libération 
Nationale) in Kibdani in the north-east of Morocco, and later a camp in Marnia 
in the Oran region of Algeria itself. Sawaba’s Assistant Secretary-General, Dan 
Galadima, had already been based in the Moroccan capital Rabat for some time. 
When Algeria became independent, he left for Accra, the Kibdani camp was 
closed, and Sawaba opened an office in Algiers. This was headed by Abdoulaye 
Mamani, who had again fallen out with Diori and fled to Bamako to escape re-
arrest. Besides maintaining control over the recruits in Marnia, Tiaret and at a 
school in Algiers, Mamani had the task of purchasing arms and dispatching them 
to Ghana.23 One Louis Bourges, described as a métis and transporter based in the 
Saharan town of Tamanrasset, was charged with the relevant liaison duties.24 
According to Aboubakar Oumarou,25 the Algerian camps were meant for  
 
                                                 
20 For the few details available, see Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 308-9. 
21 Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
22 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 310. 
23 The school was the Ecole des Transmissions d’Alger. Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 
309. Chaffard gives May 1961 as the date for Mamani’s escape. For details, see the 
necrology in West Africa, 28 June-4 July 1993, which claims 1962 was the year of his 
flight to Bamako.  
24 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
25 A chauffeur for the municipality of Niamey when Djibo Bakary was in power. Later 
he gave evidence on the Sawaba rebellion. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du 
SAWABA’. 
  
230  Van Walraven 
political-military training of the middle cadres. In December 1962, 52 Nigeriens 
travelled there and were integrated in the Algerian armed forces.26  
Sawaba’s prospective force commanders first made an astonishing itinerary 
throughout the Eastern bloc. Some, like Hassane Djibo,27 waited for seven 
months in Accra before travelling on by plane, via Dakar and Prague, to the 
Bulgarian capital Sofia. At a trade-union school there, he was taught about 
Marxism-Leninism, the workers’ movement, trade unionism and 
industrialization, before heading back – via the Black Sea resort of Varna – to 
Accra. Others, like Boubakar Djingaré, travelled from Bamako to Accra and 
then on to Moscow. Here he and ten other Nigeriens followed an eight-month 
training course at a trade-union institution before returning to Ghana.28 Then 
they flew to the People’s Republic of China or North Vietnam. For example, 
Hassane Djibo and another companion were taken by a Sawaba official, 
Issoufou Gado, to Cairo and then flew on to Karachi, Rangoon and Peking. 
There, they took a train to Nanking.29 Another Sawabist, Djibo Seyni,30 took a 
more difficult route. In the autumn of 1962 he and another compatriot flew from 
Accra to Prague, where they stayed for two days before taking the train to 
Moscow. There they were met by an official from the North Vietnamese 
embassy. Three days later, they took the trans-Siberia railway to Peking and 
then, again by train, went on to Hanoi, where they were received by three other 
Nigeriens who had flown to Vietnam the week before. The five of them then 
went on to the Ecole Nationale Militaire at Son Tay, located on the Red River, 
36 km northwest of Hanoi.31 
In China, trainers and translators helped to teach the Nigeriens, in addition to 
the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, a variety of military skills, such as 
how to handle a rifle (Figure 9.1), make bombs, commit acts of sabotage, 
ambush troops and organize coups d’état.32 Some of the training took place in 
                                                 
26 One other Sawabist who travelled to Marnia was Yacouba Dari, a companion of 
Aboubakar Oumarou, who was based there until September 1963. ibid. and Comte, ‘An 
Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
27 An agricultural teacher. Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. 
28 Djingaré was a 26-year-old mason from Niamey. Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la 
SAWABA’. 
29 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. 
30 A nurse by profession. Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
31 Ibid. and Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 311. 
32 Hassane Djibo claimed that military training was only theoretical and that his 
instructors did not allow them to carry arms. However, he had been condemned to death 
and may have had an interest in playing down his training. Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de 
Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 311, claimed Sawabists were 
trained at an exercise ground fifteen km outside Nanking.  
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the so-called School of the Chinese Revolution.33 All in all, the training lasted 
three months.34 While in Nanking the Nigeriens were only in the company of 
compatriots or other Africans, but in North Vietnam they met thousands of other 
trainees, mostly Vietnamese, but also other foreigners.35 Training there consisted 
of indoctrination and guerrilla warfare and took eight to nine months.36 In total, 
some thirty Nigeriens received such training, either in Nanking or Son Tay.37 
Then came the return journey to West Africa, usually along the same route that 
had taken them to the Far East. Djibo Seyni, for example, arrived back in Accra 
in May 1963 and, according to him, was personally welcomed by Bakary. Seyni 
and his men were then taken to Mampong, north of Kumasi.38 
While the Nanking contingent represented Sawaba’s force commanders,39 
Mampong and other Ghanaian camps trained the party’s foot soldiers. The other 
camps where Sawabists would have received training were at Half-Assini, Axim 
and Konongo-Odumassi near Syniani.40 If it is true that Sawaba’s total force 
amounted to some 300 men, of which roughly one third41 were middle and 
higher cadres receiving training in Algeria and the Eastern bloc, then the 
Ghanaian camps could have instructed some 200 Sawabists. Their training 
involved military skills, details of which were published later by the government 
that toppled Nkrumah’s regime. Some of the instructors may have been Russian, 
                                                 
33 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’. Boubakar Djingaré spoke of a big 
school on the outskirts of the city. Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
34 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’ and Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 
311. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 509, suggests ten months on the basis of the 
trainees’ personal notebooks. 
35 Son Tay was a major North Vietnamese training site, later to be attacked by US 
Special Operations Forces in an effort to free POWs (1970). See the website 
www.sontayraider.com 
36 Bretholz, ‘Les Camps de Sofia, Nankin et Accra’ and ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses 
Amis communistes’ and Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
37 Later, some people received training in Cuba. See Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965. 
38 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
39 Morillon gives the following names: Dodo Hamballi, Baro Alfari, Dandouna 
Aboubakar, Sékou Béri, Harouna Bonkourou, Issoufou Bambaro, Souley Gori, Tini (or 
Tine) Malélé, Joseph Akouët and Issoufou Gaho (Gado?), former announcer on Radio 
Moscow’s Hausa service. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. To 
this list should be added Salle Dan Koulou, who flew to Peking with eight or ten 
activists. Le Monde, 4 February 1965 and Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
40 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. Obenemasi should also be included in this 
list, where, for example, 50 Nigeriens were enrolled in May 1965. See Nkrumah’s 
Subversion in Africa, 20. 
41 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
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as Chinese trainers arrived only in October 1964 – the very month of the 
invasion of Niger.42 
In Niger itself, meanwhile, political tensions were rising. In November 1963 
the Diori government became embroiled in a row with neighbouring Dahomey 
over the sacking of Dahomeans from Niger’s public services and a related 
frontier dispute. Domestic opposition came from trade unionists whose 
organization had been banned; students who accused the educated elite of 
having monopolized power; and Touareg resenting Zerma-Songhai domination 
of the country’s political system. Moreover, in the eyes of the government not 
all sections of the army could be relied upon. Two top functionaries, both of 
them Peul, were considered suspect: Zodi Ikiah, the Minister of Defence, and 
Captain Hassan Diallo, an officer in charge of a heavy weapons unit who staged 
a failed mutiny to get redress for various grievances. Both men, who were 
interned in December 1963, were approached by Sawaba in a bid to secure their 
support against the Diori regime.43 About that time, the first clandestine 
operation was undertaken inside Niger, either to assist in a military mutiny or to 
contact different opposition figures. The infiltrator, possibly the Son Tay trainee 
Djibo Seyni, then returned to Accra and is said to have reported negatively on 
the country’s revolutionary potential.44 
Efforts to reconcile Niger’s government with its arch enemy came to nothing, 
at least in part because of Djibo’s own intransigence. Things turned uglier with 
Sawaba sympathizers being beaten up in Zinder and Tahoua and a terrible 
incident near the town of Maradi, which was in the heart of Hausaland and seen 
as Djibo’s fief:45 in May 1964 Sawaba sympathizers attacked Boubou Hama and 
Maïga, the two government hardliners, in the course of a local meeting, after 
which police moved in and some forty people, the majority of whom were not 
Sawabists, were thrown in prison. In the overcrowded conditions, 21 of them, 
many youngsters, died of asphyxiation. The incident scared people in the Hausa 
east and it was reported that several took refuge in Nigeria.46 Gendarmes also 
killed Alzouma Koussanga, a vet and one of Sawaba’s most respected internal 
leaders. He was arrested in Maradi on 2 September, as were other people, and 
                                                 
42 Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa, 6-7. 
43 Details in Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 313-16; Fuglestad, History of Niger, 160; 
Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Niger, 118 & 332; and Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 
October 1964). 
44 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
45 See Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 October 1964). 
46 It was said that Sawaba recruited among these people. Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 
October 1964). 
  
 Sawaba’s rebellion in Niger 233 
died in detention shortly afterwards.47 Another leading Sawabist, Adamou 
Sekou, was again taken into custody and incarcerated in a camp in the Sahara. 
Boubacar Ali Diallo, a cabinet minister and former Sawaba militant, was 
dismissed on suspicion of complicity in the mutiny of the previous year.48 
These events may have convinced Djibo that discontent was widespread, 
while most reports of clandestine Sawabists suggested that the party’s guerrillas 
would be received with open arms. Yet, while the toughening of the government 
did much to escalate the conflict, Djibo had possibly all along entertained the 
option of violent action. At roughly the time that the Maradi detainees died, 
Djibo, Abdoulaye Mamani and Ousmane Dan Galadima met in Porto Novo in 
Dahomey to review operational planning.49 Moreover, by the summer of 1964 
military training had been under way for well over two years. 
The cadres assembled in Accra. In September, Sawaba’s main forces were 
dispatched in small groups to Porto Novo, which could be used as a forward base 
as the Dahomean authorities, embroiled in their own dispute with Diori, were 
prepared to turn a blind eye and facilitate operations. Sawaba issued several 
communiqués and declarations, broadcast throughout West Africa, in which it 
announced that it would liberate Niger from the Diori regime, which was deemed 
‘anti-national’ and neo-colonialist, imposed as it had been by ‘foreign’ (French) 
forces that together with Diori had ‘illegally usurped’ power in the years 
before.50  
 
 
Invasion 
 
Some guerrillas would infiltrate via Dahomey, some through Upper Volta and 
others through Nigeria, assisted by activists of the Nigerian Labour Party. 
Operations were directed by Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Chief of Staff, in Porto 
Novo, where weapons would be distributed. Units would first attack Niger’s 
border posts and then try to occupy the urban and rural centres with the help, it 
was imagined, of the local population. At a given signal, the internal Sawaba 
party would rise in support of the guerrillas.51 Djibo had ordered Salle Dan 
Koulou, Nanking trainee and member of Sawaba’s political bureau, to dispatch 
                                                 
47 Koussanga had been director of political affairs in Djibo’s government. The most 
detailed description of this sad tale is in Afrique Nouvelle, 895 (2-8 October 1964). 
48 West Africa, 17 October 1964. 
49 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321. 
50 Thompson, Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 366; Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964; 
Afrique Nouvelle, 898 (23-29 October 1964); Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965; Chaffard, 
Les Carnets Secrets, 321-24. 
51 Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510.  
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the guerrillas in small groups, spread along the entire length of the frontier with 
Upper Volta, Dahomey and Nigeria. The units would consist of ten to fifteen 
men each. Those in the western sector (Téra to Doutchi) were to attack the 
towns of Téra, Gotheye, Say and Gaya, those in the central sector Birni 
N’Konni, Tahoua and Madarounfa, and the eastern commandos would take on 
Matameye, Bosso and N’guigmi (see Map).52 
Those in the western sectors were to attack first.53 One unit would establish 
contact in the Téra region with a group from Upper Volta, led by Nanking 
trainee Tini Malélé, and incite the local Peul and bellas (people of slave origin) 
to revolt. According to documents found later on this group, it had to isolate 
Téra by cutting communications, attack the administrative post of Bankilaré, 
capture all arms, and together with the Upper Volta group charge on Kokoro, 
take Téra and march on to Dargol. If it were not possible to occupy Téra, the 
guerrillas would try and capture its armaments, create confusion and start 
harassing ‘the whole of the Songhai region’. Both the population of the Téra 
canton and the people of Diagourou would be incited to rebel.54  
During the final stages of the operation, commandos would try and capture 
the capital. They would have to destroy its water supply, cut electricity and 
telephone lines, silence Radio Niger and destroy the Shell and Mobil Oil depots. 
Other commandos would occupy the airport, ammunition depots and the police 
headquarters. Across the country, market towns had a special importance, as 
they represented sources of people, ideas and money.55 Money taken from 
border and administrative posts would be used for the cause and detainees freed 
from prison recruited for the struggle.56 Once the various sectors had been 
occupied, Dan Koulou had to impose the villayas system – the autonomous 
military regions that had been used by the FLN in Algeria in its struggle against 
the French.57 Some commandos were given orders to take certain people hostage 
or liquidate members of the government, such as the hated Minister of the  
                                                 
52 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321-24. At the OAU, Niger’s foreign minister referred 
to a western sector, a southern one (Birni N’Konni to N’Guigmi) and a northern sector 
(Filingué-Tahoua to Agadez), led by Abdoulaye Mamani and Issoufou Dambaro. Text 
in Fraternité Hebdo, 9 July 1965. 
53 See undated letter of Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, printed in Fraternité Hebdo, 
9 July 1965. 
54 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’ and Le Monde, 4 February 
1965. 
55 G. Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’, Est et Ouest, 357 (16-28 February 1966). 
56 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’ and Le Monde, 4 February 
1965. 
57 Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, undated. Malélé’s instructions, of Chinese origin, 
also spoke of creating ‘free zones’. Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510. 
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Interior Maïga, on whose comings and goings domestic activists had collected  
valuable information.58 All commandos were ordered to hide their documents 
before crossing into Niger. Djibo himself was to monitor infiltrations from Porto 
Novo.59 
The central units were to be led by men from Sawaba’s highest political 
hierarchy, as this region had provided considerable electoral support in the past. 
Hence, Dandouna Aboubakar, a former trade unionist and Nanking trainee, 
would attack Birni N’Konni, Salle Dan Koulou would take on Madarounfa and, 
if all went well, Maradi; and, further to the north, Abdou Iddi, a Son Tay trainee 
and political commissar attached to the guerrilla force,60 would infiltrate Djibo’s 
political stronghold at Tahoua.61 
Thus, eight commando units went on the attack between late September and 
mid-October.62 On 27 and 28 September attacks took place in the west of 
Niger.63 Between Say and the border with Upper Volta, one guerrilla unit was 
intercepted, five commandos were caught and their leader, Hassane Moussa, was 
killed. According to documents found on Moussa, the unit had planned to attack 
Say and incite a rebellion. It had infiltrated as two groups, one from Malanville 
in Dahomey and the other from Upper Volta.64 Further west, a group of fourteen 
men, who had to establish contact with Tini Malélé’s unit from Upper Volta, 
penetrated the Téra region.65 On 2 October 1964, seven commandos, who had 
infiltrated from Upper Volta, attacked Gotheye in the west, 70 kilometres 
northeast of Niamey. They shot several PPN cadres and were heading for Téra 
when they were nearly all captured by armed villagers.66 On 4 October, Salle 
                                                 
58 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 324. 
59 Djibo Bakary to Salle Dan Koulou, undated. 
60 According to Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’, Iddi had been 
trained in Nanking from 22 November 1962 to 4 May 1963, together with Yacouba 
Issa, Amadou Boube, Souley Chaibou and Amadou Chaibou. 
61 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 321-25. One of these central units also included Dodo 
Hamballi, a Sawaba delegate from Zinder-Magaria. Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-
Ghanéen’. 
62 Chafard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du 
SAWABA’, speaks of nine. A few more could be counted, depending on what 
constituted a commando unit. 
63 Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964. 
64 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
65 Le Monde, 4 February 1965. The fourteen could have been the total of both groups or 
Malélé’s group alone, as Comte (‘An Assassination that Failed’, 510) speaks of 
Malélé’s ‘fourteen armed partisans’. 
66 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 324. According to Niger’s foreign minister (note 61), 
at least four groups penetrated from Upper Volta, and at least three from the town of 
Sokofé. 
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Dan Koulou’s unit struck the post of Madarounfa in the central sector. It 
consisted of twelve men assembled in Kano, Nigeria, at the end of September 
and was armed with grenades and machine guns.67 In the eastern sector, Sawaba 
commandos overran the customs post of Bosso near N’Guigmi around 8 
October,68 wounding several people, killing two officials, and capturing ten old 
rifles. They were led by a former chief, Katchella Abba Kaya, and assisted by 
smugglers active along the border with Chad and Nigeria. This unit had 
originally assembled in Kano, left the city on 14 September and regrouped at the 
Komadougou River before the attack.69 Matameye, in the Hausa heartland, was 
attacked on 12 October by guerrillas armed with grenades and automatic rifles 
who had also left Kano, two days earlier.70 Other guerrillas charged on 
Magaria71 and Ayorou, having crossed the border from Watagouna in Mali.72 
On 11 or 13 October, Dandouna Aboubakar and ten guerrillas, who had 
entered Niger from the Nigerian city of Sokoto, attacked Dosso in the Birni 
N’Konni region and shot the schoolmaster of Dibissou, who was considered to 
be pro-government. On this party more information is known thanks to an 
interview by a Western journalist with one of its captured members, Boubakar 
Djingaré, and the speech by Niger’s foreign minister at the OAU. Djingaré’s 
group left Sokoto on 14 September, travelling to the towns of Amaroua and 
Gamdawa, before it crossed into Niger and headed for the town of Illela. The 
commandos hid in the fields for several days, avoiding all contact with villages, 
while their commander and political commissar went off during the evening. 
Then the unit attacked a land rover and drove through the night to a homestead 
where a peasant had prepared a hideout.73 
The Bosso operation mentioned above could be interpreted as the high-water 
mark of Sawaba’s invasion, as all other attacks backfired, were prevented or 
could not be followed up with forward action. Thus, one group was discovered 
by peasants only three days after having entered the western sector from 
Malanville. While eleven managed to escape, three were caught, among them 
                                                 
67 Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’; 
and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
68 The dates vary from 7 to 10 October. Marchés Tropicaux (7 November 1964) gives 
the night of 8 to 9 October. Le Monde (4 February 1965) mentions 8 October. 
69 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Afrique Nouvelle, 
898 (23-29 October 1964); and Aliali (‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’) who said the 
two victims in Bosso were a nurse, shot in his dispensary, and a defenceless peasant. 
70 Le Monde, 4 February 1965, and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
71 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’. 
72 Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
73 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; Marchés 
Tropicaux, 7 November 1964; and Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
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Djibo Seyni.74 From Madarounfa, Salle Dan Koulou was supposed to press on to 
Maradi. On 6 October, however, the Nanking trainee brought about his capture 
by accidentally firing his gun, killing one of his men and in the process 
betraying the unit’s presence.75 He was shot – possibly by a woman76 – wounded 
and arrested with at least three other guerrillas.77 Four of his comrades were 
killed. Djingaré’s unit could not use the hideout prepared by their peasant friend, 
who feared that villagers would find out since the guerrillas had arrived during 
daylight. They were forced to take cover in the bush and after a few days left in 
the direction from which they had originally stolen the land rover. This time the 
men attacked a farmstead but peasants caught up with them.78 They were all 
arrested, including Djingaré, a certain ‘Momon’79 and one Amadou Diop. The 
unit’s leader, Dandouna Aboubakar, was interrogated and beaten to death with 
sticks.80 
Several others hid in the countryside, demoralized by the hostile reception 
they had received and at a loss as to what to do.81 On 6 November at Gaya on 
the Dahomean border, one guerrilla was attacked by dogs and caught by 
peasants.82 Another was killed near Tahoua on 28 November.83 His commander, 
Abdou Iddi, had shot himself in the mouth but was captured alive.84 Possibly 
around mid-October, security officers arrested Dodo Hamballi, Nanking 
Sawabist from Zinder-Magaria, while he was trying to smuggle weapons into 
the country.85 On 24 October, the group of fourteen men in the Téra region, 
                                                 
74 Bretholz, ‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’. 
75 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’.  
76 According to Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. No other information is known on 
this. 
77 West Africa, 31 October 1964, and Marchés Tropicaux, 7 November 1964. 
78 Braumann, ‘Avec les Tueurs de la SAWABA’. 
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Aliali, ‘Le Contentieux Nigéro-Ghanéen’. 
83 Perhaps from the unit that crossed the frontier with Mali at Ménéka. Ibid. 
84 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 325. 
85 Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’. 
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possibly led by Tini Malélé, was intercepted by PPN youth cadres.86 Six days 
later, another group of five, who were armed with Russian machine guns and 
had been ordered to take the administrative post of Say, was captured, among 
them Hassane Djibo, the trainee from Nanking and Sofia.87 Commandos who 
attacked Bosso were caught some three weeks later. Numerous others hid in the 
countryside for weeks, chased and starved, before being taken prisoner. Of some 
240 guerrillas, 136 were captured and a dozen or so killed, while the others fled 
back across the border. A wide assortment of weapons was confiscated.88  
 
 
Interlude 
 
The response of Niger’s authorities was swift and harsh. They benefited from 
the fact that they knew well in advance that the guerrillas were coming. Despite 
its elaborate planning, Sawaba had trumpeted its attack with communiqués 
broadcast throughout the region. French intelligence had also kept a close watch 
on Sawaba activities and French officers still occupied various positions in 
Niger’s security structures. Colombani, the former colonial governor, held a 
high-level position as Director of the Bureau of the Presidency, being 
responsible for state security.89 In other West African countries, too, French 
officers continued to man high-security posts, maintaining a network of political 
and military informers. French troops were stationed in Dahomey and in several 
cities in Niger right up until the autumn of 1964.90 
West African governments were equally aware of the guerrilla training 
courses taking place in Ghanaian camps and even had their own spies there. 
West African diplomats posted in Accra were, according to a scholar who 
interviewed them in the mid-1960s, well informed about what was going on.91 
The governments organized in the so-called Entente, at least those of Niger, 
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, also kept in close touch with each other. 
Moreover, Nkrumah’s government constituted a ramshackle administration with 
                                                 
86 Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’; Le Monde, 4 February 1965; 
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87 Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’. 
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various interests and self-serving institutions led by loose-tongued militants – a 
situation not conducive to discretion.  
Thus warned, Niger’s police, military and PPN cadres could mobilize the 
population, a fact that explains the hostile reception the guerrillas received from 
the peasantry. Those guerrillas that survived the encounters were quickly 
rounded up and incarcerated while awaiting trial. On the night of Monday 12 
October, the State Security Court sentenced to death the four Sawabists who had 
been caught the week before at Madarounfa, including the wounded Salle Dan 
Koulou. The following evening they were shot, watched by a crowd of 10,000 
people who had been incited to assemble by a police loudspeaker touring the 
capital. The body of Dandouna Aboubakar, who had been lynched by peasants 
in Birni N’Konni, was exhibited in front of the new police headquarters and lay 
there for three days.92 This move was clearly meant to intimidate the 
government’s enemies and anyone sympathizing with the Sawaba cause.93 After 
this, a special court was constituted to try the remaining guerrillas. Although 
they would be allowed defence counsel, there would be no right of appeal, not 
even in the event of the death penalty being handed down.94 In total, eleven 
Sawabists were sentenced to death but only ten were executed as the eleventh 
was lucky enough to be forgotten about and left in his cell. He was subsequently 
pardoned.95 
The political consequences of Sawaba’s autumn attack reverberated across 
the region as Diori’s government waged a diplomatic offensive to improve its 
strategic position. Undaunted, Djibo issued a hollow statement in Accra 
announcing that his men had inflicted ‘severe losses’ on Niger’s government and 
appealing to the population to take up arms.96 The party’s leadership had, in fact, 
envisaged a second invasion for June or July 1965, which would apparently be 
supervised by the Ghanaians and members of the Nigerian Labour Party.97 In a 
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letter from Sawaba’s leadership to the BAA, it was observed that the party 
would gain political power through ‘the revolution’, which would lead to a 
social and economic transformation that would give it ‘complete revolutionary 
victory’. In order to achieve this, however, the leadership intended to change 
strategy.98 With still some 250 to 300 Sawabists in Ghanaian training camps,99 
the training of recruits continued, now with the help of Chinese instructors. 
Ghana Airways was requested to transport men and armaments to Cotonou, 
Dahomey, and the BAA was asked to follow up on its recent gift of ₤25,000 and 
resolve the party’s financial difficulties.100 
Things did not run smoothly, however, as the catastrophe of the autumn had 
led to tension inside Sawaba’s leadership. In February 1965, Dan Galadima and 
Abdoulaye Mamani101 met with Djibo in Accra and criticized him for 
overestimating Sawaba’s popularity and underestimating the strength of Diori’s 
regime. According to them, he had also purchased arms of poor quality, declined 
to make full use of training possibilities and failed to boost the guerrillas’ 
morale. In addition, they accused him of spending too much time and money on 
women.102 The upshot of these exchanges was that Issaka Koke, the Sawabist 
based in Bamako, would take control of party funds.103 
 
 
Climax 
The second invasion never took place as it was superseded by a dramatic turn of 
events. At 9 a.m. on Tuesday 13 April 1965, during celebrations to mark the 
Muslim Tabaski festival, a Sawabist threw a grenade at President Diori who was 
present at a gathering of more than 20,000 people in the Grand Mosque in 
Niamey, on the very spot of the 1964 executions. As the American grenade fell  
                                                 
98 Some activists dispatched to China and Cuba for instruction had returned to Accra 
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Amadou Diop, who tried to assassinate President Diori  
Copyright: Rheinischer Merkur, 18 (30 April 1965), 14 
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three rows behind him, Diori – who was in the middle of praying – escaped 
injury. The projectile exploded and killed a four-year-old boy. Three Nigeriens 
were wounded, including a member of parliament, as well as three members of a 
Malian basketball team on tour in Niger. Having missed Diori, the Sawabist 
threw a second grenade but it failed to explode.104 
According to the Ghanaian ambassador to Niamey, the perpetrator, who went by 
the name of Amadou Diop, had missed his target as he ‘was probably both 
nervous and incapable of stretching his arms fully’.105 The ambassador cabled to 
his superiors in Accra: 
 
From all accounts, Amadou Diop is the suicide type and was fully aware and 
prepared for the consequences of throwing the bomb at President Diori at such an 
open space and from among such a crowd as at the prayer congregation. He bit his 
finger hard in expression of disappointment at not getting his target and that sums 
him up.106 
 
The assassin was immediately arrested and stripped naked. A pistol was found 
on him. The crowds were asked through a microphone to remain calm and the 
area was quickly cordoned off. With the exception of the president and the chief 
Imam, everyone, including cabinet ministers, was searched before being allowed 
to leave the grounds. Three more people were found carrying grenades and 
pistols.107 Interrogation of the assassin yielded several details about his 
background and planning: Diop was from the Zinder region, his mother was 
Nigerien and his father Senegalese. In the early 1960s he had left Niger to 
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receive training abroad. The places and countries mentioned included Marnia, 
Nanking, Son Tay and North Korea.108 In China, he had served as an announcer 
for Radio Peking’s Hausa service. From China, he had returned to Ghana and 
received training in Mampong.109 
As mentioned above, he was arrested in October 1964 when peasants caught 
up with his unit and beat to death its leader, Dandouna Aboubakar, whose body 
was exhibited to the public. Diop, who was described as Dandouna’s assistant,110 
had been imprisoned but escaped. He had fled to Nigeria111 and returned to 
Accra and was said to have sworn to avenge his comrades and their families 
who, Sawaba’s leaders would have told him, had all been shot.112 Diop left 
Accra again either on 19 March or some date in February, travelled to Kano and 
entered Niger at the beginning of April 1965.113 He arrived in Niamey with a 
party of eight men, who were carrying twelve grenades each. He would have 
admitted that he got the grenades from an undisclosed source in Nigeria and that 
he had originally planned to kill the president at the airport upon his return from 
a visit to Abidjan.114 Since Diop originated from the Zinder area, few people in 
the capital knew him, which could explain why he had been able to come so 
close to the president.115 Ghana’s ambassador wrote that activists had planned to 
throw grenades simultaneously in all the district capitals during Tabaski prayer 
meetings. Underground activists would have openly warned the government that 
‘their number was great’ and that these actions would continue.116 
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Aftermath 
 
By now the high point in Sawaba’s war had come and gone and Niger’s 
government lashed out at its enemies. Disagreements in the country’s 
triumvirate healed overnight, with Maïga and Boubou Hama uniting behind the 
president. On 25 May, the State Security Court sentenced five people to death, 
including Zodi Ikiah, the former Minister of Defence, and Captain Hassan 
Diallo, who had both been interned for the 1963 mutiny. Fourteen people were 
sentenced to life imprisonment, 28 received sentences ranging from four to 
fifteen years, while eighteen others were acquitted.117 
While the government was busy rounding up activists, it also turned its 
attention to foreign quarters. It consulted Western governments, mended 
relations with Mali and Dahomey and improved diplomatic ties with Nigeria, 
where Sawabists were arrested after a shooting incident in Kano.118 Ghana was 
isolated through action in the OAU. When Ben Bella was toppled in a coup 
d’état in Algeria in June 1965, Sawabists there were ordered to desist from 
political activity in return for their right of abode.119 
More dramatic were the consequences of Nkrumah’s fall from power the year 
after. With Nkrumah toppled, Sawaba’s men were effectively trapped inside 
Ghana, and only a few leading figures and assistants managed to escape to the 
country’s Eastern-bloc embassies.120 In April 1966 some sixty121 handcuffed 
Sawabists were deported to Niamey.122 Dan Galadima, Sawaba’s Chief of Staff, 
was arrested in January 1967.123 Djibo had found temporary solace in Accra’s 
Bulgarian mission. Later, he managed to leave Ghana. At the end of 1966, he 
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was spotted in Algiers, where Abdoulaye Mamani was still based, and early in 
1967 he left for Dar es Salaam.124  
The party’s staff base had shrunk from some 300-400 people to possibly 
twenty or thirty diehards.125 As of 1966, the government began to pardon 
individual activists, while others were thrown in prison.126 The partial 
clampdown continued until the end of the decade. In 1969 the authorities 
organized trials in Tahoua and Agadez, following which 134 people were sent to 
prison for several years. Two years later, 53 of these were pardoned, Amadou 
Diop’s death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment and 81 life sentences 
were reduced to twenty years’ imprisonment.127  
 
 
‘In search of estuaries’: Interpretation and conclusion 
 
At the time of the invasion, outside observers saw Sawaba’s actions as evidence 
of a regional-ethnic conflict, placing east against west and the northern Touareg 
against the south, with the Zerma majority in government accused of favouring 
the ethnic communities in the west.128 The government’s inner circle was staffed 
mainly by Zermas and Songhais, while Sawaba specifically aimed to incite 
members of minority ethnic groups (Peul) or people of inferior social status 
(bellas). Moreover, there were tensions in the Hausa east in the run-up to the 
invasion. There were, however, also other cleavages that cross-cut with these 
ethnic-regional divisions and, hence, reduced their salience. The government 
had also adopted a profoundly conciliatory attitude towards Hausaland’s chiefly 
                                                 
124 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 331 and idem., ‘La Subversion au Niger en 1965’, 37. 
Both men returned to Niger in 1974 when Diori’s regime was toppled, but a little later 
were incarcerated and spent several years in prison before being released. Mamani died 
in 1993 and Djibo in 1998. 
125 Comte, ‘Ou en Est le Niger?’, 11. However, in the Ruttiman interview Diori 
estimated Djibo’s followers to be between fifty and seventy. Ruttiman, ‘Le Président 
Hamani Diori Nous Déclare’.  
126 Comte, ‘Ou en Est le Niger?’, 12, and ‘Treize Années d’Histoire Nigérienne’, 3. On 
10 August 1967 Hassan Diallo had his death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. 
The same happened to Zodi Ikiah. Both were released in February 1971. Boubacar Ali 
Diallo, former Sawabist and cabinet minister arrested after the 1964 invasions, had died 
of a fever in prison on 11 May 1965. Adamou Sekou, incarcerated in the Sahara, was 
released and reintegrated into the administration. Le Monde, 21-22 February 1971; 
Decalo, Historical Dictionary of Niger, 117-18 & 332-33; Chaffard, Les Carnets 
Secrets, 328 & 331. 
127 Le Monde, 21-22 February 1971. Also C. Raynaut, ‘Trente Ans d’Indépendance: 
Repères et Tendances’, Politique Africaine, 38 (June 1990), 9. 
128 See the editorial in Le Monde, 16 October 1964. 
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class,129 something that weakened Sawaba’s power base in an area where its 
support among the peasantry had never been strong. 
In this context, Sawaba agitation was less the expression of regional-ethnic 
deprivation than a revolt against the social-generational dimensions of the status 
quo in Hausaland itself, a dimension that was also much broader than the 
cultural confines of Hausaland. It should be noted, for example, that while many 
activists appear to have been Hausa, several others were not. Some even 
originated from other countries. That generational tensions130 were present in 
Nigerien politics in the 1960s had already been noted by contemporary 
observers, who referred specifically to people in their twenties and thirties, with 
relatively high levels of education and good incomes.131 Looking at Sawaba, one 
may conclude that this conflict was much wider and involved youths of lower 
status. While the available evidence is sketchy, one is struck by the relatively 
humble backgrounds of the guerrillas. They had had vocational training and 
included masons, nurses, gardeners and agricultural instructors with an 
aspiration for higher education. Most claimed they were lured with promises of 
schooling abroad, an assertion not so extraordinary in view of Djibo’s 
international linkages. In their confessions, the arrested guerrillas presented 
themselves as eager, gullible youngsters who were intent on going abroad and 
enrolling in foreign institutions, but were kept dangling until they found 
themselves in Eastern bloc schools studying, not their desired courses in 
agriculture or architecture, but Marxism-Leninism and agit-prop. Once they 
discovered the true reasons behind their travels, they could not opt out and 
return home since they were financially dependent on their benefactors. Hence, 
they decided to make the best of it.132 
This should not be dismissed outright as disingenuous. In Niger and West 
Africa generally, then as now, one could not lightly dismiss an offer of a free 
                                                 
129 S. Abba, ‘La Chefferie Traditionnelle en Question’, Politique Africaine, 38 (1990) 
56. 
130 These were specifically noted by Le Monde (16 October 1964) in relation to the 
insurrection. 
131 V.T. Le Vine, Political Leadership in Africa: Post-Independence Generational 
Conflict in Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic 
(Stanford, 1967), 31-32 & 84-85. 
132 See the interviews conducted by Bretholz and Braumann. A tendency to make the 
best of it could also be observed in other contexts and periods. See for example, C. 
Dunton, ‘Black Africans in Libya and Libyan Images of Black Africa’, in R. 
Lemarchand (ed.), The Green and the Black: Qadhafi’s Policies in Africa (Bloomington 
& Indianapolis, 1988), 150-66, especially 159. 
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education or foreign travel.133 Moreover, a contemporary eyewitness who went 
to study medicine in the People’s Republic of China reveals the 
misunderstanding over the true purpose of these journeys to Eastern bloc 
countries. Many had expected they would be taught a profession but to their 
surprise faced sub-standard courses and political indoctrination.134 This part of 
the testimony may, therefore, well have been genuine. 
Whether this was also true for the journeys to the Far East, which were 
follow-up visits for the higher cadre, is open to question. The testimonies 
consistently pleaded ignorance about military training as the objective of the 
long road to China, although they are not unambiguous.135 Perhaps the guerrillas 
were just blessed with a mixture of personal aspirations, ideological conviction 
and pragmatic opportunism. In addition, Sawaba’s recruits were subjected to 
what appeared to be stiff discipline. The Instructions et Directives aux Missions 
found on arrested commandos included what Gilbert Comte quoted as ‘Le 
Serment du Combattant Nigérien’, which provided en detail the text and 
procedure of the oath of allegiance that the party’s soldiers had to swear before 
Sawaba’s flag. It came down to an unconditional subjection to the party’s 
leadership, on pain of unspecified sanction – more or less along the lines of the 
dogma of democratic centralism as practised in communist parties.136 Several of 
the arrested guerrillas complained about the discipline they had been subjected 
to.137 One Sawabist, who had provided his leaders with intelligence running 
counter to party analysis, was treated as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ and 
‘defeatist’. He was reminded of his oath and the money spent on his 
education.138 
Nevertheless, their oath of allegiance and military preparations made it clear 
that the Sawabists had come to kill if necessary. Hope of attaining good 
domestic positions as veterans of a victorious army and a certain eagerness to 
                                                 
133 See, in other contexts/periods for example, Dunton, ‘Black Africans in Libya’ and K. 
Peters & R. Richards, ‘“Why We Fight”: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone’, 
Africa, 68, 2 (1998), 183-210. 
134 E.J. Hevi, An African Student in China (London & Dunmow, 1963), 119-43. 
Translated excerpts of this book were published in extenso in Fraternité Hebdo in the 
spring and summer of 1965. 
135 ‘C’est vrai ... les dirigeants nous ont envoyés en Asie sans préciser le caractère de 
notre formation. En apprenant là-bas qu’il s’agissait d’entraînement militaire, nous ne 
pouvions pas prétrendre avoir été induits en erreur.’ Ruttiman, ‘Le Président Hamani 
Diori Nous Déclare.’ 
136 G. Comte, ‘Un Plan de Destruction du Niger’, France-Eurafrique, 161 (April 1965), 
9-10. 
137 Ruttiman, ‘Le Président Hamani Diori Nous Déclare’. 
138 Djibo Seyni to Bretholz (‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’). 
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return home after several years in exile may have given them the final push. In 
addition, some activists, like Amadou Diop, may have been motivated by 
revenge for what the authorities did to fellow activists. However, as Diop had 
come straight from Accra and arrived in Niamey with several other men, the 
attempt on Diori may have been approved at the highest level of the party.139 
That the act was carried out during a Muslim prayer meeting – a fact met with 
contempt among Nigeriens, including Sawaba sympathizers140 – shows the 
degree of hostility between Sawaba and Niger’s political leadership. 
Ideological justification for this violence was provided by a cocktail of 
militant African nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoist beliefs. Many of 
the party’s arguments centred on the degree of foreign (French) influence in 
Niger, which had ‘imposed’ a ‘neo-colonial’ regime on its people. In addition, 
Maoist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines suggested an analysis of Niger’s political 
situation involving a systematic justification for Sawaba’s war as historically 
correct. That these ideological perspectives were unsuited to the circumstances 
pertaining in Niger is beside the point, as the evidence suggests that the Chinese 
and, perhaps, Sawaba’s officers, thought they were appropriate. When Niger’s 
authorities arrested the party’s commandos, they found various documents and 
personal notebooks faithfully reproducing Maoist and Marxist beliefs. The 
notebooks, embellished with dragons and pagodas, contained heavy ideological 
prose copying Chinese views on such outlandish issues as Peking’s quarrels with 
the Soviet Union and Soviet-Yugoslav ‘revisionism’. Alternatively, the 
handwritten notes reproduced more stereotypical and unsuitable tenets as the 
vanguard role of the proletariat and the identification of imperialism, feudalism 
and the ‘comprador bourgeoisie’ as the targets of Sawaba’s revolutionaries. The 
fact that these notes were found alongside gris-gris (personal fetishes meant for 
protection against evil) shows that if these Marxist beliefs had been internalized 
by the party’s fighters, they were at least part of a blend of discursive 
imaginations of reality.141 
In the past, doubts have been expressed about the sincerity of Djibo Bakary’s 
own ideological convictions.142 They involved a militant-nationalist 
interpretation of Niger’s situation, the portrayal of Diori’s presidency as a neo-
colonial usurpation of power and occasional references to Pan-Africanist tenets. 
Djibo’s militancy may also have been fed by the experience of exile. The 
sketchy evidence on his behaviour during this period paints a picture of an 
                                                 
139 See Ruttiman’s interview with Diop (‘Le Président Hamani Diori Nous Déclare’). 
140 GNA: N/POL/66, Ambassador B.L. Placca to H.E. M.F. Dei-Anang, African Affairs 
Secretariat, 16 April 1965. See also Comte, ‘An Assassination that Failed’, 509. 
141 Comte, ‘Les Carnets de Nankin’. 
142 Fuglestad, History of Niger, and ‘Djibo Bakary, The French, and the Referendum of 
1958 in Niger’. 
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uncompromising personality, driven perhaps by revenge, and intent on capturing 
power from a rival politician by capitalizing on resentment among certain 
sections of Niger’s population. Even after the disastrous autumn invasions, 
Djibo did not show any signs of soul-searching or regret about the fate of his 
foot soldiers. 
Sawaba’s analysis failed to grasp the weakness of its support base, which 
was flawed as a result of its inability to penetrate the Hausa peasantry, hold the 
backing of the Sarkis and gain a significant foothold in the west of the country. 
The rising tensions in Hausaland in 1963-1964 did not, therefore, provide 
enough ground for a successful revolt. Exile may have militated against realistic 
appraisal. While the party possessed a network of internal spies, its command 
structures precluded careful processing of information. In many cases, informers 
tried to please the leadership by feeding it data confirming its analysis,143 while 
contrary intelligence was ignored.144 
Despite meticulous planning the execution of the invasion was marred by 
mistakes and inattention to detail. Many of the rank and file had not been paid 
for some time and before reaching the targeted entry points in Niger had to fend 
for themselves.145 Weaponry was insufficient146 and a possibly fatal error in 
strategy was the decision to attack along the entire length of the southern and 
western frontiers. While this required considerable capacity for planning and 
coordination, it also diminished the strike power of Sawaba’s forces. The 
decision to attack the western sector first, possibly induced by a desire to reach 
the capital as quickly as possible, diminished any chance of success even 
further, as it was here that the party enjoyed least support. 
Nevertheless, guerrillas and leadership appeared to display shocking 
confidence in the run-up to the invasion. The guerrillas had expected to be 
received with open arms as they would have been told by the party leadership 
that they could expect a triumphant welcome.147 This anticipation may have 
been part of the reason why Sawaba thought that it could gain control of a 
country the size of Niger with only 240 men at its disposal. It could also explain 
why guerrillas claimed that they had been fooled by their leaders. The rank and 
file were possibly convinced that things were about to change. Hence, they were 
eager to leave their Ghanaian base camps.148 This psychology of coming home, 
which nobody who has experienced years of exile can fail to ignore, may have 
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144 Djibo Seyni to Bretholz (‘Comment N’Krumah et Ses Amis Communistes’). 
145 For complaints about this by arrested commandos, see Ruttiman, ‘Le Président 
Hamani Diori Nous Déclare’. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. and Morillon, ‘La Tentative Insurrectionelle du SAWABA’.  
148 Chaffard, Les Carnets Secrets, 322. 
  
 Sawaba’s rebellion in Niger 251 
driven them to their death.149 This could additionally explain why many of the 
leaders headed the units that infiltrated the country and why no one bothered to 
destroy their papers as they had been instructed to.150 
The actions of Djibo himself appeared influenced by naive – even romantic 
– conceptions about the nature of revolutionary struggle. While he was 
instructing Salle Dan Koulou to introduce the villayas system of autonomous 
military regions, Sawaba’s commandos would not have had the possibility of 
applying a system that drew its inspiration from a very different war of 
liberation. Coupled to his years in exile, this romantic touch led to what 
Ghana’s ambassador in Niamey deemed Djibo’s dependence on miracles rather 
than political organization.151 Yet a belief in miracles may have been a crucial 
part of Sawaba’s inspiration. In fact, it had that romantic dimension in common 
with most Marxist-inspired ideologies of revolutionary liberation, which were 
fashionable at the time and stipulated the need for a radical break with the past, 
but with little precise guidance. Colburn notes, in this respect, that Marxism-
Leninism amounts, or amounted, more to a mentalité than a coherent plan of 
government, which explains the millenarian ideas of revolutionary elites and 
their ignorance of how to realize society’s Herculean transformation.152 Imbued 
by such conceptions, revolutionaries could be seen as the mystics of the 
twentieth century.153 Consequently, as the nationalist agitator trained in the best 
French communist tradition, Djibo could be considered representative of or at 
least affected by a dreamy framework that urged him to walk inexorably 
towards the attainment of his burning desire – the capturing of political 
power.154 
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The same buoyancy characterized the Chinese, whose leader Mao Tse Tung 
enjoyed exceptional prestige among Third World revolutionaries.155 In the same 
decade as the Cultural Revolution, the creation of chaos would have fitted into 
Chinese ideas of revolutionary advancement through conflict and destruction.156 
If Sawaba’s commanders presented, at best, a rather mediocre picture of the 
party’s intellectual forces, this was certainly matched by what appeared to be a 
complete misunderstanding by the Chinese of African conditions – something 
that can partly explain their spectacular failure.157 Thus, instructions found on 
Sawabists assured the latter that the revolutionary potential of the rural areas 
was ‘inexhaustible’, as the peasant masses were eager to shake off the forces of 
imperialist domination. Inspired by their own history, China’s instructors 
advised Sawaba’s men to conquer the countryside and then encircle the cities; 
and just in case the situation should turn against them, they were advised to 
establish support bases in mountainous regions or areas with ‘networks of rivers, 
lakes and estuaries’.158 
Predictably, once on the ground, the Sawabists appeared to be at a complete 
loss159 and were destroyed as much by their own ineptitude as by the 
government’s forces. Shooting each other by accident and stumbling on hostile 
peasants, they were beaten to death in a lynching party or captured alive, 
stripped naked in public and shot by firing squads and their bodies laid to rot in 
desecration. They met total humiliation, demonstrating for all to see that 
Sawaba’s luck had run out. If contemporary observers found the idea of 
desperate guerrillas seeking refuge in Niger’s imaginary estuaries amusing,160 
later authors were perhaps closer to the truth when judging it pitiful.161 This, of 
course, does not transform Sawaba’s men into moral champions. They were, 
after all, carrying arms, shot their enemies and wounded others. While this is not 
the place to engage in conjecture, one wonders what would have happened if the 
invasion had turned into a rout of the PPN. War is ignorant of romance. 
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The vagaries of violence and power in post-
colonial Mozambique 
 
Gerhard Seibert 
 
 
Renamo fought a bloody war from 1976 to 1992 against the 
socialist Frelimo government that devastated the country, but 
since Renamo had been created by Rhodesia and 
subsequently supported by South Africa, the internal 
dimensions of the conflict were played down. However, the 
resistance of large sections of Mozambican society against 
the authoritarian politics of the Frelimo regime explains why 
Renamo did not remain a small guerrilla force but finally 
controlled entire regions of the country. The excessive 
violence against civilians by Renamo obscured the fact that 
in certain regions the movement enjoyed popular support. 
The conflict in Mozambique was both a modern war with 
sophisticated weapons and an armed conflict where ritual 
powers played a role. After the war, collective and individual 
rituals contributed to the reconciliation of the warring 
parties and the reintegration of individuals into their local 
communities. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Just one year after independence and the end of the struggle by the Liberation 
Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) against the Portuguese colonial army, 
Mozambique once again became a theatre of war when the Mozambican 
National Resistance (Renamo) began its campaign against the socialist Frelimo 
government. The war lasted twelve years and was one of the most violent and 
destructive periods in post-colonial African history. The conflict was not only a 
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modern war with sophisticated weapons and the interference of foreign powers 
but was also an armed conflict in which traditional methods of warfare and 
ritual powers were influential. Renamo used terror and excessive violence often 
of a ritualized form in areas controlled by the government and in zones where 
initial popular support for Renamo had vanished due to the forced recruitment 
of youngsters and the coercive methods the rebels employed to compel people 
to hand over food. This chapter considers the violence not as the individual acts 
of sadistic commanders or the consequence of poor military discipline but as 
Renamo’s way of deliberately terrorizing the local population. However 
violence and terror tactics were not the prerogative of the Renamo forces and 
were employed equally by government forces. 
 About one million people lost their lives during the conflict, an estimated 
200,000 children were orphaned and another 250,000 separated from their 
families.1 Some 1.7 million people, more than 10 per cent of the total 
population, fled to neighbouring countries and another 4.3 million people 
became so-called deslocados (displaced persons) and sought refuge in the cities 
and other government-controlled areas2 while the rebels systematically 
destroyed their schools, hospitals and government buildings. The excessive 
violence against civilians frequently tended to obscure the fact that there were 
considerable regional differences on both sides as far as the relationship 
between soldiers and the local population was concerned.  
Popular resistance by large sectors of Mozambican society to the 
modernization projects of the socialist Frelimo regime, as well as the regional 
contradictions stemming from the (pre-)colonial era and the widespread use of 
violence can all help to explain how Renamo was able develop from a small, 
externally created rebel group into a large guerrilla army that finally controlled 
entire regions of the country. 
 
 
The origins of Renamo 
 
Renamo was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian secret service, the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO), to attack Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) bases across the border in Mozambique and 
destabilize the Frelimo regime because of the support it offered the 
                                                 
1 A.A. de Abreu, ‘Mozambican Women Experiencing Violence’, in M. Turshen & C. 
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Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU).3 However the Rhodesian army 
itself also attacked ZANLA bases, refugee camps and infrastructure in central 
Mozambique. For example, during a raid on a refugee camp in Nyazonia 
(Manica Province) in 1976 the Rhodesians killed some 600 people.4  
The first members of Renamo recruited by the Rhodesians were demobilized 
Mozambican soldiers of the Portuguese colonial army and former Frelimo 
guerrillas who had fallen into disgrace at home. The rebel group was not given 
any political programme during its three-month military training in Odzi, 
Rhodesia but recruits were submitted to anti-communist and anti-Frelimo 
propaganda. The Rhodesians used to pay the rebels a regular monthly salary and 
an additional bonus for every successful operation they undertook,5 money that 
was an important motivational factor that encouraged young men, and their 
families in central Mozambique, to participate in the war.6  
 
Violent recruitment methods 
Many of the Renamo fighters were young men and children kidnapped during 
attacks on their villages.7 In many cases Renamo forced children to kill one of 
their parents or a relative to break their links with the community and bind them 
to the movement through shame and guilt. Child soldiers were reportedly forced 
to smoke a mixture of soruma (marijuana) and gunpowder to increase their 
courage and physical strength.8 Child units were primarily employed in attacks 
on civilians and in looting raids on local communities to provide bases with 
supplies. They were rarely involved in direct confrontations with government 
troops.9 Most children were abducted in the south where Renamo was less well-
established among the local population. Escape was risky since Renamo would 
retaliate with immediate execution and abducted men and children were usually 
taken to distant training camps to prevent escape. In addition, the threat of being 
                                                 
3 At the time the official designation was Mozambican National Resistance (MNR). 
4 W. Finnegan, A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique (Berkeley, Los 
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punished by the government after their return discouraged the captives from 
abandoning Renamo. Anyone who escaped the clutches of Renamo was likely 
to find himself in a no-win situation as government forces frequently accused 
escaped captives of having failed to fight Renamo forces or of being Renamo 
collaborators, in which case they were severely punished. 
Promotion within Renamo military ranks was not dependent on how a 
person had been recruited and some of those abducted during Renamo raids 
even made it to the rank of general. One, for example, had been travelling in a 
bus full of young men who had been forcefully recruited by the government 
when Renamo attacked the vehicle and took all the men to their own training 
camp.  
Frelimo used to act similarly and did not only regularly organize raids to 
kidnap young men for military service, but also recruited children by force, 
albeit to a lesser extent than Renamo. At the time of their recruitment, 16,553 
government soldiers (23.3 per cent of the total Frelimo soldiers later 
demobilized) and 8,945 Renamo guerrillas (40.7 per cent) had been under 18 
years of age. Another 4,334 Renamo soldiers (19.7 per cent of total ex-Renamo 
fighters) and 3,073 government soldiers were aged between 10 and 14 at the 
time of their abduction and can be considered child soldiers.10 According to a 
survey conducted during the demobilization process, 82 per cent of Frelimo 
soldiers and 87 per cent of Renamo guerrillas were recruited by force.11  
To increase the educational level of its cadres, Renamo lured some 200 
secondary school students into its ranks by promising scholarships to study 
abroad. However, the opportunities never materialized and many of the students 
died in the rebel camps of disease and hardship.12 While coercion was dominant 
in recruitment, voluntary participation in the war was due to a lack of 
alternative opportunities. Basic survival and the chance of gaining access to 
goods and food, and sometimes a vague notion of political conviction against 
Frelimo’s socialist projects played a role in the recruitment process.13 Even in 
the south of the country where Renamo did not enjoy much popular support and 
despite the dangers of war and the Renamo’s notoriously strict discipline, young 
men were attracted by the excitement of guerrilla life, adventure, the availability 
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of women, and easy access to looted goods.14 Occasionally during Renamo 
attacks on local communities, young boys even joined the rebels in looting their 
neighbours’ houses and then left with the attackers. Everywhere in the 
impoverished country large sectors of the population found themselves without 
schooling, skills or employment. The rampant economic crisis and the 
devastating war had increased the numbers of those marginalized, creating a 
fertile ground for further Renamo recruitment. Derluguian suggests that people 
who find themselves constantly in a situation of disintegrating social relations 
and generalized instability caused by crisis and war lose any immunity to 
violence and easily become both its object and subject.15 
 
 
Renamo’s military organization 
 
Renamo was never composed of loosely operating small units but was a 
centrally organized and hierarchical military organization. Under the 
supervision of Afonso Dhlakama who became Renamo’s president and 
commander-in-chief in 1980, there was a 15-member military council 
composed of the three principal commanders of the north, centre and south 
zones and ten provincial commanders. The basic operational unit was a 
company of some 100 to 150 men, generally stationed at a central main base 
with smaller attached bases responsible for special tasks such as security and 
patrols. A company was divided into platoons, while two or three companies 
formed a battalion. Usually two or more battalions were based near the 
provincial headquarters but spread over several bases. Each company had 
modern radio transmission facilities operated by a communications officer who 
was in regular contact with the provincial base and indirectly with the 
headquarters in Gorongosa. The general staff was equipped with a system 
capable of frequency hopping that impeded detection by government forces.  
While the middle and lower-level cadres were multi-ethnic,16 the military 
leadership was dominated by Ndau speakers from central Mozambique, a 
subgroup of the Shona to which Dhlakama also belongs. They were the first to 
have been recruited by the Rhodesians and over time had assumed senior 
                                                 
14 A. Harneit-Sievers, ‘Sozialgeschichte des Bürgerkrieges in Mosambik. Ein Workshop 
in Maputo’, Afrika Spectrum 30, 1 (1995), 88; Roesch, ‘Renamo and the Peasantry’, 
476. 
15 G. Derluguian, ‘Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Postcolonial 
Mozambique’, Review XIII, 4 (1990), 439-62. 
16 M. Cahen, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicities: Lessons from Mozambique’, in E. Braathen, 
M. Bøås & G. Sæther, Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of War, Peace and Ethnicity in 
SubSaharan Africa (New York & Houndmills, 2000), 172. 
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positions within Renamo’s military hierarchy. Consequently, Ndau was the 
official language in Gorongosa and at many bases, but the lingua franca used in 
a particular unit depended on the ratio of different ethnic groups represented in 
its ranks.17 When Renamo arrived in a new area the majority of the rebels were 
Ndau speakers. However, over time they became the commanders, while the 
majority of the ordinary guerrillas were local people. Also the madjuba (sing. 
ndjuba),18 the local Renamo representatives and spies, used to come from the 
native population. Many had been colonial tax collectors or junior officials 
dismissed by Frelimo after independence. The madjuba maintained links 
between the Renamo base and the local population and were in charge of the 
labour recruitment of carriers and others. They did not usually live on the base, 
but nearby. They were not issued with firearms but used knives, machetes or 
other similar weapons. It was the madjuba who were said to have committed 
many of the worst atrocities during the war and regularly mutilated their victims 
by cutting off their ears, noses, and hands. 
 
Renamo bases 
The principal bases were established in sparsely populated regions but at a 
distance of less than about 50 km from more densely populated areas and main 
roads since the rebels needed access to these areas for supplies.19 The excellent 
radio communication of Renamo troops enabled dispersed units to assemble 
quickly to mount large-scale attacks and then disperse again.  
Although Renamo’s communication system was superior to the Frelimo’s, 
the rebels had almost no heavy artillery or mechanized transport20 so its troops 
had to cover large distances on foot, sometimes walking more than 500 km. 
They relied on the plundering of local food stocks and the abduction of local 
people to supply their labour requirements. During looting and pillaging raids, 
everything that could be transported was taken away: cattle, pigs, poultry, 
foodstuffs, clothes, radios, china and household items. To supply the food needs 
of the base, Renamo soldiers exchanged looted goods with the local population 
for foodstuffs and some of the captured goods were even sold in neighbouring 
countries. During their attacks, Renamo forced local inhabitants to carry the 
booty back to the military base and as they were often taken by surprise during 
night-time raids they had to walk barefoot and in their underwear. In a few 
cases the captives even had to walk distances of more than 250 km to the 
                                                 
17 M. Hall, ‘The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study in the 
Destruction of an African Country’, Africa, 60, 1 (1990), 46. 
18 ZANU used the same designation for supporters within the local population. 
19 G. Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg in Mosambik ca. 1980-1992. Abläufe und 
struktureller Wandel des Landes’, Unpublished manuscript (Maputo, 1995), 14. 
20 Finnegan, A Complicated War, 58. 
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bases.21 Usually the whole group walked in Indian file, with the rebels at either 
end and in the middle to prevent the abducted inhabitants escaping. During the 
march to the base only the guerrillas were allowed to eat. Exhausted load 
carriers who were unable to walk further would be killed in front of the others 
and babies were murdered immediately as the rebels feared that their crying 
would alert government forces to their presence. Renamo soldiers frequently 
raped the mainly female carriers during the retreat in front of the other captives. 
Most men and some of the women were released after the guerrillas reached 
their bases. Civilians who were forced to stay with the rebels on the base found 
themselves in what was cynically called liberdade (freedom).22 If a Renamo spy 
at the base was recognized by one of the newly arrived captives, he usually 
ordered the immediate execution of the kidnapped, since he feared being 
denounced if the person managed to escape.23 The abducted women and girls 
were forced to join the officers’ and soldiers’ households, either as wives or in 
the case of young girls as servants. Some commanders reportedly had more than 
five women.24 In the early 1980s when the main base was in Garágua (Manica), 
Dhlakama himself was said to have eight wives, who were officially his 
bodyguards.25 As the wife of a military man, a captive woman enjoyed some 
protection and was not expected to render sexual services to other men. 
However, the women of soldiers whose units were transferred remained at the 
base and received new partners.26 Young women in the camps who did not 
become pregnant risked being killed by their partners.27 Newly arrived women 
frequently became the source of disputes between the guerrillas so to avoid 
conflict, the problem was solved by killing the woman.28 The rebels considered 
rape and the use of slave wives as their right of access to women and important 
war booty.29 
                                                 
21 Liesegang,’Der Bürgerkrieg’, 9. 
22 F. Pequenino, ‘Estudo de Caso: Localidade Administrativa de Mugeba (Zambezia), 
1982 a 1992’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 21. 
23 P. de Jesus, ‘Alguns Aspectos do Impacto da Guerra em Certas Zonas de Inharrime e 
Zavala’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 17. 
24 N. Castanheira, Ex-criança Soldado: ‘Não Queremos Voltar para o Inferno’ (Maputo, 
1999), 11. 
25 Tajú, ‘Os factos’, 21. 
26 Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg’, 32. 
27 Ibid. 24. 
28 H.C. Mucusete, ‘Um Estudo de Caso: O Distrito de Angoche’, Unpublished paper. 
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo, 1994), 39. 
29 K.B. Wilson, ‘Cults of Violence and Counter Violence in Mozambique’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 18, 3 (1992), 536. 
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The women living on the bases carried goods between bases, looted villages 
and in the case of permanent bases cultivated plots to produce food. Despite the 
threat of immediate execution, married women in particular often tried to escape 
as soon as they had more freedom of movement, while younger single women 
tended to make the best of their situation and only returned home after the war, 
often with children. Some continued their relationships with the fighters but 
most women returned home and were accepted back by their former husbands. 
Families submitted these women and returning child soldiers to purification 
rituals performed by traditional healers or pastors of Zionist churches.30 Schafer 
maintains that during the war both government soldiers and Renamo guerrillas 
considered women in enemy-controlled areas as fair prey for capture and sexual 
abuse, whereas women in their own areas were generally treated according to 
local social norms.31  
A base such as that in Chigowa, Tete Province, was representative of other 
permanent Renamo bases located in the centre and north of the country.32 The 
military command was situated at the centre of the base, surrounded by the 
compounds of guerrillas with more than two or three wives, depending on the 
number of women taken captive. Further out beyond these residences were the 
huts of the single women who had to render sexual services to off-duty soldiers. 
Then came the old people and the children’s houses and the corrals where the 
commanders’ stolen cattle were kept. The base was surrounded by three circular 
protection rings. The machambas, the fields for cultivation, were located 
between the first and second rings. Renamo bases in the south were by contrast 
only small, often mobile, bases that did not usually have fields or permanent 
huts but only provisional tents made of plastic sheets or cotton. In the case of a 
government attack they could easily be moved. The bases relied entirely on 
plunder and looting for their everyday supplies.  
Both soldiers and captives were severely punished for disobedience and the 
bases often had prisons. Child soldiers were not excluded from punishments 
that ranged from corporal punishment, the withholding of food, the amputation 
of fingers, noses and ears, and executions carried out by one or more of the 
other children.33 Captives who could not endure the military training were also 
killed.34 The people on the Renamo bases were also affected by disease and 
periods of famine when attacks and plundering failed to provide sufficient food. 
                                                 
30 E. Muianga, ‘Mulher e a Guerra’, Unpublished paper, Universidade Eduardo 
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31 Schafer, ‘Guerrillas’, 233. 
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If food supplies were limited, the guerrillas received what was available and the 
civilians were simply left to their own devices.35 Some of the permanent bases 
had a military hospital and occasionally Renamo kidnapped curandeiros 
(healers) and pastors of Zionist churches and took them to the bases where they 
were obliged to tend the sick and wounded.36  
 
 
The unfolding of the conflict and external support 
 
The first Renamo attack occurred on 3 February 1977, on the anniversary of the 
death of Frelimo’s first president, Eduardo Mondlane.37 On that day two men 
attacked a school bus on the road between Chimoio and Manica town, just 
across the border, to kidnap students for military training in Rhodesia.38 One of 
the two attackers was the legendary André Matsangaíssa, a Manyika shoemaker 
and former Frelimo guerrilla who had fled to Rhodesia from the re-education 
camp in Sacuza (Gorongoso District, Sofala Province), where he had been 
imprisoned for embezzling funds after independence. Later in 1977, 
Matsangaíssa, who in the meantime had become Renamo’s leader, commanded 
a group that attacked the prison camp in Sacuza and succeeded in freeing 75 
detainees who were all taken to Rhodesia and incorporated into the emerging 
Renamo.39 As a result of Matsangaíssa’s fame Renamo guerrillas became 
popularly known as matsangas, whereas the official propaganda labelled them 
as bandidos armadas (armed bandits). Matsangaíssa was killed during a battle 
with Frelimo in Gorongosa on 17 October 1979 and his succession was fiercely 
disputed. Finally Afonso Dhlakama, the son of a local chief in Sofala Province, 
got his way and became the new Renamo leader. He had reportedly given 
orders to execute his rival Lucas Muchanga, Renamo’s second-in-command at 
the time.40  
During the years of Rhodesian patronage Renamo’s operations were largely 
restricted to the central provinces of Manica and Sofala. Projects associated 
with Frelimo such as so-called lojas do povo (people’s shops), aldeias comunais  
                                                 
35 Pereira, ‘The Politics of Survival’, 48. 
36 Castanheira, Ex-criança soldado, 25. 
37 He was killed by a parcel bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969. 
38 Personal account of Sebastião Chapepa alias Janota Luís, one of the participants, 
Chimoio, December 1999.  
39 Tempo, 26 January 1997. 
40 In 1983 and 1988 respectively, other internal conflicts resulted in the murders of 
Renamo´s two first secretary-generals: Orlando Christina, a white Portuguese, in South 
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(communal villages) and agricultural cooperatives, as well as lorries, buses and 
trains were the principal targets for attack. At that time, Africa Livre, another 
small rebel movement based in Malawi, frequently infiltrated and attacked 
border areas in Zambezia and southern Niassa. 
Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, Renamo was taken over by 
South Africa that was keen to support and equip the movement in an attempt to 
destabilize the Frelimo government. The South Africans were easily able to 
supply Renamo by air or by sea, since Mozambican government forces were 
unable to defend the country’s large air space and its 2,000 km long coastline. 
Pretoria’s political objective was to force Frelimo to abandon its socialist 
policy, pursue a more friendly attitude towards South Africa and deny the ANC 
a safe haven. South Africa was not, however, motivated by a desire to see a 
Renamo government in power in Mozambique.  
Encouraged by its new patrons to promote its international credibility, 
Renamo for the first time opened representations abroad and in 1981 approved a 
political programme calling for a government of national unity, democratic 
elections and a mixed economy. The following year, the movement published a 
list of members of the National Council. However, the political structures 
remained minimal and Renamo was always predominantly a military 
organization.  
With South Africa’s support, the movement began a successful military 
expansion into the country’s remaining provinces. Within two years its strength 
had increased from 500 to 8,000 guerrillas41 and following the opening of a 
northern front with Malawi as a staging ground in 1981, the splinter group 
Africa Livre merged with Renamo. In late 1983 Renamo transferred its 
headquarters from Phalaborwa (Northern Transvaal) to Gorongosa in 
Mozambique. The 35,000 government troops were unable to stop Renamo since 
they were not prepared for anti-guerrilla warfare. Instead, Frelimo forces had 
been trained in conventional army operations, fearing a possible invasion by the 
white Rhodesian and South African minority regimes after independence. 
Government forces were additionally constrained by a lack of education and 
low morale.42  
Faced with the advancing rebels, a non-existent infrastructure and a 
collapsing economy, the Mozambican government sought a peace settlement 
with South Africa and in March 1984 the Nkomati Accord was signed by the 
                                                 
41 C. Alden, ‘Political Violence in Mozambique: Past, Present and Future’, in W. 
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two countries. According to this agreement South Africa would end its support 
of Renamo, while Mozambique would expel the ANC. In September 1985 
Mozambican government troops overran the Gorongosa headquarters, but 
Renamo soon recaptured it. Documents found in Gorongosa proved that, despite 
the non-aggression pact, some sectors of the South African regime still 
continued to support Renamo. Military support for Frelimo, provided by 
Tanzanian troops in Quelimane in 1987 and Zimbabwean forces in central 
Mozambique from 1982 onwards, could only temporarily help the government 
troops to recapture some of the lost ground, but was not able to halt the rebels’ 
expansion. Besides, the Zimbabwean contingent’s mission was primarily 
restricted to protecting the Beira-Mutare corridor that provided trade access for 
most of Zimbabwe’s imports. When Renamo had to leave its bases in Malawi in 
late 1986 several thousand expelled fighters invaded Zambezia Province in a 
wave of violence. Subsequently the fighting intensified in the northern 
provinces of Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.  
While Renamo controlled large parts of the rural areas, the government 
always maintained control of the cities and most district capitals. Consequently, 
and contrary to what happened in Angola, Mozambique’s larger cities were not 
affected by fighting and shelling at all. The areas permanently defended and 
protected by the government covered little more than 10 per cent of the 
country.43 In areas in central and northern Mozambique that remained 
permanently under its control for many years, Renamo ran schools and a health 
service and reinstalled deposed local chiefs who assumed some juridical and 
administrative functions. The origin of the soldiers reflected the government’s 
control of the urban centres: Frelimo recruited most of its soldiers in the cities, 
while the majority of Renamo troops came from the countryside. 
 
 
Peace 
 
As at the beginning of the conflict, the international and regional political 
constellations were instrumental in the cessation of the bloody war in 
Mozambique. Government troops received weapons, transport, fuel and the 
bulk of its food supplies from abroad44 and Renamo relied on external sources  
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for its supply of arms, sea and air transport, and modern communications 
equipment. With the end of apartheid and the Cold War, the warring parties in 
Mozambique lost this necessary external support and were ready to negotiate a 
peace settlement.  
The success of the amnesty offered from early 1988 to Renamo fighters who 
turned themselves over to the authorities was limited. During the two years of 
this programme, Renamo recruited more men than the approximately 4,000 who 
officially surrendered to the government.45 Despite offers of clemency, more 
Frelimo soldiers deserted than did Renamo rebels.46 At the end of the 1980s the 
failure of the socialist development project had forced Frelimo to introduce 
political and economic reforms that largely met both the demands of Renamo 
and the interests of its foreign sponsors. At its 5th party congress, held in mid-
1989, Frelimo dropped all Marxist-Leninist dogma from its programme and a 
new democratic constitution was approved in November the following year. 
Negotiations in the late 1980s brought Renamo the political recognition it 
demanded from Frelimo. After several rounds of negotiations in Rome, with the 
Santo Egídio community serving as mediators, a general peace accord was 
signed in October 1992. Following the end of hostilities 64,130 government 
troops and 22,637 Renamo guerrillas were demobilized under the supervision of 
a special UN mission (UNUMOZ). The number of Renamo soldiers 
considerably surpassed that of the 8,000 Frelimo guerrillas who had fought 
against the Portuguese colonial army during the 1964-1974 liberation struggle 
that had only affected five provinces.47 In the course of this conflict the strength 
of the Portuguese colonial army had increased from 30,000 men to 75,000.48 By 
the end of the colonial war about 60 per cent of the Portuguese army in 
Mozambique were local African troops.49 
 
 
Internal dimensions 
 
As Renamo had been created and supported by the white minority regimes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa, for many years the internal dimensions of the 
conflict were largely played down or completely denied.50 Initially external 
factors dominated the scholarly debate on the war in Mozambique and it was 
preliminarily understood to have taken place as a result of Rhodesian and 
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subsequently South African destabilization that was supported by neo-colonial 
and reactionary groups in Portugal and the United States. This view was largely 
in accordance with that of the Frelimo government that insisted that the conflict 
was a case of external aggression, with Renamo being used as a proxy force.  
Only in the late 1980s following the publication of the pioneering work of 
the late French anthropologist Christian Geffray, who had done research on the 
causes of the conflict in the northern province of Nampula, did the local 
dynamics of the conflict receive more attention and the discussion become more 
open. Geffray demonstrated that conflicts and social changes within the 
peasantry that emerged due to the government’s forced resettlement of many 
people as part of the communal village programme had created a favourable 
environment for Renamo.51 Meanwhile it has become almost uncontested that it 
was popular resistance against Frelimo policies that formed fertile ground for 
the emergence of Renamo. Large sectors of the population resisted government 
policies because they felt marginalized, discriminated against and oppressed. 
 
Resentment of villagization  
Prominent among the groups that resented Frelimo’s policies were the peasants 
and former local chiefs who provided most of Renamo’s support since they 
were most directly affected by the regime’s socialist modernization project.52 
The central government’s ambitious programme of compulsory villagization of 
the countryside, the establishment of the aldeias comunais that forced thousands 
of peasant families to leave their ancestral rural homesteads and move to other 
areas provoked anger and bitterness directed towards Frelimo, particularly when 
the people began to realize that the promised improvements in their living and 
working conditions were not materializing.53 Renamo´s military expansion 
increased the speed of villagization efforts, since Frelimo tried to keep the 
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peasants away from the rebels. Pereira suggests that the regime’s major concern 
with regard to villagization was the concentration of the rural people to exert 
political control, rather than to improve agricultural output by collective 
production.54 Increasingly peasants perceived villagization as a government 
attempt to facilitate tax collection, apply public corporal punishment and oblige 
people to participate in so-called voluntary labour. Frequently, discontented 
residents of communal villages who wanted to return to their former 
homesteads helped Renamo to destroy the newly formed settlements.  
The central government had substituted the local chiefs with administrators 
and party secretaries who often came from other regions, did not speak the local 
language and were not familiar with the local culture. The substitution with 
outside administrators of the régulos who derived their legitimacy and authority 
through the political and religious functions they exercised in their communities 
created considerable discontent in many rural areas. This dissatisfaction 
increased when the regime’s promises of an improved standard of living did not 
come about and the people were confronted with the hardships of the economic 
crisis and the regime’s coercive measures. In general, the new people in charge 
within the public administration and the economy throughout the country were 
southerners. This southern dominance, which was veiled by Frelimo’s anti-
tribal discourse of national unity, nurtured existing regional tensions that 
stemmed from the colonial period.55  
The disproportionately high number of senior positions occupied by people 
from the south has frequently been denounced by non-southerners as 
domination by a second Gaza Empire, a reference to the Gaza kingdom of the 
Nguni in the nineteenth century that controlled large parts of central 
Mozambique. The régulos, the former chiefs, were prohibited from exercising 
their political functions as early as 26 June 1975 since, according to the 
Frelimo, they had been part of the colonial system. Therefore many régulos 
were willing to support Renamo when the rebels appeared. In turn, Renamo 
accepted local traditions and religion, reinstated the former régulos and 
entrusted them with the public administration of the controlled area. Renamo 
restored customs such as polygamy and lobolo (bride price) that Frelimo had 
banned as feudal and reactionary practices.  
As a result of southern dominance after independence, the local elites in the 
centre and the north felt marginalized by Frelimo. There were certain ethnic 
groups (Ndaus, Sena, Macua) who were represented neither in the party nor in 
the state that also resented Frelimo. Not surprisingly, the interruption of traffic 
between Rhodesia and the seaport of Beira, as a consequence of the sanctions 
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introduced in 1976 against the Smith regime and the resulting economic decline 
of this city, were perceived by many local inhabitants as a deliberate measure 
imposed by the central government in Maputo. The results of the elections in 
October 1994 and December 1999 when Renamo gained a majority of the votes 
in the central and northern provinces, while Frelimo completely dominated the 
southern provinces and the capital city, emphasized the crucial role played by 
regional factors in Mozambican politics.  
In addition, Frelimo’s Marxist-inspired revolutionary campaign against all 
religions including ancestor worship as obscurantism and the harassment of 
churches and traditional healers in the first years after independence alienated 
large sectors of the rural population. Other groups that were opposed to Frelimo 
were the former prisoners of the re-education camps established right after 
independence, including former colonial officials and Frelimo opponents, and 
some 50,000 urban migrants who were considered unproductive and arbitrarily 
deported from the cities in the south to the rural areas in the north, particularly 
to Nampula and Niassa, as part of the Operação Produção (Operation 
Production) in 1983. Many of these men voluntarily joined Renamo since they 
were eager to take revenge on the government. For many who had initially been 
in favour of Frelimo, the rapid economic decline after independence, the 
resulting scarcity of consumer goods, poor marketing of agricultural products, 
and queues in the shops discredited the government’s programme of national 
reconstruction and constituted another factor in favour of Renamo.  
Naturally there was not always a direct correlation between discontent with 
Frelimo and acceptance or support of Renamo. However, it is unlikely that 
without the cooperation of the local population Renamo would have been able 
to expand to such an extent that it was able to mobilize support throughout the 
whole country. Renamo was more successful in capitalizing on popular 
disenchantment with Frelimo in central and northern Mozambique where 
specific social and cultural conditions prevailed that were unfavourable for 
Frelimo.56 The initial support for Renamo decreased over time due to the forced 
recruitment of youngsters and the permanent coercion of the rural population to 
supply food. Consequently many peasants fled from Renamo-controlled areas 
and those who remained tried to hide their possessions and produce in the bush. 
In response, Renamo increasingly resorted to terror and violence to force the 
local population’s submission in occupied areas.57 
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Violence and terror 
 
Renamo rarely challenged government forces directly but preferred to attack 
civilians in rural areas. In war in non-industrialized societies, plundering and 
pillaging for food and other supplies and the abduction of women for sexual 
services have always instilled greater fear in the local population than the 
violence of a true battlefield.58 Similar tactics were employed by Renamo in 
Mozambique where the preferred targets in the south and centre of the country 
included the majonijoni (the migrants who worked in the South African mines) 
whose houses were systematically looted due to their relative wealth.59 Many 
migrant workers lost everything they had accumulated.  
There appears to have been considerable regional variation in Renamo’s 
military tactics and strategies, recruitment methods and violence against 
civilians. In his report on Mozambican refugees, Gersony identified three areas 
under Renamo’s control according to the violence used against the population in 
each. The people living in tax areas that were located between the zones 
permanently controlled by Renamo and by the government were obliged to 
supply food to the guerrillas. The inhabitants of a control zone near a Renamo 
base had to provide forced labour including the transport of goods and booty to 
and between bases. They also had to provide food, and participate in patrolling 
and looting.60 The population within a control zone was composed of local 
inhabitants, government dissidents and people abducted from other areas. The 
social relations between guerrillas and civilians were based on a system of 
organized violence where any disobedience or resistance was severely 
punished. However, there are also reports of cordial relations between peasants 
and Renamo soldiers, who, for example, asked the villagers for goats and 
chickens and promised to replace them as soon as they could loot zones beyond 
their permanent control.61 Destruction zones were areas where Renamo had not 
established a permanent presence and in these zones the rebels frequently 
attacked and looted rural settlements and communal villages. 
 
Renamo violence against civilians 
As long as it enjoyed the support of local communities, Renamo was less cruel 
and violent in the centre and the north of the country than in the south where 
Frelimo had a strong base and from where most of its leaders originated. Some 
people living in areas occupied by Renamo even claimed never to have 
                                                 
58 Harneit-Sievers, ‘Sozialgeschichte’, 87. 
59 Liesegang, ‘Der Bürgerkrieg’, 15; Roesch, ‘Renamo and the Peasantry’, 478. 
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61 Ibid. 15. 
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witnessed any atrocities against civilians.62 However, the worst Renamo-
organized violence and atrocities against civilians occurred in the south and in 
government-controlled regions elsewhere in the country. Renamo’s violence 
against the rural population was instrumental in the sense that it undermined its 
legitimacy by demonstrating the inability of the Frelimo government to defend 
its population. Even spectacular mass killings like the July 1987 massacre of 
424 civilians in Homoine (Inhambane) were apparently not spontaneous actions 
of local commanders but were deliberately committed with the agreement of the 
Renamo leadership to force the government to surrender. The major massacres 
occurred around 1987 in the south of Mozambique after the new government 
under Joaquim Chissano had rejected negotiations and tried to win the war.63 
Yet, the rebel movement has never assumed responsibility for the massacres, 
which were counterproductive regarding its international reputation and in the 
end prevented Renamo from receiving official American-government support.  
During Renamo attacks, the principal targets were Frelimo party and state 
officials who were usually killed in front of the local population. Occasionally, 
local villagers had betrayed the officials to the arriving rebels64 and exemplary 
violence including public mutilations and executions served to intimidate the 
general population, maintain control, and prevent escape from the occupied 
areas. Such atrocities aimed at spreading the news about Renamo violence far 
beyond the operational area to break any possible resistance in advance of the 
rebels’ arrival. The rebels always allowed someone to escape to tell the 
terrifying story.65 Frequently, the executioners used machetes and knives 
instead of firearms since they would not alert government forces, saved 
ammunition and created a maximum of fear.  
Targets of systematic destruction were infrastructure such as local offices, 
schools and health posts because they symbolized the hated Frelimo state and 
represented a few of the regime’s success stories. The local church or mosque 
was often the only building that was not destroyed during a Renamo attack, 
since Renamo sought religious legitimacy inside and outside the country.66 The 
destruction of social infrastructure was part of a wider strategy based on the 
simple belief that whatever weakened Frelimo reinforced Renamo.67 However, 
the rebels also engaged in inconceivable acts of brutality against defenceless 
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people that defy any concept of rationality. Some of the excessive violence was 
directed at sexual taboos. Rebels raped women in the presence of their 
husbands, relatives and neighbours and in other cases, fathers were forced to 
rape their daughters, and brothers were coerced into have sex with their 
sisters.68 Obscure rites were also frequently practised by Renamo. For example, 
former captives reported that they had to drink water from the skulls of dead 
people.69 Wilson stresses that ritualized violence often has to be 
incomprehensible in order to have the desired effect.70 
 
Government atrocities 
The rural population also suffered from atrocities committed by government 
forces. People living in Renamo-controlled areas accused government soldiers 
of committing most of the violence directed at the local population.71 
Occasionally, people living in areas visited by Renamo guerrillas were accused 
by the local authorities of having permitted Renamo forces to pass through their 
area, before being executed. Peasants living in areas in central Mozambique, 
which had been recaptured by Frelimo, fled into the bush or to Malawi since 
they feared that government troops would kill them in retaliation for their 
supposed support of Renamo.72 Government soldiers who accompanied 
convoys of citizens to protect them from Renamo assaults simulated ambushes 
to rob the people of their property. To avoid the loss of goods during such a 
journey and to ensure a safe arrival at their destination people went to the 
barracks prior to departure to bribe the commander of the convoy.73  
When government troops surprised Renamo guerrillas they often did not 
return stolen goods to their owners but took possession of them themselves. 
Mucusete reports from Angoche (Nampula) that when the local population tried 
to flee during a Renamo attack in the forest they found the paths blocked by 
police and government soldiers who beat them up and forced them to return to 
their homes saying ‘Do you want to see us die alone?’.74 While fleeing to their 
hiding-places during Renamo attacks, the military often took the goods that the 
peasants tried to rescue. Most of the government’s popular militias were inferior 
to Renamo in terms of military training and equipment and were unable to 
                                                 
68 In local culture these cases are reminiscent of ritual violations when a curandeiro asks 
his client to have sex with his mother or daughter to empower certain magic powers. 
Magic implying the use of human organs is also common in this context. 
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defend the people. Instead of defending the locals, many militia units abused 
their power by maltreating the population at control posts and during nightly 
patrols. Not receiving regular pay, the militias lived on what they confiscated 
from the locals or recaptured from Renamo forces.75 The situation of the regular 
troops was not much better. Due to insufficient supplies caused by 
organizational shortcomings and disrupted military logistics, particularly in 
remote areas, government forces suffered from a lack of food and ammunition, 
and their wages were paid months in arrears. Morale deteriorated and soldiers 
coerced the local population into providing them with women and foodstuffs, 
attacked houses and plundered villages. In addition they diverted food aid from 
government institutions and international organizations. Frelimo soldiers in the 
cities were much less dependent on local resources since they had access to 
food supplies that could be used for barter.  
 
 
The role of ritual power 
 
In its propaganda, Renamo claimed that it was fighting in an alliance with the 
ancestral spirits to return the country to its ancestral traditions. It accused 
Frelimo of showing total disrespect for local religion and culture. On the 
battlefield Renamo commanders did not only place their trust in their modern 
weapons and sophisticated radio communication, but frequently resorted to 
local diviners and spirit mediums to protect them in combat or to guarantee the 
success of an attack. By reverting to magical military powers, Renamo 
continued the old traditions of war medicines used during anti-colonial 
rebellions and pre-colonial wars.76 Matsangaíssa, who was surrounded by 
legends of magic powers and invulnerability, reportedly never waged an attack 
without first consulting his diviner. The same holds true for the majority of 
Renamo commanders.77 Renamo’s cult of violence terrified both the population 
and Frelimo soldiers, and its military successes were generally attributed to its 
superior magical powers.78 People were convinced that the rebels, and 
particularly the Ndau speakers among them who are famous for their ritual 
powers throughout Mozambique, had powerful magic at their disposal.79 The 
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fame of a local curandeiro who possessed the ability to make men resistant to 
bullets, invisible to the enemy or transform government bullets into water 
served to attract new recruits.80 The frequent consultation of their traditional 
healers gained Renamo the respect of the local people, who believe in the 
existence of powerful supernatural forces. On the other hand, spirit mediums 
working for Renamo forced peasants to cooperate with the rebels by praising 
their abilities, claiming that otherwise their ancestral spirits would become 
angry.81  
Local beliefs in spirits and magical powers have always been widespread 
among the entire population, including Frelimo followers. Cuahela reported 
from Zambezia that people believed that government troops only succeeded in 
killing a feared Renamo guerrilla after they had managed to tie him up and 
remove his magical power from his pocket, a knot of hair in which a human nail 
and a glass-bead were tied together.82 In the same province the population 
attributed the recapture of a district capital by government forces in late 1987 to 
the intervention of a curandeiro whose magic resulted in a complete loss of 
vigilance within the Renamo ranks on that day. As it was felt that successful 
military leaders owed their abilities to supernatural powers, particular efforts 
were made to defeat and kill them. After the war, former guerrillas owed their 
survival to the protection of their ancestral spirits and many demobilized rebels 
spent part of their demobilization allowance on conducting rituals to thank the 
spirits for their safe return.83 
As a result of the inability of government forces to protect the population, an 
armed peasant movement known as Naparama (meaning ‘irresistible force’ in 
the Makua language) emerged in Nampula in 1988, where it successfully fought 
against Renamo and subsequently expanded to Zambezia. Naparamas, who 
were armed with traditional weapons such as assegais and machetes, were 
feared because of their supernatural powers that involved what Wilson calls a 
‘cult of counter-violence’.84 Before they got their weapons, the peasant soldiers, 
who wore a red ribbon attached to their clothes, were initiated by being 
vaccinated with a medical plant that was rubbed into three cuts in their chests 
before they were plunged into water and had their bodies greased with oil. The 
commanders were initiated by the leader Manuel António, a Makua curandeiro 
who claimed to have died of measles only to be resurrected from the dead six 
days later and thought by Jesus Christ to make anti-bullet vaccines. The 
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syncretic Christian elements in António’s religious discourse distinguishes it 
from Renamo’s ritual powers that were derived from ancestral religious 
traditions. António’s fighters were forbidden to rape, argue with or steal from 
the local population, shake hands with married men and women, or to have sex 
on the day prior to a battle. As in the case of other ritually empowered people in 
Southern Africa, it was believed that breaking these rules would result in death 
during combat, since the fighter had lost his supernatural powers and was no 
longer resistant to bullets.  
The Naparamas also forced the local population to obey certain rules. People 
were not allowed to wash plates and pots in the river, shake off the water from 
washed clothes, beat clothes heavily during washing, spread out clothes on 
roofs, or pound grain at the end of the day. Disobedience required the 
summoning of the Renamo.85 The peasant soldiers did not constitute a full-time 
standing army but usually stayed at home and tilled their machambas, only 
fighting Renamo when called upon to do so. They attacked in their hundreds, 
armed with spears and machetes, rattling tin cans and blowing cow horns to 
terrify the enemy. Thanks to the military successes of the Naparama, thousands 
of displaced people could return to their home areas. António claimed to have 
some 30,000 men at his disposal86 and thanks to their magical protection, the 
Naparamas were believed to be able to fight the Renamo rebels without being 
hit by bullets themselves. Despite their superior arms, Renamo troops were so 
terrified by the appearance of Naparama fighters that the latter were able to 
withstand rebel attacks in large parts of northern Mozambique until António’s 
death in Macuse near Quelimane in December 1991. The Naparama were 
militarily successful since they came from the same cultural background as the 
Renamo guerrillas, which allowed their magical forces to become an effective 
weapon. Accordingly, Renamo only succeeded in defeating the Naparama after 
having regained the superiority of magical powers.87 In turn, Frelimo forces did 
not accuse Naparama of obscurantism but cooperated with them and supported 
them logistically. Frelimo soldiers are reported to have frequently asked them 
for their amulets to become resistant to bullets themselves.88 However, while 
Frelimo soldiers resorted to magic predominantly on an individual base, for 
both Renamo and Naparama forces, the traditional religious and ritual discourse 
constituted an integral part of their struggle. 
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Conclusion 
 
Renamo was set up by external forces hostile to the socialist Frelimo regime. 
However, the destabilization policy of the white minority regimes is insufficient 
explanation of the transformation of Renamo from a small rebel group into a 
powerful guerrilla army that controlled most of Mozambique by terrorizing the 
local populations. Large sections of the rural population facilitated the 
successful expansion of the rebel movement since they had been alienated from 
Frelimo by its forced collectivization of the countryside, the removal of 
traditional chiefs, and religious persecution. Entire regions and ethnic groups in 
northern and central Mozambique backed Renamo because they felt 
marginalized by the domination of southerners within the Frelimo regime. 
Regional divisions within Frelimo had emerged during the liberation struggle in 
the 1960s but historically their roots go back much further. Renamo’s electoral 
successes in the 1994 and 1999 elections, when the opposition party gained a 
majority of votes in most central and northern provinces, have ultimately 
confirmed that the movement has always enjoyed considerable regional support. 
Supernatural powers played an important role in this conflict. For Renamo, 
traditional religious discourse and resorting to magical rituals were integral 
parts of the war. Renamo committed the worst atrocities against civilians during 
the conflict in areas controlled by Frelimo and where the local population’s 
initial support started to decrease as a result of the rebels’ coercive measures. 
Renamo deliberately used excessive ritualized violence to instil a maximum of 
fear in the local population to maintain control and to guarantee supplies for 
their soldiers. According to this strategy, ‘cult’ violence had to be necessarily 
unpredictable, irrational and terrifying to achieve its intended goals. Renamo’s 
lack of mechanized transport and of supplies led to the recurrence of traditional 
methods of transporting goods and persons. The acquisition of supplies by 
attack and coercion became a salient feature of the war. However, the terror and 
violence of Frelimo forces should not be ignored. Government troops did not 
accept any passive neutrality and frequently perceived the local population in 
areas controlled or visited by Renamo as collaborating with the rebels. 
Summary justice was meted out. 
With both the government-controlled Frelimo forces and the Renamo rebels 
instilling fear in rural communities while expecting collaboration and 
cooperation in return, the result was a traumatized people who, regardless of 
which side they had initially supported, often became unsure of who was truly 
fighting on their behalf during this dark period in Mozambique’s recent past. 
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Herero genocide in the twentieth century:  
Politics and memory 
 
Jan-Bart Gewald 
 
 
Between 1904 and 1908 imperial Germany pursued an 
active policy of genocide in German South West Africa, 
present-day Namibia. This chapter analyses the manner in 
which, during the course of the twentieth century, numerous 
people in varying contexts have sought to use the genocide 
perpetrated upon the Herero to further their own ends. It 
charts the manner in which an historical event has come to 
be deployed for varying and, at times, contradictory 
interests by German social democrats and English 
imperialists through to anti-Apartheid activists and post-
colonial tribalists. It has been used to strengthen arguments 
that range from colonial policies through to claims that call 
for ethnic autonomy and compensation.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 11 January 1904, the Herero-German War broke out in a small dusty town 
in central German South West Africa (GSWA), present-day Namibia. By the 
time hostilities ended in 1908, genocide had been committed, the majority of 
the Herero people had been killed, and the survivors, mostly women and 
children, incarcerated in concentration camps as forced labourers.1 Throughout 
the twentieth century, Herero survivors and descendants used the memory of 
this seminal act of failed resistance to substantiate and justify further acts of 
resistance against the colonial and post-colonial state in Namibia. 
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Map 11.1  Namibia (formerly German South West Africa)
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In this chapter, after a short description of the Herero genocide, a chronological 
overview is provided of the manner in which Herero and others have used the 
memories and historical recollections of the Herero-German War as a political 
instrument to support and further their own ends. The conscious deployment or 
negation of memories and references to the genocide has been used to 
strengthen arguments in support of a variety of issues ranging from colonial 
policies and claims through to ethnic autonomy and compensation. This is 
followed by a short discussion on the manner in which historical memories may 
be used to further political objectives. In conclusion it is noted that memories of 
resistance are powerful incentives for further resistance, and that a continued 
dialectical relationship between memory and resistance existed among the 
Herero of Namibia throughout the twentieth century.2 
 
 
The Herero-German War (1904-1908) 
 
Misunderstandings and the paranoia of self-fulfilling settler prophecies led to a 
war of extreme brutality and conscious genocide perpetrated by German troops 
against the Herero and to a lesser extent Nama peoples of colonial South West 
Africa.3 The increasing socio-economic pressure placed upon Herero society by 
the arrival of ever more German settlers demanding land and assuming racial 
privilege produced a tense situation. The war did not result from premeditated 
insurrection against German rule, rather, amid the tension that had developed 
over time, a single shooting incident served as a trigger. Starting in Okahandja, 
the war spread across central Namibia and developed in intensity and brutality 
as fresh contingents of German troops disembarked and attempted to impose 
their vision of order on the territory and its inhabitants. The Kaiser’s personal 
choice and appointment of commanding officers in GSWA signalled the highest 
authorization and endorsement of what occurred in the name of imperial 
Germany. In a policy of genocide, German soldiers and settlers sought out, shot, 
beat, hung, starved and raped Herero men, women and children. By the end of 
 
2 For those interested in looking at a similar approach to history, i.e. the manner in 
which memories of violence influence and determine later action, see J. Alexander, J. 
McGregor & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the ‘Dark 
Forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000) and L.H. Malkki, Purity and Exile: Violence, 
Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania (Chicago, 1995). 
3 Those seeking a detailed day-to-day introduction to the Herero-German War are 
referred to G. Pool, Die Herero-Opstand 1904–1907 (Cape Town, 1979). For an 
English introduction see J.M. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros (Berkeley, 1981). 
Regarding the concept of self-fulfilling settler prophecies, see S. Marks, Reluctant 
Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal (Oxford, 1970). 
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1904 the war had spread to southern Namibia. Here it also overwhelmed the 
Nama inhabitants of GSWA. When it finally ended, no fewer than 80% of the 
Herero and at least 50% of the Nama had lost their lives.4 Most of the Herero 
who remained, primarily women and children, survived in concentration camps 
as forced labourers employed on state, military and civilian projects.5 In short, 
the war and its aftermath were characterized by acts of excessive violence and 
cruelty on the part of German soldiers and settlers.  
Indiscriminate shootings, hangings and beatings were the order of the day. 
The diaries, letters and photographs of contemporaries are littered with 
references to these events. Missionary Elger, working in the settlement of 
Karibib along the railway line to Windhoek, reported in his diary that all he 
heard was ‘aufräumen aufhängen niederknallen bis auf den letzten Mann, Kein 
Pardon’ (clean-up hang-up shoot-down till the last man, no pardon). Elger also 
described the manner in which Herero prisoners were treated: 
 
Things proceeded in a particularly brutal manner. Herero prisoners were terribly 
maltreated, whether they were guilty or not guilty. About 4 Herero were taken 
prisoner, because they were supposed to have killed a railway worker (Lehmann, 
Habis). The courtmartial ordered them to be freed and declared them to be not 
guilty. However one could not release them as they bore too many marks of 
shameful abuse [Schändlicher Mißhandlung] on their bodies. For example, people 
had beaten an eye out of one. After the court martial had declared them to be 
innocent, some of the Germans outside immediately resumed the abuse with the 
words, ‘the court has declared you to be innocent, we however want to string you 
up’.6 
 
After the initial battles, the civilian governor was relieved of his command 
and replaced by the Kaiser’s own candidate, Lieutenant-General Lothar von 
Trotha.7 Under the command of Von Trotha, the German army sought to 
engineer a crushing defeat of the Herero in the vicinity of the Waterberg.8 In 
keeping with Von Moltke’s principles of separate deployment and encirclement, 
                                                 
4 The history of the Nama-German War and its ongoing aftermath as well as the impact 
on Nama society are not dealt with in this chapter. Interested readers are advised to read 
H. Drechsler, ‘Let us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against 
German Imperialism (1884-1915) (London, 1980), first published in German (Berlin, 
1966). 
5 Gewald, Herero Heroes, 141-230. 
6 Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (ELCRN), V12 Karibib, 
JBG’s translation. 
7 See H. Bley, South-West Africa under German Rule 1894-1914 (London, 1971), 158-
63 for a discussion on the appointment of Von Trotha. 
8.Pool, Opstand, 210-11. 
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Von Trotha sent out his armies to annihilate the Herero at the Waterberg. Or, as 
he put it in his own words: 
 
My initial plan for the operation, which I always adhered to, was to encircle the 
masses of Hereros at Waterberg, and to annihilate these masses with a simultaneous 
blow, then to establish various stations to hunt down and disarm the splinter groups 
who escaped, later to lay hands on the captains by putting prize money on their 
heads and finally to sentence them to death.9 
 
On 11 August the Battle of Hamakari took place at the Waterberg. The 
Herero were defeated and fled in a southeasterly direction into the dry desert 
sands of the Kalahari, known to the Herero as the Omaheke.10 Von Trotha 
issued orders which, by placing a cordon along the waterholes, cut off all escape 
routes to the west, south and northeast. This effectively forced the fleeing 
Herero to move ever further into the inhospitable Omaheke.11 Surrounded by the 
desert and German patrols, the Herero chiefs and their followers congregated 
along the Eiseb River. 
Around 1 October 1904, General Lothar von Trotha, who was actively 
taking part in the pursuit, and his retinue had reached the Osombo-Windimbe 
waterhole. During the afternoon of the following day, Sunday 2 October 1904, 
after the holding of a field service, General von Trotha addressed his officers.12 
In his address he declared that the war against the Herero would be continued in 
all earnestness and read out a proclamation, which stated amongst others that: 
 
The Herero people must…leave the land. If the populace does not do this I will force 
them with the Groot Rohr [Cannon]. Within the German borders every Herero, with 
or without a gun, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer accept women 
and children, I will drive them back to their people or I will let them be shot at.  
These are my words to the Herero people. 
The great General of the mighty German Kaiser.13 
 
Of late a number of authors have sought to deny or at least downplay the 
existence and implications of Von Trotha’s proclamation, which has become 
 
9.Von Trotha's diaries cited in G. Pool, Samuel Maharero (Windhoek, 1992), 251. 
10.Pool, Opstand, 219-40. Omaheke is the Otjiherero name for the sandveld area east of 
the Waterberg. 
11.Pool, Opstand, 245 ff. 
12 C. Rust, Krieg und Frieden in Hererolande: Aufzeichnungen aus dem Kriegsjahre 
1904 (Berlin, 1905), 384. 
13.Namibian National Archives Windhoek (NNAW), ZBU D.1.a Band 3-4, leaf 165. 
With thanks to Mr W. Hillebrecht for finding it at such short notice. JBG's translation. 
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known as the Vernichtungsbefehl.14 However, Von Trotha’s own words, in his 
diary and elsewhere, indicate that he knew full well what his proclamation 
would entail. On the day the proclamation was issued, Von Trotha wrote in a 
letter: 
 
I believe that the nation as such should be annihilated, or, if this was not possible by 
tactical measures, have to be expelled from the country by operative means and 
further detailed treatment. This will be possible if the water-holes from Grootfontein 
to Gobabis are occupied. The constant movement of our troops will enable us to find 
the small groups of the nation who have moved back westwards and destroy them 
gradually. 
My intimate knowledge of many central African tribes (Bantu and others) has 
everywhere convinced me of the necessity that the Negro does not respect treaties 
but only brute force.15 
 
From 1904 and through into 1905 Ludwig von Estorff, one of Von Trotha’s 
officers, ‘had the thankless task of chasing after the refugees in the Sandveld 
and preventing their return’.16 Estorff’s own words describe clearly what he did 
and what his commanding officer’s intentions were: 
 
I followed their tracks and found numerous wells which presented a terrifying sight. 
Cattle which had died of thirst lay scattered around the wells. These cattle had 
reached the wells but there had not been enough time to water them. The Herero fled 
ahead of us into the Sandveld. Again and again this terrible scene kept repeating 
itself. With feverish energy the men had worked at opening up the wells, however 
the water became ever sparser, and wells evermore rare. They fled from one well to 
the next and lost virtually all their cattle and a large number of their people. The 
people shrunk into small groups who continually fell into our hands [unsere Gewalt 
kamen], some of the people escaped now and again through the Sandveld into 
English territory [present-day Botswana]. It was a policy which was equally 
gruesome as senseless, to hammer the people so much, we could have still saved 
many of them and their rich herds, if we had pardoned and taken them up again, they 
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had been punished enough. I suggested this to General von Trotha but he wanted 
their total extermination.17 
 
In early 1905 the German parliament rescinded Von Trotha’s extermination 
order following which captured Herero were placed in concentration camps 
(Konzentrationslager) and put to work as forced labourers. By late 1905, an 
estimated 8,800 Herero were confined in camps and forced to work on various 
military and civilian projects across GSWA.18 Missionary sources provide first-
hand eyewitness accounts of conditions in the camps. In Karibib missionary 
Elger wrote: 
 
And then the scattered Herero returned from the Sandfeld. Everywhere they popped 
up -not in their original areas-, to submit themselves as prisoners. What did the 
wretched people look like?! Some of them had been starved to skeletons with 
hollow eyes, powerless and hopeless, afflicted by serious diseases, particularly with 
dysentery. In the settlements they were placed in big kraals, and there they lay, 
without blankets and some without clothing, in the tropical rain on the marshlike 
ground. Here death reaped a harvest! Those who had some semblance of energy 
naturally had to work. (…) 
 
It was a terrible misery with the people; they died in droves. Once 24 came together, 
some of them carried. In the next hour one died, in the evening the second, in the 
first week a total of ten – all to dysentery – the people had lost all their energy and 
all their will to live. (…) 
 
Hardly cheering cases were those where people were handed in to be healed from 
the effects of extreme mistreatment (schwerer Misshandlungen): there were bad 
cases amongst these.19 
 
The Herero camps were finally abolished in 1908, after which the Herero 
were confined within a tangled web of legislation that sought to control the 
lives, in their entirety, of all black people living in German South West Africa. 
Within the areas of German control, all Africans over the age of eight were 
 
17.Ibid. 116-17. JBG's translation. 
18.Berichte Rheinische Missions Gesellschaft (BRMG) 1906, 10. 
19.ELCRN, V. 12, Missions Chronieken, Karibib 1906, written by missionary Elger. See 
also BRMG 1906, 11-12. That this mistreatment of Herero was not merely incidental but 
structural is indicated by a circular letter from military headquarters in Windhoek to the 
German officer commanding Karibib in late 1906. The letter noted ‘(...) due to the 
mishandling of Herero prisoners, who act as carriers, it is advisable to recruit Ovambo 
labour as carriers’. NNAW, STR 19 1.und 4. Kompagnie Karibib, Letter Windhuk 
16/11/06. 
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ordered to wear metal passes. They were embossed with the imperial crown, 
magisterial district and labour number, and were used to facilitate German 
control of labour. In addition, all Herero were prohibited from owning land and 
cattle – the two basic necessities of a society based on pastoralism. 
 
 
‘Blue Book’ (1914-1921) 
 
At the outbreak of the First World War, South African forces under British 
command invaded German South West Africa and defeated the much-vaunted 
German army. Between 1915 and 1921, Namibia fell under the jurisdiction of a 
military administration. As the war progressed, it became clear that the 
victorious parties had no intention of allowing Germany to retain its colonies. 
To this end, from at least 1915 onwards, British colonial officials were 
instructed to gather material which would strengthen the British Empire’s 
claims to Germany’s colonies.20 In Namibia this task was facilitated by the 
existence of a well-organized and detailed German government archive which 
the incoming military administration found waiting for it in Windhoek. In the 
most chilling detail, officials found in it accounts and reports on the manner in 
which the settlers of German South West Africa and its administration had dealt 
with the country’s original inhabitants. Apart from files dealing with the way in 
which the Herero had been incarcerated in concentration camps and distributed 
amongst settlers and companies, the archives also contained a series of 
documents dealing with the excesses of settlers who had flogged Herero. Glass-
plate negatives detailed the torn and rotting backs of women flogged for alleged 
insubordination, and pages and pages of court transcripts covering the brutal 
lashings of labourers.21 
Apart from detailed archives, the South Africans were greeted by a 
population more than willing to provide information about their experiences 
under German rule. During the course of their successful military campaign, 
South African forces were dependent on Herero scouts for information 
regarding watering points, routes and so forth. These scouts had in many cases 
fought against German forces between 1904 and 1908 and had vivid memories 
of the atrocities committed by German soldiers at that time. Often these scouts 
                                                 
20 Public Records Office (PRO) CO 537/1-17 Telegram from Mr Long, to Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa, 4 January 1918 quoted in ‘Memo for War Cabinet’, 15 
October 1918.  
21 The glass-plate negatives and files, and in fact most of the original source material 
used to compile the Blue Book have been sought out by J. Silvester and J.B. Gewald in 
the National Archives of Namibia. Silvester and Gewald are currently engaged in 
republishing an edited and annotated edition of the Blue Book.  
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were the sons of Herero chiefs who prior to and in the course of German 
colonialism had turned in vain to Britain for assistance. They were highly 
articulate men who left a deep impression on the South African officers they 
were assigned to. Being Herero royals, these men also had direct access to 
substantial numbers of people. When in 1917 the military administration 
formally called upon its magistrates to provide information that would 
substantiate the British Empire’s claims to the territory, men such as magistrate 
O’Reilly of Omaruru could depend on the support of the Herero community. A 
memorandum for the war cabinet noted: 
 
The fullest reply received has been from the Union which sent a series of statements 
on oath by responsible and respected leaders of the various native races of South-
West Africa.22 
 
The combination of testimony taken from the German archives found in 
Windhoek along with a series of painstakingly detailed statements taken under 
oath from large numbers of surviving Namibians resulted in the publication of 
one of the most shocking documents of colonial history. The Report on the 
Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (London 1918), 
generally referred to as the ‘Blue Book’, remains an indispensable source 
document on the nature of German colonial rule in Namibia. It is beyond doubt 
that the events and issues presented so clearly in it served to scuttle any attempts 
by Germany to retain control over its former colonies, and Namibia in 
particular.23 In the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was deemed to be unfit to 
govern colonies and forced to renounce ‘in favour of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers, all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions’.24 In 
addition, in terms of the Charter of the League of Nations, Namibia, which was 
seen to be ‘inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world”, was deemed to be a territory which 
could ‘be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory [the Union of 
 
22 PRO CO 537/1-17 Memo for War Cabinet, 15 October 1918. 
23 A.J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and 
Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919 (New York, 1967) provides a detailed and 
authoritative account of the Versailles Treaty negotiations. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 (New York, 1924) contains a 
complete text of the 1919 treaty.  
24 Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
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South Africa] as integral portions of its territory’.25 As such, Namibia was 
placed under the jurisdiction of South Africa.26  
The Blue Book was not unique. The British also commissioned research into 
the Armenian genocide perpetrated in 1915 by the forces of the Ottoman 
Empire, Germany’s First World War allies. In the aftermath of the humiliation 
of Versailles and in direct response to the Blue Book, the Germans published a 
‘White Book’ on the activities of Britain in its colonies. Nevertheless, the Blue 
Book had fulfilled the purposes for which it had originally been compiled, and 
the genocide perpetrated by imperial Germany on the Herero had been 
successfully used for political purposes. Germany was forced to relinquish 
forever its colonies.27 
 
 
White settler unity and the Blue Book (1920-1928) 
 
Within settler society in Namibia under South African mandate, the existence of 
the Blue Book continued to bedevil settler politics. German settlers wanted to 
have the Blue Book banned and all copies of the publication destroyed. In 1925 
the first all-white election for a legislative assembly took place. Representatives 
of the German settler party, the Deutsche Bund in Südwestafrika, opposed 
settler parties allied to the Union of South Africa. Anxious to maintain a 
working relationship within the legislative assembly, the administrator, A.J. 
Werth, acceded to German settler demands for the abolition of the Blue Book. 
Thus in 1926, Mr Stauch, a member of the all-white legislative assembly in 
Namibia, tabled a motion stating that the Blue Book: 
 
…only has the meaning of a war-instrument and that the time has come to put this 
instrument out of operation and to impound and destroy all copies of this Bluebook, 
which may be found in the official records and in public libraries of this Territory. 28 
                                                 
25 Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations. 
26 A. du Pisani, SouthWest Africa/Namibia: The Politics of Continuity and Change 
(Windhoek, 1985), 76. 
27 This must have been galling given that there was a secret convention in 1898 which 
contemplated the partition between Great Britain and Germany of certain of Portugal’s 
African colonies in the event of it not being found possible to maintain the integrity of 
the African possessions of Portugal. PRO CO 323/957/5 ‘Draft Memo: The Case for 
Mandate’, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonial Office, 30 June 1926. 
28 NNAW, ADM 225, Memorandum on the Blue Book, Annex A. In addition, the 
administration was ‘requested to make representations to the Union Government and to 
the British Government to have this Bluebook expunged from the official records of 
those Governments’. Furthermore Stauch’s motion requested that the administration 
‘take into consideration the advisability of making representations to the Union 
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The motion was passed and legislation came to into force, to be applied in all 
territories administered by the Union of South Africa that circumscribed the 
distribution of the Blue Book. Copies were no longer made available to the 
public, and were removed from libraries and destroyed. In the rest of the British 
Empire, copies of the Blue Book were moved to the Foreign Office. Even in 
wartime Britain as late as 1941, in response to a request from the Ministry of 
Information, it was noted that: ‘No copy may be issued without authority of the 
librarian’.29 
Stauch and his fellow members of the Deutsche Bund consciously denied the 
recorded role of German settlers and soldiers in the Herero genocide and put 
pressure on the South African administration to accede to their demands. As 
Stauch noted, the passing of the motion ‘would…remove one of the most 
serious obstacles to mutual trust and co-operation in this country [Namibia]’. In 
his view, ‘the honour of Germany had been attacked in the most public manner 
and it was right that the attack should be repudiated in an equally public 
fashion. (…) The defence of the honour of one’s country was a solemn duty 
imposed upon all sons of that country.’ The validity of Stauch’s claims were not 
questioned by the assembly, even less was any Herero view of the recorded 
events given an airing. The subjective arguments of Stauch and his compatriots 
sought to obscure a historical past in the interests of their own continued 
privileged position as settlers. The promise of peaceful cooperation with the 
German settler community was uppermost in the minds and concerns of South 
Africa’s administrators. Stauch claimed that ‘the Germans were ready and 
anxious to co-operate in the building up of South West but they could not do so 
fully until the stigma imposed by the publication of the Bluebook …had been 
removed from their name’. This claim was considered to be more important 
than historical veracity and the views of Namibia’s African inhabitants. In other 
words, the Herero who died in the genocide were dismissed and forgotten in the 
interests of white settler cooperation. 
 
 
Michael Scott and Herero representations to the UN (1945-1952) 
 
To the members of the white settler community it may have looked as if their 
attempts to rewrite their own vision of the past had succeeded. For a number of 
years after 1926 nothing was heard of the Herero genocide. Within the territory, 
Government and the British Government to impound and destroy all copies of the 
Bluebook, which may be found in the public libraries in the respective Countries and 
with the official booksellers mentioned on the title-sheet of the Bluebook’. 
29 PRO F= 371/26574 Minute, 20 June 1941. 
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Herero had withdrawn to the newly established native reserves and refrained 
from directly articulating demands that related to the genocide.30 This is not to 
say that the genocide was no longer of any importance to Herero society, far 
from it. Instead, Herero society literally turned in upon itself and sought as 
much as possible to refrain from any form of interaction with the colonial state. 
References to the genocide perpetrated upon the Herero surfaced from time to 
time in unexpected places, yet it was no longer an essential part of the colonial 
discourse.31  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the South African government 
undertook steps to incorporate Namibia as the fifth province in the Union of 
South Africa. To this end, in 1946, a series of staged meetings was held with the 
African population of the territory. As the newly formed United Nations had 
taken over from the League of Nations, Namibia, as a mandated territory, fell 
under the jurisdiction of South Africa under the auspices of the United Nations. 
With carefully structured meetings, it was hoped that the colonially appointed 
and recognized leaders of Namibia’s African populations would sanction South 
Africa’s plan to incorporate Namibia. However, this was not to be. The events 
of 1904-1908 once again became part and parcel of settler and administrative 
concerns with the arrival of Rev. Michael Scott in Windhoek in 1947.32 In 
conjunction with Herero leaders, Scott used the atrocities perpetrated in the 
Herero genocide as a weapon at the United Nations against the incorporation of 
                                                 
30 J.B. Gewald, ‘We Thought We Would Be Free’: Socio-Cultural Aspects of Herero 
History in Namibia 1915-1940 (Cologne, 2001). 
31 Thus while searching for waterholes in the newly established Herero reserves in the 
eastern reaches of South West Africa, British administrators stumbled across the site of 
the German massacre of Herero at Ombakaha. Gewald, Herero Heroes, 182. 
32 Scott is one of the more remarkable figures of Southern African history. Having 
experienced Ghandi in India, Scott became actively involved in the anti-colonial 
struggle, first in India and later in Southern Africa. Initially Scott campaigned amongst 
the Indian community in Natal, and later became active in drawing attention to and 
improving the shameful living conditions in Bethel, one of Johannesburg’s ‘native 
locations’. In exile he founded the Africa Bureau in London and continued campaigning 
for Namibia’s independence, even going so far as to drop his initial non-violent 
approach. In 1958, whilst attending the All African People’s Conference in Accra, Scott 
delivered a speech to the delegates on behalf of the Herero people living in Namibia 
who had been prevented from sending their own representatives. In his speech, Scott 
called for the creation of an African freedom army saying, ‘Africa needs such a freedom 
army desperately urgently if it is to be saved from inhumanity’. Scott continues to be 
fondly remembered by many in Namibia. His activities brought the injustices of 
colonial rule in Namibia to the attention of the wider world. For an overview of this 
remarkable man’s life see F. Troup, In Face of Fear: Michael Scott’s Challenge to 
South Africa (London, 1950). 
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Namibia into South Africa. In the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust, the full 
extent of which was still only just beginning to be understood, genocide 
committed by an earlier generation of Germans made powerful political 
ammunition. 
Throughout most of 1948, Michael Scott lived in a tent along the Gammans 
River just beyond the Windhoek old location. Here he met and entertained 
township residents, many of whom had experienced the horrors of German rule 
at first hand.33 Scott’s attention was drawn to the Herero genocide. Here, in a 
nutshell, Scott realized the sum of the inequities of colonial rule: a people 
driven off their land, slaughtered, banished to live in barren homelands, and still 
with no rights. An article entitled ‘Michael Scott and the Hereros’ published in 
The New Statesman and Nation in 1949 presented Scott’s summary of 
Namibian history: 
 
Then came the German colonists, hungry for land; and finally von Trotha, a general 
whom Hitler would have delighted to honour. (…) In 1904 he issued the 
‘Extermination Order’. All Hereros whether man, woman or child were to be killed. 
An orgy of looting, torture, and massacre followed. To read the records is exactly 
like reading the accounts of the obliteration of Poland, except that the Germans had 
not gas chambers then, but killed babies with their own hands, or burned sick old 
women in their huts. The tribe broke and fled… The majority, all but fifteen 
thousand out of ninety thousand, were hacked to pieces by the Germans or died of 
thirst.34 
 
The mention of Von Trotha’s ‘Extermination Order’ clearly indicates that 
Scott must have gained access to a copy of the Blue Book. Scott’s history also 
made explicit the link between the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis and the 
activities of the forces of Imperial Germany in Namibia, a link that continues to 
garner extensive academic interest.35 In addition, Scott indicated how the South 
Africans had betrayed the Herero: 
 
33 Troup, Face of Fear, 173-80. 
34 NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, Rev. M. Scott, Typed copy of article that appeared 
in The New Statesman and Nation, 5 March 1949. 
35 Hannah Arendt became the first academic to alert the world to the linkages that exist 
between Germany’s colonial past and the later development of the national socialist 
state. H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, 1967). The work of East and 
West German historians, Horst Drechsler and Helmut Bley further developed this 
theme, and recently a new generation of historians has once again taken it up. A 
selection of some of the papers presented at the annual meeting of the African Studies 
Association in Houston, Texas in November 2001 clearly brings this trend to the fore. 
J.B. Gewald, ‘Anticipating the Kaiser: German Soldiers and the Herero-German War’; 
J. Gaydish, ‘”Die Lösung der Eingeborenenfrage”: The Role of the Swakopmund 
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In the 1914 war, lured by British promises that native lands would be returned, the 
desert remnant trekked back. But in 1918 they met not the British as the Mandatory 
Power, but the South Africans, who never for a moment considered giving them 
back their tribal lands. Some pastures were left to the German settlers who 
remained. More went to the Afrikaner settlers, ...36 
 
Throughout 1948 and 1949 and in the face of constant harassment, Scott 
sought to bring conditions as they existed in Namibia to world attention. 
Eventually in November 1949 the United Nations granted Scott an official 
hearing. In the months following this hearing, the colonial authorities in 
Namibia started a campaign to dismiss his statements.37 Vilified in the press, 
Scott continued to be supported by Herero, many of whom recalled the events 
of 1904-1908 to justify and support their faith in Scott. One such Herero, who 
signed his letter as ‘A Native who had been deprived of his land from 1904-
1950’, noted: 
 
I want to emphasise that the information given by the Rev. Michael Scott at UNO is 
what actually happened in S.W.A. and was obtained from the best reliable sources.38 
 
Finally in 1950, Scott, already the victim of constant harassment, was 
declared a prohibited immigrant and prevented from ever returning to Namibia. 
 
 
The Herero genocide and nationalist struggle (1958-1990) 
 
In Namibia, the events of 1904-1908 informed the establishment of the South 
West African National Union (SWANU) and the South West African People’s 
Organization (SWAPO). Particularly within SWANU, which came to be 
dominated by Herero ideologues, the loss of the land incurred in the Herero 
genocide proved to be a major mobilizing factor.39 Within Namibia, the political 
                                                                                                                       
Concentration Camp in the Development of German “Native Policy” in Southwest 
Africa’; C. Erischsen, ‘Shark Island: Forgotten Concentration Camps and History in 
Colonial Namibia 1904-1908’. 
36 NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, Rev. M. Scott, Typed copy of article that appeared 
in The New Statesman and Nation, 5 March 1949. 
37 See for example, NNAW, SWAA 1981, A 427/48, M. Scott, Draft letters of Bowker 
written to the Windhoek Advertiser and published 1 March 1950. 
38 Windhoek Advertiser, 18 March 1950. 
39 Z. Ngavirue, Political Parties and Interest Groups in South West Africa (Namibia): A 
Study of a Plural Society (Basel, 1997), 214 ff, and T. Emmett, Popular Resistance and 
the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966 (Basel, 1999), 283 ff. 
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mobilization, which had begun in earnest in the years after the Second World 
War, was brutally terminated by the December shootings of 1959. These 
shootings, by the South African authorities, took place in response to African 
protests against the Apartheid Group Areas Act.40 In the aftermath of the 
shootings, there was a substantial South African government clamp-down on 
nationalist political organization in Namibia. This saw the flight into exile of 
many of Namibia’s most highly skilled and articulate Herero.41 It was in the 
context of these events that some of the Herero leaders who had remained 
within the territory sought to play down the ideas of conflict and tension 
engendered through the remembrance and commemoration of the Herero 
genocide. Instead they sought to pursue a policy of appeasement in which they 
urged leaders of the German community to do the same. The conditions of 
heightened repression and tension that existed in Namibia at the time made 
some of the Herero leaders within the territory seek cooperation as opposed to 
opposition to the settler community. As Herero chief Hosea Kutako stated in 
response to German commemorations of the Battle of Hamakari: 
 
We do not want to cling to the past or to have old war grudges. Our aim is to forget 
the past and to look forward rather than backward and to have good relations with 
all sections of the population but good relations cannot exist if some people try to 
remind us of the bad past.42 
 
Younger Herero such as Clemens Kapuuo, Hosea Kutako’s eventual successor, 
were far less conciliatory. When German settlers wanted to commemorate the 
Herero-German War, Kapuuo reminded them of the terror wrought in the genocide 
and its links to the Holocaust. 
 
To our minds there is little difference between the extermination order of General 
von Trotha and the extermination of Jews by Adolf Hitler. The members of the Alte 
Kameraden are today a free people whereas the Hereros are not and are under a 
foreign Government which was elected partly by members of the Alte Kameraden. It 
is natural that the Hereros would be opposed to the celebration of a battle which 
placed them under foreign domination up to this day.43 
 
 
40 K. Dierks, Chronology of Namibian History: From Pre-Historical Times to 
Independent Namibia (Windhoek, 1999), 124. 
41 Amongst others, Moses Katjiongua, Mburumba Kerina, Fanuel Kozonguizi and 
Zedekia Ngavirue. 
42 ‘”Forget the Past”: Improve Race Relations Kapuuo Urges Kameraden’, in Windhoek 
Advertiser, 7 August 1964. 
43 ‘Hereros Oppose Waterberg Celebrations: Alter Kamerad Denies "Extermination"’, in 
Windhoek Advertiser, 29 July 1964. 
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As might well have been expected, Carl Schrader, a spokesman for the Alte 
Kameraden, denied that the Herero had been ‘exterminated’.  
In exile, the genocide perpetrated upon the Herero and the Nama came to be 
one of the pillars of anti-colonial propaganda used by those who wanted to rid 
Namibia of its South African occupiers. Initially, this propaganda was based 
primarily on the works of Bley and Drechsler. Given the gravity of the Herero 
genocide, it seems remarkable that the only published account of it in English 
until the 1970s was the Blue Book. The reworked academic theses of the 
German historians Horst Drechsler and Helmut Bley first appeared in German 
in 1966 and 1968 in East and West Germany respectively. Bley’s work came 
out in English in 1971, whilst Drechsler’s was only published in English in 
1980.44 These two excellent studies were primarily concerned with a debate 
relating to the nature of German imperialism and the development of totalitarian 
societies. Both books sought and found the roots of National Socialism in 
Germany’s colonial past in Namibia. For both historians, the genocide 
committed upon the inhabitants of Namibia between 1904 and 1908 
foreshadowed later events in Western Europe between 1939 and 1945. As Bley 
noted in the conclusion to his work: 
 
In SWA conditions crossed over into totalitarianism. This confirms, perhaps even 
reinforces, Hannah Arendt’s contention that in African colonialism one may find the 
seeds of modern totalitarian rule. 45 
 
The publication of To be Born a Nation by the SWAPO publicity bureau in 
London owed much to these two works.46 The title referred to SWAPO’s 
nationalist slogan ‘To die a tribe, to be born a nation’, which reflected the 
earlier words of the Nama anti-colonial warrior Hendrik Witbooi who, while 
fighting against the Germans, had called others to arms with the words: 
 
Let us die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some 
other calamity.47 
 
For the first time in a single volume, the atrocities committed by the 
Germans were linked directly to the atrocities being committed by South 
                                                 
44 See notes 4 and 7 above. 
45 Bley, South-West Africa under German Rule, 282. Bley was referring to the work of 
Arendt, Totalitarianism, 185-222. 
46 Dept of Information and Publicity, SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born a Nation: The 
Liberation Struggle for Namibia (London, 1981).  
47 H. Witbooi cited in P. Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London, 1988), 
9. 
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African security forces operating in Namibia and Angola at the time. 
Photographs of emaciated Herero with lashed backs were juxtaposed with 
images of migrant workers and affluent whites. The genocide perpetrated upon 
the Herero and Nama was conveniently linked to the exploitation of 
predominantly Ovambo migrant labourers. This oppression and exploitation 
were seen as two examples on a linked continuum of illegal colonial rule.48 In 
this manner, the Herero genocide became the shared history of oppression of all 
Africans living in Namibia, and not just the Herero. The beaten backs of Herero 
in 1908 came to be linked to the beaten and burnt faces of Koevoet prisoners in 
northern Namibia in the 1980s.49 
In the early 1980s, shortly after he had completed his PhD in history at 
Oxford University, Peter Katjavivi – the current Vice-Chancellor of the 
University of Namibia – became the highly articulate SWAPO spokesman in 
London. Well-versed in the history of Namibia, Katjavivi did not hesitate to 
liken the attacks of South African forces to those perpetrated by Von Trotha 75 
years earlier. The anti-colonial struggles of the Herero and the Nama came to be 
applied to all of Namibia, as if the nationalist struggle had begun with the wars 
undertaken by imperial Germany against the Nama and the Herero. The 
published version of Katjavivi’s thesis A History of Resistance in Namibia 
clearly fell within this paradigm. It argued that Namibia’s colonial governments 
were a single continuum where South African soldiers and police in the 1980s 
were continuing the work started by the German colonial Schutztruppe in the 
1890s.50 To a lesser extent, the work of Kaire Mbuende, who like Katjavivi was 
a Herero historian in exile, also emphasized the perceived continuum.51  
 
 
48 Thus for example, Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO’s publicity officer in London, wrote: 
‘Although the hopes of a change with the end of German rule were soon dashed, the 
Namibian people were not deterred from pursuing their cause further’. P. Katjavivi, 
‘The Development of Anti-colonial Forces in Namibia’, in Namibia 1884–1984: 
Readings on Namibia’s History and Society (London, 1988), 561. 
49 Koevoet was a paramilitary anti-insurgency police unit established by the South 
African administration in Namibia in response to a legal loophole in UN Security 
Council Resolution 435 which allowed the presence of police in the envisaged 
changeover to Namibian independence. Guilty of outright murder, torture and extensive 
and consistent human rights abuses, Koevoet built up a ferocious reputation for itself in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola. See T. Cleaver & M. Wallace, Namibia Women 
in War (London, 1990). 
50 P. Katjavivi, ‘The Rise of Nationalism in Namibia and its International Dimensions’ 
PhD thesis, Oxford University (1984). The thesis formed the basis for History of 
Resistance. 
51 K. Mbuende, Namibia, The Broken Shield: Anatomy of Imperialism and Revolution 
(Lund, 1986). 
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South Africa and the Herero genocide (1970-1990) 
 
Whilst SWAPO used the history of the genocide to further its nationalist 
struggle from exile, the South African authorities sought the collaboration of the 
Herero and other communities inside Namibia through a selective 
commemoration of historical events. As SWAPO had effectively appropriated 
the sole rights, as it were, to use the genocide, those Herero who cooperated 
with the South African government could not use it for political purposes even 
though they were well aware of their history. In addition, they could not afford 
to alienate a major influential constituency, namely that of the economically and 
politically powerful German-speaking settler community.  
Members of the South African Defence Force (SADF) operating in Namibia 
must have been aware of cross-currents in the minds of people in Namibia at the 
time. The mass conscription of Herero into the South West African Territorial 
Force (SWATF), the SADF proxy force in Namibia, united German settlers and 
Herero in the same uniform for the first time since 1908. Indeed, the beret badge 
of a section of the SWATF was that of a kudu, the symbol of the Herero royal 
house of Tjamuaha. The SWATF officers’ school was situated in Okahandja at 
the ancestral site of the residences of the Tjamuaha chiefs. Herero and German 
settler conscripts were expected to run up a hill at Osona and bring down leaves 
from the tree at the top of this hill. The fact that the hill was one on which 
Herero chief Samuel Maharero anticipated the arrival of German soldiers in 
1892, or that the tree in question was a Witgat boom that is considered by 
Herero to bear ritual meaning, cannot have been missed by observers.52 
From 1978 onwards the massed annual commemorative marches of Herero 
para-militaries to the graves of Herero chiefs in Okahandja became an event that 
was almost totally dominated by the SADF and SWATF. The commemorations 
of Herero chiefs, and through them the Herero dead of the genocide, became a 
demonstration of South African-sponsored opposition to SWAPO. In what is 
one of the profound ironies of Southern African history, SWATF forces, 
consisting in large measure of Herero conscripts, marched in staged spectacles 
in support of South Africa and against the liberation of their country. Indeed, 
the fraternity of blood brotherhood, which had allegedly been created between 
Herero and German settlers in the 1904-1908 genocide, now came to be realized 
in the massed marches of Herero and German settler conscripts. In support of 
this new-found fraternity, and in conscious negation of the past, Herero symbols 
were used to forge an opposition to nationalist forces. It was in this period that 
                                                 
52 In the first weeks immediately after Namibian independence the tree in question was 
sawn down, an act that would have been considered sacrilege on the part of any Herero. 
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Namibian papers carried extensive coverage of Herero soldiers at the graves of 
German soldiers at the annual commemorations in Okahandja. 
In the second half of the 1980s, there was a flurry in which officially 
sanctioned monuments, graveyards and game reserves were established. Under 
the auspices of the SADF, ethnologists were asked to find and document the 
graves and monuments of Namibia’s African people. In so doing, ethnologists 
travelled throughout the territory documenting graves and, in part, history. As a 
result of these activities, state-funded monuments came to be erected to the 
memory of Herero chiefs who had cooperated with the South African colonial 
administration. 
At the same time, the Waterberg and its immediate environs, the site of the 
defeat of Herero forces in 1904, was declared a game reserve. In other words, 
the Waterberg, the symbol and site of the Herero genocide, was consciously 
robbed of its potent symbolic function by relegating it to the status of a tourist 
resort.53 In the Namibian newspapers of the period, in particular those owned by 
the South African-funded Republican press, there is no mention of the genocide. 
In addition, the genocide is almost totally missing from historical work being 
conducted in Namibia at the time. The Herero oral historian Alexander Kaputu, 
who was employed by the South African-sponsored Namibian Broadcasting 
Corporation, also steered clear of the subject. Afrikaner historian Gerhardus 
Pool discussed the war but not the genocide, and settler historian Sudholt denied 
that the genocide had taken place. This was a clear case of what Anderson 
charmingly referred to as ‘remembering to forget’.54 
The successful sublimation of the Herero genocide in the interests of a 
unified front against the forces of nationalism drew the attention of SWAPO 
military planners. SWAPO propaganda continually railed against those Herero 
leaders who cooperated with the South Africans and referred to the history of 
anti-colonial resistance of Herero chiefs such as Samuel Maharero. It is possible 
that military operations were undertaken by SWAPO in eastern Hereroland 
because SWAPO planners wanted Herero to ‘remember to remember’. 
Throughout the Bush War in Namibia, SWAPO military activities in eastern 
Hereroland were doomed to failure, and SWAPO planners were well aware of 
this. By the end of 1978, South African forces had effective and total military 
 
53 Interestingly in post-independence Namibia, the tourist nature as opposed to the 
commemorative function of this site continues to be emphasized. This is done primarily 
with the argument that ‘all Namibians suffered’, and that as the sites are allegedly 
linked solely to a single ethnicity, commemoration would support tribalism. Implicit in 
this position is a denial of the genocide. 
54 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, revised and extended edition (London, 1991), chapter 11. 
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control of Namibia. In the event of attempted infiltrations by SWAPO’s 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), South African ‘hunter-killer’ 
units, such as Koevoet, ensured that incursions were short-lived. Although 
SWAPO planners knew that their forces would be defeated, captured and killed, 
the symbolic action of an infiltration into eastern Hereroland would not have 
been lost on the Herero population. The PLAN fighters who were infiltrated by 
SWAPO into Hereroland were a carefully selected multi-ethnic group of young 
Namibians, representative of the nation that was to be. Given that the military 
validity for their incursion was non-existent, one could argue that this group of 
young people was sacrificed in the hope that their actions would trigger 
memories of the Herero genocide, memories that would come to substantiate 
support for SWAPO, as opposed to collaboration with the South Africans.55 
 
 
Namibian independence, Herero genocide and Herero unity (1990-
2000) 
 
Whereas in the years leading up to independence in 1990 the Herero genocide 
had been successfully appropriated by the nationalist forces allied to SWAPO, 
immediately after Namibian independence the Herero genocide became the 
preserve of Herero elites opposed to the new government. In the run-up to 
independence, Herero activists began seeking a formal apology from the 
German government for the events of 1904-1908. In the late 1980s, SWANU 
activists living in Germany had already approached the anti-Apartheid 
movement in the Netherlands for assistance in bringing a case against the West 
German government.56  
After independence, the SWAPO government of Namibia tried to ensure that 
Herero claims for reparation would remain muted or couched within the 
demands of the nation-state which they controlled. The last time that  
                                                 
55 ‘Omaheke Region to Mark Heroes’ Day’, The Namibian, 25 August 1993. 
56 Author’s personal observation regarding meetings held in Amsterdam in 1988 and 
1989. 
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The inauguration of Heroes’ Acre on Namibian Heroes’ Day, 26 August 2002  
Photo by Jan-Bart Gewald 
300 Gewald 
government ministers referred directly to the issue was during the visit of  
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bundes-President Herzog to Namibia in 1995. At 
the time, Foreign Affairs Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab noted in an interview that 
the injustices committed against the Namibian people by the former German 
colonial power would always remain a ‘festering sore’ and the two countries 
needed to discuss war reparations ‘at some stage’. Yet he also said that the issue 
was at that time not a priority for the government, though he did add that ‘we 
must have the courage and frankness to discuss this when the time is right’.57 In 
2002, the government, reaping the rewards of a booming tourist industry, was 
well aware of the benefits that accrue to the state on account of continued close 
economic and military cooperation with Germany.58  
During their 1995 visit, Chancellor Kohl and President Herzog refused to 
meet Herero representatives and found themselves unable to offer an apology to 
the people of Namibia for what had happened in the past. Instead, Herzog 
referred to the war as ‘a dark chapter in our bilateral relations’ and made the 
extravagant claim that the massacres formed ‘a burden on the conscience of 
every German’.59 Up to 2002, the government of Schroeder and Rau has also 
made no official statement with regard to Herero claims. This is in contrast to 
when the former governing parties were still in opposition and they agreed that 
what had occurred in Namibia constituted genocide.60 
The current government of Namibia is dominated by people who know that 
their support base is largely to be found in the Ovambo north.61 This area, 
though deeply affected by war during the dying days of South African 
occupation, was left untouched by German imperialism. Although Herero and 
Nama lost all their lands, the inhabitants of the Ovambo kingdoms were never 
driven off their lands by either the German or South African colonial presence. 
As such, the present government does not feel itself called upon to fight for 
something that is not part and parcel of its shared historical experience. In 
addition, the government is at pains to ensure that its heroes, and not those of 
another sector of society, receive recognition. This was well illustrated by the 
spectacle of the statue of the Herero chief Hosea Kutako that was placed in front 
                                                 
57 L. Fild, ‘War Reparations on Govt Agenda’ in The Namibian, 21 September 1995. 
58 No less than 46% of the country’s development budget is paid by Germany. ‘German 
Visit is a "Total Success"’, in The Namibian, 24 June 1996. German military advisors 
and technicians are stationed in Namibia where they teach and assist Namibian Defence 
Force personnel. B. Weidlich, ‘Helmut Bistri: Offizier und Gentleman’, in Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 1 December 1995. 
59 D.G. McNeil Jr., ‘Its Past on its Sleeve, Tribe Seeks Bonn’s Apology’, in New York 
Times, Late Edition – Final Edition, COL 01, P. 3, 31 May 1998. 
60 ‘Major German Parties Agree on “Genocide”’, in The Namibian, 5 November 1990. 
61 On the post-colonial state, see the chapter by Henning Melber in this volume. 
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of the Namibian parliament in early 1999 and immediately covered with black 
plastic sacking. Kutako, a major nationalist leader, also happened to be Herero, 
and though the government did not state so outright, Kutako’s ethnic 
background ensured that his statue remained clad for no less than two years. 
The statue was eventually unveiled on 10 December 2001, Namibia’s Human 
Rights Day. However, Kutako’s statue was not unveiled alone. Instead it was 
unveiled together with two others hastily commissioned after the original statue 
of Hosea Kutako had been erected in early 1999. The two other statues were 
those of Reverend Theophelus Hamutumbangela and Captain Hendrik Samuel 
Witbooi, two nationalist leaders who had done much to ensure the 
establishment and maintenance of the ruling SWAPO party.62 The disrespect 
shown to Kutako, a man who came through the genocide and sought to re-
establish Herero society and later fought for Namibian independence, merely 
serves to ensure that Herero speakers who entered post-colonial society in a 
thoroughly divided condition now find a shared identity in the genocide 
experienced by their ancestors and not by the ancestors of the current 
government. 
It is in this context that, on 22 August 1999, Dr Kuaima Riaruako, the self-
appointed paramount chief and king of all of the Herero, proclaimed that the 
‘Herero nation’ as a whole had decided to approach the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague, where a charge of genocide was to be laid against the 
German state and war reparations would be demanded for genocide committed 
in Namibia against the Herero between 1904 and 1907. At the time, Riaruako’s 
statement caused a few ruffled feathers in Namibia. German diplomats in 
Windhoek emailed colleagues in Bonn and Berlin to look into the issue, and 
then two days later a clinically worded statement by a spokesperson of the 
International Court in The Hague put everyone, with the exception of Riaruako, 
at ease.  
 
Only states may be parties in contentious cases before the ICJ and hence submit 
cases to it against other States.63 
 
However, nobody had actually approached the International Court of Justice, 
and clearly no case was being seriously constructed against the German 
government to plead for war reparations in Namibia. Why then did Riaruako go 
out of his way to claim that this was so? A possible explanation is that, since 
Herero identity increasingly appears to be determined by a shared history of 
genocide, Riaruako can claim to speak on behalf of his people as long as he is 
 
62 The Namibian, 11 December 2001. 
63 Published accounts in The Namibian, 25 August 1999 and 8 September 1999. 
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able to control the calls for reparation.64 If the Namibian government fails to 
take the initiative and call for reparation on behalf of the Herero and Nama, 
Riaruako can continue to control these financial demands, secure in the 
knowledge that he enjoys the support of the majority of Herero speakers. 
In the absence of a formal apology, the call for war reparations from 
Germany has become more vociferous. Government inaction and the continued 
extensive presence of German tourists, settlers, businesses and farms merely 
serve to legitimate and emphasize the demands on the part of the Herero and 
strengthen the bonds of a shared genocidal experience. Recently, this has been 
emphasized with the launch of two court cases in the District Court of Columbia 
in the United States. With the assistance of Afro-American organizations, the 
Herero People’s Reparations Corporation was established, with the objective of 
suing three German companies, Deutsche Bank AG, Terex Corporation 
(Orenstein und Koppel) and Woermann Linie (Deutsch Afrika Linien), as well 
as the Federal Republic of Germany in the person of its foreign minister, 
Joschka Fischer, for reparations. The introductory paragraph of the charge reads 
as follows: 
 
…the Federal Republic of Germany (‘Defendant’ or ‘Germany’), in a brutal alliance 
with German multi-national corporations, relentlessly pursued the enslavement and 
the genocidal destruction of the Herero Tribe in Southwest Africa, now Namibia. 
Foreshadowing with chilling precision the irredeemable horror of the European 
Holocaust only decades later, the Defendant formed a German commercial 
enterprise which cold-bloodedly employed explicitly-sanctioned extermination, the 
destruction of tribal culture and social organization, concentration camps, forced 
labor, medical experimentation and the exploitation of women and children in order 
to advance their common financial interests.65 
 
Possibly the historical linkage between the Herero genocide and the later 
Holocaust was emphasized because of the notable success that Holocaust 
claimants have had in the American courts.  
                                                 
64 Regarding earlier work dealing with Herero identity, see in particular the work of H. 
Hendrickson, ‘Historical Idioms of Identity Representation among the Ovaherero in 
Southern Africa’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of New York (1992); ‘The Long 
Dress and the Construction of Herero Identities in Southern Africa”, African Studies, 
53, 2 (1994) 25-54, and Clothing and Difference. Embodied Identities in Colonial and 
Post-Colonial Africa (London, 1996). For an interesting discussion on the power of 
historical genocides in attributing identity, see R. Lemarchand, paper presented at the 
ASA Chicago 1998 and Malkki, Purity and Exile. 
65 Case papers in the possession of the author. 
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While in the past it was the Otruppe or Truppenspieler66 that maintained 
Herero identity in the face of colonial repression, now it is participation in 
discussion about genocide that performs that role. Association with the dreadful 
events of 1904-1908, even if only through language or fourth-generation 
descendancy, allows for the participation of all in the world of war reparations. 
This has also come to be combined with a notion of remembering-to-forget the 
often enormous differences that existed and still exist between the Herero.67 
Historically, Herero speakers were divided amongst themselves. Not all sections 
of Herero society were equally affected by the genocide, let alone in the South 
African Apartheid years. Yet discourse on the genocide allows people to paper 
over these distinctions. It is thus the first truly shared experience of all Herero 
speakers in the present.68  
 
 
Genocide, memory and resistance 
 
In Namibia, memories of the genocide perpetrated between 1904 and 1908 have 
been instrumentalized and were used to further the aims and objectives of 
differing socio-political actors during the course of the twentieth century. 
Herero have sought to use the memory of their seminal act of resistance, which 
was in effect a disastrous failure, to advance and substantiate further acts of 
resistance since 1904, and memories of the genocide have been redeployed over 
the years in differing circumstances and with varying goals. Yet underlying all 
of these deployments has been the intention of Herero political actors to further 
their position and resist colonial and current post-colonial domination.  
The immensity of the catastrophe that befell the peoples of central Namibia 
between 1904 and 1908 was such that it could not, and still cannot, be banished 
from public memory and debate. However, in Namibia prior to the Second 
World War, though the enormity of the genocide was known, it was not 
necessarily appreciated and expressed by all. For the Herero, it was an event in 
history that knows no comparable precedent. Yet though both Herero survivors 
and German perpetrators were aware of what had happened in Namibia between 
 
66 Herero paramilitary organizations formed after 1915. See W. Werner, ‘“Playing 
Soldiers”: The Truppenspieler Movement among the Herero of Namibia, 1915 to ca. 
1945’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 16, 3 (September 1990), 485-502. 
67 For an interesting discussion on the issue of remembrance, memory and forgetting, 
see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 187-206.  
68 To a large extent this was also displayed by the presence of Chief Munjuku in 
Okahandja in August 1999. Munjuku who had previously been closely allied with the 
SWAPO government has of late left the fold, and through the articulation of claims to a 
shared genocide has found refuge with Herero associated with Riaruako. 
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1904 and 1908, German settlers were able to dismiss the Herero genocide as 
nothing more than a colonial war. However, the full horror of the Herero 
genocide became apparent to observers when, in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, the Nazi Holocaust became known to the wider world. The real and 
imagined linkages of the Herero genocide to the Nazi Holocaust could not be 
hidden and came to be deployed in further discussions relating to the Herero 
genocide. Hence, the Nazi holocaust changed forever the import and meaning of 
the Herero genocide.  
Engaged as the Herero are at present in a legal tussle for war reparations, 
Herero political actors are well aware of the Nazi Holocaust and are making full 
use of the implications of this fact. In this manner the Herero indicate how 
memories, even of failed acts of past resistance, can be used as acts of resistance 
in the present. Though resistance to colonial rule in Namibia was by and large 
unarmed, it was not passive. Instead, it was a struggle for control of memory 
that informed and guided Herero political actors in their dealings with the 
colonial and post-colonial state. From 1945 onwards it came to be seen in the 
wider context of the Nazi Holocaust, and the issue of morality began to be 
emphasized. In Namibia the party that speaks on behalf of those killed in the 
Herero genocide can now claim the moral high-ground. 
Thus, the case of the Herero genocide in Namibia emphasizes once more that 
though physical resistance may be of a passing nature, memories may continue 
to inform and justify political action long after the events that spawned them 
have receded into the past.  
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‘Namibia, land of the brave’: Selective 
memories on war and violence within nation 
building 
 
Henning Melber 
 
 
The limits to the memory of liberation are investigated with 
regard to the factors affecting a liberation movement in the 
process of achieving legitimate power in a post-colonial 
society. The case of Namibia is explored in the transition 
from anti-colonial resistance to comprehensive control, by 
the former liberation movement, over the state. The concepts 
of political rule, the state and democracy are tested against 
the impact of a liberation struggle in terms of the applied 
understanding of political dominance once access to power 
has been achieved. The political culture under a government 
with a record of liberation struggle suggests limitations to 
the implementation of democracy. 
 
 
Namibia, land of the brave, 
freedom fight we have won, 
glory to the bravery, 
whose blood watered our freedom. 
 
These are the first four lines of Namibia’s national anthem. Its melody was 
composed and selected during a competition before independence in early 1990 
and the words were added a few months later.1 The anthem is evidence of the 
                     
 I am grateful to Reinhart Koessler for his comments on the draft manuscript of this 
chapter. 
1 These introductory lines led to some raised eyebrows and concerns among members of 
the white minority with regard to the extent to which the declared notion of national 
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pride of an emerging new nation placing itself on the map of sovereign states 
after more than a century of foreign occupation and continued resistance, 
including more than two decades of an armed liberation struggle. The 
introductory words also illustrate the legacy of this struggle for post-colonial 
development. Such legacies are nothing new, and far from typically African, but 
they also have a history on the continent.2 
This chapter explores, presents and comments upon some visible features of 
a political culture affected by a militaristic orientation in the independent 
Republic of Namibia. This is not to say that Namibia is governed either by 
warlords or the military but the picture sketched by this overview highlights an 
aspect of Namibian society that, to my knowledge, has not yet been explicitly 
made a thematic subject, unlike in other societies in the region.3 It can be 
considered one of the historical, structural and psychological legacies of 
colonial rule, that an earlier study termed ‘the violent heritage’.4  
This heritage, from a dialectical point of view, shaped mentalities and 
ideologies not only among the colonizers but also among the colonized. There is 
a growing tendency to critically analyse the processes in which victims in the 
                                                  
reconciliation is taken so seriously by the newly elected political leadership of the 
country. They did not in fact contribute to eliminating their original worries in facing 
the fate of an endangered species, though subsequent experiences have so far not 
confirmed their fears. That these first lines bear striking resemblance to the concluding 
words in the United States national anthem, ‘The Star Spangled Banner’, did not occur 
to those confined to the Namibian perspective. But this is a healthy reminder that the 
subject of this chapter is clearly not typically African but is one of patriotism in nation-
building processes all over the world. 
2 See, as impressive early evidence of coming to terms with such a history in the African 
context of decolonization, the essays on various topical subjects compiled in the volume 
by A.A. Mazrui, Violence and Thought (London & Harlow, 1969). 
3 In particular the social history of Zimbabwe has in recent years produced a striking 
range of in-depth analyses dealing with the impact of the second chimurenga upon 
(post-)colonial identity formation and ideological discourse. See among more prominent 
recent examples the variety of contributions to the two volumes by N. Bhebe & T. 
Ranger (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, Portsmouth & Harare, 
1995) and Society in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (Oxford, Portsmouth & Harare, 
1996), and especially R. Werbner, ‘Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the 
Dead, Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe’, in R. Werbner (ed.), Memory and the 
Postcolony. African Anthropology and the Critique of Power (London & New York, 
1998).  
4 D. Soggot, Namibia: The Violent Heritage (London, 1986). Soggot has been active as 
a South African-based lawyer for several years in Namibia defending those accused in 
political trials. His story reveals numerous atrocities and the kind of human rights 
violations notorious under Apartheid, which as a legacy to the post-colonial society 
shaped the mentality of both the colonizers and the colonized. 
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role of freedom fighters became perpetrators. Breaking such taboos is necessary 
in a debate that is dealing increasingly with the content of liberation and 
reflecting (if not questioning) the concept of solidarity of the past years and 
marks the end of the cultivation of ‘heroic narratives’.5 Growing insight shows 
that armed liberation struggles were not a suitable breeding ground for the 
establishment of democratic systems of government after independence. The 
forms of resistance against repressive regimes were themselves organized along 
strictly hierarchical and authoritarian lines because otherwise they would have 
had little prospect of success. In this sense, the new societies bore the essential 
elements of the old system they had fought. Aspects of the colonial system 
reproduced themselves in the struggle for its abolition and subsequently in the 
concepts of governance applied in post-colonial conditions. They share the 
binary view of the colonial discourse of the past.6 
Governments were formed by the anti-colonial liberation movements that 
had themselves been far from non-violent. They assumed control of the state 
machinery and reorganized themselves as political parties. The legitimacy to 
rule stemmed from their emergence from the decolonization process as 
democratically elected representatives of the majority of the people. Since then 
and with varying results (and sometimes with the use of further organized 
violence, as the case of Matabeleland illustrates), they have been able to 
strengthen their political dominance and maintain control over the state. This is 
true even though in Zimbabwe at present it can be seen that these governments 
may not last forever.7  
The social transformation in these southern African societies shaped by a 
settler colonial brand, can at best be characterized as a transition from 
controlled change to changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite 
operating from commanding heights constructed in the particular context of the 
post-Apartheid societies and shaped by selective narratives and memories 
related to the war(s) of liberation. In this context, new traditions to establish an 
exclusive post-colonial legitimacy were constructed or invented under the sole 
authority of one particular agency of social forces. The ‘mystification’ of the 
                     
5 G. Harrison, ‘Bringing Political Struggle Back in African Politics, Power & 
Resistance’, Review of African Political Economy, 89 (2001), 390. See also R. Kössler 
& H. Melber, ‘The West German Solidarity Movement with the Liberation Struggles in 
Southern Africa. A (Self-)Critical Retrospective’, in U. Engel & R. Kappel (eds), 
Germany’s Africa Policy Revisited (Münster & Hamburg, 2002). 
6 See, for example, B. Ashcroft, Post-Colonial Transformation (London & New York, 
2001), 21. 
7 See for a more detailed overview, H. Melber, ‘From Liberation Movements to 
Governments: On Political Culture in Southern Africa’, African Sociological Review, 6 
(2002).  
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liberators plays an essential role in this process. What has been stated with 
regard to the ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe applies to Namibia’s SWAPO too. It ‘had 
since independence sought to ground the nation’s identity as well as its own 
political legitimacy in the liberation war’.8  
The evidence presented here is an attempt to collect and assess the impact of 
histories of war and violence on the post-colonial mental environment of 
Namibia, which still shapes and affects memories and their institutionalization 
in symbols, rituals and daily practices related to the present political culture and 
hegemony. By doing so, the significance of revolt and resistance in the history 
of Namibia and its utilization for the legitimacy of currently dominant patterns 
of rule under a previous liberation movement can provisionally be explored.9 
This follows the appeal by Werbner:  
 
The critique of power in contemporary Africa calls for a theoretically informed 
anthropology of memory and the making of political subjectivities. The need is to 
rethink our understanding of the force of memory, its official and unofficial forms, 
its moves between the personal and the social in postcolonial transformation.10   
 
This exploratory effort does not claim to provide any definitive answers but 
seeks to offer some thought-provoking input on reflections on the current socio-
political environment after more than a decade of Namibian independence. I 
suggest that the post-colonial reality reflects the contradictions and challenges 
predicted so convincingly by Artur Carlos Maurício Pestana, a former MPLA 
fighter. He published, under his nom de guerre, the notes he made in 1971 
during his participation in the guerrilla war in the rainforest of the Cabinda front 
in Angola for the MPLA. As a novel and narrative it offers a remarkable degree 
of sensitivity and insight into the complexity (and limits) of social 
transformation subsequent to a situation of armed resistance against foreign 
colonial rule. As the commander of the guerrilla unit (‘Fearless’) explains to the 
                     
8 J. Alexander, J. McGregor & T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in 
the ‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, 2000), 254. 
9 To that extent this chapter relates directly to the one by Jan-Bart Gewald in this 
volume (and vice versa). For other recent efforts to find a more systematic analytical 
context assessing the track record of the SWAPO liberation movement as the party in 
political power since independence, see H. Melber, ‘The Culture of Politics’, in H. 
Melber (ed.), Namibia – A Decade of Independence, 1990-2000 (Windhoek, 2000) and 
H. Melber, ‘Liberation and Democracy in Southern Africa: The Case of Namibia’, in H. 
Melber & C. Saunders (eds), Transition in Southern Africa – Comparative Aspects. Two 
Lectures (Uppsala, 2001). 
10 R. Werbner, ‘Beyond Oblivion: Confronting Memory Crisis’, in Werbner, Memory 
and the Postcolony, 2. 
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political commissar (‘New World’), for whom he ultimately sacrifices his life in 
battle:  
 
We don’t share the same ideals. (…) You are the machine type, one of those who is 
going to set up the unique, all-powerful Party in Angola. I am the type who could 
never belong to the machine. (…) One day, in Angola, there will no longer be any 
need for rigid machines, and that is my aim. …what I want you to understand, is that 
the revolution we are making is half the revolution I want. But it is the possible. I 
know my limits and the country’s limits. My role is to contribute to this half-
revolution. (…) I am, in your terminology, adventurist. I should like the discipline of 
war to be established in terms of man and not the political objective. My guerrillas 
are not a group of men deployed to destroy the enemy, but a gathering of different, 
individual beings, each with his subjective reasons to struggle and who, moreover, 
behave as such. (…) I am happy when I see a young man decide to build himself a 
personality, even if politically that signifies individualism. (…) I cannot manipulate 
men, I respect them too much as individuals. For that reason, I cannot belong to a 
machine.11  
 
This conversation is more than fiction: it sets the parameters and social 
constraints for a post-colonial society with a history of armed resistance against 
settler colonialism in southern Africa – a society like that of present-day 
Namibia. 
 
 
                    
‘Let us die fighting’: Armed resistance as a historical continuity 
 
In 1960 the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) was formed 
as a result of the organizational structures emerging during the 1950s among the 
contract workers from the northern part of Namibia – Ovamboland – a region 
named after its population.12 Until the mid-1960s SWAPO was competing with 
 
11 Pepetela, Mayombe (London, 1996), 197-98.  
12 The different Ovambo communities form more than half of Namibia’s population and 
are the backbone and power base of SWAPO. The SWAPO narrative is thus strongly 
guided and influenced by an Ovambo perspective. This chapter, however, does not 
explore the regional-ethnic aspects and components of post-colonial national ideology 
in Namibia in depth. For a comprehensive official historiography on the liberation 
struggle and SWAPO’s role, see Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of 
Namibia, To Be Born A Nation. The Liberation Struggle for Namibia (London, 1981). 
Other semi-official historiographies include the scholarly works of two long-time 
SWAPO activists who graduated in exile from Oxford and Lund respectively: P. 
Katjavivi, A History of Resistance in Namibia (London, 1988) and K. Mbuende, 
Namibia, the Broken Shield: Anatomy of Imperialism and Revolution (Lund, 1986). 
Katjavivi has been the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Namibia since its 
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other anti-colonial organizations for a leadership role but its decision to launch 
an armed struggle as the ultimate means to liberate Namibia marked a turning 
point and paved the way for SWAPO’s international and local recognition as 
the most relevant organization of the Namibian people to bring about 
independence. The subsequent steps to hegemony within the anti-colonial 
resistance were constituted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
3111 of 12 December 1973, recognizing SWAPO as ‘the authentic 
representative of the Namibian people’ and its amendment in the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/146 of 20 December 1976 to be the 
‘sole and authentic’ representative. It thereby endorsed the exclusive status and 
political monopoly of SWAPO in the ongoing negotiations on behalf of the 
Namibian people. 
The armed struggle – as executed by SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) – constituted a substantial if not decisive 
step towards legitimacy in this process.13 In principle decided upon in the early 
1960s, it finally started after a ruling by the International Court of Justice in The 
Hague that denied the Namibian people a hearing on their right to self-
determination on purely legal grounds. Its announcement on 18 July 1966 
provoked a statement, released the same day by SWAPO’s external 
headquarters (then in Dar es Salaam, later in Lusaka and finally in Luanda), 
declaring that: ‘We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring about our 
liberation’.14 
The first military encounter between SWAPO insurgents and the South 
African army occurred on 26 August 1966 when the colonial forces attacked a 
guerrilla base at Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland (nowadays in politically 
correct post-colonial terminology more vaguely referred to as Northern 
Namibia). Subsequently, August 26 was commemorated by the United Nations 
as ‘Namibia Day’. An editorial in the June/July 1968 issue of the SWAPO 
publication Namibia News illustrates the crucial element introduced with the 
armed liberation struggle to the historiography of SWAPO, which from now on 
could claim to represent the continuity of resistance by the people of Namibia 
against foreign occupation: 
 
26 August is a day of commemoration for our people. One of our early uprisings 
against the Germans took place on this date and ever since the date has been 
                                                  
establishment in the early 1990s, while Mbuende was Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 
then SADC Executive Secretary and since 2000 a Member of Parliament. 
13 See T. Emmett, Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-
1966 (Basel, 1999), 331-34. 
14 Department of Information and Publicity/SWAPO of Namibia, To Be Born A Nation, 
177. 
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remembered. On 26 August this year it is two years since we, the people of Namibia, 
entered a new phase in our fight against the racist white minority by launching our 
armed struggle. Until then we fought by non-violent means, but this brought us 
nothing but increased violence and brutality from our enemy. When we saw there 
was no way out – the last straw was the let-down by the world community in The 
Hague – we took up arms. 
Namibia’s history contains many accounts of armed uprising against foreign 
invaders. For instance, from 1904 to 1907 the Germans faced continuous revolts 
which were led by the dynamic chiefs, Maherero and Witbooi. The Germans met the 
resistance with what they called ‘a war of extermination’, during which they 
ruthlessly killed any Namibian they could find, whether soldier or civilian. When the 
war ended, the population in parts of our country was reduced by two-thirds. In 1917 
another uprising took place, this time under the leadership of King Mandume. 
Mandume’s men fought the Boers in the South and the Portuguese in the North. 
Although this revolt was crushed, we did not lose our determination to free our 
country from white overlordship. Today we are again engaged in an armed battle 
against our enemy, but this time we cannot be stopped until we have liberated 
Namibia from the white settler regime.15  
 
With the armed struggle, SWAPO had entered a new stage in Namibian 
history. Not only did this add a further dimension to the efforts to bring about 
independence, but it also opened the way for its consolidation as the one and 
only decisive organization within the anti-colonial movement. It created the 
idea of historical continuity since the days of the early ‘primary’ anti-colonial 
resistance beginning in the late nineteenth century. This is clearly illustrated by 
the quotation above which underlines the direct links to the efforts of leaders 
among the Nama (Witbooi), the Herero (Maherero) and the Kwanyama/ 
Ovambo (Mandume) under early colonial rule to resist foreign occupation by 
means of armed resistance too. 
‘Let us die fighting’, a quote accredited to a letter by Herero Chief Samuel 
Maherero, in which he tried to convince the Nama Kaptein Hendrik Witbooi 
shortly before the first organized military attack on the German colonial 
authorities in 1904 to join the resistance, emerged during the 1980s as a 
catchphrase to link the contemporary struggle with the early history of armed 
anti-colonial struggle. It became popular as a result of a qualitatively new 
perspective within historical analysis, with subsequent prominent and also 
politically relevant impact.16 Maherero’s letter, actually sent to the Kaptein of 
                     
15 Quoted from A. de Braganca & I. Wallerstein (eds), The African Liberation Reader. 
Volume 2: The National Liberation Movements (London, 1982), 5-6. 
16 H. Drechsler, ‘Let Us Die Fighting’: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama against 
German Imperialism, 1884-1914 (London, 1980). The title of the German original 
(Südwestafrika unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft), a thesis published in the GDR in 
1966 (and published in a revised version in 1984) did not make use of the quote. See on 
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the Rehoboth Basters and instead of being handed over to Witbooi passed on to 
the Germans, contained the following appeal, which allowed later analysis to 
suggest the emergence of a common interest and alliance during early anti-
colonial resistance between hitherto divided groups: 
 
I appeal to you, my Brother, not to hold aloof from the uprising, but to make your 
voice heard so that all Africa may take up arms against the Germans. Let us die 
fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other 
calamity.17  
 
The claim to historic continuity was one of the things illustrated by the fact 
that The Combatant, the monthly organ of PLAN, in a later standard front cover 
header combined the images of Hendrik Witbooi and Tobias Hainyeko, a PLAN 
commander who was killed and praised as one of the fallen heroes.18 
SWAPO’s military activities were never as effective and successful as 
efforts on the diplomatic front. This was partly the result of the relative 
weakness of the combat units and the unfavourable geographical and geo-
strategic conditions for guerrilla warfare in many parts of the country. It was at 
the same time at least as much Namibia’s genuine status in terms of 
international law that resulted in special attention by the United Nations towards 
this ‘trust betrayed’.19 It allowed for diplomatic offensives that other anti-
                                                  
the relevance of Drechsler’s study, also in current debate, the chapter in this volume by 
Jan-Bart Gewald. 
17 Ibid. 143. For a more recent summary of the context of ‘primary’ resistance in the 
process of colonization, see H. Melber, ‘Economic and Social Formation in the Process 
of Colonisation: Society and State Before and During German Rule’, in C. Keulder 
(ed.), State, Society and Democracy. A Reader in Namibian Politics (Windhoek, 2000). 
18 The Combatant – The Monthly Organ of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN) was published from 1980 onwards in mimeographed and stapled A4 format but 
changed its layout in the mid-1980s into a more sophisticated A5 format print version. 
The relevance of the armed struggle is also illustrated by the fact that The Combatant 
was among the SWAPO publications and periodicals (such as Namibia News and 
Namibia Today) with the longest continuity and ceased publication only at the end of 
1988 with the ceasefire agreement and subsequent implementation of United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). 
19 Namibia – A Trust Betrayed had in fact been the title of a United Nations publication 
to explain the case in terms of international law. As a result, SWAPO received not only 
support from the majority of member states in the United Nations General Assembly, as 
already mentioned by its recognition as ‘sole and authentic representative’, but could 
subsequently claim observer status to the United Nations and was supported by a United 
Nations Council for Namibia, as well as a later established United Nations Institute for 
Namibia – both agencies collaborating closely with SWAPO or in the latter case even 
run by a considerable number of SWAPO cadres. For a recent comprehensive summary 
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colonial movements rarely had at their disposal. But without the existence of the 
armed struggle, the diplomatic and political successes as well as the internal 
mobilization of Namibians could not have been achieved to such a degree.  
 
 
‘To be born a nation’: The armed struggle as a midwife 
 
The battlefield offered few, if any, victories over the South African forces of 
occupation. The war was waged mainly in the Angolan border area and on 
foreign soil. But however much a military victory might have boosted morale, 
defeats contributed to a growing identity in the struggle. Seen in this light, the 
‘ravages of war’20 did not only have a devastating impact on the further course 
of the struggle for liberation but also brought together the oppressed Namibian 
majority. The collective trauma of the Cassinga massacre hence symbolized not 
defeat but a determination to resist and to make sacrifices. This refugee camp in 
southern Angola was bombed – as the height of cynicism and in an obvious 
effort to sabotage the acceptance of the decolonization plan as defined in the 
United Nation Security Council Resolution 435 – on 4 May 1978 (Ascension 
Day) by the South African army.21 The several hundred victims (mainly women 
and children) have remained a symbol of the Namibian struggle for 
independence ever since.  
The idea of martyrdom created in every case of violence exercised by the 
occupation army and police, both in exile as well as on the home front, in police 
cells and in the townships, added to the consolidation of resistance under the 
SWAPO banner. The glorification of resistance and sacrifices on the battlefield 
were articulated in numerous (often crude) praise poems published in 
SWAPO’s various publications. One, which gave the title to the only published 
anthology documenting the spirit of these days, ends with the following lines: 
 
We fear not your beatings 
Neither your brutal bombardments 
                                                  
and documentation of the role of the United Nations in the dispute, see L.C.W. Kaela, 
The Question of Namibia (London & New York, 1996). 
20 Described in some detail in B. König, Namibia – The Ravages of War (London, 1983) 
and D. Herbstein & J. Evenson, The Devils are Among Us. The War for Namibia 
(London, 1989). 
21 The best accounts are A. Heywood, The Cassinga Event (Windhoek, 1994) and M.Y. 
Nangolo & T. Sellström, Kassinga. A Story Untold (Windhoek, 1995). As the titles 
show, Cassinga is also referred to as Kassinga. 
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For you cannot smash our strength 
We so united and strong 
Your flesh and heart we shall bear.22  
 
The same volume includes a poem about Cassinga, which ends with a similar 
appeal to the masses, reminding them of the legacy left behind by the dead and 
the obligation of survivors still suffering from oppression to fight for liberation: 
 
They have died for our country, 
They have died for our people. 
Their blood is shed – but not in vain! 
Their brightest sacrifice – won’t be in vain! 
The task is over to you and me, 
The task is given to all of us, 
We have to continue from where they ended, 
Never betray their sacred blood! 
Their blood is shed – but not in vain! 
Their highest sacrifice – won’t be in vain! 
Ensure the success of the struggle! 
Defend the revolution for the good of all!23 
 
Frantz Fanon’s classification of this mode of expression is a relevant 
characterization of the ‘midwife’ function the armed struggle was able to 
assume in the creation of a national consciousness. For him, this ‘literature of 
combat’ 
                     
22 F. Tshirunga, ‘It Is No More a Cry’, in H. Melber (ed.), It Is No More a Cry. 
Namibian Poetry in Exile (Basel, 1982), 38. 
23 N. Wakolele, ‘Kassinga’, in ibid. 47. In the early 1980s, the author was a student at 
the United Nations Institute in Lusaka. When he died in the mid-1990s, he was 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Namibia. Other 
authors of the ‘literature of combat’ included the current Namibian ambassador to 
Germany, Hinyangerwa Asheeke. I hereby admit to have actively disseminated the 
revolutionary pathos and phraseology of two decades ago without much of a critical 
distance, as the introductory essay to this aforementioned volume testifies: H. Melber, 
‘Colonialism, Culture and Resistance: The Case of Namibia’, in ibid. As a member of 
SWAPO since 1974 and banned from entering Namibia after 1975 until independence, I 
was part of the dominant anti-colonial spirit in exile, propagating the gospel of the 
national liberation struggle with few or no doubts concerning the absolute moral 
superiority of the historical mission. While I do not see a reason to regret the 
commitment of the time or to revoke my affiliation to SWAPO and its goals and ideals 
of national sovereignty, I am having second thoughts on some of the issues then 
unnoticed by myself from today’s perspective. 
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…calls on the whole people to fight for their existence as a nation. It is a literature of 
combat because it moulds the national consciousness, giving it form and contours and 
flinging open before it new and boundless horizons; it is a literature of combat because 
it assumes responsibility, and because it is the will to liberty expressed in terms of time 
and space.24  
 
Praise poems have remained a relevant mode of expression in the context of 
post-colonial Namibian culture and politics, though their content has changed 
from revolutionary pathos to other forms of similarly robust patriotism.25 The 
socio-psychological impact of the armed struggle to the formation and 
consolidation of an emerging identity of a Namibian nation in combat for 
independence is an obvious message from the quoted documentary evidence 
and is also reflected in SWAPO’s national anthem, the words of which followed 
the tune of ‘Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika’: 
 
Honour to the heroes of Namibia 
Glory to their blood and bravery 
We give our love and loyalty 
For their blood sustains us 
To fight till victory!26  
 
The armed struggle was conceived as an integral part of the battle for liberation 
among the SWAPO activists by the early 1970s and considered to be a shared 
responsibility. Evidence of this is in one of the recommendations tabled by a 
report compiled after investigations into dissent and power struggles within 
SWAPO in the mid-1970s. The conflicts were a result of frustrations over issues 
related to the armed struggle, the relationship between the political and the 
military as well as the treatment of combatants.27 The Commission of Inquiry 
emphasized: 
 
                     
24 F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Harmondsworth, 1967), 193. 
25 Including a collection of praise poetry on President Sam Nujoma. 
26 Verse three of the national anthem, quoted from SWAPO News and Views, Special 
Issue, 1 (1989) 2, 52. Any resemblance to the first lines of Namibia’s national anthem 
quoted at the beginning is of course not purely coincidental!   
27 The most detailed account so far on these internal tensions and conflicts are presented 
by C. Leys & J.S. Saul, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle. The Two-Edged Sword (London 
& Athens, 1995) and L. Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: War by 
Other Means (Basel, 1998). Both studies offer the best explanatory and analytical 
framework so far for the legitimizing function of the armed struggle in SWAPO’s 
strategy, relevant for substantial subsequent practices and their ideological justification. 
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the framework of the principle of armed struggle as being the only viable and 
effective means of achieving total liberation. Within this principle all SWAPO 
members are soldiers. As a rule all SWAPO officials should spend at least two 
months a year at the front.28 
 
Namibia’s ultimate decolonization in a transitional phase with direct United 
Nations involvement during 1989/1990 was brought about by a combination of 
local, regional and global factors. The military aspect, though certainly not 
decisive, was one of them. SWAPO, in its efforts to underscore its claim to have 
been the ultimate force of liberation through the barrel of a gun, presented a 
different view in line with its self-image. This was expressed in what was 
probably the last issue of The Combatant, which for ten years published news 
from the battlefield on a regular basis: 
 
…the intensification of the armed liberation struggle for the last 22 years has finally 
made South Africa seek a negotiated solution to Namibia’s independence problem 
and avert a humiliating military defeat that would shatter its dreams of being the so-
called regional superpower.29 
 
In fact, an emphasis on the military dimension attached to the liberation 
struggle almost derailed the transition to independence. On 1 April 1989, the 
day of the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 
(1978), many of the several hundred SWAPO combatants gathered in Northern 
Namibia were massacred in cold blood by South African troops in spite of a 
ceasefire agreement.30 They were blamed for having invaded an area outside 
their originally confined (Angolan) bases in violation of the ceasefire 
agreement. South Africa claimed, on the basis of reconnaissance evidence, that 
PLAN insurgents had sneaked into Namibia to create the impression that they 
had been occupying bases inside the country (a fact which would have given 
additional support to SWAPO claims that it was playing a relevant military role 
by operating from Namibian territory). While SWAPO still officially denies that 
the PLAN fighters had been ordered only a few days earlier to move into 
                     
28 ‘Report of the Findings and Recommendations of the John ya Otto Commission of 
Inquiry into Circumstances which Led to the Revolt of SWAPO Cadres between June, 
1974 and April, 1976’, submitted 4 June 1976 to the SWAPO Central Committee at its 
meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, July 1976 (unpublished), 16. I am not aware, however, that 
this recommended rule was indeed applied. 
29 The Combatant, 10 (1988) 5, 7. 
30 A detailed but unashamedly biased pro-South African description of the events is 
offered by P. Stiff, Nine Days of War. Namibia – Before, During and After (Alberton, 
1989). 
 
 ‘Namibia, land of the brave’ 317 
Namibian territory, and vigorously refutes any other interpretation,31 serious 
evidence points in a different direction.32 Be that as it may, the hundreds of 
young men caught by surprise had to pay the highest price and sacrificed their 
lives on a battlefield that was no longer supposed to exist.33  
In the Republic of Namibia’s first hours, the first (and so far only) president 
– who has also been SWAPO’s president since its foundation – did not forget to 
remember the price of liberation paid by so many. He closed his inaugural 
speech with the following words: 
 
Master of Ceremony, Sir, in accepting the sacred responsibility which the Namibian 
people have placed on me, as the first President of the Republic of Namibia, I would 
like to bow and pay homage to our fallen heroes and heroines, whose names 
Namibia’s present and future generations will sing in songs of praise and whose 
martyrdom they will intone. 
In conclusion, I move, in the name of our people, to declare that Namibia is forever 
free, sovereign and independent!34  
 
 
‘Where others wavered’: Post-colonial war narratives and 
militarism 
 
It should come as no surprise that Namibia’s society today still bears the scars 
of its violent colonial history. The official political discourse, with the national 
                     
31 See, for example, the surprisingly offending remarks in President Sam Nujoma´s 
autobiography where he accuses Martti Ahtisaari as the highest United Nations official 
in charge of Namibian decolonization ‘to be more concerned with his career at the 
United Nations than with his responsibilities towards the oppressed people of Namibia’. 
He further maintains that ‘Ahtisaari’s action betrayed our cause’ and that he ‘plotted’. S. 
Nujoma, Where Others Wavered (London, 2001), 396-97.  
32 See the interview with Martti Ahtisaari, previously Head of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia, then in charge of the United Nations Transitional Assistance 
Group (UNTAG), in I. Soiri & P. Peltola, Finland and National Liberation in Southern 
Africa (Uppsala, 1999), 185-86.  
33 There are earlier sacrifices of a similar nature, though not the same dimension, on 
record. See the failed incursion by SWAPO combatants into Eastern Hereroland in the 
late 1970s, motivated by other deliberations than any chance for a military success. Jan-
Bart Gewald’s reference to this incident in his chapter in this volume indicates that the 
young people were sent to their death for reasons of political mobilization among the 
Herero. 
34 Quoted from the speech as reproduced in full length in Nujoma, Where Others 
Wavered, 447. Nujoma dedicated his autobiography ‘to the gallant sons and daughters, 
heroes and heroines under the leadership of their vanguard SWAPO, and to those who 
struggled and sacrificed their precious lives for the total liberation of Namibia’. 
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liberation movement assuming the power of definition by seizing legitimate and 
democratically based control over the state as the elected Namibian government 
since then, reflects a continued affinity towards authoritarian structures required 
to wage war. The dominant narrative of post-colonial Namibia is presented here 
by means of several examples. It has been suggested elsewhere with reference 
to Zimbabwe’s second chimurenga that the ‘variety of appropriations of 
violence is the dating of events’ and ‘the memorising of dates of wars and 
battles (as well as biographies of great men – and women) as markers of 
history’.35  
Namibian independence started by choosing such a day: 21 March 1990 was 
agreed upon as Independence Day following a SWAPO suggestion to the 
Constituent Assembly to honour the memory of the Sharpeville massacre in 
South Africa by opting for this date. Though largely unknown in the public 
sphere in Namibia, it reiterates the liberation movement’s commitment to 
remember victims of struggles in times of peace. On 4 May, Kassinga Day – a 
public holiday – marks the biggest single massacre of refugees in exile. Heroes 
Day on 26 August, introduced earlier as Namibia Day by the United Nations, is 
also a public holiday and commemorates the beginning of the armed struggle in 
Omgulumbashe (where a memorial has since been erected).36 Human Rights 
Day on 10 December focuses, in the Namibian context, on the violent 
oppression in 1959 when police opened fire on those demonstrating against the 
planned forceful removal of black urban residents from the ‘old location’ in 
Windhoek to the new ‘township’ of Katutura, killing eleven people.37  
These national public holidays tend to be monopolized by SWAPO as the 
party in control of government. Their one-sided celebrations, including the 
display of party emblems by the head of state during official ceremonies,
                     
35 H. Schmidt, ‘Neither War Nor Peace: Making Sense of Violence’, in G. Elwert, S. 
Feuchtwang & D. Neubert (eds), Dynamics of Violence (Berlin, 1999), 219. 
36 It is also revealing that the Namibia Defence Force (NDF) runs a holding company 
with the registered name ‘August 26’. It owns a diamond mine in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, with an NDF general as the company’s managing director.  
37 This incident marked a turning point in the history of the Namibian liberation struggle 
in as far as it contributed to the formation of SWAPO in early 1960 and the subsequent 
decision to ultimately resort to an armed struggle against colonial repression. See for 
documentary evidence, D. Ridgway, M. Jafta, N. Kautja, M. Oliphant & K. Shipingana, 
An Investigation of the Shooting at the Old Location on 10 December 1959 (Windhoek, 
1991) and an eyewitness account, J. Ya-Otto, Battlefront Namibia (London, 1982) in 
the chapter entitled ‘The Windhoek Massacre’, 34-54. 
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Heroes’ Acre (and detail of relief) on the outskirts of Windhoek, July 2002, just 
prior to its official opening 
Photos by Henning Melber 
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motivated a political opponent to articulate public criticism in parliament.38 In 
addition to these national public holidays, particular group memories contribute 
to aspects of regional-ethnic identity in a historical perspective. In Okahandja, 
the Herero commemorate their war against the Germans at the end of August.39 
So do the Witbooi Nama in Gibeon each year in October.40 Kaptein Hendrik 
Witbooi, the leader they pay most prominent tribute to by re-enacting the war 
against the Germans, has been reproduced on the different Namibian dollar 
notes introduced as the country’s own currency in the early 1990s.41  
A monument outside the capital Windhoek complements the war memorial 
constructed in Omgulumbashe according to the declared aims of the political 
leadership in SWAPO. Plans for a Heroes’ Acre have been implemented with 
the assistance of North Korea.42 The state’s annual budget for 2001/2002 
financed the construction work at a site in the direct vicinity of the military base 
of Luiperds Valley. Commentary in the local daily German newspaper 
characterized this project as a gigantic symbol of a late-nationalist triumph.43 
North Korean architects are also designing an Independence Museum to be built 
next to the Alte Feste (the colonial fort erected by the German Schutztruppe) 
and in close vicinity to both the Tintenpalast (the previous administrative 
                     
38 A former SWAPO activist in exile (during the first five years of independence the 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and since 2000 an elected 
parliamentary representative of the opposition Congress of Democrats tabled a motion 
in early April 2002. He blamed SWAPO, in the light of the recent Independence Day 
ceremonies, for using national commemorative events and public holidays for party 
propaganda and thereby acting against the spirit of national reconciliation. See M. 
Springer, ‘Feier Missbraucht’, Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek), 9 April 2002. 
39 See the chapter in this volume by Jan-Bart Gewald for a comprehensive analysis of 
the historical events and their psychological and political implications for Namibian 
politics.  
40 See R. Kössler, ‘Tradition als Politische Strategie. Vom Witbooi-Fest zum Heroes 
Day in Gibeon, Namibia’, in A. Eckert & J. Müller (eds), Transformationen der 
Europäischen Expansion vom 16. bis 20. Jahrhundert (Rehberg-Loccum, 1997), 62-74; 
R. Kössler, ‘Rebuilding Societies from Below: Reflections on Heroes Day, Gibeon, 
October 1995’, in R. Kössler, H. Melber & P. Strand, Development From Below: A 
Namibian Case Study (Uppsala, 2002). 
41 The subject is further touched upon in Jan-Bart Gewald’s chapter in this volume with 
reference to the monuments of three Namibian patriots from different regions and 
population groups unveiled in Windhoek in 2001, after the statue of Hosea Kutako had 
to remain covered under a layer of black plastic for several years. 
42 See on the symbolic relevance of such a memorial site under Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe (also erected with North Korean involvement), N.J. Kriger, 
‘The Politics of Creating National Heroes: The Search for Political Legitimacy and 
National Identity’, in Bhebe & Ranger, Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War. 
43 E. Hofmann, ‘Selbsterkenntnis’, Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek), 6 February 2002.  
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offices of the German colonial authority, now the National Assembly) and the 
Christuskirche. The old colonial monument of the German equestrian 
Schutztruppenreiter, which has looked down from the hillside onto the centre of 
town for about 90 years, is to be moved, due to construction work, to a less 
prominent site a few hundred metres away.44 
Sam Nujoma, as the political father figure of Namibian independence, 
personifies in a marked and pronounced way the cultivation of the memories of 
the liberation war beyond such changes in infrastructure. Testimony to this is 
not only to be found in his autobiography, which ends with independence and 
words from one of his earlier speeches during the days of the struggle: 
 
When the history of a free and independent Namibia is written one day, SWAPO 
will go down as having stood firm where others have wavered: that it sacrificed for 
the sacred cause of liberation where others have compromised.45 
 
The president’s vivid memory of combat motivated him in May 2001 to a 
physical re-enactment of a war scene in front of a television camera when he 
was visited on his farm by a South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 
team. The scenes, in which he throws himself to the ground and imitates 
shooting, are in stark contrast to the expectations of how an elder statesman 
ought to behave in public. To the embarrassment of State House, the pictures 
were included in a less than favourable profile of Namibia’s head of state 
broadcast in neighbouring South Africa in a popular documentary series. 
Following official protests by the Namibian government on biased reporting, 
the film crew had to offer an apology. 
The tendency towards glorification of the history of warfare for liberation 
(which by implication is for a just cause and hence tends to embrace 
affirmatively the dubious notion of a ‘just war’) is an obvious symptom in 
Namibian society today. It plays a relevant role in the current symbolism and 
rituals of the post-colonial political culture. (After all, the pictures in the 
controversial film documentary did indeed show the president.) It also allowed 
for a rather problematic treatment of the far-reaching decision to become 
militarily involved in ongoing conflicts beyond Namibia’s borders (in the sense 
of showing little visible concern for the consequences). In August 1998 troops 
were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where they came to the 
                     
44 Ironically, some of the newly built manifestations of independence (including the 
Constitutional Court constructed in the mid-1990s close to the site of the future 
Independence Museum) bear some obvious resemblance to the Nazi architecture of 
Albert Speer. 
45 This quote is taken from the brochure SWAPO Information on SWAPO: An Historical 
Profile (Lusaka, 1978). 
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rescue of President Kabila. Since the end of 1999, Namibia has also been 
directly involved in the ongoing war in neighbouring Angola, where the 
Namibian army has been involved in fights with UNITA guerrillas. In neither 
case was parliament or the cabinet consulted, and decisions were taken solely 
by the head of state who is also in command of the army and entitled to act in 
the national interest.46 In a parliamentary debate on the additional budget in 
November 1998, Namibia’s foreign minister declared categorically that the 
debate over Namibia’s intervention in the DRC had come to an end and labelled 
any further criticism as ‘un-African’. The first soldiers officially returning from 
the Congo in June 2001 were honoured with a heroes’ reception.47 In his New 
Year’s Message for 2002, President Nujoma deemed this military involvement a 
remarkable event: 
 
I can state with pride that the gallant soldiers of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) 
and other SADC Allied Forces showed great courage and bravery … Our soldiers 
completed this task with honour and returned home in triumph…48 
 
 
‘One Namibia, one nation’? 
 
More than a decade after independence, many of the high-ranking political 
office bearers still have a track record as comrades dating back to SWAPO’s 
formative years during the 1960s and 1970s. The situational application of 
militant rhetoric as a tool for inclusion or exclusion in terms of the post-colonial 
national identity is common practice. It demonstrates that the declared notions 
of national reconciliation and the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ do not always 
receive the desired acknowledgement in terms of political pluralism and 
tolerance. Namibian identity is instead defined increasingly by those in power 
along narrow lines of definition and (self-)understanding. What has been 
suggested with reference to the understanding of post-independent power 
                     
46 While he was chairing the United Nations General Assembly sessions in New York, 
his deputy minister, in an acting capacity, accused the print media in Namibia critical of 
Namibia’s involvement in the Angolan conflict in January 2000 of being a ‘fifth 
column’ of UNITA and of damaging the country’s reputation. 
47 See the eyewitness report by R. Kössler, ‘Szenen einer Heimkehr. Siegesfeier auf der 
Independence Avenue in Windhoek’, afrika süd, 4 (2001). 
48 ‘Let’s Look Back at the Great Events’. President’s New Year Message, Die 
Republikein (Windhoek), 2 January 2002. Shortly afterwards, when a volcano erupted 
in the Congolese border area of Goma during late January 2002, the president publicly 
expressed his regrets that this human tragedy had taken place on enemy territory 
(implying that Namibia would not be able to offer any kind of humanitarian aid to the 
victims). 
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relations in neighbouring Zimbabwe has much relevance for the Namibian case 
too: 
 
…whilst power relations had changed, perceptions of power had not changed. The 
layers of understanding regarding power relations, framed by socialisation and 
memory, continued to operate. …actors had changed, however, the way in which the 
new actors executed power in relation to opposition had not, as their mental 
framework remained in the colonial setting. Patterns from colonial rule of ‘citizens’ 
ruling the ‘subjects’ repeated and reproduced.49 
 
This is reflected in a dichotomy of polarized perceptions along the ‘we-they’ 
divide. If you are not with SWAPO, you are considered to be an enemy. Given 
the blurred boundaries between party, government and state under a factual one-
party system (with SWAPO having an overwhelming majority of votes 
allowing it to rule as it pleases) and the growing equation of the party being the 
government and the government being the state, any opposition or dissent is 
considered to be hostile and the person involved is branded an enemy of the 
people and the national interest. 
The so-called ex-detainee issue is a classic case in point. This is a group of 
former SWAPO members who were detained in exile following various internal 
disagreements that led to mass repression. From the early 1980s onward, 
hundreds if not thousands were kept in dungeons in southern Angolan camps 
where they were tortured and executed as suspected South African spies.50 
Many did not survive. Most of the others were traumatized for the rest of their 
lives. Following their return to independent Namibia, they have not been 
rehabilitated, despite numerous efforts. Nor was SWAPO prepared to be held 
accountable on this issue of violating human rights in its own ranks during the 
struggle. Instead, the ‘ex-detainees’ continued to live under the stigma of being 
considered by many as traitors and collaborators with the Apartheid regime and 
directly or indirectly held responsible for the deaths of numerous Namibian 
refugees, combatants and political activists both at home and in exile. Their 
plight was brought to renewed public attention by the personal account of an 
external witness with moral credibility.51 It provoked a considerable reaction 
                     
49 K.P. Yap, ‘Uprooting the Weeds: Power, Ethnicity and Violence in the Matabeleland 
Conflict, 1980-1987’, PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam (2000), 312-13 (original 
emphasis). 
50 See for a concise summary of the issue and its implications, G. Lamb, ‘Putting 
Belligerents in Context: The Cases of Namibia and Angola’, in S. Chesterman (ed.), 
Civilians in War (Boulder & London, 2001). For more details, see Leys & Saul, 
Namibia’s Liberation Struggle.  
51 S. Groth, Namibia – The Wall of Silence (Wuppertal, 1995). For detailed accounts on 
the subsequent controversies, see L. Dobell, ‘Silence in Context: Truth and/or 
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from SWAPO. Advocates of attempts to seek reconciliation through open 
discussion were accused of acting against the national interest. A senior 
political activist and member of parliament in a public address at a rally in 
Northern Namibia (Ovamboland) encouraged the audience to burn the 
incriminating book that had raised the issue anew. The party released a public 
statement that it  
 
cannot allow this country to be made ungovernable and be turned into a chaotic and 
lawless society by irresponsible, unpatriotic elements and foreign remainents (sic!) 
of fascism and apartheid.52  
 
Such an attitude displays striking similarities to the failure in neighbouring 
Zimbabwe to come to terms with the atrocities committed during the mid-1980s 
by the special units using violence against the civilian population on behalf of 
the central state authority by ZANU-PF in Matabeleland: 
 
The metaphor of ‘opening old wounds’ was a powerful one, invoked by former Zapu 
and ZANU-PF politicians as well as by ordinary citizens and human rights groups. 
The ‘wounds’ stood as markers of a history of violence, inscribed on both 
individuals and the body politic; ‘opening’ them meant public probing. Whether 
they had ever healed, and hence stood to be ‘opened’, whether ‘opening’ them 
constituted a destructive or a healing act, were subjects of contention which begged 
a range of questions regarding the proper commemoration of the dead and 
appropriate ways in which history might be invoked in the present without ‘tearing 
the nation apart’.53 
 
As a result of the new taboos, those reminding the new rulers of an 
‘unfinished business’ of such a nature are the targets of personalized defamation 
campaigns with the aim to discredit the individuals, normally on the basis of 
accusations that they betrayed the struggle. One of the previous SWAPO 
members, who during the exile years was originally trained in the Soviet Union 
but then left the organization in 1980, has established a National Society for 
Human Rights (NSHR) in independent Namibia. It is accredited in an advisory 
status with the United Nations and cooperates with both Amnesty International 
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The 
                                                  
Reconciliation in Namibia’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23 (1997) and C. 
Lombard, ‘The Detainee Issue: An Unresolved Test Case for SWAPO, the Churches 
and Civil Society’, in I. Diener & O. Graefe (eds), Contemporary Namibia. The First 
Landmarks of a Post-Apartheid Society (Windhoek, 2001). 
52 Media Statement by SWAPO Party on the so-called Detainee Issue, 12 March 1996, 
1. 
53 Alexander, McGregor & Ranger, Violence and Memory, 259. 
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NSHR is a highly critical human rights watchdog and at times very negative (if 
not prejudiced) concerning government policy. It regularly raises publicly 
issues concerning individual cases of violence exercised by the army and police. 
The Namibian army’s quarterly NDF Journal in its issue at the end of 2001 
accused the NSHR director of having deserted the liberation struggle, 
disseminating lies and propaganda.54  
Other political opponents of SWAPO are similarly stigmatized. A previous 
guerrilla fighter, who after being captured spent several years on Robben Island, 
became a militant trade-union leader after his release. He was then appointed 
deputy minister and later ambassador to the United Kingdom before he 
articulated open dissent with the policy of the SWAPO leadership and resigned 
from his prestigious diplomatic post. After his subsequent suspension from the 
Central Committee, of which he was a member, he left the party and founded a 
new political opposition party campaigning for the parliamentary and 
presidential elections at the end of 1999. SWAPO responded with an 
orchestrated smear campaign, denouncing him personally as a former South 
African agent who had sacrificed the lives of his comrades in arms.55 Other 
personalized attacks similar to the two examples just presented, aiming to 
discredit the individuals, disclose patterns of a war mentality that still guides 
opinion leaders in the former liberation movement. 
While the constitutionally enshrined civic rights and political liberties that 
exist in Namibia are formally defined and coded essentials of a plural 
democracy, the dominant political culture does not support a vibrant civil 
society. Instead it divides the people along narrowly defined yardsticks of 
loyalty. A professor of public law involved in the process of drafting the 
Namibian constitution has hence described the hostility and intolerance 
displayed towards civil society actors as a worrying sign: 
 
Lawyers assisting the inhabitants of Kaokoland in 1999 with respect to Government 
plans for a dam in the Kunene River (which would have flooded ancestral land) 
were severely criticised and their involvement equated with undermining Namibia’s 
ideals. The same fate met academics writing critically about the elections of 1999. 
Such reaction may be indicative of personal intolerance; it unfortunately also 
reflects negatively on the political culture and lack of tolerance in society and the 
State apparatus.56 
                     
54 See the articles in Allgemeine Zeitung (Windhoek) of 24 and 25 January 2002. 
55 While SWAPO maintained that it was in possession of evidence to prove this 
accusation, it never explained why it had co-opted him into the upper echelons of the 
party and government structure after independence until his own articulation of dissent.  
56 G. Erasmus, ‘The Constitution: Its Impact on Namibian Statehood and Politics’, in 
Keulder, State, Society and Democracy, 99. 
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How issues can escalate under growing intolerance towards deviations from 
the increasingly narrow-minded national norm became obvious in August 1999. 
A secessionist Caprivi Liberation Movement (CLM), aiming at autonomy from 
Namibia, launched an unsuccessful attack in the isolated and marginalized 
northeastern part of the country, the Caprivi Strip.57 This could be seen as an 
unrealistic response to failed integration in nation-building processes based 
more on the exclusion than inclusion of minorities. The desperate military 
attack culminated in the subsequent proclamation of a state of emergency for 
the first time in the history of the Republic of Namibia. The serious loss of any 
sense of reality on the side of the secessionists met its match in an over-reaction 
by the state and its security organs (the army and police).58 A background article 
concluded that, in retrospect, the attack in the Caprivi led to a new stage of 
national chauvinism, guided by the primacy of the military.59 
On the basis of its quasi-monopoly of political power, SWAPO displays an 
exclusionist tendency, which defines nation building in terms of marginalizing 
‘the others’ as enemies. Namibia remains – despite the liberation movement’s 
earlier claims of fighting for ‘one Namibia, one nation’ to establish a post-
colonial society characterized by ‘unity in diversity’ – a deeply divided society. 
Similar to what has been diagnosed with regard to neighbouring Zimbabwe, 
‘the postcolonial state has sponsored a whole complex of elite memorialism’,60 
but by doing so at the same time has buried other relevant memories: 
 
…the state has itself become the agent of nostalgia, for the sake of nation-building; 
heritage is state cultural policy, often in an anti-colonial appeal inventing tradition 
for an authentic past; (…) 
                     
57 See for background information to the event, H. Melber, ‘Grenzen einer Nation: 
Koloniale Territorien und Staatsentwicklung – das Beispiel Namibia’, in Geopolitik. 
Zur Ideologiekritik politischer Raumkonzepte (Wien, 2001). 
58 Amnesty International reacted to the physical violence exercised by the state actors 
against the accused secessionists and the civilian population by articulating official 
concern over the violation of human rights. Local NGOs such as the Legal Assistance 
Centre and the National Society for Human Rights expressed public criticism on several 
occasions about the heavy-handed treatment of both civilians and arrested suspects. At 
the time of writing, more than a hundred prisoners accused of high treason had already 
been under arrest without trial for almost two and a half years, during which time 
several had died. 
59 G. Hopwood, ‘Caprivi – A Year After’, The Namibian (Windhoek), 2 August 2000. 
See also the account published by the Human Rights Committee of South Africa, 
Namibia in Focus (Johannesburg, 1999), 22-28. 
60 Werbner, ‘Beyond Oblivion’, 8. 
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Despite the weighty monumentalism or the substantial flow of material and 
immaterial tribute from the redistributive state to its honoured citizens, the 
commemoration of the nation is remarkably fragile. (…) Tensions emerge in a 
variety of ways, sometimes explosively subverting the carefully scripted course of 
state pomp and ceremony. The state theatrics, so full of impassioned appeals to 
higher moral bonds in the ‘undying struggle for national freedom’, are risky. …the 
controversies over remembered identity and postwar trauma heighten as the 
postcolony itself transforms from an early period of triumphalism to a current one of 
widespread disaffection, subverting the regime’s mandate and legitimacy.61  
 
Namibia has not yet copied the two decades of post-colonial experiences of 
Zimbabwe as summarized in this diagnosis, but the writing is on the wall.62  
In mid-December 2001, President Sam Nujoma attended a street re-naming 
ceremony as the guest of honour in the coastal town of Swakopmund. This town 
with its particular German flavour had its main street named after Kaiser 
Wilhelm – an anachronism today. Some of the German-speaking business 
community rendered an unfortunate disservice to the meaning of reconciliation 
when they strongly objected to the overdue abandoning of such a colonial relict. 
In reaction to their protest, the president explained in his speech that the 
population of Namibia in an independent Namibia has to honour its currently 
recognized heroes – and he unveiled the new street name: Sam Nujoma Avenue.  
 
 
 
61 Ibid. 1 & 8. 
62 Evidence of this is also the embarrassing degree of uncritical solidarity with the 
Mugabe regime under ZANU-PF on the occasion of the presidential elections in 
Zimbabwe. For a summary of the SWAPO (and in fact Namibian government) position 
see H. Melber, ‘Zimbabwe and “The Pitfalls of National Consciousness”’, in H. Melber 
(ed.), Zimbabwe and Beyond (Uppsala, 2002). 
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Dervishes, moryaan and freedom fighters: 
Cycles of rebellion and the fragmentation of 
Somali society, 1900-2000 
 
Jon Abbink 
 
 
There has been a state of near-permanent revolt in Somali 
society since 1991. This chapter offers a cultural analysis of 
patterns of political and military activity from the pre-
colonial era through the Italian and British colonial period, 
state independence (1960-1991), to the present period of 
statelessness. The focus is on a comparison of elements in 
the campaigns of revolt against the colonial states between 
1900 and 1920 with those in the late Siyad Barre period 
(1988-1991) and the era of statelessness (1991 onwards). A 
transformation of ideas of revolt and violent action has 
occurred in which Somali notions of egalitarian social 
order, kinship and local leadership have taken on a 
different shape. This prevented the institutionalization of 
crosscutting alliances and the emergence of a wider 
political arena – except in certain regions such as 
Somaliland and Puntland. The cultural and social unity of 
Somali society has always been overestimated. Somali 
political culture is by nature centrifugal, preventing the 
institutionalization of a legitimate leadership at state level 
but not at a regional clan level. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Somali remain an enigma. Fiercely attached to their independence and 
rebellious towards any perceived or real outside interference in their country, 
their society appears deeply divided and chronically unstable, as exemplified 
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by the absence of a central state since 1991. Certainly, the decentralized and 
centrifugal Somali political culture, marked by localized if not fragmented 
authority structures, is one explanation. Their culture is rooted in a strong 
segmentary lineage and clan organization based on a predominantly pastoral 
way of life and guided by a remarkable genealogical self-consciousness1 that 
has persisted through time. The phenomenon of group division based on 
instrumentalized clan identities, while not explaining everything, goes a long 
way in accounting for the perpetual tensions in Somali socio-political 
organization, as the Somali themselves are the first to admit.2  
At the same time, the diversity of patterns of economic adaptation and 
socio-cultural difference within Somali society should not be underestimated.3 
Although more than 60% of Somalis are transhumant pastoralists, there is more 
sedentary settlement, hierarchy and class formation in the southern part of the 
country, while an urban trader/hustler class is increasing in size as well. In the 
riverine Digil-Rahanweyn area there is also more clan flexibility in that people 
have changed their clan affiliation, and many newcomers or migrants have been 
included in the clan system. In coastal cities there is a distinct sub-culture of 
traders and urban people of mixed origins. In addition, there are ‘despised’, 
low-status caste groups and other small minorities who have always been on 
the lower rungs of the social ladder and have been disproportionately hit by 
successive armed conflicts. In recent years, the non-urban and non-pastoral 
Somali, like the sedentary agricultural Digil-Rahanweyn peoples of the area 
between the Juba and Shebelle (see Map), the Bantu-speaking (or Jareer) 
groups,4 the Wa-Gosha and the occupational caste minorities (for example, 
                                                 
1 The great value attached to personal genealogical reckoning (abtirsiinyo) is proverbial 
in Somali culture. See for instance, I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone. The Call of Kinship in 
Somali Society (Lawrenceville NJ, 1998), 19, 82, and I.M. Lewis, ‘Doing Violence to 
Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman’s “Representing Violence and 
‘Othering’ Somalia”’, Cultural Anthropology, 13 (1998), 101. See also G. Prunier, 
‘Segmentarité et Violence dans l’Espace Somali, 1840-1992’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
Africaines, 146 (1997), 381. 
2 Said S. Samatar, ‘Somalia: The Politics of Poetry’, Africa Report, 38 (1993) (Online 
version: www.anaserve.com/~mbali/samatars.htm); see also G. Hanley, Warriors and 
Strangers (London, 1971), passim. 
3 Cf. L.V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a 
Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia, 1982); V. Luling, ‘The Other Somali – 
Minority Groups in Traditional Somali Society’, in T. Labahn (ed.), Proceedings of the 
Second International Congress of Somali Studies, University of Hamburg, August 1-6 
1983, vol. IV (Hamburg, 1984), 39-55. For a map of the Somali clan families, see 
www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_ethnic92.jpg. 
4 F. Declich, ‘“Gendered Narratives”, History and Identity: Two Centuries along the 
Juba River among the Zigula and Shanbara’, History in Africa, 22 (1995), 93-122. See 
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Midgan, Yibir, Tumaal), were involved in the civil war predominantly as 
victims and less as perpetrators.5 
Civil war and disunity (1991-2001) have exacted a heavy toll among the 
Somali population in general. After the failed war against Ethiopia in 1977-78,6 
Somalia, under an increasingly brutal dictatorship, crept towards oppressive 
clan-based rule,7 disunity and armed strife, with the northern regions becoming 
the prime victim. This led to the death of tens of thousands of people, well over 
half a million refugees and displaced persons, a dramatic increase in clan-based 
conflict, malnutrition and famine, and economic and environmental crisis.8 As 
a result, the political structure of a united Somalia unravelled in the 1980s 
during the regime of President Mohammed Siyad Barre and evaporated after 
the demise of his regime in January 1991. Since then, the country has remained 
vulnerable to famine, natural disaster and predation by warlords. Civil strife 
again resulted in vast numbers of human casualties.9  
 
                                                                                                                       
also M. Mohamed-Abdi, ‘Les Bouleversements Induits de la Guerre Civile en Somalie: 
Castes Marginales et Minorités’, Autrepart (Cahiers des Sciences Humaines N.S.), 15 
(2000), 131-48. In the pre-colonial era, many Bantu-speaking people were brought to 
Somalia as slaves.  
5 See A. Haji Mukhtar, ‘The Plight of the Agro-Pastoral Society of Somalia’, Review of 
African Political Economy, 23 (1996), 543-53; L.V Cassanelli, ‘Victims and 
Vulnerable Groups in Southern Somalia’, Research Directorate, Immigration and 
Refugee Board Canada Occasional Paper (Ottawa, 1995); Mohamed-Abdi, ‘Les 
Bouleversements’, 132. 
6 See Gebru Tareke, ‘The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited’, International 
Journal of African Historical Studies, 33 (2001), 635-67. 
7 By Marehan-Ogaden-Darod clan elites. 
8 See Hussein M. Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’, in T.M. Ali & R.O. Matthews (eds), Civil 
Wars in Africa. Roots and Resolution (Montreal, 1999), 180-81; I.M. Lewis, ‘UN 
Paperclips for Somalia’, Horseed, online newspaper [www.horseed.com/jan/03/24/htm], 
3; IRIN news message of 13 June 2002 on the massive destruction of remaining Somali 
forests for charcoal for export to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. See also: 
www.padrigu.gu.se/EDCNews/Research/SomaliaCharcoal.html 
9 For a good chronology of developments in Somalia over the past 41 years, see M.A. 
Pérouse de Montclos, Interprétations d’un Conflit: Le Cas de la Somali (Pessac, 2001), 
7-18. What is remarkable in this chronology is the high incidence of violent events and 
episodes. For a report on the devastation before 1991, see also 
www.somaliawatch.org/archivefeb01/010202301.htm 
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Map 13.1  Somali clan family distribution 
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Somali culture and politics 
 
There is by now a rather familiar account of the causes of the civil war and the 
havoc it has wreaked in post-1991 Somalia.10 Political analyses of the Somali 
drama tend to yield similar stories, referring to socio-political decline and 
internal division in the absence of a developed state tradition. Analysts only 
differ in the relative weight accorded either to certain political and historical 
factors or to the role of ‘clan identities’ used as a basis for political action or 
abused for personal or factional gain, igniting conflict. These points were 
reiterated, respectively, by those termed the ‘traditionalist’ and the 
‘transformationalist’ scholars of Somali affairs.11 Those who aim to transcend 
these two polarized positions12 usually end up with a modified version of the 
second position, stressing elite private abuse. 
In my view, the core of the enigma of Somalia’s violent decline is not only 
explained by an appeal to greedy elite competition or class conflict at the level 
of state elites. This would not account for why competing factions and fighting 
groups have assumed such notable clan identities and also judge their 
opponents in the same way. In addition, the elite is divided and shows a highly 
shifting basis for the recruitment of supporters and private pursuits. The fact 
that Somali socio-political organization has lent itself to such monumental 
abuse and has actively worked against the emergence of any accepted central 
state authority or durable territorial or other alliances is telling of the 
peculiarities of and continuities in Somali society, and sets it apart from other 
societies. 
                                                 
10 See for instance, Adam, ‘Somali Civil Wars’; ‘Pérouse de Montclos, Interprétations, 
19; Prunier, ‘Segmentarité et Violence’; M. Jama, ‘Trajectoire du Pouvoir en Pays 
Somali’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines 146 (1997), 403-27; Th. Vircoulon, ‘La Crise 
Somalienne’, Afrique Contemporaine, 177 (1995), 3-16. 
11 See Abdi I. Samatar, ‘Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal 
Convention’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 30 (1992), 625-41. ‘Traditionalists’ 
are those seen to be putting (too much) emphasis on clan identities and lineage 
segmentation as the persistent (and explanatory) basis of Somali politics, while the 
‘transformationalists’ stress social inequality, personal abuse of resources, and 
exploitative elite or class rule as the motor of divisive politics and conflict. The 
‘traditionalists’ reject the epithet given to them by their opponents.  
12 For instance, M. Jama, ‘Sur la Violence en Somali: Genèse et Dynamique des 
Formations Armées’, Politique Africaine, 47 (1992), 147-51; C. Besteman, 
‘Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia’, Cultural Anthropology, 11 (1996), 
120-33. See also the recent PhD thesis by A. Mohamoud, ‘State Collapse and Post-
Conflict Developments in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001)’, University of 
Amsterdam (2002). 
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In this chapter, I do not repeat the conventional explanations of political 
crisis but instead reconsider the impact of some historical and cultural factors 
on Somali political and military rebellion and revolt across time. The ideas and 
practices of (armed) rebellion seem to have dominated Somali society in the 
past century, and specifically in the past fifteen years, but the ultimate aims and 
benefits appear to have been lost along the way. In this respect, cultural 
premises and the manner in which they were made to interact with the political 
dynamics of Somalia (as determined by both internal and external factors) need 
renewed attention. Cultural and social structural elements are simply part of the 
longue durée structure of Somali history. Such a cultural analysis is, however, 
hampered by the comparative lack of empirical field research done in Somalia 
in the past decade, and this chapter can only be a modest attempt towards an 
understanding of the topic. 
While conflicts and violence were common features of life in pre-colonial 
Somali society,13 the emergence of collective revolt can be located in the era of 
foreign colonization by the Italians and the British since the late 1890s. The 
response to this external domination was marked by violent ideological and 
armed rebellion. In the era of state independence (1960-1991) and right through 
the period of statelessness (1991-present) such a violent response surfaced 
again with renewed and much more destructive force. But it might be said that 
the Somalis were not only in revolt against the above-mentioned external forces 
but also against themselves, as is evident from persistent patterns of kin-group 
feuding, regional antagonism or rebellion against indigenous elite groups 
forming in the urban centres and through trade networks. Most dramatic 
perhaps were the revolts against the independent state that had become deeply 
suppressive and violent especially in the last decade (1980-1991) of Siyad 
Barre’s rule.  
More historically and culturally informed explanations for the centrifugal 
forces that have prevented the Somali nation from successfully organizing its 
own state structure14 remain necessary. Indeed, the Somali experience provides 
the most convincing argument to date that an ‘ethnic group’ (and one with ill-
defined boundaries at that)15 is not the best or even a necessary unit for the 
construction of a ‘national state’. In particular, one could ask what the 
                                                 
13 Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society; I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia. 
Nation and State in the Horn of Africa (Boulder & London, 1988); G. Prunier, 
‘Segmentarité et Violence’. 
14 Cf. D. Laitin & Said S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder Co., 
1988); G. Schlee, ‘Régularités dans le Chaos: Traits Récurrents dans l’Organisation 
Politico-Religieuse en Militaire des Somalis’, L’Homme, 161 (2002), 17-50. 
15 Schlee, ‘Régularités’, 18. 
  
334 Abbink 
mitigating or reinforcing role of Somali Islam and cultural precepts related to 
customary law (or heer) have been in the articulation and perpetuation of 
conflict in Somalia. A theoretical approach to structure and agency would 
emphasize that cultural organizing principles do not disappear under the force 
of political conjunctures but are brought to play a role in the power game.16  
While attention will be paid to the intervening decades, two historical 
episodes stand central in this chapter: the upheaval and resistance led by a 
notable religiously inspired leader, Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan17 (from 1899 
to 1920, see below), and the period of ‘clan-faction’ violence18 between 1991 
and 2001. I consider these two periods not to assert that they are similar in their 
way of revolt but to illustrate the continuity and change in the character of 
armed conflict and resistance in Somali society. In addition, I sketch the 
transformative impact of new forms of violent revolt on local society.  
Briefly, the dominant image in the literature is that of a ‘Somali identity’ in 
the political sense. The first period was a formative, nationalist one while the 
second was fragmenting. One of my theses in this chapter is that the mythical 
image of Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan and his Dervish movement as 
‘nationalist’ obscures the nature of Somali political identity. Although he 
initially appealed to all Somalis in the name of a religious identity, to speak of 
his rebel movement as advancing a nationalist cause is somewhat anachronistic. 
The parallels between then and now are remarkable because of the effect of its 
violent tactics on Somali society.  
Somali politics has retained an undercurrent of cyclical conflict based on 
certain principles of kinship, ideology and (perceived) material group interests, 
and in this sense one could say that politics is ‘absorbed’ or reproduced by 
Somali culture. Somali cultural values, ideas of personhood and identity, 
achievement and self-image have changed much less over the past century than 
the vagaries of political crisis and conflict would suggest. In this sense, the 
dramatic demise of the Somali state in 1991 was not a sudden and unexpected 
                                                 
16 For instance, it could be said that the failure (except in its humanitarian work) of the 
US-led ‘Operation Restore Hope’ in the early 1990s was based on a well-intentioned 
but monumental ignorance of the cultural substratum of Somali society and politics. 
‘Black Hawk Down’, the recent film based on the 1993 armed confrontation in 
Mogadishu, does not suggest that the Americans have learnt much since. See for a 
review, http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StoryID=12175 
17 Here I follow Abdi Sheik-Abdi, in his excellent book Divine Madness. Mohammed 
Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920) (London, 1993), 44, by rendering his name in the Somali 
not the Arabic spelling (which would be Muhammad ibn ‘Abdullah Hassan). 
18 I use ‘clan-faction’ instead of the widely popular but somewhat misleading term 
‘warlord’ violence. 
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event but the result of a longer, incremental process of decline of a political 
structure that could never do what it was expected to do.  
I do not wish to succumb to any primordialist view of the force of clanship 
and segmentary identities as the basis of all politics, let alone as the 
explanation for recurring factional fighting and social chaos: there is no direct 
link between the existence of clan identities and their violent and divisive 
instrumentalization. But certainly it is a fact that the idiom of kin- and clanship, 
genealogy and segmentation forms the structural basis of competition and 
political strife, aided by a territorial dimension of clans and clan families being 
concentrated in certain areas. As such, this idiom is an excellent vessel for 
manipulation by elite groups or classes that emerged in the colonial and post-
colonial era, allowing for meaningful collectives to be formed as well as for 
flexible alliances.19 This is mainly because kin- and clanship and segmentation 
(i.e. situational positioning vis-à-vis others) provide the basic identity that 
people fall back upon and recognize as defining themselves. This is also true in 
modern conditions. No one with first-hand knowledge of Somalis and Somali 
society will underestimate this fact. In Hussein Adam’s view,20 Somali political 
culture is pervaded not only by ideas of kinship and segmentation but also by 
an ethos of equality, pride and prestige between groups at any level of 
segmentation, jealously guarding public status vis-à-vis each other. The 
important point is that people want recognition and reciprocity, even if they are 
not prepared to give it to others. They also make claims to social justice. 
Following Hussein Adam, one could say that this characteristic attitude is 
politically relevant in Somali life, in that clan consciousness is mobilized in the 
struggle for prestige and justice. 
Thus, a political-economic view must be developed in dynamic linkage with 
a culturalist view to explain continuities and change in patterns of group 
identity and political agency that have shaped rebellion in Somalia. An 
understanding of what motivates the Somali people in socio-cultural terms 
would help in devising international assistance programmes and sounder 
political cooperation with Somalia.  
 
 
                                                 
19 This is because most Somali clans allow for filiation on a non-descent basis and have 
clientship or ‘adoption’ (sheegad) of people from other clans. 
20 Hussein M. Adam, ‘Militarism and Warlordism: Rethinking the Somali Political 
Experience’, African Studies Center, Boston University Working Paper no. 49 (Boston, 
1993). 
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Pre-colonial Somalis 
 
Revolt and resistance seem perennial themes in Somali history and are often 
tied to the segmentary nature of Somali society, dominated by patrilineal 
kinship links (tol waa tolaane – ‘agnates are connected’) as well as 
reconstructed lineage and clan identifications21 of individuals and groups. 
While the system has a patrilineal bias, the uterine links in the paternal line as 
well as the links though the mother’s clan or lineage are also of vital 
importance. 
Somalis traditionally neither knew a state authority nor recognized the 
primary binding force of an external power beyond the (sub-) clan. The 
clan/lineage and its nominal authority structure, based on elders and certain 
chiefs (boqor, ugaaz, garad)22 and buttressed by religious leaders (wadaaddo, 
ma’allimiin) and the structure of the Sufi orders (turuuq),23 formed the bedrock 
of society. Due to the nature of their mobile economy and social organization, 
Somalis could (and still can) largely afford to ignore the claims of state or other 
overarching institutions. An oft-cited comment is that by the Baganda 
companion of a British soldier travelling for the first time in the Somali area in 
1910: ‘Somalis, bwana, they no good; each man his own sultan’.24 Somalis still 
cultivate this self-image of personal pride and independence.25  
It should also be emphasized that the Somali social order, while recognizing 
links through females, is deeply patriarchal, with public, religious and political 
activity strongly dominated by men. Married women are vocal, economically 
active and central figures in domestic life and maintain important links with 
their family and clan of birth26 but husbands or male relatives should give their 
approval for what their womenfolk do. 
                                                 
21 Tol means patrilineal kinship linking and is situational as to the actual links stressed. 
Starting at the lowest level and then going up, Somalis are members of a qoys (family), 
a reer, a jilib, a qolo and a qabiil (this is the most inclusive level, that of the six large 
clan families). Jilib and reer, and to a lesser degree qolo, can be mag (blood money)-
paying groups in the case of homicide. 
22 These had no meaningful executive power and cannot be considered on a par with the 
chiefs known elsewhere in Africa. 
23 Ahmadiyya, Qadiriyya and Salihiyya. 
24 Cited in Samatar, ‘Somalia: The Politics of Poetry’. R.F. Burton’s remarkable book 
First Footsteps in Africa (London, 1856) is replete with similar observations. 
25 Gerald Hanley’s memoir Warriors and Strangers, about his time as a British officer 
and administrator in Somaliland after 1941, offers a penetrating and delightful picture of 
this. 
26 See Aman, with V.L. Barnes, Aman, the Story of a Somali Girl (London, 1997). 
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 Figure 13.1 Outline of the total Somali clan genealogy 
Modified on the basis of the chart in T. Lyons & A.I. Samatar, Somalia: State 
Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction 
(Washington DC, 1996) 
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      Pre-colonial economic conditions in Somalia, a vast, semi-arid country with 
a widely dispersed population, never allowed state formation processes based 
on surplus extraction or power monopolization to take off because the main 
source of wealth was ‘mobile capital’ in the form of livestock and local trade, 
neither of which is easily controlled or taxed by central authorities (like in the 
kingdoms of, for instance, Buganda, Ethiopia or Congo). Also, a state in 
Somalia could, almost by definition, only be a territorial, clan-based structure 
at the expense of others, perhaps even at that of the Somali heer, the customary 
law based on principles of social contract. This was the case in the pre-colonial 
past as well as today. States formed by agreement or social contract, as in 
today’s Somaliland under the Somali National Movement27 since 1991, remain 
beset by internal tension and are conditional upon careful respect for, and a 
balancing of, the rights and local interests of the common people, especially if 
they are of another, non-dominant clan (family).28 
Nor was there any ideology or idea of nationalism in the pre-colonial period. 
There was a vague and decentred notion of cultural and religious identity of 
Somali-speaking groups but most of the clan and territorial units did not know 
each other and had little or no contact. Politics was localized and based on 
nested segmentation without central leaders. There was substantial diversity 
also in dialects, lifestyle and prestige between Somali groups, not only between 
the Samaale and Sab (see Figure 13.1) but also within these two great divisions 
and between them and the craft-worker groups and the Bantu speakers in the 
south.29 The only meaningful crosscutting loyalties were formed by the Sufi 
orders (turuuq) to which most Somalis (males and also many females)30 were 
affiliated, but even here the orders and their local settlements had membership 
of a dominant clan, and in times of conflict and feuding they did not prevent 
violent confrontation. 
Discussing violence in Somalia, Prunier31 has described pre-colonial 
Somalia as a real ‘culture of violence’ and cites instances to this effect. Violent 
strategies were part and parcel of the harsh way of life in the country, and 
competition was necessarily fierce. A forced reconstruction of an idyllic 
Somali social space where custom reigned and people settled their disputes in 
amicable rituals should therefore be rejected. Even the much reputed heer, or 
                                                 
27 Dominated by the large Isaaq clan. 
28 For example, the ‘Iisa and Gadabursi in the Awdal area and the D’ulbahante in the 
east are minority clans under the Isaaq. 
29 Not to mention the people of Hamar (Mogadishu), Baraawa, Kismaayu and other 
coastal towns. 
30 See F. Declich, ‘Sufi Experience in Rural Somalia: A Focus on Women’, Social 
Anthropology, 8 (2000), 295-318. 
31 Prunier, ‘Segmentarité et Violence’, 384. 
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customary contract law, was only valid within the agnatic (clan) groups, not 
outside them, at least not if there was no prior agreement or patron-client 
relationship. What has to be kept in mind is that violence in Somalia – as in so 
many pre-colonial or pre-industrial societies – while frequent, was not seen as 
controversial and problematic as it is today in the global normative discourse 
on human rights. Violence as part of accepted relations between groups and the 
threat of feuding were facts of life. The early travel literature (for example, R. 
Burton’s First Footsteps in Africa, published in 1856) regularly mentioned 
such feuding and massacres. Hanley also described repeated incidents of 
Somalis robbing, killing and preying upon each other.32 On the coasts, they had 
a tradition of looting shipwrecks and also of piracy.33 The Somalis thus formed 
a loosely connected pre-colonial realm of dispersed pastoralists, coastal towns 
and sultanates, related through ideas of common descent, clan fission and 
fusion, a violent pastoral economy, Islamic religious identification (since the 
thirteenth century) and regional trade links. In this realm, the European powers 
arriving in the 1880s, with their claims to take possession of coastal areas to 
protect sea-lanes and establish political control, were to pose a challenge. 
 
 
Italian and British interference: Chimeras of governance and order 
 
As elsewhere in Africa, Western colonial expansion in the late nineteenth 
century reshaped local Somali society and politics. Indeed, it led to the reactive 
forging of an incipient national identity, initially couched in a religious 
idiom.34 The British established a protectorate in 1885 in the north, the Italians 
their presence in 1889 in the south, and both carved out their domains of 
influence in subsequent years. The French, after concluding treaties with local 
chiefs, had, in 1884, secured what is now Djibouti as a vital port on the Red 
Sea route. While the British originally had no intention of occupying the 
hinterland beyond the coastal strip, the Italians – established in southern 
Somalia with its fertile inter-riverine plains – sought to control the interior and 
make it productive and to settle substantial numbers of Italian agrarian 
                                                 
32 Hanley, ‘Warriors and Stangers’, 80, 98, 101. 
33 Cf. L. Kapteijns & J. Spaulding, ‘From Slaves to Coolies: Two Documents from the 
Nineteenth-Century Somali Coast’, Sudanic Africa, 3 (1992), 2-3. 
34 Cf. E.R. Turton, ‘Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule and the Development of Somali 
Political Activity in Kenya, 1893-1960’, Journal of African History, 13 (1972), 119-43; 
Said S. Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism. The Case of Sayyid Mahammad 
‘Abdille Hasan (Cambridge, 1982). 
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immigrants there.35 Italy’s greater aim was to ultimately conquer the fertile 
highlands of Ethiopia.36 The purpose of the British and French was not to 
substantially colonize and transform indigenous society. Even more than in 
other African regions their attitude to the Horn was one of ‘indirect rule’, 
taking advantage of trade and maintaining public order. But even this modest 
form of political control proved to be a challenge on the Somali coast. From 
the start, the colonizers did not intend to alter the religious character of the 
local population: their primary motive was political and they hoped for consent 
from or co-optation of the local leaders. The colonizers did not pursue or even 
allow a missionary Christian agenda, as was asserted by Somali religious 
opponents. The colonial state was more of a secular administrative structure, 
with an often-remarkable fascination with and admiration for the Somali’s 
pride and demeanour.37 Colonialism certainly brought new forms of power, 
economic control and submission in the Somali regions. These challenged the 
local economy of land use and pasture, as well as the decentralized political 
system of Somali clan groups and their kin-ordered social structures.38 Stirrings 
of resistance were not unusual in the early colonial period. One important anti-
colonial party was that of the Somali slave owners.39 
The nature of the colonial enterprise in the Horn was thus mixed. France, 
Britain and, to a lesser extent, Italy were primarily there to compete with each 
other and with Ethiopia (that resented European intrusion and defeated Italy in 
the 1896 Battle of Adwa) for sea and trade routes. In the case of the British and 
the French, there was no effort to root out customary law and local leadership 
in Somalia. The Italians, however, came to see Somalia as a settler colony, the 
productive resources and political structures of which were to be utilized. Their 
policies (for example of creating ‘state domains’) were a threat to local Somali 
forms of collective tenure of land and pasture.40 But these policies came to 
                                                 
35 As in Eritrea, the northern coastal part of Ethiopia, which was made a colony in 1890. 
Somalia was an Italian protectorate until 1905 when it was also made a colony. 
36 M. Guadagni, ‘Colonial Origins of the Public Domain in Southern Somalia (1892-
1912)’, Journal of African Law, 22 (1978), 1. 
37 Cf. A. Jardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland (London, 1923), 34, 319; Hanley, 
‘Warriors and Strangers’, 20, 49, 107, 124-27, 149; also I.M. Lewis, ‘Unravelling a 
‘Flawed’ History’, Journal of African History, 41 (2000), 522. These social and cultural 
relationships of colonizer and colonized, while prominent in recent anthropological and 
historical debates, have not been well studied in the case of Somalia. 
38 See Guadagni, ‘Colonial Origins’, 5-8, 12, on the Italian land laws in Somalia and the 
frequent opposition of the local population. This resistance was independent of the 
Dervish movement and based on people’s direct material interests. 
39 Cf. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society, 231. 
40 Guadagni, ‘Colonial Origins’, 25. 
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fruition mainly after the Dervish revolt had fizzled out, and in southern areas 
where the Dervishes were much less active. 
 
 
Incipient modernity, Dervish revolt and violent transformation 
 
The colonial venture inevitably was one of incipient modernity in the widest 
sense. Italy and Britain brought a (rudimentary) state administration, new 
modes of governance and political action and the use of state force, as well as 
material changes, new technologies, motorized transport but also modern 
firearms, economic exploitation and colonization of land and other natural 
resources. 
Somalis often reacted negatively in a variety of ways but were also 
accommodating and tried to profit from new opportunities, especially in the 
coastal areas and the agricultural south. One important response, however, 
came to be couched predominantly in a religious idiom of resistance. In 1899 
an anti-foreigner insurgence was formally declared by Sayyid Mohammed 
‘Abdulle Hassan (1864-1920), (abbreviated as MAH), a well-educated Islamic 
teacher (sheikh) and militant proto-nationalist from the Ogaden clan.41 Sayyid 
Mohammed was a member of the Salihiyya Sufi order, which originated in 
Saudi Arabia and was influenced by the puritanist Wahhabi movement. At a 
big northern Somali clan assembly in Burao that year, he raised the flag of 
resistance against the ‘Christian invaders’ in Somali lands. At this point he had 
about 4,000 to 5,000 followers. His insurgency came to be known as the 
Dervish movement42 and had its strongest base among the D’ulbahante clan of 
the Darod clan family (see Figure 13.1). In the years to follow, his aim was to 
create an autonomous space, beyond the reach of the colonial powers, and to 
develop an alternative politico-religious order with the contours of a strict 
Islamic theocracy. To this effect, the message was spread with intimidation and 
brute force. In the border area of Italian and British Somalia, the movement 
built settlements and fortresses for its fighters and followers. A predatory 
                                                 
41 His mother was from the D’ulbahante (also part of the Darod clan family). 
Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan was often called Mullah or Sayyid. The epithet ‘Mad 
Mullah’ (see Jardine, The Mad Mullah) did not originate with the British or the Italians 
as is often thought but is a translation of the Somali expression wadaad wal (‘lunatic 
religious leader/priest’) used in the late 1890s by Somalis opposed to him. See Sheik-
Abdi, Divine Madness, 55. 
42 The word darwish is Persian, originally meaning Islamic mendicant. It is generally 
used for members of Sufi orders. In Somalia, members of the Salihiyya Sufi order in 
particular were called ‘dervish’, and Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan liked having his 
movement called thus.  
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economic system based on pastoralism, raiding livestock, looting caravans and 
confiscating trade profits from coastal populations emerged. 
Remarkably, the initial act of this revolt in August 1899 was not a massive 
attack on the British but on two religious villages of the Ahmadiyya, a Sufi 
order that had not displayed total support for the Sayyid’s call for a jihad.43 
This is a telling event which foreshadowed the nature of the insurgency. 
Indeed, MAH’s movement was directed as much against other Somali as 
against the British or Italians.  
Initially, MAH appeared to call for transcending segmentary clan divisions 
but soon he started playing upon them.44 In the years 1900-1905, the insurgency 
wreaked havoc in the north-central Somali areas, and was combated by the 
Italians and especially the British. After this initial phase of revolt, MAH 
reached a political compromise with the British and the Italians in 1905, known 
as the Illig Treaty, under which he was allowed an autonomous area in the 
Nugal Valley, and freedom of movement and religious practice. He then had an 
armed retinue of some 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, with their dependants.  
For about four years things were quiet but in 1908 a new phase of violence 
began, again not targeting colonial troops but the coastal sultanate of Hobyo, 
the Majerteen clan in the northeast, the Hawiya area, and even the Rahanweyn 
in the southeast.45 Only in 1912 did MAH’s troops attack the British in 
Berbera. After 1909 the insurgency again grew in strength. In 1910 the British 
had even decided to concentrate their forces in the coastal areas in order not to 
lose resources and men in fruitless forays into the interior, which was of no real 
interest to them. Due to their mobile warfare and the depth of their retreat lines 
on the Ogaden Plains, the Dervishes were hard to pin down and defeat.  
The repeated campaigns of the British and Italians could neither root out the 
movement nor prevent its devastation of other Somali clan groups and their 
resources. Throughout the twenty-year insurgency, the majority of victims were 
other Somalis, not colonial troops and their supporters. Indeed, MAH’s revolt, 
through its use of often callous and indiscriminate armed force against Somalis 
perceived to be ‘against him’ and his Ogaden clan, transformed existing 
patterns of clan coexistence and cooperation, undermined the heer, led to 
internal disarray, and generated new antagonisms that proved to be a burden in 
the future. Interestingly, the Dervish insurgence was denounced in a letter 
written in 1909 by Sheikh Mohammed bin Salih Rashid, the founder of the 
Salihiyya order of which MAH was a member. Although it might have been at 
the instigation of the Italians that some Somalis (among them ‘Abdullah 
                                                 
43 See Lewis, A Modern History, 69. 
44 Prunier, ‘Segmentarité et Violence’, 388-89. 
45 The Warsangeli clan, however, declared support for MAH’s cause in 1908. 
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Shahari, a former close adviser to MAH) went to visit the Sheikh in Saudi 
Arabia to get such a condemnation, the letter nonetheless had a significant 
impact on many of MAH’s followers. It was not a ‘somewhat mild 
denunciation’, as Lewis terms it,46 but as is evident from the text,47 a quite 
outspoken and threatening condemnation that even questioned MAH’s Islamic 
identity. 
The second decade of the revolt continued with in-fighting and raiding of 
clan groups, religious leaders and regional chiefs that opposed him or tried to 
work out a compromise with the colonial regimes. It did not bring the stated 
aims of MAH any closer. The year 1911-12 came to be known as the 
Haaraama ‘Une, the ‘Year of Eating Filth’,48 reflecting the famine, chaos and 
communal hatred generated by the Dervish movement. In view of this, the 
British changed their policy in late 1912 and founded the Somali Camel 
Constabulary as an expeditionary force to end the Dervish movement. It would 
still take seven years to do so, partly because from 1914 to 1918 the British 
were hindered by their commitments elsewhere during the First World War. 
Towards 1920 the insurgence movement was weakened, and the social basis 
of MAH’s authority and rule among clan groups in the north declined. He still 
had followers, and held out in his impressive fortified settlement at Taleh (see 
photo). The British wanted to put an end to his activities and after MAH 
declined negotiations, they undertook one last offensive in July that year, 
assisted by Somali troops of the Habr Tolja’elo and Habr Yunis clans and, 
ironically, of the D’ulbahante, who had once been MAH’s strongest supporters. 
Several British planes from Aden were used to drop bombs on the Taleh 
fortress. While the military impact of this action (with 20-kg bombs) was 
limited, the psychological aspect was important, and MAH and his hard-core 
followers fled to Ogaden territory in Ethiopia. There he was approached 
concerning new negotiations and a truce, but again he refused, humiliating the 
peace delegation. In December 1920 he died in Ethiopia either of malaria or of 
an infectious disease, leaving a Somali people more divided than ever.  
As noted above, the trans-clan Sufi brotherhoods (turuuq) in Somalia did 
not create sufficient crosscutting loyalties to prevent or neutralize clan-based 
rivalries, often generated on the basis of material interests (pasture, livestock, 
territory, trade profits and women). Throughout his insurgence, MAH remained 
at odds with the leaders of the Ahmadiyya and Qadiriyya, as well as with 
numerous clan groups across the country. Indeed his main base was always 
                                                 
46 Lewis, A Modern History, 75. 
47 Given in Jardine, The Mad Mullah, 184-85. 
48 Lewis, A Modern History, 77; S. Samatar, ‘An Open Letter to Somalist Scholars’, 
Horn of Africa, 13 (1990), 88-89. 
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within the Ogaden clan. Many opponents, whether religious men, clan elders or 
coastal sultans, were assassinated on his orders. One notorious example is that 
of the prestigious Qadiriyya sheikh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi, killed by 
a Dervish hit-team in April 1909.49 Sheikh Uways had been putting up 
resistance against the foreigners in his own way but he refused the violent, 
divisive path of the Sayyid, whom he denounced in a series of poems. In 1909 
MAH had his own Qadi killed for dissent, which according to Jardine50 caused 
the defection of about four hundred Dervish fighters. 
MAH’s mission also generated vehement polemics with other important 
Somali religious leaders, for example, Sheikh Abdallah Yusuf al-Qutbi.51 This 
was expressed in poetic combat, often in strings of poems in response to each 
other. A reading of the poetry for which the Sayyid became famous52 shows it 
to be full of references to the fighting against foreign ‘infidels’, but also to the 
bashing of those Somali individuals and clan or lineage groups that were 
opposed to him. Farah Abduf and Kapteijns53 note that Somalis view his poems 
often as brilliant, but frequently also as vulgar and divisive. Presumably they 
mean his frequent references to slaughtering and smashing his enemies, and 
showing pride in this. Sexual insults of his opponents also abound. Somali 
poetry has a genre of curse poems, the gabaar-awayti,54 a veritable ‘poetics of 
violence’ marked by aggressive, stabbing images and metaphors of uprooting 
and annihilation, and MAH’s poems certainly fit into this category. But in his 
case, these poetic images were also part of a politics of violence. As many of 
his opponents found out, such passages were exhortations to be taken literally. 
MAH’s remarkable poetic gifts added much fuel to the force of his message. 
Poetry was part of his struggle and was widely recited in the years of the 
insurgency. His last recorded poem Dardaaran (written in the year of his 
                                                 
49 B.G. Martin, ‘Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Uways b. 
Muhammad al-Barawi and the Qadiriya Brotherhood in East Africa’, Journal of African 
History, 10 (1969), 472. See also Lewis, A Modern History, 70, for mention of earlier 
assassinations of prominent Somali leaders. 
50 Jardine, The Mad Mullah, 186. 
51 Sheik-Abdi, Divine Madness, 9. 
52 See Samatar, Oral Poetry for an excellent and now classic study. 
53 Mursal Farah Afdub & L. Kapteijns, ‘“The Defeat of the Infidels”: A Poem by Sayyid 
Muhammad ‘Abd Allah Hasan of Somalia’, Sudanic Africa, 10 (1999), 27-47. See also 
Samatar, Oral Poetry, 202. 
54 Cf. S. Samatar, ‘Sarbeeb: The Art of Oblique Communication in Somali Culture’, in 
J.K. Adjaye & A.R. Andrews (eds), Language, Rhythm and Sound (Pittsburgh, 1997), 
49. 
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death) reveals what imaginative force and religious zeal he could display,55 
although it is also a testimony to the utter failure of his project. Indeed, this 
failure has made it clear that his poetry was the message; the political reality 
was always quite different. Although he started out as a sheikh and a wadaad, 
MAH is not remembered as such. Nor was he ever regarded as a saint by later 
generations of Somali. In the course of his violent campaigns, he effectively 
lost any religious authority he may have had, and his personal reputation 
declined markedly in later years.56 A wadaad is by definition a religious 
mediator between clans: MAH became the opposite. The end results of his 
Islamist insurgency avant la lettre57 were large-scale material and human 
destruction,58 deep divisions, new clan hatreds, and no end to the colonial 
presence.  
 
 
The transformation of armed resistance into politics: 1920-1960 
 
In the years from 1920 until the start of the Second World War, the impact of 
colonialism on Somali society increased notably. Both Italy and Britain became 
more committed to the colonial venture, modestly investing in road building, 
agriculture, well drilling and health facilities.59 But only Italy, under Mussolini, 
promoted a real colonization, intended to make the country a settlement colony. 
The effects of colonial policy on Somali land tenure, pasture and water rights, 
and thereby on transhumance patterns of clan groups, were problematic, 
especially in the south where Italy wanted to develop its agricultural projects. 
Land was taken from its traditional users, new boundaries were drawn, clan 
families and clans were divided and cut off from each other, and their modes of 
subsistence threatened.60 Indigenous patterns of leadership were devalued and 
                                                 
55 See the text in Sheik-Abdi, Divine Madness, 176-81. It was republished in a different 
translation by Mursal Farah Afdub, L. Kapteijns & Hasan Farah Warfa, ‘“Parting 
Words of Wisdom” (Dardaaran): A Poem by Sayyid Muhammad ‘Abd Allah Hasan of 
Somalia’, Sudanic Africa, 11 (2000), 25-34. 
56 Cf. the accusations of contemporary poets cited by Samatar, Oral Poetry, 164-65. 
57 The mode of thinking of MAH, as evident from his poems and letters (for example to 
the British authorities, see Lewis, A Modern History, 78-79) indeed shows remarkable 
similarity with present-day Islamists’ discourse. 
58 Jardine, The Mad Mullah, 315, (over)estimated the number of people killed directly 
or indirectly as a result of the Dervish war to be about 200,000. 
59 Lewis, A Modern History, 104-5. 
60 Laitin & Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search, 61-62. 
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undermined. The insights of Italian scholars like Colucci61 into customary 
tenure and decision-making in Somali culture were not much heeded in 
colonial policy. The colonial regimes did not make any major investment in 
formal, modern education in Somalia and no new class of urbanized educated 
Somalis emerged to formulate a nationalist movement. This only came during 
and after the Second World War. 
Resistance was fomenting but before the Second World War did not take on 
an organized, collective form. While a vibrant Somali local politics developed 
– as far as the colonial regime allowed it – the political scene showed a 
complex balancing act between clan-based politics and nationalist political 
organization. The violence and internal chaos seen in the Dervish days did not 
return. There were small-scale rebellions but not wide-scale organized protests 
on a national basis. For instance, the 1937 Camel Corps mutiny appears not to 
have been inspired by nationalist motives but primarily by direct material 
causes.62 
The Second World War meant a radicalization of Somali politics and a 
growing unease with colonial governance. The Italian East African Empire 
collapsed in 1941 following the Allied military victory, and the debate about 
the future of its constituent parts began. Ethiopia regained its independence and 
part of the Somali-inhabited Haud and the Ogaden were ceded to it. 
In 1942, former British and Italian Somalia experienced a period of British 
Military Administration (BMA) until 1950. In the report of the 1948 UN Four 
Power Commission, reporting on Somalia to help prepare its political future, 
the opinions of a wide section of Somalis were presented.63 From this report 
one can deduce not only that the economic interests and agricultural schemes of 
the Italians had created serious tensions concerning matters of land, labour,64 
territory and ‘clan borders’, but also that British-Italian political competition 
and Somali party politics had created great rifts. The effect was further 
opposition between clan families. For instance, people from the Somali Youth 
League (SYL), formed in 1943 and in favour of speedy independence, were not 
liked in the south. They were seen as a mainly Majerteen group and were 
opposed by the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle Somali party active in the riverine areas of 
                                                 
61 M. Colucci, Principi di Diritto Consuetudinario della Somalia Italiana Meridionale 
(Florence, 1924). 
62 See Jama Mohamed, ‘The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny: A Contrapuntal 
Reading’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 33 (2001), 615-34. The 
same was true of a revolt of the same corps in 1944. 
63 See L.V. Cassanelli, ‘Somali Perceptions of Colonial Rule: Testimonies to the Four 
Powers Commission’, in R.W. Harms et al. (eds), Paths toward the Past: African 
Historical Essays in Honor of Jan Vansina (Atlanta GA, 1994), 143-55. 
64 The Italian forced labour policy was especially hated by Somalis. 
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the south.65 This again illustrates the values attached by clan groups to their 
own traditions and to self-determination in the game of clan politics and 
reciprocity. Colonial policy had aggravated rather than lessened such 
tendencies.  
In 1950 Italy – though defeated in the Second World War and with a 
dubious colonial record – received a UN trusteeship to administer its former 
colony of Somalia for ten years. The British retained northern Somalia, also to 
prepare it for independence. Collective insurgency movements like the 
Dervishes did not appear in either country. While the public memory of the 
revolt of the ‘Mullah’ (MAH) was vivid, it was not a political example. But in 
the new party politics that emerged, factionalism and regional divisions among 
clans, clan families and caste groups were not overcome. Also, the Italian 
political model for Somalia was based on transposing a centralized state to a 
decentralized, rebellious country, an approach that had adverse effects on local 
politics and clan-group relations.66 
In this state context, clan politics came to have a lasting appeal, despite the 
objective challenge of colonialism to the Somali subjects to unite, and despite 
the growth of the idea of Somali unity across the various colonial frontiers. The 
colonial state arena, with its disregard for local leadership, autonomous 
structures and customary law, created a ‘spoils system’, whereby competition 
for the distribution of state resources on the basis of identifiable constituencies 
was the game. Accordingly, after the Second World War and the BMA period, 
new ‘tribal’ political parties emerged alongside the more pan-Somali SYL67 
and the Hizbia Digil-Mirifle party: for example, the Marehan Union, the 
Progressive Majerteyn League, the Hamar Youth Club (in Mogadishu) and the 
Hawiye Youth League. They garnered to a specific clan-based constituency 
even at a time when an agenda of national unity might have been expected to 
be the best way to promote a viable independent Somalia. As Tripodi states: 
‘...the new state organization became just an instrument in the hands of 
predominant clans, who administered power according to their own interests’.68 
In a way, the Somalis fell into a political trap set inadvertently by the Mandate 
authorities. 
 
 
                                                 
65 See Cassanelli, ‘Somali Perceptions’, 145-46, 148-49. See also his citation of the 
complaint of the Elai clan community about all Somali political parties, ibid. 153-54. 
66 Cf. P. Tripodi, ‘Back to the Horn: Italian Administration and Somalia’s Troubled 
Independence’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 32 (1999), 79.  
67 With mainly Darod and Hawiye membership. 
68 Tripodi, ‘Back to the Horn’. 
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Independence and an attempt at state formation: The irredentist 
illusion 
 
In 1960 the two Somalias, ill prepared and divided by under-funded and top-
down colonial rule, became independent. After five days of separate 
independent existence, they joined together as one state. A multi-party political 
system evolved, and for a while things looked promising in the new era of 
nationalist fervour. A careful politics of clan balancing at the national level 
started but soon factional manoeuvring and elite competition, aimed at the 
selective use and control of central state power, resurfaced leading to a 
creeping fragmentation of the polity. The conditions for this lay partly in the 
faulty political system not recognizing the continued importance of clan 
identification at a social and cultural level but also in the colonial land policies, 
that more than ever had tied clan rivalries to material interests around 
resources, generating conflicts no longer covered by the heer, the legal rule of 
clan elders and religious mediators (wadaad). 
In 1969 General Mohammed Siyad Barre, chief of staff of the Somali army, 
took power in a coup, deposing a fragmented, faction-ridden government and 
an impotent parliament. He declared a state-socialist programme of 
development aimed at education, economic growth, literacy campaigns, an 
improvement in the rights of women, and neutralizing customary law and clan 
politics, even clan identities. Instead of constructively engaging them in a 
consociational or federal formula, he denied them and tried to forcefully 
repress them. As is known from the literature, this campaign of denial took on 
hilarious forms, with people asking each other about their ‘ex-clan’, it being 
forbidden to ask what their clan was.69 
When he came to power Siyad Barre did not instigate clan rule. His system 
of governance was initially led by the ideology of ‘scientific socialism’, and he 
employed anyone who showed ability and personal loyalty, also those from 
marginal groups. For instance, his long-time defence minister was a member of 
one of the minority castes but his policy of alleged ‘declanization’ amounted to 
a denial of people’s primary identifications and of the structures of regional 
power and prestige. His Marxist-modernist policies were directed against heer, 
clan law, and local civil-society institutions. 
Over the years, Siyad Barre’s orientation to his own clan (Marehan) and that 
of his mother (Ogaden) increased. A turning point was the debacle in 1977-78 
in the Somalia Irredenta war against Ethiopia, aimed at taking the Ogaden. The 
                                                 
69 See also the joke cited by Ch. Geshekter & S.A. Warsama, ‘An Introduction to 
Humour and Jokes in Somali Culture’, in R.J. Hayward & I.M. Lewis (eds), Voice and 
Power (London, 1996), 147.  
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attempt to wrest this vast area up to the city of Jijiga from Ethiopia was a costly 
illusion that brought the regime to the brink of disaster. Instead of unifying the 
Somalis in a common cause, it led to internal recrimination, clan division and a 
decline in the development commitments of the regime. Internal opposition 
movements with an agenda of liberation emerged in various parts of the 
country. 
After 1988, the first year of the devastating war against the Somali National 
Movement in the Isaaq-dominated north, Siyad Barre reverted to relying fully 
on the so-called ‘MOD’ alliance70 and began excluding people from other clans 
from power. In a predictable development, this led to an aggravation of clan 
rivalry,71 manifesting itself in pervasive distrust and enmity among people and 
perceived clan groupings, as well as in violent conflict. Subsequently, a speedy 
decline of the national state and the emergence of clan-based factional 
contestation for power went hand in hand. The various revolts in the country – 
in the north, in the Majerteen area, in the Hawiye area and in the southern 
coastal cities – seemed to usher in an era of freedom and equality, but it 
eventually turned into the opposite. Armed revolt and insurgency became a way 
of life adopted by the clan-based militias and factions that saw easy ways to 
gain and profit. The new links of the Somali economy to export markets as well 
as external political forces (including international organizations and aid 
agencies) played an important role in enhancing such tendencies. 
It may not be fair to compare Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan with 
Mohammed Siyad Barre but what can be said is that both their nationalist 
programmes failed because of their ruthless application of ideologies and 
violent practices that ignored and indeed actively suppressed the social 
structures and cultural values of Somali life. Foremost among them were 
segmentary clan identification, customary law, the prestigious role of clan 
elders and clan councils, and the traditions of egalitarianism and local 
autonomy. Their policies evoked clan-based movements fighting for freedom as 
well as a culture of violence rooted in feuding, the settling of scores and 
looting. 
 
                                                 
70 See footnote 7. 
71 Cf. M. Jama, ‘Trajectoire du Pouvoir’, 423. 
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Table 13.1  Approximate population distribution of the six clan families 
 
Digil 4 % 
Rahanweyn 16 % 
Dir 7 %  
Isaaq 22 % 
Hawiye 23 % 
Darod 21 % 
Ethnic and national minorities 4-6 % 
 
The last Somali government census was in 1987 so these figures are estimates only. The 
total population of Somalia is thought to be about 7-8 million. In Ethiopia there are 
about 3.2 million Somalis, and in Kenya the figure is estimated to be about 340,000. 
 
 
State disintegration – clan resurrection: The post-1991 period 
 
After 1991, the basis of collective political action was sought in the 
resurrection of clan identities, though shifting in scope according to the level of 
clan (tol) segmentation. Initially the element of freedom fighting was obvious. 
The southern Rahanweyn and Digil groups, choking after years of central state 
oppression, aimed for autonomy. The Isaaq-dominated north successfully 
fought free from southern, mainly Hawiye and Darod, domination but tensions 
remained with the D’ulbahante and Warsangeli clans (that had in the past 
largely supported the Dervish movement). In the south and northeast, factions 
based in a majority clan family were formed and became the units of 
insurgence and revolt, for example the opposing Abgal and Habr Gidir sub-
clans within Hawiye, heading two wings of the USC movement. But here the 
aim was no longer a national state or an Islamic-inspired restoration of order 
and justice but survival, predation and the building of fiefdoms as large as 
possible. Almost all major clans saw the emergence of their own parties, 
militias or combatant groups. While these are manipulated by elite sections 
within the clans, they nevertheless were formed on the basis of kinship thinking 
and segmentation. In the past decade, several dozen such groups have emerged, 
even down to the smallest size of a lineage. For instance, the tiny group of Reer 
Barre in the north at one point also claimed to be a political party. The major 
ones still involved in political entrepreneurship and violence in Somalia today 
are listed in Table 13.2.  
The main clan-militia leaders/entrepreneurs active in southern Somalia, 
especially in and around Mogadishu, are Ali Mahdi Mohammed (an Abgal 
businessman), Hussein Mohammed Farah (a Habr Gidir), Osman Hassan Ali 
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Ato’ (Habr Gidir), Muse Suudi Yahalow (Abgal), Muhammad Qanyare Afrah, 
Mohamed Hussein Addow, Bashir Raghe, and Husayn Haji Bod. They are 
predominantly from the Hawiye clan family and often head factions of the 
various organizations mentioned in Table 13.2. All have used moryaan, the 
heavily armed, roaming groups of young fighters living by intimidation and 
predatory activity, to further their own interests.  
Fierce resource competition emerged between these various organizations 
and militias, be it for land, livestock, fragments of the state machinery, 
possession of former nationally-owned facilities like airports, contacts with 
NGOs and aid agencies, trade and export routes, or arms imports. There was 
also a marked but often ill-reported dimension of sexual politics involved, as 
the larger clan-faction groups claimed forceful access to women from weaker 
groups, especially in the southern agricultural areas and the big cities on the 
coast. This politics of humiliation aggravated clan divisions and communal 
anger. 
In addition, the traditional inequalities between Somali pastoral groups and 
urban elites, especially from the big clans like Hawiye, Majerteen and Marehan 
on the one hand and the Waable (caste minorities) and Bantu groups on the 
other, were reproduced, if not reinforced.72 Together with the agricultural 
Digil-Rahanweyn, these vulnerable groups were a major target in the civil war 
and the warlord fighting, with most of their resources being taken or claimed. 
In this respect, nothing had changed since the pre-colonial era except for the 
severity of resource exploitation and destruction. Several authors such as 
Prunier and Schlee73 have tried to see some ‘order in the chaos’, i.e. the 
regularities underlying the violence of armed groups, shifts in their alliances, 
economic activities etc. There are indeed notable regularities and patterns but 
the only predictable factor is the orientation of Somalis towards clan identity 
and their structuring of political action in similar terms. 
The Somali central state of 1960-1991 has gone forever. The various 
independent regional administrations in Puntland,74 in Somaliland, and since 
2002 in the South West State in the Rahanweyn area75 can be seen as having 
emerged from resistance against any central government dominated by clans 
other than the majority ones in their own region. As no region is homogeneous, 
                                                 
72 Cf. Mohammed-Abdi, ‘Les Bouleversements Induits’. 
73 Schlee, ‘Regularités’; Prunier, ‘Segmentarité et Violence’. 
74 See M. Doornbos, ‘When is a State a State?: Exploring Puntland’, in P. Konings, W. 
van Binsbergen & G. Hesseling (eds), Trajectoires de Libération en Afrique 
Contemporaine. Hommage à Robert Buijtenhuijs (Paris, 2001), 125-39. 
75 See the declaration on www.somalilandnet.com/warya/2002/somalianews/10532. 
shtml  
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there are constant tensions within these new units for political and economic 
control, often fuelled by claims of kin loyalty, segmentation and the idiom of 
rivalling clan sub-units. 
As the work of Compagnon and Marchal76 has shown, in most cases the use 
of violence was instrumentalized by clan-faction groups without a clear 
programme, except an economy of violent loot and intimidation. The 
traditional Somali waranle ideal – that of warriors legitimately defending the 
interests of their clan and territorial group – had transformed into the 
entrepreneurial violence of moryaan, the armed youths active both 
independently and in the service of clan elites or so-called warlords, the 
entrepreneurs of violence. Most major Somali traders at some point began 
supporting or organizing armed clan-faction groups to advance their interests 
and monopolize resources like import-export lines.77 Towards the end of the 
1990s, this culture of living by looting was not only limited to the militias and 
moryaan but had also spread to the general population, especially in the urban 
areas.  
Revolt and resistance thus dissipated into a generalized culture of violence 
based on shifting alliances and without any wider socio-political aims. Any 
distinction between moryaan and politically inspired fighters became blurred. 
The situation in many areas of the south is still marked by this kind of everyday 
violence by looting rebels without a cause except for intimidation and 
extortion. In this situation, the underlying continuities of clan and lineage 
distinctions and of locally based interests in Somali society are notable: clan- 
based groups form the units of survival and reproduction.78 They keep 
providing people, also in the cities, with a basic identity used for collective 
identification and instrumental gain. 
                                                 
76 D. Compagnon, ‘Somali Armed Units: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship 
and Clan-Based Factions’, in C. Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas (Oxford & 
Bloomington, 1998), 73-90; R. Marchal, ‘Formes de la Violence et de son Contrôle 
dans un Espace Urbain en Guerre: Les Mooryaan de Mogadishu’, Cahiers d'Etudes 
Africaines, 33 (1993), 295-320. 
77 Compagnon, ‘Somali Armed Units’, 85. 
78 Several authors have stressed the role of the ideology of expansive reproduction in 
Somali culture. Cf. I.M. Lewis, Understanding Somalia (London, 1993), 13. The 
Somali population growth figure is high at 4.43%, with a fertility rate of 7.01 children 
per woman. See www.wifak.uni-wuerzburg.de/fact98/so.htm 
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Moryaan in Mogadishu 
Source: Hollandse Hoogte, Amsterdam 
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Resistance and revolt as a way of life? 
 
After the fall of the Siyad Barre government in 1991, the famous statue in 
Mogadishu of Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan, the declared proto-nationalist hero 
of Somali nationhood, was ‘...defaced and later toppled, to be sold for scrap’.79 
This was no doubt a poignant symbolic event, underlining in the eyes of many 
the total demise of Somalia by violent internal rivalry and factional fighting. It 
was simply the outcome of the same processes of territorial and clan-based 
division that had plagued Somalia in the time of Sayyid Mohammed ‘Abdulle 
Hassan’s insurgence. Kin groups based on tol remain the ideational and 
material survival mechanisms in times of state collapse and economic decline. 
Such groups, be they clans, sub-clans or mag-paying (lineage) groups, provide 
an element of social and psychological identity even – or perhaps especially – 
to uprooted people estranged from their socio-cultural orders. But these groups 
are not based on ancient hatreds. Clans and clan-thinking appear not to be 
atavistic elements of the past reasserting themselves. They are, and always 
were, ‘identity vessels’ in a stateless environment that give agency to people. In 
this sense, the fall of the MAH statue in the capital symbolizes another turn in 
the cycle of internal disarray and rebellion that has characterized Somali 
society for the past 150 years – a cycle whereby only the names of protagonists, 
the alliances, and the number and extent of violent conflagrations differ while 
elements of continuity are notable. 
Briefly recalling the various periods of revolt in the past century, we see 
similarities. In both episodes described in this chapter powerful political 
movements arose, the first instigated by a charismatic but destructive and 
divisive religious leader (wadaad) turned war leader (Mohammed ‘Abdulle 
Hassan), and the second by a warrior (waranle) gone awry (General M. Siyad 
Barre), whose rule led to the growth of liberation movements, civil war and the 
rise of the moryaan generation in a sort of stateless limbo. After 1991, these 
various movements quickly transformed into, or engendered, clan-based 
factions whose leaders appealed to clan identity and/or interests that placed 
them against each other, mocking both traditional and Islamic ideas of peace or 
mediation. In any of these periods, it is therefore difficult to label all these 
movements of revolt as ‘freedom fights’.  
Sayyid Mohammed ‘Abdulle Hassan may have had an agenda of Islamic 
revivalism against a foreign colonial presence but he created a regime of 
pervasive repression against his countrymen, leading to chaotic violence and 
unprecedented clan reckonings that were self-defeating vis-à-vis the colonial 
powers. Siyad Barre, in the Marxist-socialist spirit of the times (1960s-1970s), 
                                                 
79 Sheik-Abdi, Divine Madness, 212. (A photograph of the statue appears on p. 210.) 
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came to power on a ticket of anti-clanism, equality and social development, but 
his rule ended in utter tyranny with the state being seen as a mafiose 
association.80 The period of clan-based factions after 1991 yielded a precarious 
liberation of certain hard-hit regions (Somaliland, Puntland and the Digil-
Rahanweyn South) by their own forces while the rest of the country saw a 
descent into mayhem or violent predatory rule.  
There is both continuity and change in the nature and political relevance of 
clan segmentation and in the use of violence in Somalia. The big difference 
with the traditional, pre-state situation now is that most of the violence since 
1991 has been fully instrumentalized, released from its social context of 
legitimate self-defence and of competition for basic interests of clan/lineage 
groups in the pastoral or urban trade economy, regulated by law, heer or 
mediating elders. As the persistent presence of clan militias and warlords as 
well as the many groups of moryaan (a new term and phenomenon in Somali 
history) makes clear, predatory violence and the culture of looting could not 
easily be ‘retrieved’ within the socio-cultural frameworks of Somali society, all 
the more since there was no real ideological rationale to be discerned. While 
many violent militia groups active today were once part of political movements 
– or still claim to be – their wider political aims have become lost in nebulous 
clan-based conflict, opportunism and violently defended business interests. 
Violent action became an entrepreneurial activity – a rational means of 
accumulating resources, though at the expense of other Somalis (and foreign 
aid agencies). The destabilizing effects of this soon became clear but such 
activities could not easily be stopped. Continuities with pre-modern conditions 
are evident in that clan-based politics proved to be quite adaptable to the 
modern setting of a stateless Somalia, perhaps even more so since the two 
meta-narratives of Islamic revolt (Mohammed ‘Abdulleh Hassan’s movement) 
and of state socialism (in the Siyad Barre era) failed so dramatically. 
After January 1991, a process of conciliation and rehabilitation was slow in 
coming, except in Somaliland. Here independence was declared under the 
SNM and a national project of rebuilding a state administration was initiated. 
Puntland, under the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (the SSDF, founded in 
1978 by Majerteen), and Southwest State (in the Digil-Rahanwein area) 
followed in early 2002, but were weaker institutionally. During the late 1990s, 
social rebuilding and grassroots initiatives for civic and economic recovery 
were largely initiated by people tired of the daily violence, especially clan 
elders, customary law experts, women’s groups, Islamic (Sufi) orders and some 
                                                 
80 Prunier, ‘Segmentarité et Violence’, 396. 
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other local Islamic groups and courts.81 But southern Somalia, including 
Mogadishu, has lagged behind. Paradoxically, this is also the area where the 
claim to restore national order and unity through a ‘transitional national 
government’ (TNG) for all Somalia was put forward following the 2000 Arta 
Conference, a meeting of reconciliation of Somalis called by the President of 
Djibouti with UN assistance and held in the town of Arta in Djibouti. The 
above claim seems weak in view of the ongoing conflict in that area, divided 
among six clan-militia leaders, and the limited representativeness of the 
conference. Interestingly enough, the TNG is backed by the local Islamic 
movement in Mogadishu82 that has adopted methods of force similar to those of 
the warlords, with armed militias driving around in ‘technicals’ (pick-up trucks 
mounted with machine guns) to intimidate opponents. The TNG, led in 2002 by 
Abdiqassem Salat Hassan (a Hawiye Habr-Gidir), is also regularly accused, 
mostly by non-Hawiye opponents, of trying to win support in other regions, 
such as Puntland, by subversion.  
In many parts of Somalia today, revolt or resistance against any form of 
political or other authority, especially if it is perceived as clan-based, seems to 
have been institutionalized as a way of life: a whole generation knows nothing 
else. 
 
 
Conclusion: Cultural structure and political conjuncture 
 
The past decade of statelessness and regional conflict after President Siyad 
Barre’s downfall shows similarities with the colonial period during and after 
the Dervish insurgency. At that time, internecine fighting, generated by 
external influences and the challenges of modernity, also produced chaos, 
thousands of casualties, economic disruption and deep clan divisions 
instrumentalized by war leaders. While the present political conjuncture in 
Somali history shows new forms of violence and conflict, continuities in 
cultural and social structure are remarkable, going back to the frameworks not 
only of clan organization and kin-group identification but also to traditional 
disputes and material interests related to land and other resources. But a 
century later the cycle has gone further, with Somalia’s constituent clan-based 
                                                 
81 See S. Arnold, ‘Islam and Somali Clan Wars’, 25 May 1996, on www.netnomad.com/ 
islam-clanwar.htm 
82 There were credible reports that Arab countries bankrolled the TNG and its associated 
Islamic groups. See Reuters news message of 26 June 2001, ‘Chief Says Saudi Arabia is 
Destabilising Somalia’. Also A. Le Sage, ‘Somalia: Sovereign Disguise for a 
Mogadishu Mafia’, Review of African Political Economy, 29 (2002), 134, 37. 
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units, especially in the urban areas and the South, showing little inclination to 
come together, even if these various movements have achieved some sort of 
political order in their own areas. The perception is that a Hawiye has no 
understanding of Majerteen problems, that the Darod should keep away from 
the Dir, and an Isaaq has nothing to tell the Rahanweyn. A pervasive and 
distrustful localism has settled in Somalia. In a typical phenomenon of 
globalization, Somalis in the diaspora are enhancing this discourse of localism 
and clan-thinking, as is evident from the highly polemic and sectarian nature of 
Somali Internet website contributions. Indeed, these exchanges on the 
numerous sites on Somalia would merit a separate study of divisive and often 
aimless ‘diaspora politics’.83 
Somalia in recent years has shown that in permanently unstable political 
conditions new models of socio-political organization and conflict management 
need to be sought, based on the centrifugal, loosely ‘federative’ character of 
Somali society. Under some conditions a centralized legal-bureaucratic state is 
one option, but not necessarily the best. This, in a way, ‘post-modern’ situation 
of contested authority and decentred state power is full of challenges for both 
the notion of a viable social order in Somali society in particular and for 
political theory in general.84 There is no direct prospect of resurrecting a central 
state order among the southern Somalis, and authority structures that emerged 
elsewhere – while promising in Somaliland and fledgling in Puntland or South 
West State – remain fragile and conflict-prone. The Transitional National 
Government of Somalia in Mogadishu (since 2000) remains a shaky and 
localized structure with only a façade of national authority. It is beset by 
rebellious and/or criminal groups, is incapable of maintaining public order or 
regulating illegal economic activities, and is contested even within its own 
ranks.85  
Power and the control of resources in Somalia – including land, livestock, 
trade profits, women,86 and qat – are very fluid but remain based on the 
wielding of armed force. This is reinforced by the near-universal spread and 
possession of automatic weapons across the country, leading to a 
‘democratized’ and instrumental use of violence.87 These resources are a 
continuous bone of contention between local groups and clan formations vying 
                                                 
83 For some samples, see: www.somaliawatch.org; www.mudug.org; allpuntland.s5.com; 
somalitalk.members.easyspace.com and www.xamarcadde.com 
84 Cf. M. van Notten, ‘From Nation-State to Stateless Nation: The Somali Experience’, 
(forthcoming). 
85 See Le Sage, ‘Somalia: Sovereign Disguise’. 
86 Cf. Lewis 2001. 
87 See a recent report on the continuing flow of illegal arms to the Horn by the UN IRIN 
news service of 15 July 2002 on www.irinnews.org 
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for survival and predominance in a world ill-contained by traditional 
frameworks of national law and custom.  
There is an emerging consensus among Somalia observers that imposing a 
unitary state based only on abstract individual rights and top-down government 
is less fruitful than a policy of recognition of the existence of these collective 
identities based on clan thinking and buttressed by traditional systems and 
customary laws related to land use and territory, especially in the interior of the 
country. As caste and ethnic minorities as well as people of the coastal cities 
have different identities and economic concerns, a forced unitary regime will 
only perpetuate division and centrifugal conflict. In addition, the economic 
situation in southern Somalia is now one resembling the ‘ultimate free market’ 
with no regulatory institutions, great entrepreneurial freedom, and deals based 
on trust (clan members) or on extortion and intimidation (non-clan members). It 
is, however, a system where the bills are not paid: environmental pollution and 
exhaustion continue unabated. The visibly devastating effects of this might 
eventually press the various clan and territorial groups to work towards 
reaching an agreement. 
Ultimately, a durable socio-political order in Somalia will have to take into 
account traditional institutions like the recognized clan elders, religious 
mediators, and the heer.88 There is significant transformation in Somali society, 
but also notable continuity in ‘tradition’. A historical and cultural approach to 
the politics of Somalia shows that such institutions would contribute by 
addressing the concerns of most Somalis with underlying issues like tol 
segmentation, the rhetoric and practice of (clan) group equality, and their desire 
of mutual respect and having rights and duties met. More intense inter-clan 
communication and negotiation in an institutional manner would be equally 
necessary. Institutionalizing regular meetings of local stakeholders in the 
various regions also seems necessary. In recent years, new possibilities have 
been opened up by NGOs or women’s groups mediating and organizing peace 
activities as well as small-scale economic ventures.89 
Somalia has thus to be re-imagined anew, not only as a political idea or state 
but also as a cultural and social order in line with the values of clanship and 
customary law. That a reinvention of traditional Somali notions of values, 
religious identification, clan belonging and civilizational identity should hereby 
                                                 
88 S. Samatar, ‘Somalia: The Politics of Poetry’ emphasized the role of poetry (as in 
Mohammed ‘Abdulleh Hassan’s time) but this genre has virtually disappeared from 
Somali public life in the last 20 years. 
89 For examples, see Asha H. Elmi et al. ‘Women's Roles in Peacemaking in Somali 
Society’, in D.L. Hodgson, Rethinking Pastoralism in Africa. Gender, Culture and the 
Myth of the Patriarchal Pastoralist (Oxford & Kampala & Nairobi, 2000), 121-41. 
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stand central – and not imported Western, Arab or Islamist ideas – seems 
reasonable but is by no means sure in view of constant external pressure by the 
UN and powers like the US, the EU, Saudi Arabia and some Arab Gulf states.  
Southern Somalia is still in a ‘cycle of rebellion’ that is becoming 
increasingly vicious. The entrepreneurs of violence and predation dominate the 
scene, and any overarching authority structure or normative framework is 
absent. What was achieved in the rest of the country should, however, not be 
underestimated. There has been a remarkable movement towards restoring a 
social order based on local courts, heer, clan elder mediation and in some cases 
a resurgence of religious (Islamic) mediators and women’s NGOs. But even 
these positive developments have been largely based on clan-group identities. 
In view of the Somali game of clan prestige and the façade of status and 
nominal equality, as previously emphasized by Hussein Adam,90 an ‘integrative 
structure of constructive conflict’ should be sought if the county intends to 
move forward.91 Even then, some conflicts in Somalia may not be solved 
except by ignoring them. Disagreements should be given room to be expressed, 
though without the prospect of immediate resolution. The main thing would be 
to build structures that could contain the escalation of violence. It is also an 
illusion to think that a non-violent consensus structure can be built in a country 
with persistent natural resource scarcity and decentred, kin-based polities with 
deep-rooted traditions of autonomy and collective honour. This is evident from 
the simmering conflicts within Somaliland and Puntland and along their border, 
cutting across certain clan territories.92 It is interesting that the Puntland 
administration, dominated by the Majerteen, is trying to win over parts of the 
D’ulbahante and Warsangeli sub-clans in Somaliland, appealing to clan unity 
under a higher level of segmentation: all three form the Harti clan that is 
opposed to the Isaaq dominant in Somaliland. 
For the construction of a more comprehensive political order, recognition of 
cultural continuities in Somali society would remain necessary, despite their 
transformed, violent articulation in the post-state era. In this respect, a down-up 
‘building block’ approach to conflict resolution and the creation of a wider 
                                                 
90 See Adam, ‘Militarism and Warlordism’. 
91 As all observers of contemporary Somalia feel bound to offer their advice, I follow 
suit. For a recent example, see also M. Doornbos, ‘Somalia: Alternative Scenarios for 
Political Reconstruction’, African Affairs, 101 (2002), 93-107. 
92 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_576000/576721.stm (on the 
1999 tensions) and the IRIN news item of 15 July 2002 (‘Somalia: Troop Build-Up 
Creates Tension in Sool’) on www.irinnews.org 
Dervishes, moryaan and freedom fighters 363 
social order – as advocated by I.M. Lewis, Ahmed Yusuf Farah93 and others in 
the early 1990s but rejected by the UN – still offers the most reasonable way 
ahead. It implies avoiding a top-down, externally funded model of politics, and 
rediscovering traditional units of decision-making and legal discussion, some 
regulation of economic life, and creating working administrative structures at 
the local level of clans and clan-family regions. This is already happening. In 
Somaliland, Puntland, South West State and several coastal cities, some 
precarious progress was made in the last few years, despite the internal 
segmentary tensions. These units – in themselves also based on a federative 
association of sub-clans and urban elites and agreement to respect their 
interests, including at some point the heers – might at a future date decide to 
form a state confederation. Unfortunately it seems that the ‘Arta process’, 
leading to the TNG, has subverted this long-term development because it 
posited the need for a state at a point when most Somalis were not in agreement 
about its desirability and shape. The unitary state of the thirty-year 
independence era had left an image of internal division and disaster that 
worked against any resurrection of such a structure.  
Finally, there is also a wider regional context of the Somali conundrum as it 
concerns neighbouring countries in the Horn. The prime example is Ethiopia, 
again deeply involved in Somali affairs,94 as it was in the time of Mohammed 
‘Abdulle Hassan when it encroached in the Ogaden and staked claims with 
Italy and Britain.95 Ethiopia was sucked into the post-1991 Somali problems 
precisely because of the country’s internal divisions. For example, Hawiye 
faction leaders invited or allowed Eritrean troops and insurgents of the 
separatist Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to operate against Ethiopia from their 
territory during the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998-2000. Also, al-Ittihad groups in 
the Luuq area made attacks into Ethiopia in the late 1990s. Ethiopia came to 
oppose the transitional government in Mogadishu and to support the 
                                                 
93 See Ahmed Yusuf Farah & I.M. Lewis, Somalia: The Roots of Reconciliation. Peace-
Making Endeavours of Contemporary Lineage Elders: A Survey of Grassroots Peace 
Conferences in ‘Somaliland’ (London, 1993). 
94 In February 2002, the Ethiopian ambassador to the UN, Dr Abdul-Mejid Hussein who 
is of Somali origin himself, spoke about the instability in Somalia and was quoted by 
Reuters as saying: ‘If the Somalis don't solve their problems, then we will do it for 
them...We won't wait for ever.’ He was strongly criticized for this by Djibouti and by 
the Transitional National Government of Somalia in Mogadishu (see 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=23245). There is, however, no doubt that 
he meant what he said and tensions still remain high. 
95 See Lewis, A Modern History, 57-58, 69, 71, 72. Ethiopian interest in Somali-
inhabited territories must be seen in the light of the Italian policy of systematic 
infiltration into Ethiopia. Cf. Lewis, ibid. 89-90.  
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Somaliland government, as well as the forces of the Rahanweyn Resistance 
Army (RRA) and the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) 
based in the Digil-Rahanweyn area. 
Since 11 September 2001 the Somali case has assumed added relevance in 
the aftermath of the global terrorist challenge from the Al Qa’eda network, 
which allegedly has had training camps and a network of activists in the 
country. According to American and Ethiopian intelligence sources, small 
Somali Islamist groups (for example Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya) were connected to 
this network and in 1993 participated in the torture and killing of American 
servicemen during the failed ‘Operation Restore Hope’.96 Hence, what happens 
in Somalia concerns more people than only the Somalis and their immediate 
neighbours, although that is probably the least of their worries. The wider 
conflict potential of a fragmented, segmentary society is much greater than its 
constituent parts can imagine. This is part of the tragedy of what are often 
called ‘collapsed’ state orders (cf. Sierra Leone, Congo, Afghanistan, parts of 
Pakistan). Such societies are nevertheless part of globalizing networks with 
economic, religious and political interests. Somalis, at least those clan factions 
interested in an Islamist or anti-Western agenda, may come to join new 
international forms of resistance against Western and other domination.97 Thus, 
another cycle of conflict and violence would be initiated, creating new 
formations of clan power and identity but boding ill for the emerging social 
order and economic rehabilitation within Somali society itself. The above 
account may illustrate that gaining an understanding of the politics of 
contemporary Somalia requires a rethinking of definitions of rebellion and 
resistance and their socio-cultural basis, as does any imagining of a ‘functional’ 
Somali state in the classic sense. The twentieth-century Somali state certainly 
                                                 
96 When the Al-Ittihad group became active in southern Ethiopia in the late 1990s this 
provoked a major retaliatory campaign by the Ethiopian army in the Luuq area, leading 
to the collapse of the group’s military wing and the elimination of several of its core 
leaders by Ethiopian or Ethiopian-supported troops. Since then, the Al-Ittihad has 
followed a largely domestic Somali agenda, although it maintains active links with an 
international Al Ittihad network existing in the Gulf States, Sudan, Pakistan and other 
countries. It is highly unlikely that Al Qa’eda remnants will regroup in the unpredictable 
environment of Somalia. (After Pakistan and Muslim aeas in the Caucasus, they would 
perhaps, in Africa, be most likely to choose northern Nigeria.) 
97 For a conservative US view, see J. Philips, ‘Somalia and Al-Qaeda: Implications for 
the War on Terrorism’, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 1526 (2002), 1-12. 
www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/commentary/2002/0201somterror_body.html provides a 
more liberal viewpoint – see K. Menkhaus, ‘Somalia at the Crossroads of American 
Policy’. 
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was made through cycles of rebellion, but ‘who resisted who and what’ at 
crucial moments was unclear. The definition of the state was always in 
question. While resistance seems to have been an inherent part and thus 
constitutive of the state in many parts of Africa, in Somalia it was as much 
against the state – any state – itself. 
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